Visconti Victorious: Medieval Italian Unification

The discussion of the situation in Russia is certainly interesting, but the last few pages have somehow derailed the TL with walls of text.
I do trust that it is a temporary hiccup, and once @The Undead Martyr is back from his holiday it goes to end

No idea how long it will take but I do appreciate the discussion as I said, it hasn't changed the general intention but its helped me flesh out how Russia gets to where I want her to be thos century.

I will try to write a bit on the ride home today but I think that I won't finish. Maybe next month? This one is fairly long, deals with not only Russia and Poland but also Persia and Byzantium, and I need to do a bit of rereading to check on all the dates and such. The hiatus I took threw me off and I didn't take good notes.
 
@krieger

As was correctly noticed, this went far away from the OP. If you want to continue with your scenario, please feel free to start your own “de-wank Russia” :)-) ) TL. Not sure that I can add too much to what I already wrote.
 
@krieger

As was correctly noticed, this went far away from the OP. If you want to continue with your scenario, please feel free to start your own “de-wank Russia” :)-) ) TL. Not sure that I can add too much to what I already wrote.

I mean Russia is sort of being "de wanked" ITTL? It was a largely unexpected consequence (though once I hit on the idea, rather like the idea of "strong Poland" emerging out of the differences in HRE and Central European politics, I ran with it) but Russia is basically TTLs Italy insofar as I have general plans for it.
 
I mean Russia is sort of being "de wanked" ITTL? It was a largely unexpected consequence (though once I hit on the idea, rather like the idea of "strong Poland" emerging out of the differences in HRE and Central European politics, I ran with it) but Russia is basically TTLs Italy insofar as I have general plans for it.

My main issue was not an idea per se but with it running too far away from realistic possibilities of OTL. Variations are, of course, possible but your TL started too late for changing some fundamental processes that were already well under the way (for example, it was already too late for making Russia just a geographic notion in mid-XV) and I have serious doubts about logistical possibilities of, say, wanking Poland all the way to Volga or a successful crusade against the Crimea. Could not be done in OTL and definitely could not be sustained.

More or less the same goes for the unlimited Polish cultural expansion: while it was successful in some areas, it caused huge problems in Ukraine (with a resulting loss of the Left Bank in mid-XVII) and a relatively short presence in the Central Russia (to the East from Smolensk) resulted in animosity on a national level, to a great degree thanks to the OTL behavioral style.

Of course, this is yours TL and you can change history in whichever way you want all the way to ASBs level but would it make sense to discuss a pure fantasy? :)
 
As I see it, the consolidation of Poland was an unintended consequence of the early formation of unitary powerful and rich states in Western Europe (very early for Italy, but also for Great Britain). Some other state entities benefited from it (Poland and Scandinavia), other lost. 150 years after the POD, the world is completely unrecognisable and OTL historical events cannot be a guide anymore. Russia didn’t get on the first train, nor the second one, because of its distance from the epicentre of the change, and now is between a rock and a hard place.
 
As I see it, the consolidation of Poland was an unintended consequence of the early formation of unitary powerful and rich states in Western Europe (very early for Italy, but also for Great Britain). Some other state entities benefited from it (Poland and Scandinavia), other lost. 150 years after the POD, the world is completely unrecognisable and OTL historical events cannot be a guide anymore. Russia didn’t get on the first train, nor the second one, because of its distance from the epicentre of the change, and now is between a rock and a hard place.

Premise that development of the national states could be triggered by the events in a single geographic area does not stand up to any serious criticism on nonASB Earth. But even if we assume a reality of this unreality, the PoD is too late. Russian train was pretty much on the way by mid-XV (which is just few decades after POD in 1402): it was just departing from a different train station. :)
 
Premise that development of the national states could be triggered by the events in a single geographic area does not stand up to any serious criticism on nonASB Earth. But even if we assume a reality of this unreality, the PoD is too late. Russian train was pretty much on the way by mid-XV (which is just few decades after POD in 1402): it was just departing from a different train station. :)
A single geographic area comprising Western Europe, the Mediterranean and Middle East? Not to mention starting the age of exploration 100 years earlier.
Well, we can only agree to disagree.
 
A single geographic area comprising Western Europe, the Mediterranean and Middle East? Not to mention starting the age of exploration 100 years earlier.

None of which was impacting schedule of a train that already departed from another station... But, I agree that we can only disagree.
 
As I see it, the consolidation of Poland was an unintended consequence of the early formation of unitary powerful and rich states in Western Europe (very early for Italy, but also for Great Britain). Some other state entities benefited from it (Poland and Scandinavia), other lost. 150 years after the POD, the world is completely unrecognisable and OTL historical events cannot be a guide anymore. Russia didn’t get on the first train, nor the second one, because of its distance from the epicentre of the change, and now is between a rock and a hard place.

Although this had a role the immediate cause was the differences in the Hussite Wars, the wars between Austria and Milan, and thus in Bohemian and Hungarian and German politics, having a direct impact on Poland's development (specifically the Polish king annexed the Teutonic Order decades ahead of OTL due to the Italian pope taking an anti-German cue from his Visconti master). This, along with the successful marriage between a Polish princess and the heir to Brandenburg, allowed Poland to effectively settle her eastern border at (or even across) the Oder-Niesse line, which along with the stronger and richer dynastic succession due to the Hohenzollerns not dying out like the Jagellonians did (and not wasting time fighting for the Hungarian crown either- though they did contest Bohemia this was resolved relatively quickly and much more successful due to the latter essentially fighting on two fronts) puts Poland on the path to centralization a la the French, English and Italian crowns.

This in turn had dire ramifications for Russia since a strong Poland naturally turned east once the western border mostly stabilized. A stronger Iran (which like the Ottomans involved herself in the Turkish Khanates- indeed Persia is compared to the OTL Ottomans much more involved there due to reasons of geography, ideology, and lacking other major frontiers or neighboring rivals to distract them- India, the Middle East and Anatolia are all mostly occupied by weak states and thus not really able to resist Persian pressure, as opposed to the Ottomans who faced the Habsburgs in the Balkans, the Portuguese in the Gulf, the Mamluks in the Levant, the Venetians in the Mediterranean, the Persians in Mesopotamia and *Russia and Poland in Crimea) and unified Kalmar Union sealed the deal.

So it's not really an ideological thing (since "states" are not really more sophisticated than OTL, ideologically speaking; albeit the development of a unified Italy does have such an effect due to *capitalism and urbanization naturally presaging such things and Renaissance "Realism" a la Machiavelli becoming much more mainstream) so much as the general pressures of where the strong states are, and where they are willing and able to apply their pressures. The "great powers" of TTL are very different from the major powers of OTL, and they have different concerns and different priorities, thus different conflicts and "spheres of influence" than the historical timeline (Iberia and southwest Germany being far more of a battleground for example, likewise to an extent southern France; the Balkans OTOH are comparatively quiet and much more stable than OTL). Russia was one of the most obvious losers of that process; like OTL Italy she failed to unify in time to face her increasingly aggressive and powerful neighbors...
 
So it's not really an ideological thing (since "states" are not really more sophisticated than OTL, ideologically speaking; albeit the development of a unified Italy does have such an effect due to *capitalism and urbanization naturally presaging such things and Renaissance "Realism" a la Machiavelli becoming much more mainstream) so much as the general pressures of where the strong states are, and where they are willing and able to apply their pressures. The "great powers" of TTL are very different from the major powers of OTL, and they have different concerns and different priorities, thus different conflicts and "spheres of influence" than the historical timeline (Iberia and southwest Germany being far more of a battleground for example, likewise to an extent southern France; the Balkans OTOH are comparatively quiet and much more stable than OTL). Russia was one of the most obvious losers of that process; like OTL Italy she failed to unify in time to face her increasingly aggressive and powerful neighbors...

I like to think that the main impulse to change was the better cash flow available to ruling princes by the increase in trade, which continued to increase thanks to the raise of a bureaucracy required to properly manage and regulate the taxation, which was invested in infrastructures (ports, roads and canals) and universities (the obvious recruiting grounds for the new aristocracy of the pen). I would also believe that the relatively multi-front wars of TTL were ultimately much less destructive (and less costly) than the almost continuous smaller wars of OTL.
 
A Storm in the East
A Storm in the East

The Polish Commonwealth- Europe’s largest state- was also the most fractious. Lithuania’s expansion into the lands of the Rus and the Steppe gave the sprawling Polish kingdom substantial Orthodox and Muslim populations, and the German settlers in Prussia, Silesia and the Baltic coast maintained steady contact with their peers in the west; together the groups provided fertile ground for more radical religious movements emanating out of the Holy Roman Empire. Religion was far from the only fault line, however, nor even the most significant- as in the other western states Poland faced a restive nobility resentful of impositions on traditional feudal privileges. Poland, as a nominally elective monarchy, was plagued by an especially weak central authority- as early as 1480 the Polish author Jan Siska wrote admiringly of Poland’s “Republican” character, in striking contrast to the more autocratic governments then emerging in France, England and Italy. Above all else the king was bound by the oath of election to respect rights, properties, and privileges of the aristocrats, above all else granting them representation in the Sejm, with each noble born man, no matter his wealth or standing, having the right of immediate veto on legislation. In practice the Hohenzollern monarchs tended to ignore the Sejm as not worth their time- they preferred to negotiate with individual landowners and cities, or else fall back on the family’s extensive holdings, which included Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg itself and parts of rich Silesia, especially after the extinction of the Silesian Piast dukes of Opole in 1490 and the reversion of his territory to the Polish crown. The monarchy also asserted an exclusive royal prerogative over the rivers and roads of the kingdom, with a royal tax levied on traffic on the Oder and Vistula rivers. This was vehemently opposed by local landowners and the crown was forced to compromise in de jure Poland, but the kings- backed by the merchant classes and enjoying the general favor of the Holy Roman Empire- were able to progressively alienate the existing landed estates in the western, wealthy periphery of the kingdom, exploiting the ambiguous status of the border territories along the Oder and general contradictions between Imperial and Royal law to assert a more favorable status quo. Poland’s Hohenzollern monarchs were German princes, and considered themselves prince-electors of the Holy Roman Empire first and foremost- but they were born, not in Berlin, but in Legnica, came of age in Krakow, and diverted much of their energies in expanding east. The Polish government issued documents in Latin, used Italian or French for diplomacy, and Polish and German in the court; in the Grand Duchy Lithuanian, Ruthenian, and Polish were all prominent among the upper classes with the latter increasingly dominating among the nobility.

The war against Kalmar Denmark did not immediately upset Poland’s internal affairs, but the strain of the conflict neverthelss shook the foundations of royal rule. Much of the fighting had occurred along the Pomeranian coast, in territories held by the Hohenzollern dynasty directly or within their zone of influence. War and the perils of a hostile power controlling the Oresund hit the Baltic cities especially hard, and royal revenues declined substantially with the collapse of trade, undermining a major pillar of fiscal support for the royal administration. In response to the growing threat of Danish naval power the Polish king formally incorporated Prussia into the Holy Roman Empire, thus in theory obliging the Empire to rally to the province’s defense if attacked by a foreign power; in practice the German states had little interest in meeting any such obligations, demanding that the Emperor underwrite any such expenses himself. The subsequent reorganization of the Empire under Gian Federico Visconti, and continued reforms under his son and successor Gian Galeazzo, were at least in part an attempt to defray the costs of such imperial defense, and thus arguably represented an early example of the principles of collective security applied in practice to European international relations.



Poland’s descent into civil war presented an unprecedented opportunity for the Scandinavian union, and had the bellicose king Alfred the Lion still reigned it is likely he would have considered intervening immediately, but his son was a more tactful and calculating man. Known to history as Eric the Fox, he took a careful appreciation of the dwindling royal treasury, the restlessness of Norwegian barons, and- especially after the Lithuanian rebels were routed at Vilna in 1515- opted against renewed warfare. Instead the king decided to extend his tendrils into Novgorod collaborating with rebellious princes to overthrow the Hohenzollern overlord and re-establish a republic under Danish suzerainty.


Muscovy’s striking decline in the latter half of the 15th century stands as a sobering reminder of harsh geopolitical realities and the difficulties facing even competent rulers. Although the Muscovite state enjoyed capable leadership and a strong demographic and cultural foundation, the emergence on the one hand a powerful Hohenzollern led Polish-Brandenburg-Lithuanian union, and on the other of an imperialistic Persia obsessed with its patriarchal influence over the nomadic tribes ultimately proved fatal to the nascent state. In part Moscow’s obstinate adherence to Eastern Orthodoxy was emblematic of this trend- the Byzantine submission to Rome, and subsequent negotiated (or enforced) unions in Serbia, Transylvania, Wallachia, and Novgorod had the effect of diplomatically and culturally isolating the Russian states. This by itself was not overly egregious given Moscow’s geographic isolation, but it ensured that the state had few if any friends or connections in foreign courts, and the disastrous decision of Duke Ivan to intervene against Poland in the war of the Navarrese succession saw to his own death and the destruction of much of his army. Muscovy never truly recovered from the disaster, owing to constant depredations from Crimean and Astrakhani nobles along the southern frontier: in the four decades following Ivan’s death it is estimated that nearly a quarter million Russians were captured by Turkish raids, the vast majority ultimately destined for Venetian slave plantations in Egypt, Crete and Cyprus. Political incoherence, diplomatic isolation, and demographic and economic stagnation all served to cripple Russia’s last independent principality in the face of her aggressive and domineering rivals.





The end came, as it often did, with almost pathetic finality. Duke Vasily III vainly committed himself to battle against Poland alongside the English alliance, but his dreams of restoring Russian independence or even reclaiming the western fringes of the Rus lands lost to Lithuania were definitevely shattered along with the duke himself at the battle of Kiev in 1510. In the aftermath Poland marched on Moscow itself, this time with the intention not merely for plunder but outright conquest. Moscow was a strong city of nearly 100,000 souls, but with the Polish king willing and able to maintain a siege (and after the armistice in the Baltic free of pressing commitments at that frontier) the city’s fate was cast in stone. On June 11th 1511 Polish artillery breached Moscow’s walls and the king’s soldiers stormed into the city itself. The last Rurikovich Duke of Moscow vanished in the chaos and was presumed dead as his city was given over to the Catholics as a prize of war. Once the looting ended the Polish king unilaterally proclaimed himself “king of all Rossiya” and re-established the duchy of Moscow as a Polish fiefdom incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The city was also forcibly subjected to Catholic domination, with a formal Church Union (accomplished under the auspices of the Polish Crown) enacted simultaneously with the Polish occupation.



From the beginning Polish rule was nakedly brutal and lacked any substantive local support, being wholly dependent on the occupying army. The Church Union, unsurprisingly, was fatally tainted by its bloody birth. In contrast to more enduring accords- as in the Balkans, for instance- the Muscovite Catholic Church was enforced at gunpoint, whereas the Byzantine Union had been, in the words of the historian Ferdinando Galeozzi “coerced but not forced.” The Catholics were most successful at the periphery rather than on areas subject directly to Catholic conquest- in Serbia and Greece and Novgorod and Wallachia, where local princes willingly submitted to Rome in the hopes of integrating themselves into the broader Catholic political and cultural sphere. Romania’s confessional division- the persistently heretical devotions of Transylvania, which notwithstanding Hungarian oppression remained solidly Orthodox and were among the first to convert to the new Protestant faith- stands as a striking reminder both of the strength and limitation of state power at its most raw and violent.



King Henry did not enjoy his conquest for long- with the outbreak of rebellion in Lithuania Moscow finally revolted, rising against the garrision and burning the governor alive in his own mansion in March 1515. This was followed three months later by a similar much more extensive massacre in Novgorod. King Conrad of Swabia was shot dead by an assassin, and the city rose in revolt. An orgy of violence saw hundreds of Germans slaughtered- alongside Jews and Catholic priests. The city thereafter formally proclaimed a republic but Prince Erik of Scandinavia had other plans, using the abuses inflicted upon the catholic populations to justify an invasion. The revived Novgorod republic lasted four months before falling to another foreign power.





Ultimately Russia’s weakness was to the greatest benefit not of Poland- which after all had more significant commitments further west, in Germany, the Baltic, and the Dinaric Peninsula- but to the Iranicized Tatars of Astrakhan, who under the great Darvish Ali unified most of the lands of the former Golden Horde and embarked upon the last great war of nomadic conquest against his hapless neighbor. With Poland in turmoil the khan- fresh from his conquest of Crimea- set his sights on Moscow, mortal enemy of the Tartars and then under the “rule” of a succession of False Dmitrys, each claiming to be a scion of the extirpated dynasty.

Muscovy still had a respectable army, but the Astrakhan Khanate had the wealth of slaves and access to foreign markets. It is perhaps telling that the last great steppe conqueror, a supposed descendant of Genghis Khan, modeled his army along the lines of the Ottoman sultanate- although certainly using the cavalry at his disposal it was to be firearms bought from the Venetians that would destroy Moscow’s newfound independence. The False Dmitry (third of his kind) and his army of Russian nobles were annihilated at the battle of Ryazan on June 5th 1521, and Moscow again placed under siege. The city was thereafter subjected twice in as many decades to a foreign sack and occupation. Yet unlike the Poles the Tsar critically made no attempt at forced conversion; on the contrary he extended official state protection to the Russian Orthodox Church, assuming pretensions of “liberating” the city from foreign tyranny. The newly reconstituted Muscovite Metropolitan Bishop was granted authority over all the Orthodox Christians within the burgeoning empire, and was effectively transformed into a pillar of support for the new regime in lands which were after all quite different from the “native” Turkic tribes.
 

krieger

Banned
A Storm in the East

The Polish Commonwealth- Europe’s largest state- was also the most fractious. Lithuania’s expansion into the lands of the Rus and the Steppe gave the sprawling Polish kingdom substantial Orthodox and Muslim populations, and the German settlers in Prussia, Silesia and the Baltic coast maintained steady contact with their peers in the west; together the groups provided fertile ground for more radical religious movements emanating out of the Holy Roman Empire. Religion was far from the only fault line, however, nor even the most significant- as in the other western states Poland faced a restive nobility resentful of impositions on traditional feudal privileges. Poland, as a nominally elective monarchy, was plagued by an especially weak central authority- as early as 1480 the Polish author Jan Siska wrote admiringly of Poland’s “Republican” character, in striking contrast to the more autocratic governments then emerging in France, England and Italy. Above all else the king was bound by the oath of election to respect rights, properties, and privileges of the aristocrats, above all else granting them representation in the Sejm, with each noble born man, no matter his wealth or standing, having the right of immediate veto on legislation. In practice the Hohenzollern monarchs tended to ignore the Sejm as not worth their time- they preferred to negotiate with individual landowners and cities, or else fall back on the family’s extensive holdings, which included Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg itself and parts of rich Silesia, especially after the extinction of the Silesian Piast dukes of Opole in 1490 and the reversion of his territory to the Polish crown. The monarchy also asserted an exclusive royal prerogative over the rivers and roads of the kingdom, with a royal tax levied on traffic on the Oder and Vistula rivers. This was vehemently opposed by local landowners and the crown was forced to compromise in de jure Poland, but the kings- backed by the merchant classes and enjoying the general favor of the Holy Roman Empire- were able to progressively alienate the existing landed estates in the western, wealthy periphery of the kingdom, exploiting the ambiguous status of the border territories along the Oder and general contradictions between Imperial and Royal law to assert a more favorable status quo. Poland’s Hohenzollern monarchs were German princes, and considered themselves prince-electors of the Holy Roman Empire first and foremost- but they were born, not in Berlin, but in Legnica, came of age in Krakow, and diverted much of their energies in expanding east. The Polish government issued documents in Latin, used Italian or French for diplomacy, and Polish and German in the court; in the Grand Duchy Lithuanian, Ruthenian, and Polish were all prominent among the upper classes with the latter increasingly dominating among the nobility.

The war against Kalmar Denmark did not immediately upset Poland’s internal affairs, but the strain of the conflict neverthelss shook the foundations of royal rule. Much of the fighting had occurred along the Pomeranian coast, in territories held by the Hohenzollern dynasty directly or within their zone of influence. War and the perils of a hostile power controlling the Oresund hit the Baltic cities especially hard, and royal revenues declined substantially with the collapse of trade, undermining a major pillar of fiscal support for the royal administration. In response to the growing threat of Danish naval power the Polish king formally incorporated Prussia into the Holy Roman Empire, thus in theory obliging the Empire to rally to the province’s defense if attacked by a foreign power; in practice the German states had little interest in meeting any such obligations, demanding that the Emperor underwrite any such expenses himself. The subsequent reorganization of the Empire under Gian Federico Visconti, and continued reforms under his son and successor Gian Galeazzo, were at least in part an attempt to defray the costs of such imperial defense, and thus arguably represented an early example of the principles of collective security applied in practice to European international relations.



Poland’s descent into civil war presented an unprecedented opportunity for the Scandinavian union, and had the bellicose king Alfred the Lion still reigned it is likely he would have considered intervening immediately, but his son was a more tactful and calculating man. Known to history as Eric the Fox, he took a careful appreciation of the dwindling royal treasury, the restlessness of Norwegian barons, and- especially after the Lithuanian rebels were routed at Vilna in 1515- opted against renewed warfare. Instead the king decided to extend his tendrils into Novgorod collaborating with rebellious princes to overthrow the Hohenzollern overlord and re-establish a republic under Danish suzerainty.


Muscovy’s striking decline in the latter half of the 15th century stands as a sobering reminder of harsh geopolitical realities and the difficulties facing even competent rulers. Although the Muscovite state enjoyed capable leadership and a strong demographic and cultural foundation, the emergence on the one hand a powerful Hohenzollern led Polish-Brandenburg-Lithuanian union, and on the other of an imperialistic Persia obsessed with its patriarchal influence over the nomadic tribes ultimately proved fatal to the nascent state. In part Moscow’s obstinate adherence to Eastern Orthodoxy was emblematic of this trend- the Byzantine submission to Rome, and subsequent negotiated (or enforced) unions in Serbia, Transylvania, Wallachia, and Novgorod had the effect of diplomatically and culturally isolating the Russian states. This by itself was not overly egregious given Moscow’s geographic isolation, but it ensured that the state had few if any friends or connections in foreign courts, and the disastrous decision of Duke Ivan to intervene against Poland in the war of the Navarrese succession saw to his own death and the destruction of much of his army. Muscovy never truly recovered from the disaster, owing to constant depredations from Crimean and Astrakhani nobles along the southern frontier: in the four decades following Ivan’s death it is estimated that nearly a quarter million Russians were captured by Turkish raids, the vast majority ultimately destined for Venetian slave plantations in Egypt, Crete and Cyprus. Political incoherence, diplomatic isolation, and demographic and economic stagnation all served to cripple Russia’s last independent principality in the face of her aggressive and domineering rivals.





The end came, as it often did, with almost pathetic finality. Duke Vasily III vainly committed himself to battle against Poland alongside the English alliance, but his dreams of restoring Russian independence or even reclaiming the western fringes of the Rus lands lost to Lithuania were definitevely shattered along with the duke himself at the battle of Kiev in 1510. In the aftermath Poland marched on Moscow itself, this time with the intention not merely for plunder but outright conquest. Moscow was a strong city of nearly 100,000 souls, but with the Polish king willing and able to maintain a siege (and after the armistice in the Baltic free of pressing commitments at that frontier) the city’s fate was cast in stone. On June 11th 1511 Polish artillery breached Moscow’s walls and the king’s soldiers stormed into the city itself. The last Rurikovich Duke of Moscow vanished in the chaos and was presumed dead as his city was given over to the Catholics as a prize of war. Once the looting ended the Polish king unilaterally proclaimed himself “king of all Rossiya” and re-established the duchy of Moscow as a Polish fiefdom incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The city was also forcibly subjected to Catholic domination, with a formal Church Union (accomplished under the auspices of the Polish Crown) enacted simultaneously with the Polish occupation.



From the beginning Polish rule was nakedly brutal and lacked any substantive local support, being wholly dependent on the occupying army. The Church Union, unsurprisingly, was fatally tainted by its bloody birth. In contrast to more enduring accords- as in the Balkans, for instance- the Muscovite Catholic Church was enforced at gunpoint, whereas the Byzantine Union had been, in the words of the historian Ferdinando Galeozzi “coerced but not forced.” The Catholics were most successful at the periphery rather than on areas subject directly to Catholic conquest- in Serbia and Greece and Novgorod and Wallachia, where local princes willingly submitted to Rome in the hopes of integrating themselves into the broader Catholic political and cultural sphere. Romania’s confessional division- the persistently heretical devotions of Transylvania, which notwithstanding Hungarian oppression remained solidly Orthodox and were among the first to convert to the new Protestant faith- stands as a striking reminder both of the strength and limitation of state power at its most raw and violent.



King Henry did not enjoy his conquest for long- with the outbreak of rebellion in Lithuania Moscow finally revolted, rising against the garrision and burning the governor alive in his own mansion in March 1515. This was followed three months later by a similar much more extensive massacre in Novgorod. King Conrad of Swabia was shot dead by an assassin, and the city rose in revolt. An orgy of violence saw hundreds of Germans slaughtered- alongside Jews and Catholic priests. The city thereafter formally proclaimed a republic but Prince Erik of Scandinavia had other plans, using the abuses inflicted upon the catholic populations to justify an invasion. The revived Novgorod republic lasted four months before falling to another foreign power.





Ultimately Russia’s weakness was to the greatest benefit not of Poland- which after all had more significant commitments further west, in Germany, the Baltic, and the Dinaric Peninsula- but to the Iranicized Tatars of Astrakhan, who under the great Darvish Ali unified most of the lands of the former Golden Horde and embarked upon the last great war of nomadic conquest against his hapless neighbor. With Poland in turmoil the khan- fresh from his conquest of Crimea- set his sights on Moscow, mortal enemy of the Tartars and then under the “rule” of a succession of False Dmitrys, each claiming to be a scion of the extirpated dynasty.

Muscovy still had a respectable army, but the Astrakhan Khanate had the wealth of slaves and access to foreign markets. It is perhaps telling that the last great steppe conqueror, a supposed descendant of Genghis Khan, modeled his army along the lines of the Ottoman sultanate- although certainly using the cavalry at his disposal it was to be firearms bought from the Venetians that would destroy Moscow’s newfound independence. The False Dmitry (third of his kind) and his army of Russian nobles were annihilated at the battle of Ryazan on June 5th 1521, and Moscow again placed under siege. The city was thereafter subjected twice in as many decades to a foreign sack and occupation. Yet unlike the Poles the Tsar critically made no attempt at forced conversion; on the contrary he extended official state protection to the Russian Orthodox Church, assuming pretensions of “liberating” the city from foreign tyranny. The newly reconstituted Muscovite Metropolitan Bishop was granted authority over all the Orthodox Christians within the burgeoning empire, and was effectively transformed into a pillar of support for the new regime in lands which were after all quite different from the “native” Turkic tribes.

And who exactly introduced this election if Hohenzollerns got the throne by marriage with Hedwig, daughter of Jogaila? She was proclaimed heiress of kingdom of Poland by nobility gathered in Jedlnia in 1413 and she was granddaughter of Casimir III of Poland. It was neccessity to put her half-brothers on throne (Vladislaus III and Casimir IV) which forced Jogaila to undo the proclamation and enabled Zbigniew Oleśnicki, bishop of Cracow to establish an elective monarchy. If Hohenzollerns are in position to take the throne, this is not going to happen at all. And why this Jan Siska is writing about Sejm in 1480? Even IOTL Sejm didn't exist in 1480, first Sejm was called in 1493 by Jan Olbracht. And Poland was no more republican than Bohemia or Hungary back then and the main reasons behind Polish republicanism rising were the events during the reign of last Jagiellons - establishment of "Nihil Novi" law by Alexander (this law forfeited King for making laws on his own and forced him to collaborate with House of Envoys and Senate in proces of making new laws), election vivente rege (during the life of previous king) of Sigismund II - his father, Sigismund I had to confirm the right of Polish nobility to elect whoever they want unanimously (previous elections were made by small clique of wealthiest nobles and holders of important offices). And telling about right of every single noble to vote the decision is particularly ridiclous - "liberum veto" (law which You mentioned previously) was introduced in 1652 and no one in Poland ever used it before. There was no established law how Sejm should function and majority of envoys and senators just ignored the wishes of minority until 1652. And in XV/early XVIth Poland even IOTL opinion of nobility as a whole didn't matter much and King was consulting his decisions mostly with oligarchs, wealthiest nobles. And your lore removes most of the reasons why they had to do even it - they have hereditary rights ensured by being descended from right child of Jogaila (the one who comined Piast with Gediminid blood) and there was no expedition of Warna which forced king to give many estates to nobles in exchange for money needed to launch an campaign. What's more, TO was annexed in 1410's - and this is significant gamechanger for Poland. At first, the privilege which enabled nobility to have complete control over taxes and it's gathering was issued in exchange for nobility's consent to go to Thirteen Years War against…...TO - so if TO is removed, Polish king can't fight TO in 1455. Moreover, we should notice that Poland's treasure was ruined by Varna crusade and it was one of main reasons behind why King needed the support of nobility in waging war against TO. Poland didn't fully recover from the losses caused by war.
 
Is it bad that I’ve played EUIV as Florence enough times that my eyes immediately narrowed relexively at the idea of the Visconti uniting Italy?

Love the TL by the way.
 
And who exactly introduced this election if Hohenzollerns got the throne by marriage with Hedwig, daughter of Jogaila? She was proclaimed heiress of kingdom of Poland by nobility gathered in Jedlnia in 1413 and she was granddaughter of Casimir III of Poland. It was neccessity to put her half-brothers on throne (Vladislaus III and Casimir IV) which forced Jogaila to undo the proclamation and enabled Zbigniew Oleśnicki, bishop of Cracow to establish an elective monarchy. If Hohenzollerns are in position to take the throne, this is not going to happen at all. And why this Jan Siska is writing about Sejm in 1480? Even IOTL Sejm didn't exist in 1480, first Sejm was called in 1493 by Jan Olbracht. And Poland was no more republican than Bohemia or Hungary back then and the main reasons behind Polish republicanism rising were the events during the reign of last Jagiellons - establishment of "Nihil Novi" law by Alexander (this law forfeited King for making laws on his own and forced him to collaborate with House of Envoys and Senate in proces of making new laws), election vivente rege (during the life of previous king) of Sigismund II - his father, Sigismund I had to confirm the right of Polish nobility to elect whoever they want unanimously (previous elections were made by small clique of wealthiest nobles and holders of important offices). And telling about right of every single noble to vote the decision is particularly ridiclous - "liberum veto" (law which You mentioned previously) was introduced in 1652 and no one in Poland ever used it before. There was no established law how Sejm should function and majority of envoys and senators just ignored the wishes of minority until 1652. And in XV/early XVIth Poland even IOTL opinion of nobility as a whole didn't matter much and King was consulting his decisions mostly with oligarchs, wealthiest nobles. And your lore removes most of the reasons why they had to do even it - they have hereditary rights ensured by being descended from right child of Jogaila (the one who comined Piast with Gediminid blood) and there was no expedition of Warna which forced king to give many estates to nobles in exchange for money needed to launch an campaign. What's more, TO was annexed in 1410's - and this is significant gamechanger for Poland. At first, the privilege which enabled nobility to have complete control over taxes and it's gathering was issued in exchange for nobility's consent to go to Thirteen Years War against…...TO - so if TO is removed, Polish king can't fight TO in 1455. Moreover, we should notice that Poland's treasure was ruined by Varna crusade and it was one of main reasons behind why King needed the support of nobility in waging war against TO. Poland didn't fully recover from the losses caused by war.

Poland's crown is nominally elective just as the Hungarian crown was nominally elective but de facto hereditary.

The "tepublican" character is in contrast to the more centralized western monarchies. A century of dynastic rule would not IMHO be enough to upend the trend of feudal fragmentation although it is less severe than OTL as the kings manage to build a a consistent power base.

No Varna Crusade has helped and the Polish king is much richer but he's no less of a warmonger on average than your typical early modern ruler and so is still in need of cash and support from the nobility.
Note that Poland was able to conquer muscovy a decade after fighting in a general war (and having much of her coast pillaged by the danes) and that Poland proper has not engaged in rebellion. Stronger and more centralized than OTL does not mean Poland has become the Sun King overnight.
 

krieger

Banned
Poland's crown is nominally elective just as the Hungarian crown was nominally elective but de facto hereditary.

The "tepublican" character is in contrast to the more centralized western monarchies. A century of dynastic rule would not IMHO be enough to upend the trend of feudal fragmentation although it is less severe than OTL as the kings manage to build a a consistent power base.

No Varna Crusade has helped and the Polish king is much richer but he's no less of a warmonger on average than your typical early modern ruler and so is still in need of cash and support from the nobility.
Note that Poland was able to conquer muscovy a decade after fighting in a general war (and having much of her coast pillaged by the danes) and that Poland proper has not engaged in rebellion. Stronger and more centralized than OTL does not mean Poland has become the Sun King overnight.

I'm not objecting to rebellion in Muscovy. It sometimes happens even in absolute monarchies. And if anything, feudal fragmentation in Poland didn't contribute at all to rise of Polish republicanism. It was completely different situation - Boleslaus III divided his state between his sons because he thought that state is his property and he could divide it. It doesn't sound like exactly "republican" solution. If anything, republicanism was the way to REMOVE any possibility of state fragmenting again because it made state a property of whole nobility instead of it being property of a king who could divide it however he wanted, but I doubt if this way will repeat itself ITTL. I didn't deny that Polish kings would still seek support of nobility. My objections are more up to that without second half of OTL rule of Jogaila, Vladislaus III, crusade of Varna and it's OTL outcome these demands wouldn't be THAT high. So I wouldn't predict Sun King-like absolutism rising out of nowhere (political system at that moment wouldn't be so far removed from OTL at that moment), but the main difference would be lack of IDEOLOGY of republicanism emphasising equality of whole nobility. Poland would be still behind Western monarchies, but with your start conditions it'll follow their footsteps, but later.
 
I'm not objecting to rebellion in Muscovy. It sometimes happens even in absolute monarchies. And if anything, feudal fragmentation in Poland didn't contribute at all to rise of Polish republicanism. It was completely different situation - Boleslaus III divided his state between his sons because he thought that state is his property and he could divide it. It doesn't sound like exactly "republican" solution. If anything, republicanism was the way to REMOVE any possibility of state fragmenting again because it made state a property of whole nobility instead of it being property of a king who could divide it however he wanted, but I doubt if this way will repeat itself ITTL. I didn't deny that Polish kings would still seek support of nobility. My objections are more up to that without second half of OTL rule of Jogaila, Vladislaus III, crusade of Varna and it's OTL outcome these demands wouldn't be THAT high. So I wouldn't predict Sun King-like absolutism rising out of nowhere (political system at that moment wouldn't be so far removed from OTL at that moment), but the main difference would be lack of IDEOLOGY of republicanism emphasising equality of whole nobility. Poland would be still behind Western monarchies, but with your start conditions it'll follow their footsteps, but later.

Indeed, I did not mean to imply anything else but that the Polish crown was weaker than the (somewhat more centralized than OTL) French or Italian crowns, and that certain parties in Poland took an ideological perspective on that.

The division between Republic and Monarchy isn't as clear cut in the early modern era.
 

krieger

Banned
Indeed, I did not mean to imply anything else but that the Polish crown was weaker than the (somewhat more centralized than OTL) French or Italian crowns, and that certain parties in Poland took an ideological perspective on that.

The division between Republic and Monarchy isn't as clear cut in the early modern era.

OK, but these parties wouldn't use non-existent (even IOTL) at that time entities (like Sejm or liberum veto) in their propaganda, would they?
 

krieger

Banned
I thought that "Sejm" was just the assembly, like a Diet or Senate? That would still exist as it was fairly common.

No, the name "Sejm" meant the full-blown version of the Polish parliament with King, Senate and House of Envoys as a three states of Sejm. The assemblies called previously by kings were called "zjazd" (literally "gathering" in Poland) and they were nowehere near Sejm's power level.
 
I started this timeline back in summer 2017- five long and eventful years, both for myself and for the world.
By the end, I was clearly having issues with motivation, but above all a lack of direction. In part I think that I did not have a full grounding on where I started, nor a firm idea of where I wanted to go, or rather I had a very vague notion but no structure to it. I have finally read a biography of Gian Galeazzo, and among other things it convinced me that the point of divergence I took was not realistic, and ignored the broader context of European affairs. The discussion re: Russia was a symptom underlying the lack in versillimitude, which ultimately spoke to the key issues.

Suffice to say that this timeline is ended, but not dead- I have settled on a new point of divergence and new story threads and developments, and have something I lacked in most of my other projects- structured arcs, from beginning, to at least the middle if not the end. Notwithstanding school, I've settled on pulling the trigger on a deadline-
From Gian Galeazzo's 670th birthday, October 16th 2021, I will start this timeline again from the beginning, and continue until this is done.
 
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