#29
View attachment 433232
July, 1982
The Israeli diplomatic delegation enters the room, the American delegation already there. Both sides have several aids, but as usual in this sort of meeting they are mere ornamentation and will not be participating. The chief of the Israelis puts his hands up in mock defensiveness, and before the American can even make the accusation he says:
“I’m calm. I’m calm. We’re reasonable people, we can have a reasonable discussion.”
“You’re thinking of breaking the treaty.”
“Never.”
“I’ve seen the photos, Zemel. Your soldiers are staying put.”
“Yes.”
“You have a timetable to keep. It's already been extended for you once. The new schedule says this base is supposed to be dismantled by the end of the month. How are you going to manage it if they don’t get started?”
“I don’t suppose they will manage it.”
“So you’re breaking the treaty.”
“Never.”
“What semantic game are you hinting at, Zemel?”
“Semantics is the study of meaning, and meaning is very important. We aren’t the ones breaking the treaty, and that’s all there is to it.”
“You’re accusing the Egyptians of breaking the treaty?”
Zemel takes out a folder. Documents detailing Egyptian troop movements are placed on the table.
“The Egyptians were limited by the treaty to three battalions in this area. Does this look like three battalions to you?”
Brandon points to one column of figures.
“These are Ghazala’s men and you know it.”
“Do I know it? Or is this cover for an escalation?”
“They’ve withdrawn already. They’ve been defeated.”
“A breach is a breach. You can’t ignore that it happened. What’s to stop it from happening again?”
“The UN. The US Navy. Sadat.”
“Sadat might lose.”
“Sadat will not lose.”
“What are you doing to ensure that?”
“Everything we can. Sadat needs to look strong in this conflict so our support is limited in the main battle. But the carrier group is deployed now. We’re taking action in the UN. The Sinai will be covered. Ghazala will not cross the canal again, I promise you.”
“That’s comforting. You’ll forgive us if we continue to take precautions.”
“Take all the precautions you want. As long as you continue to adhere to the terms of the treaty.”
Diplomacy was strange sometimes. The purpose of a face to face meeting like this was to state, for the record, what everyone in the room (and their respective superiors) already knew. But the forms were important. Formality was like gold or diamonds; everyone had to agree it was valuable for it to have value.
“The base will be dismantled on schedule.”
“And those troops you’re redeploying from the Lebanon border?”
“Are our concern. But, rest assured they will be sent to the Southern District. No further.”
Brandon nods.
“The US will impress upon Sadat that we do not see this movement as an escalation, and that he shouldn’t, either.”
“Our thanks.”
Everyone stands. The two primaries shake hands.
“My love to your family.”
“And mine to yours.”
----
2007
A visiting lecturer at Miami University of Ohio (go RedHawks) is discussing the political history of the Palestinian diaspora.
"Beginning with the ceasefire in 1981, Arafat’s strategy in southern Lebanon was to refrain from violence directed at the Israelis. The idea was that Israel would not be able to help itself; that it would start a confrontation, unprovoked, which would unite the Palestinians under the leadership of the PLO and also generate sufficient sympathy in the Arab world to once again form a coalition to push back against Israel militarily.
"Indeed, there is ample evidence that the Israeli military was anxious for an excuse to invade Lebanon. Invasion plans were drawn up and many high-level meetings took place on the subject within the Israeli government.
"But the destabilization of Egypt changed the strategic situation in the region dramatically. Israel’s attention was drawn south and west, away from Lebanon. Now their big fear was finding the bulk of their military engaged to the north when Ghazala’s rebels came streaming across the Sinai.
"Several large formations were redeployed to counter a possible attack from Egypt. Further, the remaining forces in the north were warned at their peril not to provoke a war in southern Lebanon. The government began extricating itself from promises of support made to the Phalangists, and while still supporting the Christian minority in the far south of the country, it threatened the immediate withdrawal of aid if the group should even consider provoking the Palestinians.
"Arafat was left waiting for an attack that would never come. As the weeks and months began to pile up, so did dissent. Arafat’s lack of action was cast as weakness, indecision, even cowardice by an ever-growing list of opponents within the Palestinian community of Lebanon.
"The coalition of the PLO did not collapse overnight. Local commanders began to slowly withdraw, some beginning as early as the start of the ceasefire. By summer of 1982, the organization was dangerously riven with factions.
"By September of 1982, attempts by Arafat to broker peace between the factions broke down. Internecine violence erupted throughout Palestinian-controlled territory as the PLO and other Palestinian factions began to tear each other apart. Isolated firefights turned quickly into running battles that lasted weeks. The number of active factions changed almost daily in the first few months of the conflict.
"But in the end it didn’t take all that long before the Syrians gained effective control of the Palestinian forces. Better supplied and more organized than their competitors, two pro-Assad groups soon dominated: the more secular Palestine Liberation Army, and the more religious As Sa’iqa. As winter arrived, almost the entire former PLO leadership cadre had been tracked down and killed, or had pledged loyalty to Assad.
"The Syrians gained another lever of power when their deepening ties with the Iranians caused that country to cease backing separate players among Lebanon’s Shia community. The pro-Syrian Amal Movement served to further isolate the anti-Syrian Christian factions that were at the time ascendant in central Lebanon.
"Significant internal movements caused by this fighting led to conflict with the Christians remaining in the Beqaa Valley. This precipitated a minor exodus, as many Christians outside and on the margins of the Mount Lebanon and North Governorates began to flee to safer territory, demographically-speaking. Tens of thousands petitioned for travel papers seeking to leave Lebanon altogether, something the dominant Phalangists tried desperately to stop. Hundreds of reprisal killings, mostly so-called 'honor killings' of heads of households, were carried out by state militias in an effort to keep families from fleeing and further depleting the faltering Christian population.
"The crackdown was only partially successful, and more than 30,000 Christians left Lebanon by early 1983, mostly for France and the United States. This only increased the panic among the Phalangists, and on March 30th, 1983, they overthrew the civilian government for good. A Christian Canton was declared (with only vaguely stated borders), separate and independent from the rest of the country. The Phalangists then immediately sought to isolate and ethnically cleanse the Muslim population in their territory, particularly in Beirut.
"This action was immediately condemned by the entire international community, including the Soviets and Americans. Non-Phalangist Christian factions began to distance themselves from the movement. Suleiman Frangieh and his Marada Movement became the nexus of Christian opposition to the Phalangists. Through pressure from the Soviets, the Syrians refrained from outright invasion, though Syrian-backed militias were the main opposition to the Phalangists outside of Beirut.
"The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was ordered to impose a ceasefire in Beirut, and it was clear it would have to be done by force. The UN troops, buttressed by three American divisions from the recently created Rapid Deployment Force, quickly set a cordon around the city and began to occupy its vitals. Their arrival caused the Phalangists to mostly retreat from Muslim neighborhoods, but in the mere three weeks before the UN could fully control the city, a great deal of damage was already done.
"This Christian Intifada would be bloody but brief, lasting only about five weeks total. In that time, at least 8,000 Muslim civilians were killed (mostly in Beirut) and another 6,000 Christian and Muslim militia died in the fighting.
"The Phalangists quickly began to lose coherent control over even the Maronite community as the people began to see the militias as attempting to lock them into a national suicide pact. A schism emerged within the party, which saw President Bachir Gemayel deposed and arrested. In 1988 The Hague sentenced him to 80 years in prison for ordering the wholesale deaths of Muslims in Beirut.
"The aftermath for Lebanon was chaotic. Another 60,000 Christians sought to leave the country by the end of 1983, with the majority being taken in by the US after President Anderson made a direct appeal to Congress to allow emergency provisions for their admittance. Another 60,000 Palestinians took advantage of the disorder to join them, with about half going to the US and the rest to Europe. Even more Palestinians moved into abandoned Christian lands outside of the Mount Lebanon core territory, effectively setting down roots in the country.
"While the international community was adamant against the wholesale annexation of Lebanon by Syria, it had to be admitted that Assad’s victory was nearly complete. Almost all of the political power in Lebanon was in his hands, with even the remaining Christian parties mostly under his thumb.
"Still, significant Soviet pressure kept them from announcing annexation. Later international accords called for a commission to study a referendum, but the results wouldn’t be published for years to come.
"In the meantime, Syria began to deepen its de facto control of the country. Most political parties now openly supported the idea of “Greater Syria.” Almost no one in Lebanon vocally opposed the idea. Perhaps most importantly, the PLA and As-Saiqa took the line that Palestine should be a free and Muslim part of Greater Syria. Significantly, the territory of the Kingdom of Jordan was also included in these maximalist proclamations.
"This development would cause a realignment that would dramatically impact the Middle East in the years to come."