What could have been the consequences of a Confederate victory in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign? Let's say that Early is able to push Sheridan out of the valley or at least keep him from destroying it like he did OTL.
WI: 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign
- Thread starter Gentleman Johnny
- Start date
Before I write my thoughts as to what would happen, I must say that defeating Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley is very unlikely. At the onset of the campaign, Sheridan had an army consisting of 35,000 infantry and artillery and 8,000 cavalry for a total of 43,000 men. Sheridan’s Middle Military Division also included 5,000 troops at Harpers Ferry, 29,000 near Washington and 8,600 elsewhere. Early’s Army of the Valley consisted of less than 9,000 infantrymen and artillerymen and between 3,500-4,500 cavalrymen. By this point, Sheridan’s cavalry was a far superior force to their counterparts and were capable of performing mass cavalry charges on their opponents.
With that being said, listed below are my thoughts:
With that being said, listed below are my thoughts:
- Barring a miraculous decisive victory over Sheridan, the 1864 election will be won by Lincoln. Atlanta had already fallen and there was nothing Early could do to prevent it.
- The main consequence for the Confederates is the preservation of the Valley as a source of supplies. The burning of the Shenandoah destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay and farming implements; over 70 mills fillef with flour and wheat; and captured and scattered a good deal of Southern livestock.
- There may be another campaign up the Shenandoah in 1865.
- If Lee withdraws from Petersburg, he will have an easier time of it as the bulk of Grant’s cavalry and the VI Corps is with Sheridan. Grant, however, was perfectly aware of the route Lee would take in his withdrawal. I frankly think that this just delays the inevitable by this point in time.
Deleted member 9338
The only way I can see the CSA winning is after a loss conducting a gorilla campaign to tie down Union forces.
Perhaps you should add your own thoughts on the matter to generate discussion. From my perspective, a Confederate victory in the Shenandoah Valley only provides more supplies for the Army of Northern Virginia and one more embarrassing defeat for the Lincoln administration. However, that’s it. Barring a miraculous decisive victory, Early can’t launch another invasion and Atlanta’s fall can only be prevented by an unrelated POD.
The 1864 election for Lincoln will be won or lost on the Atlanta Campaign. Even with a victory at the Valley, the Army of Northern Virginia could not send reinforcements to Atlanta; it was too weak and the key railroad line (Georgia Railroad) for Confederate reinforcements was severed around July 19-20. The Army of Tennessee had to be the force to secure the Confederacy’s independence and it certainly had opportunity: Cassville, defended river crossings, Peachtree Creek, Bald Hill.
Bald Hill is one I haven't heard of before. Cassville and Peachtree are the big ones that people typically talk about. What inspired me to ask this OP is I was reading another thread where people were talking about how a defeat at Peachtree, coupled with a defeat in the valley for the Union, could have forced Grant to pull back from Petersburg because significant portions of his army would have been sent to the Valley and to Georgia to reinforce the Union armies there. Anyway, this is the scenario I'm sort of thinking about. What can cause Grant to have to pull back from Petersburg? And what would Lee do now that he isn't stuck in a seige?
One scenario I heard of on CivilWarTalk is Sherman not losing patience at the Kennesaw line, outflanks it, and then losing patience at the Chattahoochee river defenses, losing even worse there than at Kennesaw.
The Battle of Bald Hill (or Atlanta) was a pretty close-run engagement between the Army of Tennessee and the Army of the Tennessee on July 22, 1864. This was Hood's ambitious attempt to strike the rear of McPherson's Army of the Tennessee and roll up Sherman's army group by the flank. The battle was ultimately won by a series of decisive decisions (or lack thereof) on the field.
- McPherson's initial position would have failed to cover his rear from two of Hardee's divisions (Bate's, Walker's) and McPherson knew it. While Kenner Garrand's cavalry division had been detached for a raid, Dodge's XVI Corps was standing in reserve and McPherson decided to use them to cover the flank. Sherman, however, did not agree with the decision and instructed him to send Dodge to tear up the Georgia Railroad while the XV and XVII Corps remained in place. Sherman unknowingly permitted the Confederates the best opportunity to inflict very serious damage to the Army of the Tennessee. As the battle was soon approaching, McPherson argued with Sherman on the matter, and Sherman chose not to argue with his subordinate's decision. Had the XVI Corps' movements been delayed by just half an hour, the XVI Corps would have been caught on the move and unprepared. IOTL, Bate's and Walker's division were easily repulsed by three brigades and two batteries of the XVI Corps in prepared positions.
- There was Walcutt's decision not to abandon his position on Bald Hill. After Cheatam's capture of the XV Corps' first line, his brigade's flank was severely threatened by Coltart's Alabama brigade. Walcutt's division commander, William Harrow, ordered Walcutt to pull out for a new position 800 yards east. The order would risk the abandonment of the two divisions of the XVII Corps and Walcutt made the decision to stand his ground for as long as he could.
- There was also Hardee's decision to order Wheeler to break-off the pursuit of Sprague's brigade and 1,500 wagons of the Army of the Tennessee. Wheeler had a fairly good chance of overwhelming Sprague's understrength troops and capturing the wagons, but Hardee pleaded with him Wheeler to reinforce Hardee's attack.
- There was also the rather piecemeal nature of Hardee's attack. Bate's division was repelled with startling ease by a single brigade and two batteries (not surprising when you consider who their commander is); Walker's division attacked haphazardly and was knocked out in less than an hour, with Walker himself killed and one of the leading brigade's commander States Right Gist wounded; Maney's attacks were disjointed and ended up separating Lowrey's brigade from Cleburne's attacking division. Only Cleburne seemed to do something right in the battle, and even then it was not particularly superb. Govan's success at overruning Giles Smith's first line was impressive, but lost momentum due to heavy losses in men and officers. The Texas brigade seemed to have gotten itself isolated from the rest of Confederate attackers and got itself punished by Harrow's division. Lowrey's attack could have been better supported by a couple of the Texas Brigade's rallied regiments. In fairness, the final assault on Bald Hill was well executed, but hopeless by then.
Interesting, I hadn't known Grant had intended to withdraw the Armies of the Potomac and James from the siege of Petersburg. The best solution I can think of is a political one. Perhaps have Lincoln lose faith in Grant and order him to operate between Washington and the Army of Northern Virginia. This would force Grant to abandon the siege of Petersburg and instead operate north of Richmond. Halleck also disapproved of Grant's decision to operate below the James River as it left Washington open. With the pressure of Grant's armies off, Lee would still have to defend Virginia and cannot detach reinforcements to Hood's army. If Grant decides to send troops to Georgia, Lee may gamble on an offensive to take advantage of the situation. Lee had done so during the Bristoe Station campaign, and with the election of 1864 fast approaching Lee would be very interested in inflicting an embarrassing defeat to harm Lincoln's chance of being elected.
An interesting idea, but not the one I had in mind. Joe Johnston's decision to give Sherman ample room to create bridgeheads on the south side of the Chattahoochee at several locations with virtually no interference was baffling. In four days Sherman had all of Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard’s Fourth Corps, the entire Army of the Ohio, and Garrard’s cavalry division on the Confederate side of the river. This was substantial amount of troops with their backs against a river, and Johnston did nothing. I feel that a vigorous assault could potentially knock out this force and improve the odds of holding Atlanta till the election.
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He hadn't planned it, but the situation could have called for it had Grant suddenly seen large numbers of troops being stripped from him.
It really matters here what you count as a win. Early continues to operate independently in the valley? probably not viable long term with a strengthening siege at Petersburg. Early drives Sheridan out of the valley so completely the union army doesn't return? Not terribly likely. My suspicion is that the best one can expect of a victory to be had here is one in which the Sheridan is defeated soundly enough that there's breathing room to evacuate supplies from the valley to Petersburg, and then return the forces in the field to the Petersburg defenses. I suspect this wouldn't be enough to prolong the war by a year, but you might see actions around Petersburg have slightly different results.
Problem with a lot of endgame what ifs in the eastern theater is that by the end of 1864 a lot of the action is overdetermined. The railroads are where they are and even if things in Georgia were to come apart for the union, it'd be an act of strategic malpractice for Grant to retreat from the gains of the overland campaign and leave Lee to operate freely.
Problem with a lot of endgame what ifs in the eastern theater is that by the end of 1864 a lot of the action is overdetermined. The railroads are where they are and even if things in Georgia were to come apart for the union, it'd be an act of strategic malpractice for Grant to retreat from the gains of the overland campaign and leave Lee to operate freely.
More likely Early gets himself neatly pinned against the Potomac by Sheridan alone. He really can't move against Washington without crushing Sheridan at this point and a crushing victory against Sheridan's army will mangle Early's forces to the point that a move on Washington would be impractical.
History Learner
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Grant was all for it in July/August, and it basically came down to Lincoln himself having a meeting with him and saying "No, you're not pulling back." In a situation where, either at Peachtree Creek or Bald Hill that significant elements of Sherman's Army have been destroyed, enough to bring the movement towards Atlanta to a close or enforce a siege at the least, Lincoln and the War Department would've been forced to accept Grant's suggestion because they need large numbers of seasoned troops to stabilize the Western Theater. Given that in the time period in question the numbers of both armies around Petersburg/Richmond are not too different, 56k to 85k, any detachments will leave Grant too exposed to do otherwise.
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Why did Grant want to end the seige in the first place? Do you have source I could read? Thanks.