This is another extract from Grand Strategy, Volume 2 (Pages 430 to 434) and covers the period from the end of the Battle of Britain to the start of Operation Barbarossa.
There was also the Spanish question: the continued non-belligerency of Spain became more likely with every Axis disappointment, but it could not be taken for Granted. General Franco replaced Señor Beighbeder as Foreign Minister by the Falangist Serrano Suñer on October 17, and at his meeting with Hitler at Hendaye on the 23rd gave a vague assurance of Span's eventual entry into the war. On November 4 the Spaniards, in disregard of British rights, assumed administrative control of the international zone of Tangier; on December 1 they incorporated Tangier into the Spanish Zone of Morocco and dismissed British officials. However, they went no further. Our possession of Gibraltar was a thorn in Franco's side, but Spanish war-weariness and economic weaknesses were decisive.
Hitler, however, as we have seen, was determined at the beginning of November to occupy Gibraltar at the first opportunity, and in his directive of the 12th he outlined a scheme for driving the British from the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose it was necessary to take Gibraltar and close the Straits, and to prevent the British from obtaining a foothold anywhere else in the Iberian peninsular and the islands in the Atlantic.
Operation "Felix" in its original form envisaged action by all three Services. The Army units must be strong enough to capture the Rock from the land side even without Spanish assistance; one corps was the force assigned. A smaller force would stand ready to help the Spaniards repel a British landing elsewhere, and a third, motorised, force would follow in order to occupy Portugal if necessary. The Air Force would begin by attacking British warships at Gibraltar and would consist largely of dive-bombers, while the Navy would supply submarines. Since the operation would increase the importance of the Canary and Cape Verde Islands, the German naval and air chiefs were to examine the problem of helping the Spaniards to defend the former and of occupying the latter, a Portuguese possession. The possible occupation of other Portuguese islands, Madeira and the Azores, was also to be studied and an early report demanded.
Hitler told Suñer, now Foreign Minister, shortly after this that the best time for the German soldiers to fight in Spain would be December and that two following months; in March and April they might be required for other tasks. But "Felix" was never put to the proof. Hitler countermanded the operation on December 11 on the ground that the required political condition did not obtain, and confirmed his decision on January 10. Any desire Franco may have cherished to join his fellow-dictators in arms was quenched by the German refusal to grant his terms and by the economic aid of Britain and the United States; the failure of the Axis in September over England and in North Africa many well have convinced him that the war would be prolonged and that he could bide his time. Nevertheless the possibility of a German thrust against Gibraltar or the Atlantic islands long caused anxiety to the British high command and valuable troops and ships were held ready to parry it.
The Chiefs of Staff considered in October and November the requirements of the fortress for sustaining a long siege and approved the estimate of the Governor (Lieutenant-General Sir Clive Liddell) that supplies for six months should be held. Discussions took place with him in London in January; it was clearly understood that in the event of a land attack the use of the naval base would have to be given up. The Governor also pointed out the inadequacy of Gibraltar as a base for contraband control.
The need for an alternative to Gibraltar was always in the British Government's mind, and forces were kept in being for the occupation of some of the Atlantic islands should the Germans invade the Iberian peninsula with or without the consent of their Governments. The forces had been re-constituted after the Dakar expedition, and various projects, with a bewildering series of code names, were discussed at all levels right through the winter and spring. There was of course the danger of the Germans again forestalling us as in Norway, and at the end of November it seemed that this danger might be imminent. The Defence Committee, however, stood by the Government's earlier decision (of 22 July) that we should not take the first step.
Staff papers of this period illustrate the extreme complexity of the practcal implications of such amphibious projects; apart from that of finding troops suitably trained and equipped, they involved difficult problems of logistics, such as the time required to load and unload ships of different kinds in different ports and the interference so caused with other military movements and with hardly less important commercial sailings. It is perhaps as well the General Weygand did not accept our offer to despatch six divisions to North Africa at this time.
Addressing the Chiefs of Staff early in January 1941 on the subject of future strategy, the Prime Minister said that he regarded a German invasion of Spain in order to force a way through Gibraltar unlikely. Attempted against the will of the Spanish Government, especially in winter, it would be a most dangerous and questionable enterprise. With the permission of the Spanish Government it would of course be a short and easy matter for the Germans to gain control of Lisbon and of the Algeciras and Cetua batteries, together with the airfields desired. But it was becoming increasingly unlikely that the Spanish Government would give the passage, and it was most improbable that they would try to force their way through before April. If matters hung fire in Spain until the spring, it was possible that Vichy might by then have been provoked by the Germans to undertake or allow the resumption of war in North Africa, in which case our whole situation in the Mediterranean would be transformed in our favour. From every point of view the delay was helpful to us, and we must be careful not to precipitate matters in Spain. Since the expeditions against the Atlantic islands could not be contemplated unless or until Spain offered passage to the Germans or Germany began to force one, it would seem that they need no longer be kept ready at 48 hours' notice.
This settled the matter for the present, but the reversal of fortune in the Near East in the spring revived our apprehensions. Towards the end of April the Chiefs of Staff presented a report expressing the opinion that German's position was now so strong that within a few weeks she could bring irresistible pressure on Spain and deprive us of the use of Gibraltar. It had always been recognised, they said, that the only substitute for Gibraltar as a base for big ships was the Canary Islands, but not until recently had we available of the assault craft for capturing them and the fighters for defending them. They recommended that a force should be assembled at once for this operation (code name "Puma") in addition to those prepared for the Cape Verde and Azores groups. The proposal was approved at a meeting at which the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were present, but the decision to launch the expeditions was to remain with the Government. Discussions about "Puma" were in fact still continuing in July.
Some embarrassment was caused in London by the fact that early in March a Portuguese staff mission had visited England to discuss how Portugal could best resist a German invasion through Spain and what help her ancient ally could provide. The Portuguese believed that the Spaniards would offer but slight opposition, and they were disappointed to find how little we could do for the defence of the Portuguese mainland. Indeed, when the matter was under consideration at the end of May the Defence Committee took the view that their Government's best policy, in the event of invasion, would be to abandon Portugal for the Azores. For this we could offer naval co-operation and a certain amount of anti-aircraft and other equipment. Dr. Salazar had been unwilling to allow the presence of British technicians in the Azores. In the year 1807, in not dissimilar circumstances, a Portuguese Government had sailed from Lisbon with the assistance of the Royal Navy for a refuge overseas; but Dr. Salazar had no wish, one may suppose, to provoke another Peninsular War. And indeed it was no part of our policy to give the Germans an excuse for a descent on the Atlantic islands.
Possession of the Azores bring a European Power a thousand miles nearer to America, and the United States could not fail to be interested in their future. The Prime Minister kept the President informed of what we had in mind and assured him that co-operation of any sort would be welcome. Mr. Roosevelt had at the end of March, in response to a British suggestion, proposed the visit of an American squadron to Portuguese waters, and in May he did in fact order plans to be drawn up for the occupation of the Azores by United States forces. But the Portuguese Government objected even tot he former proposal, and nothing come of either project, so that in this matter American help was of no immediate advantage to us.
Hitler had earlier, in November, ordered his staff to study the possibilities of occupying the Atlantic islands; but Admiral Raeder reported that the occupation and defence of the Cape Verdes and Canaries would hardly be possible while the British had command of the sea, and no serious plans were made. We have seen too that preparations for Operation "Felix" for the capture of Gibraltar were called off on January 10: Hitler told his staff that there was, for the time being, no prospect of Spain becoming Germany's ally. But the idea of an attack on Gibraltar with Spanish help was never given up; even after the invasion of Russia had become the main concern the German staff contemplated launching one in the course of the summer, possibly before operations against Russia had ended. Early in May Hitler thought it possible that the British might forestall him in Spain, and plan ("Isabella") was produced for the expulsion of the British force and the occupation of the chief Spanish ports.
Sir Samuel Hoare, our Ambassador in Madrid, laid great stress on the way in which American moral support could help us in Spain. He appreciated the visit of Colonel Donvoan, the President's emissary in Madrid and Lisbon in February 1941, at a time when German propaganda was particularly active. Our Ambassador expected soon after this that the crisis over the German demands would occur in tow or three months; but on May 8 the Foreign Office were informed on good authority that as long as we held the Suez Canal Franco would be able to resist German requests for the through passage to Gibraltar.
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