#16
View attachment 421573
October 8, 1981
The US ambassador to Egypt is being briefed by the CIA on the security situation.
“Sadat remains in a coma, no change there.”
“Any idea on how that works? Comas? Forgive me but my experience is all from the movies.”
“There's a report in the appendix of your briefing book from NIH. I believe it says the chances of a coma patient waking up fall pretty drastically after the first 48 hours. After about two weeks is generally the time we should really be looking to face facts. But then people have been known to wake up even months later.”
“For all the good it would do us then.”
“The situation is precarious, yes. The uprisings have begun to spread. They started in the south, but when they heard that the Egyptian government was completely decapitated people everywhere started taking to the streets. Several areas in Cairo are no-go zones, and it goes without saying you’re restricted to the compound for the time being.”
“But we’re not talking evacuation yet?”
“No sir, that would be premature.”
“Good. So who is in charge?”
“Sufi Abu Taleb is nominally in charge, but he’s just a placeholder. He doesn’t even want the job and he couldn’t hold it if he did. We have a notion that the military wants to appoint someone else, but the problem is Sadat. With him still alive, it’s unclear what the status of a new appointee would be.”
“Is there danger of another coup?”
“As you well know there was a coup attempt this past June, which saw a small purge and enough of a hammer brought down on the military that most of the rank and file are not eager to step out of line at the moment. Those directly responsible for the assassination attempt have already been dealt with, as well as about fifty others. The rest of the establishment seems more focused on putting down the unrest than seizing political power. We think there might be a couple factions forming, though. Those wanting to write Sadat off and those who are hesitant. But none of them have been quick to trust any of the current alternate candidates for political leadership, either."
“So what’s the answer?”
“The defense minister, Ghazala, is most likely to take power right now, with the tacit understanding that he's working for the generals. We think he’ll replace Taleb with a more able figurehead to keep up the illusion of non-military government. They're hoping it'll keep the public calm, but still leave the military faction largely in charge.”
“And what’s your read on Ghazala?”
The agent passes the ambassador a moderately thick file.
“I suggest you read this when you get a chance. Knowing Ghazala is going to be important in the coming months. But to sum-up, he’s not as solidly in our camp as Sadat was. We know he’s willing to work with the Iraqis against the established order. He’s even had some contacts with less-than-friendly governments outside the region, looking for partnerships that skirt the US-Soviet camps. He’s an opportunist. And he’s no fan of Israel.”
“But?”
“He’s not a fool. He’s not going to risk alienating us right now, with Libya saber-rattling and the Soviets getting more aggressive in Syria. Not to mention he's got a rebellion to put down. And with Israel set to withdraw from the last of the Sinai soon, we're hoping he won't do anything provocative.
----
October 11, 1981
The Egyptian Gazette
Headline: Taleb Steps Down in favor of Ahmad Fuad Mohieddin
Subhead: New Acting President pledges Loyalty to Sadat
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October 13, 1981
Defense minister Mohamed Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala is being briefed on a new threat.
“Who are they?”
“The banners say they’re the National Unity Movement, and they claim they’re assembling to pray for Sadat.”
“Armed?”
“No. But we can always say they were.”
“I don’t like this. When Sadat dies they’re likely to treat him as a martyr. Then we’ll have two insurrections on our hands, one from the jihadis, one from the secularists.”
“There is a chance they’re telling the truth. That the assembly is not meant as a threat. I only bring it up because we’ve got our hands full with El Jihad at the moment. Splitting our focus might not be-”
“I will NOT have this government threatened by a ghost who doesn’t even know he’s dead. We put this down before it becomes a problem. Clubs only for now, no guns.”
----
October 19, 1981
Abou and Sayyid face a decision. Their Muslim Brotherhood has long been a relatively moderate force in calling for a political system more rooted in the principles of Islam. The current rebellion spreading across the country has seen a schism appear amongst the Brethren, with some being tempted by more radical factions, while others seek to join the moderates. Abou and Sayyid, in fact, are about to lose their friendship over the issue.
“They’re crazy, Sayyid.”
“They’re doing something, at least.”
“They’re begging to be killed. If we follow them it’ll be the end of the Brotherhood.”
“They’ve taken Asyut, they’ve cut off Alexandria. They’re holding off the police in districts all over the country.”
“It won’t last. These jihadis can’t fight the military.”
“But they can! They have weapons now.”
“Weapons from Gaddafi! You think he cares about their war? He wants to destabilize Egypt.”
“If he’s willing to shelter freedom fighters, we’ll take his aid.”
“We have an opportunity for another way. I joined the Brethren to bring the principles of Islam to democracy, not to destroy democracy. There are thousands of common people in the streets who just want a peaceful, modern Egypt. This is who we should be allying with.”
“Secularists! Christians!”
“What of it? We’re a pluralistic society.”
“Pluralism is chaos.”
“War is chaos! I’m telling you, Sayyid, if you go down this path you do so at the cost of your soul. I don’t think you can come back.”
“Abou, I...I...you...Inshallah.”
Sayyid walks away.
----
October 20, 1981
The Egyptian Gazette
Headline: Jihadist Insurrection Enters Second Week
Subhead: Military Advance Stalls on the Alexandria Desert Road