Fall Grun 1938: Are Germany's early-war odds really worse than OTL 1939?

A liberal democracy with higher per capita industrial development likewise describes France in 1940
The relevant comparison is not Czechoslovakia and France, it is Czechoslovakia and Poland, versus respectively Germany and maybe what Hungary could bring to the table in 1938, and Germany September 1939 after Hitler had a solid year to assimilate the contributions of an undamaged Bohemia to add to the general frantic buildup pace supplied by 12 more months of Reich, combined with 12 months of daunting depression and defeatism across all liberal Europe in the face of the moral debacle of Munich sinking in, and of course massive Soviet help in crushing Poland. Given sober estimates based on counting men and guns put Poland and CZ on the same footing in numbers, but CZ has fortifications Poland has nothing like, even weaknesses in those fortifications leave CZ better off than Poland. Since you do emphasize quick fall of CZ and don't seem to factor in the consequences of it taking longer than a month anywhere, I feel justified in rebuking you on this point; note I grant others (such as Hitler starting the war in spring rather than dithering around as winter approaches as others conservatively assume) that seem quite reasonable to me. This contempt for CZ does stick in my craw.

Clearly it should at least take longer mainly on the grounds of Germany being weaker in Spring 38 than Fall 39 and the strongest equivalent to the Soviet treachery of OTL being Hungarian pile on. When will you acknowledge that? I have acknowledged that a Fall of France before Autumn 1938 is possible (though hardly the slam dunk you focus on) even with several months holdup in taking CZ. I don't like to assume it is inevitable but have mainly focused on what happens next if it happens.
 
The relevant comparison is not Czechoslovakia and France, it is Czechoslovakia and Poland, versus respectively Germany and maybe what Hungary could bring to the table in 1938,

Given that the Poles concentrated their resources on building up their armed forces and not a chunk of strategically useless fortifications that would themselves take up and render static (and thus, functionally irrelevant) a healthy portion of Czech manpower and equipment, I don't really see what the marginal difference between the two's GDP is really going to make, given that they themselves are dwarfed by Germany's GDP. What's more, the physical count-up again runs into the total ignoring of soft factors, like the lack of training and doctrine on the side of the Czechs, that tend to matter far more then such physical matters as a raw count of troops and guns.

and Germany September 1939 after Hitler had a solid year to assimilate the contributions of an undamaged Bohemia to add to the general frantic buildup pace supplied by 12 more months of Reich, combined with 12 months of daunting depression and defeatism across all liberal Europe in the face of the moral debacle of Munich sinking in,

The Reich's frantic build-up in those 12 months was massively outstripped by that of the WAllied build-up and the aftermath of Munich saw a increase of determination to oppose Naziism culminating in the guarantee to Poland, not "depression and defeatism". What the Germans gained from Czechoslovakia was really relatively marginal: for the most part, their strength stagnated in 1939 and early-1940 as their mobilization started stalling.

and of course massive Soviet help in crushing Poland.

To characterize Soviet help in crushing Poland as massive is a gross exaggeration. It was there, yes. But it was hardly massive. The German invasion of Poland was not a close-run thing.

Given sober estimates based on counting men and guns put Poland and CZ on the same footing in numbers, but CZ has fortifications Poland has nothing like, even weaknesses in those fortifications leave CZ better off than Poland. Since you do emphasize quick fall of CZ and don't seem to factor in the consequences of it taking longer than a month anywhere,

Many of those fortifications or either inadequate or irrelevant and the distances the Germans have to cover are rather much shorter then in Poland. I can see it taking somewhat longer then a month, I just don't really see that making any reasonable difference.

Clearly it should at least take longer mainly on the grounds of Germany being weaker in Spring 38 than Fall 39 and the strongest equivalent to the Soviet treachery of OTL being Hungarian pile on.

Yet the Allies too were weaker still. That's the salient point that people here either fail to understand or don't want to.

This contempt for CZ does stick in my craw.

Calling an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, plans, and consequences as "contempt" is a interestingly emotional way of characterizing my arguments. Do you think the Czechs were full of contempt for themselves when they made their projection they would only last a month?

I mean, sure... I'd like the Czechs to be able to blunt the Germans so badly that the French doesn't have any chance at falling, but whether I like it or not is what the actual case may be. In the end, whether France falls in a 1938/39 war is going to be up to the Germans and French, not the Czechs.
 
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Given that the Poles concentrated their resources on building up their armed forces and not a chunk of strategically useless fortifications that would themselves take up and render static (and thus, functionally irrelevant) a healthy portion of Czech manpower and equipment, I don't really see what the marginal difference between the two's GDP is really going to make, given that they themselves are dwarfed by Germany's GDP. What's more, the physical count-up again runs into the total ignoring of soft factors, like the lack of training and doctrine on the side of the Czechs, that tend to matter far more then such physical matters as a raw count of troops and guns.



The Reich's frantic build-up in those 12 months was massively outstripped by that of the WAllied build-up and the aftermath of Munich saw a increase of determination to oppose Naziism culminating in the guarantee to Poland, not "depression and defeatism". What the Germans gained from Czechoslovakia was really relatively marginal: for the most part, their strength stagnated in 1939 and early-1940 as their mobilization started stalling.



To characterize Soviet help in crushing Poland as massive is a gross exaggeration. It was there, yes. But it was hardly massive. The German invasion of Poland was not a close-run thing.



Many of those fortifications or either inadequate or irrelevant and the distances the Germans have to cover are rather much shorter then in Poland. I can see it taking somewhat longer then a month, I just don't really see that making any reasonable difference.



Yet the Allies too were weaker still. That's the salient point that people here either fail to understand or don't want to.



Calling an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, plans, and consequences as "contempt" is a interestingly emotional way of characterizing my arguments. Do you think the Czechs were full of contempt for themselves when they made their projection they would only last a month?

I mean, sure... I'd like the Czechs to be able to blunt the Germans so badly that the French doesn't have any chance at falling, but whether I like it or not is what the actual case may be. In the end, whether France falls in a 1938/39 war is going to be up to the Germans and French, not the Czechs.

Please explain how the allies where weaker still than the Germans in 1938. IMO the big beasts are Germany and France. France has had unbroken conscription and armaments production since WW1. Germany has not. The biggest year of German rearmament pre WW2 was 1939. You must admit that this was influenced by the capture of the significant Czech industries and resources. Yes the French are playing catch up with the Germans. It's hard for a democracy to spend as much on armaments as a dictatorship. However they are catching up form a position of relative strength. Other posters have commented that the French army didn't grow in infantry divisions between 1938 and the outbreak of ww2. This is markedly difference to the growth of the German Army which would struggle to expand without the 1938/9 conscripts and the equipment of the 39 well armed Czech divisions that layer down their arms without a fight.

It is only in the organisation of tanks and the strength of the luftwaffe that the germans have a clear advantage. Bearing in mind that the British where approaching air parity (albeit across the globe and not just in the critical European theatre) so an alliance between Brian and France (which is always going to happen for this senario to take place as France won't act without the UK) will see close to air parity.

I am also not convinced as I have posted above that a weaker France would make the same mistakes as in 1940. They are unlikely to rush into Belgium which make sure the Sickle Cut (again by no means likely) would be fought very differently. I would also point out the German generals where so appalled by the possibility of war with France in 1938 they considered a coup against Hitler and the Nazis in an attempt to save Germany from certain defeat. Admittedly I think a good pinch of salt should be sprinkled about such claims as they where made after the war by officers who where desperate to appear to be "good germans". But as the saying goes there's no smoke without fire.

I do agree that I can't see Czechoslovakia holding out more than a month without serious mistakes being made by the Germans or some serious luck. But Czechoslovakia is not France. OTL the battle for France was so implausable if I was to write a time line with one side getting so much luck I would be accused of w##king and probably asked to move it to ASB. Here we can only go by reasonable assumptions and the situation is very different in 1938 than the perfect storm of 1940.
 
Please explain how the allies where weaker still than the Germans in 1938.

Perhaps, it would be worth it to read my other posts in this thread. I have already gone over this extensively.

IMO the big beasts are Germany and France. France has had unbroken conscription and armaments production since WW1. Germany has not. The biggest year of German rearmament pre WW2 was 1939.

What matters is how the relative production between France and Germany changed over time, not how German production in and of itself changed over time. French armament production, while it had never ceased, had languished pretty badly during the late-20s and early-30s and this was only starting to be dealt with by the time of Munich. What's more, much of those armaments were obsolescent (as I've repeatedly observed almost all the French tank park were still WW1 FT-17s). By comparison, Germany had several years of all out rearmament and it showed in the balance of power, with Germany having not just much more weaponry but much more modern weaponry. In 1938, German arms production outstripped French massively. In 1939 they were neck-in-neck. By early-1940, the French had clearly pulled ahead. And the weapons produced in 1939 and 1940 were vastly more modern then the obsolescent designs that dominated the production lines as late as 1937. As for conscription... well, after their conscription term, French soldiers went into the ready reserve from which they would be called back to service in times of war. This happened in 1938 during the Munich crisis and obviously in 1939 after France declared war. The French plan was always to use the peacetime army as the seed for a massive expansion, which was unfortunately part of the problem as it meant the French army would be a defensive force with no immediate offensive capability. This is why France was unable to intervene in the Rhineland in 1936, greatly restricted her options at Munich in 1938, and prevented her from taking offensive action to relieve the Poles in 1939.

Here's what Robert Doughty has to say about the laws in "The Seeds of Disaster, the development of French Army doctrine, 1919-1939":

"In June 1920, the council unanimously adopted a resolution stating that the army required forty-one active French divisions, six as part of the army of occupation in Germany and thirty-five on the national territory if it were to ensure France's security. This figure did not include the five Algerian and three colonial divisions, and it assumed the French would eventually mobilize to 80 divisions if there was a war. In December 1920, the government forced the council to accept thirty-two active French divisions, but discussions continued through 1922. In May 1926, the Superior Council reluctantly accepted twenty active divisions, but it added the qualification that 106,000 career military were necessary." [Doughty, p.30]

These reductions corresponded in reductions of conscript service from two years in 1921, to 18 months in 1923, and finally one year in 1928. These reductions drastically slashed the number of French soldiers that could be considered available for combat. By 1933 France had only 226,000 soldiers rated capable of being used to defend the country (out of 320,000 stationed in France), just barely half Germany's treaty-mandated 100,000 force. Except the German force was highly trained and relentlessly professional due to its long service, and most of the French force was made up of short term one-year conscripts suitable for nothing beyond defense.

The French adoption of less flexible and more static infantry doctrine was directly related to the declining quality of their soldiers. Realizing that their army would be weak on even basic soldier skills, the French sought to minimize the manuevers it would be asked to conduct. Unfortunately this simplicity was then permanently written into doctrine, and became very hard to break out of once the French started fielding more capable, better trained formations. France did still have 100,000 active duty soldiers (significantly lower than the 150,000 figure the Superior Council had initially wanted), but these were intended to be the cadre around which the larger army formed. Using them to fight a war would risk France's ability to conduct her planned mobilization.

With the adoption of the one year conscription term, rigid limits were placed on French training of reserves after they left their active duty term, and these limits persisted after the two-year term was reinstated in 1935. These restricted training to just two three weeks periods over sixteen years while in the first active reserve. This would not have been adequate even to refresh basic soldier skills, never mind train for complex combat conditions. By the eve of war the army had managed to extend this somewhat, and French reserve officers received three weeks of training every two years, which was only marginally less aberrant. These were the troops who would make up the mass of the French army come a major war but the sharply limited amount of reserve training meant they would be virtually useless when first called back to service, and their effectiveness would very much depend on the training they were able to conduct once called up.

With the Munich crisis, some 750,000 reserve soldiers and 25,000 reserve officers were called back to service. At this point the French realized things were getting serious and war with Germany was a very real possibility, so reserve training became more frequent and more focused. The effect is debated (some formations benefited more than others) but it did give the French an extra year of preparations before the hammer fell on Poland.

You must admit that this was influenced by the capture of the significant Czech industries and resources.

Some of it. And some of the Czech industries and resources may still be captured intact. But then Germany didn't capture Poland perfectly intact and still had enough left under it to turn around and knock out what were by then much stronger Anglo-French forces.

This is markedly difference to the growth of the German Army which would struggle to expand without the 1938/9 conscripts and the equipment of the 39 well armed Czech divisions that layer down their arms without a fight.

While the quantity of captured, there will still likely be a substantial number given that many Czech formations would still be trapped in the border fortifications and forced to surrender much as the French or Polish divisions who were encircled and had to surrender did. I don't see why the German Army wouldn't get the conscripts they did in 1938/39, given that those were raised overwhelmingly in German territory.

It is only in the organisation of tanks and the strength of the luftwaffe that the germans have a clear advantage.

A totally unsubstantiated post. The German army constituted 65 divisions combat-ready divisions in 1938. The French had around 40 total, of which only 22-23 were combat-ready. The British had two, none of which were combat-ready. The preponderance of conventional power clearly favored the Germans.

I am also not convinced as I have posted above that a weaker France would make the same mistakes as in 1940. They are unlikely to rush into Belgium which make sure the Sickle Cut (again by no means likely) would be fought very differently.

Perhaps, perhaps not. That's where things hinge, rather more then anything which happens in Czechoslovakia.

I would also point out the German generals where so appalled by the possibility of war with France in 1938 they considered a coup against Hitler and the Nazis in an attempt to save Germany from certain defeat. Admittedly I think a good pinch of salt should be sprinkled about such claims as they where made after the war by officers who where desperate to appear to be "good germans". But as the saying goes there's no smoke without fire.

A minority of German generals were so appalled by the possibility of war and considered a coup, but even at the time they acknowledged such a move would be unpopular and unlikely to succeed. Given that many of them flinched from later coup attempts. Most of the German generals were nervous about the prospect of war, but they didn't.

OTL the battle for France was so implausable if I was to write a time line with one side getting so much luck I would be accused of w##king and probably asked to move it to ASB. Here we can only go by reasonable assumptions and the situation is very different in 1938 than the perfect storm of 1940.

Given the relative strengths and weaknesses of each army, by the time the battle had started on May 10th the German victory didn't require luck at all and indeed was entirely predictable. The Germans only got "lucky" in the run-up to that battle, in that they chose a good plan and the French chose a plan that very much played into that. IATL, the French may not be so hasty, but then the Germans headstart in armaments and training/doctrine still leaves them with a bit of extra leeway so it's still a bit up in the air how the chips fall.
 

Ian_W

Banned
My question to this is "What are the implications of Poland staying neutral in the case of a 1938 attack on Czechoslovakia ?".

Pretty clearly, the Czechs are going to repeat the Polish 1939 experience - they'll lose, but they'll do some damage to the German army.

Likewise, France will repeat it's 1939 experience - it will be busy expanding it's peacetime army and getting the country ready for war, with an offensive planned 2 years after the start of the war.

But what does a neutral Poland in the Phony War of 1938-9 mean for everyone concerned ?
 
My question to this is "What are the implications of Poland staying neutral in the case of a 1938 attack on Czechoslovakia ?".

Pretty clearly, the Czechs are going to repeat the Polish 1939 experience - they'll lose, but they'll do some damage to the German army.

Likewise, France will repeat it's 1939 experience - it will be busy expanding it's peacetime army and getting the country ready for war, with an offensive planned 2 years after the start of the war.

But what does a neutral Poland in the Phony War of 1938-9 mean for everyone concerned ?

Well, in the short-term, it means that Germany doesn't have to devote any serious forces to defending that border, perhaps throwing those 4 Austrian corps over someone mentioned around there. In the longer term, assuming for the moment that Stalin isn't willing to push the issue of military passage to the point of war, it depends on whether France holds. If France folds, then Germany's going to pretty quickly turn it's attention to them and exert all the historical pressure over Danzig and Silesia and everything. Only the Poles won't have any delusions about the French riding to their rescue. Perhaps they'll resist, perhaps they won't. If they don't, they basically will find themselves shanghaied into a Axis client state like the Romanians were. If they do... well, Yugoslavia minus any equivalent to the Croats basically. So if France falls, Poland's inevitably going to find itself in a position where it'll be forced to pick a side. If France holds, however, Poland sure be safe. Like with OTL, Germany really has only one shot to bring the French down. If they fail, their screwed and they can't really afford to be bothered about that Danzig issue then.
 

marathag

Banned
If they don't, they basically will find themselves shanghaied into a Axis client state like the Romanians were.
less helpful having them as an Ally, than taking everything they wanted, and having to trade instead of stealing the billions of Dollars of Goods and millions of slaves thaqt they did from '39 to 45

Really is going to throw a wrench into the Final Solution, if the Poles act like Hungary did with their Jews.
 
Well, in the short-term, it means that Germany doesn't have to devote any serious forces to defending that border, perhaps throwing those 4 Austrian corps over someone mentioned around there. In the longer term, assuming for the moment that Stalin isn't willing to push the issue of military passage to the point of war, it depends on whether France holds. If France folds, then Germany's going to pretty quickly turn it's attention to them and exert all the historical pressure over Danzig and Silesia and everything. Only the Poles won't have any delusions about the French riding to their rescue. Perhaps they'll resist, perhaps they won't. If they don't, they basically will find themselves shanghaied into a Axis client state like the Romanians were. If they do... well, Yugoslavia minus any equivalent to the Croats basically. So if France falls, Poland's inevitably going to find itself in a position where it'll be forced to pick a side. If France holds, however, Poland sure be safe. Like with OTL, Germany really has only one shot to bring the French down. If they fail, their screwed and they can't really afford to be bothered about that Danzig issue then.

I agree in principle with this analysis although I feel that the Germans have to at least plan against a stab in the back from Poland (and also from a less friendly Italy in 38 for that matter) if they get bogged down in France. I feel reasonably strong frontier forces would have to be employed as a deterrent if nothing else. I would expect this to be a big pipe dream in London and Paris and the Germans would expect serious diplomatic effort by the allies in achieving this goal. Although I don't think the Poles are that stupid it can't be completely ignored as a possibility by the Germans.

I was wondering how you would see a German offensive in the west unfolding in late 1938 or early 1939?
 
I can't see Poland remaining neutral in case of Franco-German war. In Warsaw alliance with France was seen as the main guarantion of keeping independence.
 
I can't see Poland remaining neutral in case of Franco-German war. In Warsaw alliance with France was seen as the main guarantion of keeping independence.
That is very interesting! I accepted a lot of people saying "Poland won't do anything for Czechoslovakia;" what I know of the history and relations between the two neighboring Slavic republics tends to be in line with that. Poland actually took advantage of Hitler's crushing of CZ OTL to seize Teschen after all. A lot of bad blood between them, it would seem.

But, it does make sense that if France is going to (unaccountably, per stipulation of the OP) take action on Czechoslovakia's part, then perhaps if Poland is attached enough to the French alliance they will act, not to help CZ directly but to honor their pact with France--just as Britain had no skin in the game regarding Serbia in the Great War, but did have reasons to honor alliance with Russia, more strongly alliance with France, and most of all the treaty that guaranteed Belgian neutrality.

Obviously if Poland will in fact follow in French footsteps, that changes the game for Hitler considerably. Even Poland is very desultory and attempts little aggression against Germany, it changes how strong a force Hitler must leave to garrison his very long, indeed double-sized due to the Polish Corridor, borders. It would not be very logistically easy for Poland to say seize Danzig, since they'd be operating at the tip of a narrow salient of territory with Germans on both sides (not to mention taking a city of pretty much entirely German population rabidly devoted to Naziism is not the easiest conquest to hold) but invading East Prussia seems pretty doable--unless Hitler isolates a big part of his Spring (per Obssessed Nuker, and given the OP premise, me too) or Fall (per people thinking conventionally about a minimum divergence POD) 1938 in that enclave. Even if the Poles take little action at first and let CZ twist in the wind all on their own, how much does garrisoning the Polish border cost the attacking force? Will Hitler really be able to take Netherlands, Belgium and France at the same time with Poland at his back? If France were to fall first, wouldn't the Poles offer terms, especially if they had not actually taken anything from Germany yet? But would not Hitler be pretty sure to reduce Poland before taking on a great power and two neutrals, costing him another month to three months and giving the western nations that much longer to prepare?
 
Polish grab of Teschen was opportunist move, when it was clear, that France and UK abandoned Czechoslovakia. If France really decides to defend Czechs, with no doubts Poles would join France. In views of Polish military junta Germany had no chance against UK and France. So if Western Allies are at war with Germany, Poland would join.
 
Anyone here have a count of the number of German AT guns actually equipping their infantry divisions in October 1938? The conversation here has focused on the tanks as if those were going to be fighting in big decisive armored battles. That was actually the exception in 1940. There were only two 'division' size armored battles in May. Most of the operationally important battles were armor vs infantry. ie: The 10th Pz vs the 71st ID; The 55th ID counter attack with two tank battalions vs the Gross Deutchland regiment; The 7th Pz vs the 18th Inf Div; The 3rd & 4th Pz Divs vs the Morrocan Ind Div @ Gembloux. Overall the 1940 campaign revolved around the ability of infantry centric combined arms groups to withstand armor centric combined arms attacks. In some cases the defense repelled the armored weighted attack, in others they failed.

Any success either the Germans, Cezchs, or French have in the first 30-50 days would revolve around their ability to repel tank centric attacks. If the Germans do concentrate their armored corps vs Cezchoslovakia, then their situation in the west depends on who well they deal with the opening French attacks. Particularly those that occur between weeks three and five of the French mobilization schedule. Thats when the Active Series formations would be fully stood up with infantry, armor, engineers, artillery, ect... in full corps sized combined arms groups. Also in the third & fourth week the Seires A formations would be fully mobilized and ready to fill out the front facing the Saar & Rhineland into full size armies.

Anyway, a close look at the AT capability of the German infantry divisions and corps of 1938 would be useful.
 
That is very interesting! I accepted a lot of people saying "Poland won't do anything for Czechoslovakia;" what I know of the history and relations between the two neighboring Slavic republics tends to be in line with that. Poland actually took advantage of Hitler's crushing of CZ OTL to seize Teschen after all. A lot of bad blood between them, it would seem.

But, it does make sense that if France is going to (unaccountably, per stipulation of the OP) take action on Czechoslovakia's part, then perhaps if Poland is attached enough to the French alliance they will act, not to help CZ directly but to honor their pact with France--just as Britain had no skin in the game regarding Serbia in the Great War, but did have reasons to honor alliance with Russia, more strongly alliance with France, and most of all the treaty that guaranteed Belgian neutrality.

Obviously if Poland will in fact follow in French footsteps, that changes the game for Hitler considerably. Even Poland is very desultory and attempts little aggression against Germany, it changes how strong a force Hitler must leave to garrison his very long, indeed double-sized due to the Polish Corridor, borders. It would not be very logistically easy for Poland to say seize Danzig, since they'd be operating at the tip of a narrow salient of territory with Germans on both sides (not to mention taking a city of pretty much entirely German population rabidly devoted to Naziism is not the easiest conquest to hold) but invading East Prussia seems pretty doable--unless Hitler isolates a big part of his Spring (per Obssessed Nuker, and given the OP premise, me too) or Fall (per people thinking conventionally about a minimum divergence POD) 1938 in that enclave. Even if the Poles take little action at first and let CZ twist in the wind all on their own, how much does garrisoning the Polish border cost the attacking force? Will Hitler really be able to take Netherlands, Belgium and France at the same time with Poland at his back? If France were to fall first, wouldn't the Poles offer terms, especially if they had not actually taken anything from Germany yet? But would not Hitler be pretty sure to reduce Poland before taking on a great power and two neutrals, costing him another month to three months and giving the western nations that much longer to prepare?
Not just Czech Tesin, Poland put pressure on Prague to let goe parts of Slovak Kysuce, Orava and Spis region. Immediately destroying support Warsaw had in Slovakia among Hlinka’s People Party. As a consequence Slovakia joined Germany in September 1939 to liberated taken territories. Plus bit more - territories ceded to Poland in 20-ties but with Slovak population.
 
That is very interesting! I accepted a lot of people saying "Poland won't do anything for Czechoslovakia;" what I know of the history and relations between the two neighboring Slavic republics tends to be in line with that. Poland actually took advantage of Hitler's crushing of CZ OTL to seize Teschen after all. A lot of bad blood between them, it would seem.

But, it does make sense that if France is going to (unaccountably, per stipulation of the OP) take action on Czechoslovakia's part, then perhaps if Poland is attached enough to the French alliance they will act, not to help CZ directly but to honor their pact with France--just as Britain had no skin in the game regarding Serbia in the Great War, but did have reasons to honor alliance with Russia, more strongly alliance with France, and most of all the treaty that guaranteed Belgian neutrality.

Obviously if Poland will in fact follow in French footsteps, that changes the game for Hitler considerably. Even Poland is very desultory and attempts little aggression against Germany, it changes how strong a force Hitler must leave to garrison his very long, indeed double-sized due to the Polish Corridor, borders. It would not be very logistically easy for Poland to say seize Danzig, since they'd be operating at the tip of a narrow salient of territory with Germans on both sides (not to mention taking a city of pretty much entirely German population rabidly devoted to Naziism is not the easiest conquest to hold) but invading East Prussia seems pretty doable--unless Hitler isolates a big part of his Spring (per Obssessed Nuker, and given the OP premise, me too) or Fall (per people thinking conventionally about a minimum divergence POD) 1938 in that enclave. Even if the Poles take little action at first and let CZ twist in the wind all on their own, how much does garrisoning the Polish border cost the attacking force? Will Hitler really be able to take Netherlands, Belgium and France at the same time with Poland at his back? If France were to fall first, wouldn't the Poles offer terms, especially if they had not actually taken anything from Germany yet? But would not Hitler be pretty sure to reduce Poland before taking on a great power and two neutrals, costing him another month to three months and giving the western nations that much longer to prepare?

I just can't see Poland doing anything decisive until the German army is fully committed and either bogged down and/or loosing. However they don't have too as a semi mobilised Poland is a threat to the German rear that can't be ignored. As I mentioned previously I feel the same would also be true for the Italians. As to the south western European states in 1938 without the Munich betrayal the French and British diplomatic/soft power is stronger than 1939/40. I think these nations will keep neutral and wait and see which way the wind is blowing when the dust settles.
 
Not just Czech Tesin, Poland put pressure on Prague to let goe parts of Slovak Kysuce, Orava and Spis region. Immediately destroying support Warsaw had in Slovakia among Hlinka’s People Party. As a consequence Slovakia joined Germany in September 1939 to liberated taken territories. Plus bit more - territories ceded to Poland in 20-ties but with Slovak population.
Annexation of that Carpathian villages was the most idiotic move of Sanacja regime. Teschen at least was really valuable, highly industrialised with high quality coalfields.
 
It could just be that the Czech had decided to fight it out. After all, the Czech fortifications were rather massive. They were called the Eastern Maginot line after all. Were they all finished, NO. But we are talking some significant percentage of finished, I believe.

Hitler had wanted to invade France in November 1939, which gave the entire OKW kittens.

So, it is not a bad question to pose in itself.

All of that said, Germany probably did it right after all. Earlier would not have been great from a logistics point of view.

Ivan
 
Surely Germans would need to crush Poland like IOTL before turning against France. After French DOW Poles would join the war as quickly as possible.
 
Anyway, a close look at the AT capability of the German infantry divisions and corps of 1938 would be useful.

I'm not sure why you'd say that, since the French won't be launching any major tank assaults (or assaults in general... French doctrine was cripplingly passive) on those German infantry divisions given their total lack of major armored formations. It'd be more useful to examine French AT use which was... well, it was poor as it was in 1940. Without the extra one to two years of training, it'd probably be completely ignorable now.
 
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I'm not sure why you'd say that, since the French won't be launching any major tank assaults (or assaults in general... French doctrine was cripplingly passive) on those German infantry divisions given their total lack of major armored formations. It'd be more useful to examine French AT use which was... well, it was poor as it was in 1940. Without the extra one to two years of training, it'd probably be completely ignorable now.

The big problem with the French army was its uneven nature of a number of good active divisions back up by first reserve divisions then the rest middle aged reservists with limited training and modern equipment in the B divisions. In theory this isn't son bad as the B divisions where there to make up the numbers in quiet areas. However the beauty of the OTL German 1940 offensive was it pitted these very units against the cream of the German Army.

By 1939 the French army was well supplied with modern albeit light anti tank guns in the form of the 25mm Hotchkiss that the French were capable of supplying 300 surplus of these anti tank guns to the British who where rather short of any anti tank weapons at the outbreak of war in 1939. I have read accounts where these 25mm guns did good work against the lighter German Pz 1's and Pz 2's in British hands. The French had also used the venerable 75's as anti tank guns to make up the numbers since the early 1930's. These would be able to take out any German tank in 1938 although admittedly over open sights (but it worked for the British with the 25 pounder in the dessert). The trick for the French is to get the good divisions into the fight against the Panzers where they would stand a good chance of putting up a credible defence.
 
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