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Before their 1745 Italian campaign could even begin, the Bourbon powers would have to resolve their differences with one another. The split of the grand Gallispan army after the capture of Ceva in 1744 had hobbled what had seemed like a promising campaign and created resentment and mutual recriminations among both the Bourbon commanders and their courts. King Louis XV, at least, was willing to address the issue of leadership; Marshal Lautrec was removed from his position at the head of the French army in Italy and replaced with Marshal Charles Louis Auguste Fouquet, duc de Belle-Isle, who happened to be the man principally responsible for France’s entry into the war in the first place. He had been discredited by the failure of France’s German campaign and had been clearly out of favor since 1743, but his military talents proved too important for him to be left forever on the sidelines.

On the matter of strategy, too, the two courts were starting to come together. Ceva provided a useful jumping-off point into Piedmont, but the French foreign minister d’Argenson, who was now reopening negotiations with Turin, hesitated to assault Piedmont directly as had been the French plan in 1744 to avoid scuttling those negotiations. Thus, despite claiming that Spain was “a bad comrade in war, still worse in negotiations,” d’Argenson was actually shifting French strategy in a way that was quite agreeable to the Spanish, who much preferred a march on Lombardy to wasting time on Sardinia. Although Spain’s foray into Lombardy had failed disastrously in the previous autumn, it was argued that numbers had been more to blame than planning. The army of Infante Felipe and General la Mina, numbering a mere 11,000 men by the end of the campaign season, had been outnumbered by the Sardinians and Austrians to either side and had to beat a costly retreat as a consequence. Now, however, both France and Spain had considerably reinforced their armies in Provence, and by the start of summer the Bourbon allies would have some 80,000 troops in the theater (including around 10,000 Genoese) opposing approximately 40,000 Sardinians and 20,000 Austrians.

Belle-Isle proposed to maintain forces at Ceva and other threatening points to keep the Sardinian army on the defensive, while the main body of the Gallispan army would proceed to Genoa and strike north from there as the Spanish had done in 1744. This would result in the capture of Madrid’s objectives and the isolation of Sardinia from its Austrian ally. If King Carlo Emanuele did not beg for an armistice, direct pressure could then be applied from the east until he was willing to come to the table, and the Austrians would be completely unable to assist him. The main remaining question was the strength of the “threatening points” which French forces would hold; Belle-Isle wished to maintain enough forces in Savoy, Nice, and Ceva to actually attempt an invasion (even if it was to be merely diversionary), an allocation of forces which he believed would keep the Sardinians quiescent.

Although clearly disadvantaged in numbers, the Worms Allies did have the advantage of time. French and Spanish reinforcements were still moving to Villefranche throughout the spring. An attack on Genoa itself was written off as too costly, but Ceva was held by only 1,600 Genoese soldiers who were poorly supplied for ammunition and isolated in enemy territory. In late March, the King of Sardinia laid siege to Ceva with an army of 12,000 men, attempting to recapture this vital position before the Bourbons could reinforce it. Much to the dismay of the French, who had labored long to take it in the previous year, the Genoese defenders made a poor showing and capitulated on April 13th, as soon as the Sardinian bombardment began in earnest. By the end of April, Carlo Emanuele had undone practically all of Lautrec’s progress in the 1744 Piedmont campaign. Ceva, which Belle-Isle had imagined would serve as a point from which to threaten an invasion of Piedmont, would now threaten his own advance.

Had this Sardinian initiative been matched by equal vigor by the British navy, Belle-Isle’s task would have been immeasurably harder. The Mediterranean squadron, however, was hindered by poor disposition. This was not entirely the fault of Vice-Admiral William Rowley, as the Admiralty had recalled several of his battleships to bolster the Western Fleet and left him with fewer ships than ever. Rowley compounded this problem, however, by positioning the bulk of his fleet far to the west. By the spring of 1745, of Rowley’s 35 ships of the line only 8 were serving in Ligurian waters, while the remainder were split between Cartagena and Cadiz. The former station was understandable, and indeed required by Rowley’s orders, as the Spanish fleet was blockaded there and from this position the British could potentially disrupt any attempted convergence between the Spanish, the French at Toulon, and the French in the Atlantic, whose arrival in the Mediterranean was still feared. The choice of Cadiz, however, was questionable. Ostensibly Rowley had sent a squadron here - larger by half than the Ligurian squadron - to catch a French cruising squadron off Spartel. They remained, however, in the hopes that they would intercept a Spanish treasure fleet which was expected back from the West Indies. Certainly such a capture would have hurt Spain’s war effort, insofar as silver and gold are the sinews of war, but Rowley was a man known for looking out for his own interests and it can hardly be doubted that the prospect of a fortune in prize money played a role in this choice. In any case, the treasure fleet landed at San Sebastián in Navarre, nowhere near Cadiz, and the only result of the Cadiz diversion was to waste a third of Rowley’s squadron in months of indolence.

The remaining British presence off Italy was not entirely without effect. The Riviera squadron managed to halt a French attempt to move forces to Genoa by sea and forced the French ships into Villefranche, while a Spanish advance overland was thwarted by naval gunfire at San Remo in May. But this careful watch on the Riviera came at the expense of the British presence further east, where a mere handful of cruisers were unable to stop the Spanish from slipping thousands of men and considerable stocks of grain and munitions into Genoa and Spezia. By April, the Spanish had managed to ship some 5,000 soldiers to Genoa, and there was some hope that yet more reinforcements would be arriving. The Battle of Monterosi in 1744 had hobbled but not completely destroyed the southern “Napolispan” army. The remnants of that force, some 12,000 men, were now under the leadership of General Fernando de la Torre y Solís, Marqués de Campo Santo, who had been tapped to replace the disgraced Gages.[1]

Campo Santo’s first choice was to take the maritime route to Genoa, and to this end marched as far north as Orbetello, part of the Spanish-owned Stato dei Presidi in the south of Tuscany. This path was closed, however, by the belated action of Admiral Rowley, who had received new orders to recommit his forces to the Italian theater prompted by the desperate pleas of British diplomats in Italy who had witnessed the narrow victory of 1744 and watched Spanish troops and supplies pour into Liguria with ever-growing dismay. Eight ships of the line and a dozen smaller vessels arrived on the scene in March, just in time to foil Campo Santo’s hopes of sneaking into Spezia, although not soon enough to prevent another 3,000 Spaniards on ships out of Barcelona from slipping past the blockade and disembarking at Genoa.

With his preferred route obstructed, Campo Santo had to examine other possibilities. The most direct overland route was straight through Tuscany, which despite the marriage of Grand Duke Franz Stefan to the Queen of Hungary was technically neutral. Neutrality, as it was then understood, did not preclude the passage of belligerent armies, and the Spanish had already marched through Tuscany in 1742 without incident. But whereas the Austrians had then been powerless to protect Tuscany, they were now ready and willing to stand in Campo Santo’s way. FZM Ludwig Ferdinand, Graf von Schulenburg-Oeynhausen, the Austrian supreme commander in Italy, had been ordered to protect Tuscany and the Milanese, while FML Johann Ernst, Freiherr von Breitwitz commanded some 7,000 Tuscan irregulars and militia who would be of little value in a pitched battle but could cause serious problems for any invader. It seemed probable that the Tuscan regency would refuse passage to Campo Santo rather than let the Spaniards march across the length of Tuscany and reinforce the Spanish army in Liguria.

The alternative was to go around Tuscany by way of the Papal territories, Modena, and Lucca. This had the advantage of avoiding Breitwitz’s involvement and the abrogation of Tuscany’s neutral status, but Schulenburg would surely oppose this march, and the route would require the army to cross the Apennines in enemy-held territory at a time of year when there was still snow in the mountain passes and the mountain streams were flooded with snowmelt. Certainly the army could not take artillery with it on such an advance, which would have to be left at Orbetello. Campo Santo resumed his advance in late April, intending to march through Umbria and the Romagna before crossing the mountains and descending towards Lucca. Schulenburg presumed that the Spanish were intending once more to invade Parma and the Milanese, and marched to Modena with 14,000 men.

Campo Santo had no intention of marching against Schulenburg and his superior force in a strong defensive position. Instead he turned west after reaching Bologna and headed towards Lucchese territory.[2] This caught Schulenburg quite by surprise, and the Spanish gained a commanding lead in their race to to the Tyrrhenian coast. Some resistance was encountered from the Tuscan militia, which Breitwitz had mobilized in the mountains of northern Tuscany with the approach of the Spanish army, particularly around to town of Piteglio (occupying a salient of Tuscan territory which the Spanish passed through), but these irregulars were only a mild annoyance to the Spanish army. Once Schulenburg realized what the Spanish were doing, the general dispatched his own irregulars to pursue them and led the rest of his army southwest along the Secchio river towards the Apennines. To have any chance of catching his adversary, he decided it was necessary to take his army over the Pass of the Radici, the highest pass in the Apennines. This was a perilous route, which even this late in the spring had snow on the ground, and his troops were lashed by strong and freezing winds. Nevertheless, despite this adversity the Austrians trudged on over the mountains and descended into the Garfagnana.

The Spanish were enjoying a considerably easier progress. Upon reaching Lucca, they were welcomed by the friendly (albeit ostensibly neutral) population and were able to resupply before marching on to the sea. They were delayed somewhat by the diversions offered here - some soldiers were a bit too inclined to enjoy the city and its wine - but Campo Santo proved an able enough disciplinarian and managed to continue his march without too much time being lost. Once they had reached the coast, the Spaniards turned north to complete the last leg of their journey through the little state of Massa-Carrara before reaching Sarzana, the easternmost town of the Genoese Republic. All that concerned Campo Santo was the presence of Austrian irregulars - not Tuscan militia, but Croat irregulars and Catalan partisans[3] - who had arrived on the scene and were harassing his rear. Still, there was no sign of the main Austrian army, and Campo Santo presumed that they were too far behind to catch him. In fact Schulenburg had elected not to pursue the Spanish into Lucca and had instead marched northwest into the Lunigiana, attempting to circle around and cut off the Spanish before they reached Sarzana. He did not manage this, for he was still too far behind, but nature would grant him another chance.

The Spanish reached Sarzana with no further incident save for the continued harassment of the Austrian light troops. Once there, however, they found that there was no suitable passage over the Magra, the river which separated Sarzana. Snowmelt from the mountains had greatly swollen the river and turned it into a surging, icy torrent. The Spanish had no choice to begin constructing a bridge, but this was expected to take several days, and was further delayed when the first bridge they tried to raise unceremoniously collapsed into the river. This crucial delay allowed Schulenburg to arrive on the scene with his main corps. The Austrians launched an attack against the Spanish, seeking to drive them into the river; as both sides lacked artillery and there was not much room in the valley for cavalry maneuvers, the fight was largely an infantry brawl. The Austrians outnumbered their foes but were exhausted by their gruelling march over the mountains, and the Spanish infantry fought with exceptional valor. A general assault by the Austrians was met by a counter-charge of Spanish bayonets, which sent the Austrians tumbling back in confusion. Rather than risk further losses, Schulenburg withdrew to a safe distance, and the Spanish were dissuaded from pursuit by the covering action of the Croats and Catalans.
The Spanish completed their second bridge on the following day (May 23rd) despite continued skirmishing by the Austrian irregulars, and this span proved more durable than the first. With the Austrian army still on the scene, however, withdrawing over the river would be perilous, for Schulenburg might attack while the army was split in half by the river. Campo Santo ordered only the baggage and the wounded moved across during the day, and waited for dusk to begin a general retreat. The Austrians, however, did not let up the pressure, and sporadic close-quarters fighting continued through the night as Austrian detachments made probing attacks on the Spanish position. Despite Campo Santo’s orderly plan, moving more than 10,000 men over one improvised bridge in a single night was not an easy task, particularly under such pressure, and a traffic jam soon developed. As dawn began approaching, Schulenburg realized the enemy’s difficulties and launched another all-out attack. Much of the army remaining on the east bank simply fled, throwing themselves at the bridge in a desperate attempt to reach safety. Only a staunch defense by the Spanish rearguard, in particular the Irish Hibernia regiment, saved the army from a complete collapse, and only at the cost of the near-obliteration of the regiment. Even with their bravery, however, some 2,000 Spanish and Neapolitan troops were killed or captured on the east bank, and when the Irishmen were overrun the remaining troops on the bridge fled so precipitously that the Austrian vanguard succeeded in capturing the bridge intact.[A]

In a technical sense, Campo Santo had accomplished his goal: He had evaded the Austrians and managed to reach Liguria with his army. But that army was a shadow of its former self. The Austrian irregulars had steadily chipped away at them during their march to the sea, they had been savaged in the Battle of Sarzana, and the Austrian seizure of the bridge allowed elements of Schulenburg’s army to cross the Magra and inflict serious casualties on the Spaniards as they made a disordered retreat towards Spezia. Of the 12,000 men Campo Santo possessed at the start of the campaign, fewer than 7,000 were in a fit state to fight at the end of May. His artillery had been left behind at Orbetello, his cavalry had lost most of their horses, and many of his men were walking wounded. Madrid attempted to spin the Battle of Sarzana as a heroic escape, and the Spanish had indeed performed heroics. The Spanish infantry fought tenaciously and the Irishmen were particularly praised, with the Hibernia regiment (or what was left of it) bearing the proud but macabre nickname of the “Irish Regiment of Death” for years thereafter. But despite this performance it is difficult to call Sarzana a Spanish victory, for the weary and depleted army which came staggering into Genoa in June was probably not of tremendous value to the Bourbon offensive.

As Schulenburg and his opponent were chasing each other through the Apennines, the grand Gallispan army had begun its slow but inexorable advance into Liguria. Belle-Isle’s greatest fear was that the Sardinians would strike him on the march as his army was stretched in a long, snaking column, but no such attack was forthcoming. The Sardinians found the Ligurian Apennines to be devoid of supplies and even with the capture of Ceva could not bring a serious counterattack to bear against the invaders. Owing to delays caused by bad roads and British bombardment, the Gallispan host would not even set foot in enemy territory until late June, but the glacial speed of the advance did not lessen the overwhelming force which it was poised to deliver.

Footnotes
[1] “Marquis de Campo Santo” was a victory title given to de la Torre after his participation in the Battle of Campo Santo in 1743, in which he led a commendable cavalry action. Coincidentally, his maneuverings between Modena and Bologna in the spring of 1745 were not far from the 1743 battle site just north of the Panaro.
[2] The Republic of Lucca was a small and weak state centered around the city of Lucca just north of Tuscany. Adroit diplomacy and strong fortifications had managed thus far to preserve Lucca’s independence against stronger neighbors and they had wisely remained neutral in the war, but it seems clear that the Lucchesi themselves favored the Bourbon cause. It was not a violation of neutrality (as it was understood in the 18th century) to accede to the mere passage of a belligerent army, nor to permit the sale of provisions to said army.
[3] The Austrian army in Italy employed a unit of several hundred Catalan irregulars or "partisans," most of them apparently deserters from the Spanish army, led by a certain Colonel Soro (Count Soro in some sources). The Spaniards considered Soro to be a rebel and a traitor, and had standing orders to execute any soldiers of his unit who were captured.

Timeline Notes
[A] IOTL, Gages followed a somewhat similar strategy, although the pass he used was the same that Schulenburg used ITTL, while Campo Santo made an easier crossing further south (IOTL Gages sent his baggage along that route instead). Gages, however, benefited from the fact that he had the larger army - he was originally supposed to attack the Austrians in Modena before suddenly receiving orders to go to Genoa instead - and that the Austrians were initially commanded by Lobkowitz, who was not entirely without merit in the early 1745 campaign but failed to assiduously pursue the foe. He was sacked and replaced with Schulenburg during the campaign, but not soon enough to matter. The Magra indeed presented a formidable challenge to the Spanish and they encountered considerable trouble trying to span it, but they were ultimately able to cross. As they made their crossing they came under attack from Austrian irregulars who nearly managed to seize the bridge behind them, but a small group of Irish soldiers managed to cut the bridge and swim back through the freezing, churning river whilst under enemy fire.