Timeline Planning: Walther Wever lives and Göring dies in June 1940

AbeLincoln1865

AbeLincoln1865

I've always found the Luftwaffe to be the most interesting branch of the Wehrmacht to read about, mainly due to the attritional nature of its operations. Therefore, I've decided to take a shot at writing a timeline about it.

Arguably the biggest cause of the Luftwaffe's defeat in World War II was the death of its Chief of Staff Walther Wever in 1936. As a result of his death, Ernst Udet was placed in charge of the Luftwaffe's Technical Office, replacing Wilhem Wimmer and sidelining Erhard Milch as head of aircraft production. Udet proved to be quite incompetent, worsening the designs of the Me210, the Do217, the He177, the Hs129, and the Ju88, while overall preventing Germany from producing as many aircraft as they could have. Udet's incompetence was only matched by that of Hermann Göring which is why this timeline includes his death. However, Göring was very important for getting the Luftwaffe as many resources as it did from Hitler, meaning the ideal time for him to die is shortly after the surrender of France, perhaps of a morphine overdose? Anyway, I have lots of ideas for this timeline, but I need input from those more knowledgeable than me.
 

Carl Schwamberger

At the macro level little changes. Its too late to implement Weavers ideas for a strategic bomber fleet. The Axis air forces are still shot out of the sky in 1943-44. Many details would change & the air war might be bloodier for the Allies in the last couple years. Might is the operative word, Weaver may have misjudged the situation in the critical years of 1940-41 just as much as Goering, Milch, & Udet. Or Weaver could have lost out in a nazi political fight over Goerings empire. Imagine the fallout had Himmler won the fight for the GAF. I don't think SS runes on the FW190 fuselages would help at all.
 
AbeLincoln1865

AbeLincoln1865

Carl Schwamberger said:
At the macro level little changes. Its too late to implement Weavers ideas for a strategic bomber fleet. The Axis air forces are still shot out of the sky in 1943-44. Many details would change & the air war might be bloodier for the Allies in the last couple years. Might is the operative word, Weaver may have misjudged the situation in the critical years of 1940-41 just as much as Goering, Milch, & Udet. Or Weaver could have lost out in a nazi political fight over Goerings empire. Imagine the fallout had Himmler won the fight for the GAF. I don't think SS runes on the FW190 fuselages would help at all.
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I don't think Himmler was that powerful for something like that in 1940.
 

Gudestein

Michele has a TL called “A Better Show” which gives you very good input up until the BoB with the Wever Lives POD.
 
AbeLincoln1865

AbeLincoln1865

The book Luftwaffe over Scotland by Les Taylor which I greatly recommend, discusses the two major problems German bombers had in the war. The first was that the Ju88 and Do217 had a poor layout compared to American and British aircraft, meaning that if the pilot was killed, the rest of the crew was also likely to be as well, or unable to remove the dead pilot from his position in the cabin. The second was that unlike the RAF, German bombers were not required to take photographs showing they dropped their payload on target. Would Wether still being around and the lack of Udet change any of this?
 

hammo1j

Donor
Hmmm have you been reading the "Luftwaffe a History" by John Killen?

Udet was unsuitable for high command, but a brilliant fighter Ace. Strategic airpower as advocated by Wever may not have been the best for the LW though.

I think the only consequence is that as a result of the dive bomber directive, the Ju88 would be more available in BoB and the He 177 would have 4 engines. Same result but perhaps a month of delay and WW2 finish of say June 1945.
 
AbeLincoln1865

AbeLincoln1865

hammo1j said:
Hmmm have you been reading the "Luftwaffe a History" by John Killen?

Udet was unsuitable for high command, but a brilliant fighter Ace. Strategic airpower as advocated by Wever may not have been the best for the LW though.

I think the only consequence is that as a result of the dive bomber directive, the Ju88 would be more available in BoB and the He 177 would have 4 engines. Same result but perhaps a month of delay and WW2 finish of say June 1945.
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Never read it unfortunately.

The best book I've found on Wever is The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940 by James S. Corum. It says that he wasn't blind to the flaws of strategic airpower and favored a well rounded air doctrine.

Wasn't the He177 designed with two engines from the outset?
 
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AbeLincoln1865

AbeLincoln1865

Byzantine fanatic said:
Surely the Luftwaffe's real problem was:

1. Fighting Britain, the USSR and the USA all at once

2. Fuel shortages. Germany did not have enough oil. In the operation at Stalingrad, there were enough planes in theory to supply the Sixth army. But they couldn't fly due to lack of fuel.
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1. Agreed, but not really relevant to this discussion.

2. Didn't this only become really bad in late-1943 and 1944? The real problem at Stalingrad was attempting the airlift at all.
 

Carl Schwamberger

AbeLincoln1865 said:
1. Agreed, but not really relevant to this discussion.
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Its very relevant. When out numbered 2-1, in a battle where attrition is important, it creates a cascade effect in losses. When you become out numbered 3-1 it really gets worse. The effort to increase production of aircraft & air crew started in 1942. It succeeded in keeping aircraft production at or close to a 1-2 ratio of German to Allied production. The trade off was a decline in quality & a significant increase in losses from mechanical failure. The same occurred with aircrew of pilot training. The system was breaking down in 1942 & the decline in aircrew quality can be traced as the year spun out In both cases the trend was showing fatal effects by the start of 1943.

2. Didn't this only become really bad in late-1943 and 1944? The real problem at Stalingrad was attempting the airlift at all.
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In terms of losses of combat aircraft and aircrew the problem had emerged at the end of 1942. it was fatally bad then & only looks better when compared to the far worse situation in late 1943. In mid 1943 the Italian air force had been effectively eliminated & both air campaigns over Sicilly and South Italy were conceded in July and again in September. Tactical victories notwithstanding the loss ratios in the Mediterranean were unsustainable, pushing to catastrophic. The air over France and wester Europe had been conceded as 1942 spun out. With bomber and interceptor actions having the nature of raids. In the east the German sir force could obtain parity only by concentrating over narrow sectors of the theatre. other sectors had to be abandoned to achieve this. As the Allied bomber offensive ramped up in mid 1943 The decision was made to cease efforts to operate significant numbers of fighters over the battle fronts. From the East approx 70% of the operational fighter strength was with drawn in the second half of 1943. Efforts to rebuild fighter strength in the Mediterranean ceased & replacements slowed to a trickle. This concentration of fighter strength over Germany created the conditions for the massacre of the US bomber raids in the Autumn of 1943, but this was the last effective effort. Some what akin to a blood circulatory system constricting flow to the limbs to concentrate the remainder in the central torso. The advantage lasted less than four months over Germany.

Statistically this trend can be seen in replacement and loss data as far back as the Autum of 1942. Just the projection for expected strengths on the war fronts in the first quarter of 1943 show the Axis or Germans are in serious trouble. The actual losses reflected the previous trends. Note that while Germany was able to more than double their production of airframes during 1942-1944 the front line operational strength remained relatively static, fluctuating between 4,500 & 6000 aircraft from month to month. The Allies increased their operational strength in the UK alone from under 5000 combat aircraft in 1942 to some 12,000 in mid 1944. Allied air strength in the Mediterranean theatre more than doubled in the first six months of 1943, from a bit over 2,000 operational aircraft to near 6,000. In the same period Axis air strength trended down wards from parity to under 1,500 operating aircraft.
 
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