ferdi254
Banned
Farmer, your examples are exactly from situations in which the NATO will not be.
1. Both in 1940 and 1944 the attack taking place was an attack which nobody expected on the defending side. Here you have the NATO gathering exact evidence where which WP units are for two months.
2. In both cases the allies were not able to bring up any good CAS or strategic help, in 1940 the Luftwaffe more or less ruled the sky over the key points. Here you have a least a fully open air war. (BTW, what is the counter the WP has against F 117 and Tomahawks? Right answer: None.
3. Both those offensives were in places in which there were only a couple of roads to bring up support for the defenders (and in the former most of those units were 200 km away from the deciding points). Here especially the Bundeswehr is fighting on ist own turf.
4. In the 1940 case the Wehrmacht had the far superior doctrine and training (which is perfectly reversed here) and in 1944 at least had the Tigers against the Shermans.
If you want to have a 1940 or 1944 case than the WP would have to make an attack somehow across mountains and forests with a not so dense roadwork. Which is perfectly against (!) all what they were trained for Because for such a stunt you would need commanders trained to take initiative. And look how far the Wehrmacht got in 1944 with an 41 divisions against 4 American. Just a bit over 120 km at the farthest place. OK this is above the 50 km mark I set here but given the different circumstances...
Sloreck that also answers a lot of your arguments. One I may be wanking slightly the tank quality but for the training, no I do not. Remember the WP ITTL is moving up CAT C and CAT D troops (in one scene in Red storm rising a US tank company is stopping a full C rated WP tank Division)
The north 50 km of the gap are in reality full of waterways, lakes and small towns, hard to attack. The next 50 km only have one crossing over the Elbe (which is already well within FRG territory) so the NATO does not have to guess that much. And key bridges will be blown up anyway. They can put half the tanks around Lüneburg, half around Braunschweig and the WP will be coming their way. If they put too many to one side, just move them. Nato may face difficulties doing so, WP is impossible to.
For the famous NATO myth of all the Spetsnats troops. One is that this would make only sense if you want to start a war which the Politoffice never(!) wanted. Second, how many would you need to really do some damage, especially considering as this myth was very alive in NATO circles, so there would be heavy security on places and third, Afghanistan has taught us that those were far away from the supersoldiers as they were depicted.
For landlines being out of order: There is one thing that is often overlooked. We are talking West Germany here. In 1945 the innergerman phone was still working! To seriously do some damage to the German cable a) most was underground b) not only for the cold war it was deliberately designed to be triple and quadruple redundant. It would take a prolonged air offensive to make dents into that (One cannot say that the RAF and USAF did not seriously try 1942-45).
WP Units attacking would be under air attack as well and if Farmer builds in huge amounts of terrorists and sympathizers in the FRG helping the WP than it is getting ASB. The RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion) had at best 30 members and inviting the WP was not on their agenda. In 1984, after the losses during the attack, we may be talking 6 or 8 people left.
1. Both in 1940 and 1944 the attack taking place was an attack which nobody expected on the defending side. Here you have the NATO gathering exact evidence where which WP units are for two months.
2. In both cases the allies were not able to bring up any good CAS or strategic help, in 1940 the Luftwaffe more or less ruled the sky over the key points. Here you have a least a fully open air war. (BTW, what is the counter the WP has against F 117 and Tomahawks? Right answer: None.
3. Both those offensives were in places in which there were only a couple of roads to bring up support for the defenders (and in the former most of those units were 200 km away from the deciding points). Here especially the Bundeswehr is fighting on ist own turf.
4. In the 1940 case the Wehrmacht had the far superior doctrine and training (which is perfectly reversed here) and in 1944 at least had the Tigers against the Shermans.
If you want to have a 1940 or 1944 case than the WP would have to make an attack somehow across mountains and forests with a not so dense roadwork. Which is perfectly against (!) all what they were trained for Because for such a stunt you would need commanders trained to take initiative. And look how far the Wehrmacht got in 1944 with an 41 divisions against 4 American. Just a bit over 120 km at the farthest place. OK this is above the 50 km mark I set here but given the different circumstances...
Sloreck that also answers a lot of your arguments. One I may be wanking slightly the tank quality but for the training, no I do not. Remember the WP ITTL is moving up CAT C and CAT D troops (in one scene in Red storm rising a US tank company is stopping a full C rated WP tank Division)
The north 50 km of the gap are in reality full of waterways, lakes and small towns, hard to attack. The next 50 km only have one crossing over the Elbe (which is already well within FRG territory) so the NATO does not have to guess that much. And key bridges will be blown up anyway. They can put half the tanks around Lüneburg, half around Braunschweig and the WP will be coming their way. If they put too many to one side, just move them. Nato may face difficulties doing so, WP is impossible to.
For the famous NATO myth of all the Spetsnats troops. One is that this would make only sense if you want to start a war which the Politoffice never(!) wanted. Second, how many would you need to really do some damage, especially considering as this myth was very alive in NATO circles, so there would be heavy security on places and third, Afghanistan has taught us that those were far away from the supersoldiers as they were depicted.
For landlines being out of order: There is one thing that is often overlooked. We are talking West Germany here. In 1945 the innergerman phone was still working! To seriously do some damage to the German cable a) most was underground b) not only for the cold war it was deliberately designed to be triple and quadruple redundant. It would take a prolonged air offensive to make dents into that (One cannot say that the RAF and USAF did not seriously try 1942-45).
WP Units attacking would be under air attack as well and if Farmer builds in huge amounts of terrorists and sympathizers in the FRG helping the WP than it is getting ASB. The RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion) had at best 30 members and inviting the WP was not on their agenda. In 1984, after the losses during the attack, we may be talking 6 or 8 people left.
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