What if Germans preemptively occupied French North Africa in July 1942?

[raharris1973]

what if equivalent forces to those sent in to Tunisia under Walter Nehring from the day after otl's op Torch started were sent to occupy Tunisia, Algeria and Morrocco in late July 1942? What are the prospects for this atl's operation torch later in the year?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

What would this mean for those forces trying to fight the 8th Army?

Between the end of May and end of July some major actions were fought in the Desert - Gazalla, Mersa Matruh and of course first El Aleimain

Also would Benny allow a weakening of forces in Libya - I don't beleive so

Lastly such an op might shift Vichy French sympathies to the Free French camp with all the implications that this envisenged.

There is far too much going on in the East of Libya/Egypt requiring a total effort (that proved OTL to be insufficient) to withdraw troops and supplies to occupy Tunisia, Algeria and Morrocco where there was no fighting

 

[Lord Wyclif]

Don’t actually see this happening. Malta would have to be taken first. This action, though I recon was within the capability of the German war machine, would be costly in terms of manpower. Britain was humiliated at the loss of Singapore, but would fight tooth and nail to avoid the loss of the island fortress.
Logistically less manpower, fuel and ammunition available for Operation Blue which would result in an earlier Russian advance west.
With Monty holding Rommel at El Alamein we could see an Anglo-American landing in NW Europe in 1843.

 

[MattII]

All the Vichy colonies switch sides immediately after the German invasion.

 

[Gudestein]

I voted Torch would not be attempted, but I have a hard time seeing those kind of forces being send to a quit front at this time without hindsight or maybe a trusted Intelligence breach.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Using what for an army

 

[Magnum]

what if equivalent forces to those sent in to Tunisia under Walter Nehring from the day after otl's op Torch started were sent to occupy Tunisia, Algeria and Morrocco in late July 1942? What are the prospects for this atl's operation torch later in the year?

I think the first question we need to ask ourselves is "can they?"

look what happened to the Allies when they tried landing directly at the harbors of Oran and Algiers:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Reservist
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Terminal

OTOH, sticking around long enough to land on the beaches close to those ports leaves the Italian invasion fleet extremely vulnerable to the Allied warships at Gibraltar.

IMO, anything further west than Philippeville is extremely dicey, if not beyond the capabilities of the Axis of June '42

 

[Gudestein]

I think the first question we need to ask ourselves is "can they?"

look what happened to the Allies when they tried landing directly at the harbors of Oran and Algiers:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Reservist
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Terminal

OTOH, sticking around long enough to land on the beaches close to those ports leaves the Italian invasion fleet extremely vulnerable to the Allied warships at Gibraltar.

IMO, anything further west than Philippeville is extremely dicey, if not beyond the capabilities of the Axis of June '42

If we want to go along with the discussion the OP wants, we might hypothesize that Vichy France get news of the operation and ask for German assistance?

 

[Magnum]

If we want to go along with the discussion the OP wants, we might hypothesize that Vichy France get news of the operation and ask for German assistance?

I'm not entirely convinced that if Petain, or more likely Laval, sent out a message, e.g. "The Germans and Italians are coming. You are to cooperate", that the local commanders in Algeria and Morocco would obey orders.

 

[starman]

From what I've read, Torch was originally scheduled for August 1942, but losses to U-boats delayed it until November. So an earlier date for torch may not have been possible--even assuming the allies would try it if defenses were much stiffer.

 

[starman]

Malta would have to be taken first.

Are you sure? The Germans sent substantial reinforcements to Africa late in '42 without taking it.

Logistically less manpower, fuel and ammunition available for Operation Blue which would result in an earlier Russian advance west.

Could it be achieved with reinforcements used in 1942-43 in the OTL i.e. not from Russia?

With Monty holding Rommel at El Alamein

If the reich perceived a threat to Vichy North Africa serious enough to occupy it, it would probably have Rommel pull back westward, so there wouldn't be an Alam al-Halfa battle.

we could see an Anglo-American landing in NW Europe in 1843.

Well maybe Dieppe made them too cautious and willing to wait until the requisite conditions were there in '44.

 

[Gudestein]

I'm not entirely convinced that if Petain, or more likely Laval, sent out a message, e.g. "The Germans and Italians are coming. You are to cooperate", that the local commanders in Algeria and Morocco would obey orders.

That is a big if, but also quite a decision to take unilaterally at a local level. As they didn’t actually invite the allies IOTL they might?

 

[James Ricker]

Germany doesn't have unlimited manpower, that's why they didn't do it in 1942.
Your going to need a lot of troops to occupy French North Africa. Where are you going to get them and what would be the consequences?
Taking them from troops fighting the British in Egypt could end the war in North Africa before Torch was supposed to happen. Taking troops from the Eastern front would be a very bad idea, taking troops from occupation duties in Europe would be a gift for the resistance and a major headache for Germany.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Don’t actually see this happening. Malta would have to be taken first.....

Malta is not in position or range to interdict the routes to Bizerte, Phillipeville, or anywhere in Algeria.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

From what I've read, Torch was originally scheduled for August 1942, but losses to U-boats delayed it until November. So an earlier date for torch may not have been possible--even assuming the allies would try it if defenses were much stiffer.

There was also the emergency in the Pacific, requiring diversion of cargo ships to reinforce Hawaii and the S Pacific. The shipment of material to the Red Army was being ramped up as well. And emergency shipments to India/Burma were added.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'm not entirely convinced that if Petain, or more likely Laval, sent out a message, e.g. "The Germans and Italians are coming. You are to cooperate", that the local commanders in Algeria and Morocco would obey orders.

OTL some French general fought the Allis & welcomed the Axis. Others did the opposite. It was extremely confused.

 

[Catspoke]

In practice, most of the lower level officers and Vichy government officials were anti German, against collaboration and against German occupation.

Resistance to a German invasion, will be light at first due to confusion, orders from above etc but would coalesce quickly. The amount of troops the Germans could move across quickly was pretty small in OTL. I could see an occupation of Tunis, Bone and Algiers but the interior would be restive and its a long way to Morocco.

Then the Germans have to feed the place, which was largely supplied by the USA. The place doesn't seem worth it. The Allies could re-invade whenever they are ready.

This only seems plausible in a no Barbarossa or a victorious Barbarossa scenario where you could commit a large contingent of air force, including lots of JU52s, then you could interdict Atlantic convoy routes and bring forward submarine bases. Perhaps the Germans would want to declare the independence of the colonies from the French to gain some internal support.

Really the Germans got a lot from having Vichy around, especially when doing Barbarossa, a secure area for a couple of campaign seasons, a blockade hole, their agents could flaunt themselves all over the place, a place they didn't have to supply.

 

[Oldbill]

I don't see how you can invade French N. Africa without Vichy France being taken also. That means occupation troops from somewhere. It also puts the entirety of French oversea possessions into the Allied camp. Darlan will keep his word and either scuttle or the ships sail. IOTL the French were desperate to hang onto their colonies and the MN. Start taking colonies and (by extension the MN, as you'll be forced to occupy Vichy) and they no longer have a reason not to resist by whatever means they have.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Darlan will keep his word and either scuttle or the ships sail. ...

Scuttle. The Armistice agreement allowed the Germans to restrict the fuel aboard ship. The fleet had enough in the bunkers for housekeeping, but fuel for training or patrols was carefully monitored. Really the Axis needed every drop pf bunker fuel for their own fleets & thats where much of it went.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

At this notional July 1942 date Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet existed. It was a USN organization controlled by the Atlantic Fleet with the US Army 1st and 9th Inf Div under its operational control. Both Divisions had been training for amphibious operations with AFAF from 1941. The 1st Marine Division had also been part of AFAF to April 1942, but had embarked for the S Pacific in April, along with the 1st marine Air Wing and the service support group. The 3rd Inf Div was enroute to the east coast in July 1942. It had been training for amphibious warfare since December of 1939 & had been part of Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet into 1942. This placed three US Inf Div and a corps HQ available to respond to a Axis entry into Africa on relatively short notice. Large scale exercises were ongoing and preparations for several contingent plans had been ongoing since early 1941. these included the GYMNAST Operations developed and redeveloped from January 1942. Putting these three divisions ashore on the Algerian, Moroccan littoral would not have been a serious challenge.

Several other Inf Div, and the 2d Armored Division were being prepared for the current Gymnast operation as non assault follow up, and the logistical support for the GYMNAST operations had been underdevelopment, tho a portions was diverted to support developing reinforcements in the S Pacific.

What the Brits had at the ready in July 1942 I can't say.