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Kantaro Suzuki: The elder statesman who negotiated a peace (1944-49)
Kantaro Suzuki: The elder statesman who negotiated a peace (1944-49)
After the collapse of the “Leizhou Peninsula” - Prime Minister Tojo’s position became increasingly untenable. The rapid advance of the NRA across Indochina sealed Tojo’s fate and Suzuki was appointed as Prime Minister by Hirohito. The appointment of Suzuki represented a fundamental shift in the balance of power between the Army and Navy. Thus far - the Army had been in a fairly ascendant position, but now - faced with a string of failures in Manchuria, China and Indochina - the Navy’s star was on the rise.
The Navy had seen nothing but success throughout the wire, they had succesfully destroyed China’s fleet at bay. Managed to isolate China from her allies and were doing real damage to China’s coastal industries and cities. The Navy was also a far more disciplined unit, the Special Naval Landing Forces didn’t engage in the sort of massacres that the Army did and while the Navy was very firm in shadowing American shipping to Chinese ports as a show of force - there were remarkably no incidents of accidental firing or conflict.
Therefore the veteran statesman Kantaro Suzuki - who was one of the eldest naval admirals and still influential among the Imperial Japanese Navy was bought in at the start of January 1944. The appointed heralded a shift in policy - one from direct invasions and large scale movements to more smaller scale raids and invasions. This had remarkable success with the destruction of the Huangkou dam showed. But Emperor Hirohito also had a hidden agenda. As a younger naval officer, Suzuki had visited the states and been received by Rear Admiral Fulham. Although Fulham was long dead, Suzuki still had some contacts among the American navy.
At this stage, Emperor Hirohito believed that the war was futile and that Japan should seek peace terms. Manchuria was lost and Japan had gained the Dutch East Indies and was holding the line in South Indochina. It was far better to consolidate her position now rather than wait for China to potentially overrun Manchuria and then Japan - or far worse, for the Japanese position to get so weak that the Soviets would take her place.
But Suzuki’s appointment was superseded by President Wallace’s peace plan. Japan, although publically looking like it was reluctant to enter negotiations - it was just tactic to increase Japanese concessions. Although Japan didn’t really gain anything at the peace table - her rule over the Dutch East Indies was confirmed.
Rebuilding:
After the war, Suzuki presided over a transition to a peacetime economy. One of the measures that he wanted to undertake was army reform - to shrink the bloated conscript army and replace it with a mechanized efficient, professional fighting force that weren’t ill-discilined rabble liable to raping and pillaging.
Needless to say, this inflamed tensions between him and the Army. The Army was delusional enough to have opposed the peace in San Francisco - spreading poisonous ‘stabbed in the back’ myths about how the Navy sued for peace to prevent the Army from winning the war. The notice of the Army reform plan in late 1947 caused the “Seoul Massacre” where a group of IJA soldiers in the Kwangtung Army refused their demobilization orders to come back to Japan and ran riot over Seoul - killing, pillaging and raping. Although SNLF Marines eventually restored control - this inflamed the Korean independence movement - causing a wave of riots, demonstrations and disobedience.
As a concession, Suzuki allowed the Crown Prince Yi Un of the Joseon Dynasty to return to Seoul and appointed him as Governor-General for Korea. This was part of a wider reform plan of wanting the “Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere” to actually exist in reality rather than being just propaganda. In addition, Suzuki also allowed Sukarno in Indonesia to form an ‘advisory commission’ to the Governor-General in Indonesia and to begin allowing Indonesian volunteers against the various guerillas and bandits that had arisen in Indonesia.
This charm offensive extended itself to other Asian countries and independence movements not in the Japanese sphere. South Indochina found itself awash with Japanese aid and supplies - as did the Burmese government. And when the chaos of confusion of the attempted Generals’ Putsch happened in April 1948 and distracted France and the chaos and confusion of the bloody days after the 1949 election happened in the UK - well - Japan was at hand to assist her friends in South Indochina and Burma. While Emperor Bao Dai’s cooperation in South Indochina was somewhat begrudging, the assistance and support of Ba Maw and the Burmese independence movement was more genuine as they believed (not incorrectly) that China betrayed them at the peace table to get Hainan back.
Suzuki saw this as vindication of his strategy. A Great East Asia Conference was scheduled to be held in Japan from the 5th-8th of November with representatives from South Indochina, Burma, Korea, Indonesia invited and delegations from Thailand and the Commonwealth of India invited to attend . It was widely rumoured that the “Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Association” would be formally declared there.
Of course, the militarists wouldn’t stand for this. The army had won Korea, Indochina and Indonesia fair and square - they weren’t going to let the navy betray them again at the peace table.
IJA mutineers taking positions outside the conference
On the first day of the conference, November 5 1949 mutinous soldiers led by Army Minister Anami seized the conference and killed Prime Minister Suzuki and appealed on ‘patriotic soldiers and true patriots’ to rise with them and seize control. Japan teethered on the brink and all eyes fell upon the Emperor.
Kantaro Suzuki: The elder statesman who negotiated a peace (1944-49)
After the collapse of the “Leizhou Peninsula” - Prime Minister Tojo’s position became increasingly untenable. The rapid advance of the NRA across Indochina sealed Tojo’s fate and Suzuki was appointed as Prime Minister by Hirohito. The appointment of Suzuki represented a fundamental shift in the balance of power between the Army and Navy. Thus far - the Army had been in a fairly ascendant position, but now - faced with a string of failures in Manchuria, China and Indochina - the Navy’s star was on the rise.
The Navy had seen nothing but success throughout the wire, they had succesfully destroyed China’s fleet at bay. Managed to isolate China from her allies and were doing real damage to China’s coastal industries and cities. The Navy was also a far more disciplined unit, the Special Naval Landing Forces didn’t engage in the sort of massacres that the Army did and while the Navy was very firm in shadowing American shipping to Chinese ports as a show of force - there were remarkably no incidents of accidental firing or conflict.
Therefore the veteran statesman Kantaro Suzuki - who was one of the eldest naval admirals and still influential among the Imperial Japanese Navy was bought in at the start of January 1944. The appointed heralded a shift in policy - one from direct invasions and large scale movements to more smaller scale raids and invasions. This had remarkable success with the destruction of the Huangkou dam showed. But Emperor Hirohito also had a hidden agenda. As a younger naval officer, Suzuki had visited the states and been received by Rear Admiral Fulham. Although Fulham was long dead, Suzuki still had some contacts among the American navy.
At this stage, Emperor Hirohito believed that the war was futile and that Japan should seek peace terms. Manchuria was lost and Japan had gained the Dutch East Indies and was holding the line in South Indochina. It was far better to consolidate her position now rather than wait for China to potentially overrun Manchuria and then Japan - or far worse, for the Japanese position to get so weak that the Soviets would take her place.
But Suzuki’s appointment was superseded by President Wallace’s peace plan. Japan, although publically looking like it was reluctant to enter negotiations - it was just tactic to increase Japanese concessions. Although Japan didn’t really gain anything at the peace table - her rule over the Dutch East Indies was confirmed.
Rebuilding:
After the war, Suzuki presided over a transition to a peacetime economy. One of the measures that he wanted to undertake was army reform - to shrink the bloated conscript army and replace it with a mechanized efficient, professional fighting force that weren’t ill-discilined rabble liable to raping and pillaging.
Needless to say, this inflamed tensions between him and the Army. The Army was delusional enough to have opposed the peace in San Francisco - spreading poisonous ‘stabbed in the back’ myths about how the Navy sued for peace to prevent the Army from winning the war. The notice of the Army reform plan in late 1947 caused the “Seoul Massacre” where a group of IJA soldiers in the Kwangtung Army refused their demobilization orders to come back to Japan and ran riot over Seoul - killing, pillaging and raping. Although SNLF Marines eventually restored control - this inflamed the Korean independence movement - causing a wave of riots, demonstrations and disobedience.
As a concession, Suzuki allowed the Crown Prince Yi Un of the Joseon Dynasty to return to Seoul and appointed him as Governor-General for Korea. This was part of a wider reform plan of wanting the “Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere” to actually exist in reality rather than being just propaganda. In addition, Suzuki also allowed Sukarno in Indonesia to form an ‘advisory commission’ to the Governor-General in Indonesia and to begin allowing Indonesian volunteers against the various guerillas and bandits that had arisen in Indonesia.
This charm offensive extended itself to other Asian countries and independence movements not in the Japanese sphere. South Indochina found itself awash with Japanese aid and supplies - as did the Burmese government. And when the chaos of confusion of the attempted Generals’ Putsch happened in April 1948 and distracted France and the chaos and confusion of the bloody days after the 1949 election happened in the UK - well - Japan was at hand to assist her friends in South Indochina and Burma. While Emperor Bao Dai’s cooperation in South Indochina was somewhat begrudging, the assistance and support of Ba Maw and the Burmese independence movement was more genuine as they believed (not incorrectly) that China betrayed them at the peace table to get Hainan back.
Suzuki saw this as vindication of his strategy. A Great East Asia Conference was scheduled to be held in Japan from the 5th-8th of November with representatives from South Indochina, Burma, Korea, Indonesia invited and delegations from Thailand and the Commonwealth of India invited to attend . It was widely rumoured that the “Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Association” would be formally declared there.
Of course, the militarists wouldn’t stand for this. The army had won Korea, Indochina and Indonesia fair and square - they weren’t going to let the navy betray them again at the peace table.
IJA mutineers taking positions outside the conference
On the first day of the conference, November 5 1949 mutinous soldiers led by Army Minister Anami seized the conference and killed Prime Minister Suzuki and appealed on ‘patriotic soldiers and true patriots’ to rise with them and seize control. Japan teethered on the brink and all eyes fell upon the Emperor.
- CCA
- Word Count: 950