Germany does not invade Belguim in 1914. What does Britain do?

[Tibi088]

Whether invited or not would be irrelevant to the principle that Germany must not control the Belgian Channel ports. "If Belgium took the more drastic step of allying with the Central Powers" means that Belgium has joined the Central Powers as an ally in the war and after it. For Britain, Belgium must not be in the Central Powers under any circumstance - any nonsense from Berlin that the alliance would end with the defeat of France would presumably be treated as an untruth, as once France was defeated Germany would be free to do whatever it wished with both France and Belgium.

So if Belgium is invaded by France and because of that Belgium accepts the help of the only power willing to give it - Germany, than Brittain will attack Germany and Belgium. Sorry but thats simply insane.

1. The channel ports wont be in german hands. They will be in belgian hands. If there will be german forces in Belgium they will be busy fighting the french in the southern part of the country not occupying allied territory.
2. Brittains declaration of neutering the channel has not been butterflied. Meaning if Germany tries to move ships to Antwerp and starts fighting in the channel than yes, Brittain will declare war. However if Germany formerly accepted Brittains declaration I dont see why they would start to ignore it in this situation and thus provoking war with London.
3. Germany will be busy throwing everything he can spare at the russians in the east. Im no expert of the military questions however I doubt how much troops they will have available to help Belgium and how much troops they are willing to move in to the area for this goal. Because without driving the french from Belgium they wont be near the channel ports and might well be cut off from not french occupied Belgium. However liberating Belgium means a much longer front and that means significant forces removed from the east. Im not sure if in a situation like this Germany would not decide its better not to exert itself too much on behalf of Belgium in order to keep the western front short. Cold but its a possibility.

 

[BooNZ]

To be precise, that once Britain signalled its intention to remain neutral, the civilian restrictions placed on the actions of the French army would be removed in direct response to that, and Joffre would be given a free hand with respect to Belgium. When the French army entered Belgium, so would the German, meaning that whatever happened afterwards, neutral Britain is faced with the prospect of having no say in the question of Belgium's fate.

On 1 August 1914 Grey signaled to Cambon the possibility the British might remain on the sidelines. The British would need to formally declare their neutrality to have any chance to influence the French to revisit the violation of Belgium neutrality, which is unlikely in the immediate future if Asquith and the British Cabinet continue to navigate the middle ground between the radical hawks and the radical doves.

If the French did stumble into the Belgium Ardennes, without sufficient maps or appropriate preparations, then the most likely scenario is Belgium formally becoming a co-belligerent against France. The Germans would be invited to expel the French from the Belgium territory, but it is unlikely the Germans would be granted access to the Belgium fortress line or beyond. The British can be satisfied that the immediate fate of Belgium is entirely secure.

The actual French campaign had three out of five field armies operating in the Ardennes, plus the BEF, so the French knew that the Ardennes were sufficient for the main effort, the common border the supporting effort. The Germans had 5 armies in the region, 2 of which crossed north of the Meuse. So, going in both directions, the Ardennes was roughly a 3-army front.

No, the BEF got nowhere near the Ardennes and the French 5th army generally operated to the west of Nampur - OTL only the French 3rd and 4th Armies operated attempted to advance into the Ardennes proper. Any French advance into the Ardennes would ultimately need to reorientate itself from a wider South-North advance into a more narrow West-East orientation. Further, it is only in the southern tip of the Ardennes that offers terrain remotely suitable for massed offensives, so any French forces beyond one Army would need to deal with terrain well suited for defence and face increasing difficult logistical challanges. The Germans were seeking to traverse the Ardennes, not attampt a sustained campaign therein.

Whether invited or not would be irrelevant to the principle that Germany must not control the Belgian Channel ports. "If Belgium took the more drastic step of allying with the Central Powers" means that Belgium has joined the Central Powers as an ally in the war and after it. For Britain, Belgium must not be in the Central Powers under any circumstance - any nonsense from Berlin that the alliance would end with the defeat of France would presumably be treated as an untruth, as once France was defeated Germany would be free to do whatever it wished with both France and Belgium.

No, Belgium intended to defend its neutrality against all comers. The Belgiums had no intention of providing the Entente with access to Belgian fortresses or ports in the case of limited German excursion into Belgium (i.e. the Ardennes) and it would be no different if the French decided to tresspass. Similarly, the Germans would be welcome to play in Belgium's back yard (i.e. the Ardennes) , but would not get the keys to the house (forts and ports). A wider invasion or assualt on Belgium forts/ ports would change the calculus.

 

[Glenn239]

If Belgium give Britain assurances that no foreign power will be allowed to occupy the Channel Ports, that could be, for the moment, enough for the UK.

The Belgians can assure the British as to the post-war actions of the Germans on the Channel Coast? I think not.

 

[sloreck]

@Glenn239 : Going with the "Germans don't invade Belgium" POD the question is what will happen in 1914, not 1924 or 1934. Assuming the CP "win" WWI, big gains in the east and modest ones in the west, are you positing at some point Germany would invade Belgium to get the Channel ports? Even if the Germans were pressuring the Belgians to give them basing rights, the British would apply more pressure the other way.

I can't see war being sold to the Cabinet, let alone the British public, on the basis of "the Germans are respecting Belgian neutrality now, but we are concerned that, should they defeat France, sometime in the future they may decide to use force to occupy Channel ports and therefore we declare war against Germany". If during "WWI" the Germans do drive for the Channel ports, Britain can have a ready force to prevent this - they can get there much faster than the Germans who have to fight across Belgium. Furthermore while fighting against France, with Britain neutral, invading Belgium to seize Channel ports (the sickle cut is out once fighting has begun) and assuring adding Britain to your enemies is well beyond even the worst blunders the Kaiser would make.

 

[MichaelWest]

@Glenn239 : Going with the "Germans don't invade Belgium" POD the question is what will happen in 1914, not 1924 or 1934. Assuming the CP "win" WWI, big gains in the east and modest ones in the west, are you positing at some point Germany would invade Belgium to get the Channel ports? Even if the Germans were pressuring the Belgians to give them basing rights, the British would apply more pressure the other way.

I can't see war being sold to the Cabinet, let alone the British public, on the basis of "the Germans are respecting Belgian neutrality now, but we are concerned that, should they defeat France, sometime in the future they may decide to use force to occupy Channel ports and therefore we declare war against Germany". If during "WWI" the Germans do drive for the Channel ports, Britain can have a ready force to prevent this - they can get there much faster than the Germans who have to fight across Belgium. Furthermore while fighting against France, with Britain neutral, invading Belgium to seize Channel ports (the sickle cut is out once fighting has begun) and assuring adding Britain to your enemies is well beyond even the worst blunders the Kaiser would make.

I think the issue is clouded by our foresight into the evolution of air power, by the late 1920s or 1930s, the bomber will present Britain with a far more dangerous threat than the Channel ports ever did, invasion is, even in 1914, a rather fanciful paranoia but a sustained bombing campaign is an increasing reality. Yet air power in 1914 offers ot even the glimmer of such future threat and as I would argue the threat of invasion is a deep fear but wholly unrealistic for Germany to dream of. Britain certainly should fear a German navy based in the Channel, indeed the true bulk of her maritime trade is dependent on the coastal shipping into and out of London connecting it with Britain and beyond. This is why Britain cordons the Channel neutrality or not. This is why the purer British strategy is to put the BEF in Belgium, influence the war without actually being on the front line, or at minimum ensure the Channel is not brought to war via Antwerp.

Here there appears no hope Germany will "race" to the sea, its Armies are wholly consumed deep in France trying to destroy the French Armies, true to doctrine, Germany is focused on its enemy's army not her territory. With the war narrowed to the Frontiers, Britain still as her historic playbook of operating on the sidelines, investing in an ancillary theater while using sea power to strike at the German ability to sustain the war, yet I agree that the public is likely not frothed to the same hysteria on nebulous future geo-political possibility. With Germany behaving to norm and respecting Belgium, Britain is left hamstrung, any push for war will be against an opposing voice which likely gains volume as the war turns into a stalemated meat grinder. As it was the BEF was deployed to intervene in Belgium not go to war with the French into Germany, things only got serious as the First Army moved to occupy ground bordering the historic Channel ports, the Race to the Sea proved the point, yet here the First will be off in the East and Northern France untouched. Even in defeat France stands to lose more terrain around A-L, not the coast. With the POD herein the threat to the Channel is an obvious Red Herring, the only threat is the HSF at sea and that is what the RN was built to counter.

 

[Glenn239]

So if Belgium is invaded by France and because of that Belgium accepts the help of the only power willing to give it - Germany, than Britain will attack Germany and Belgium. Sorry but thats simply insane.

There is a school of thought that is wrapped up in the ideology that Britain alone of all the Powers in the world in 1914 was basing its policy on globalist legal rule of law, even if obeying those laws lead directly to geopolitical catastrophe for the British Empire. That's fine, but the obverse interpretation is that morality doesn't impact national strategy and whatever needed to be done must be done. The two facts of British policy were that Germany must not defeat France and neither France nor Germany can be allowed to dominate Belgium. Those would require Britain to side with France regardless of any other consideration. That logic chain is straightforward.

1. The channel ports wont be in german hands. They will be in belgian hands. If there will be german forces in Belgium they will be busy fighting the french in the southern part of the country not occupying allied territory.

The Belgians are allied to Germany so the Germans are marching straight through Brussels into France. During the war the Germans can placate the British to their heart's content with statements about how Germany will not continue the alliance with Belgium after the war, yada yada yada. But once France is defeated, Germany can actually do whatever it wants on the Channel Coast, which is the exact one scenario that Britain must never allow.

2. Brittains declaration of neutering the channel has not been butterflied. Meaning if Germany tries to move ships to Antwerp and starts fighting in the channel than yes, Brittain will declare war. However if Germany formerly accepted Brittains declaration I dont see why they would start to ignore it in this situation and thus provoking war with London.

Germany won't provoke anything with Britain until it wins the war against France and Russia. But once France is defeated and peace imposed, now Germany can move its ships to Antwerp and Brest. By your own admission, Britain must declare war. But France and Russia are already defeated. So, Britain's position would be hopeless - it cannot wait till France is defeated and it cannot trust Germany's intentions.

3. Germany will be busy throwing everything he can spare at the russians in the east. Im no expert of the military questions however I doubt how much troops they will have available to help Belgium and how much troops they are willing to move in to the area for this goal. Because without driving the french from Belgium they wont be near the channel ports and might well be cut off from not french occupied Belgium. However liberating Belgium means a much longer front and that means significant forces removed from the east. Im not sure if in a situation like this Germany would not decide its better not to exert itself too much on behalf of Belgium in order to keep the western front short. Cold but its a possibility.

Germany will go through Belgium with the historical war plan, but this time with a Belgian corps or two on the very right flank. France may lose Paris and the war in short order.

 

[MichaelWest]

On 1 August 1914 Grey signaled to Cambon the possibility the British might remain on the sidelines. The British would need to formally declare their neutrality to have any chance to influence the French to revisit the violation of Belgium neutrality, which is unlikely in the immediate future if Asquith and the British Cabinet continue to navigate the middle ground between the radical hawks and the radical doves.

If the French did stumble into the Belgium Ardennes, without sufficient maps or appropriate preparations, then the most likely scenario is Belgium formally becoming a co-belligerent against France. The Germans would be invited to expel the French from the Belgium territory, but it is unlikely the Germans would be granted access to the Belgium fortress line or beyond. The British can be satisfied that the immediate fate of Belgium is entirely secure.



No, the BEF got nowhere near the Ardennes and the French 5th army generally operated to the west of Nampur - OTL only the French 3rd and 4th Armies operated attempted to advance into the Ardennes proper. Any French advance into the Ardennes would ultimately need to reorientate itself from a wider South-North advance into a more narrow West-East orientation. Further, it is only in the southern tip of the Ardennes that offers terrain remotely suitable for massed offensives, so any French forces beyond one Army would need to deal with terrain well suited for defence and face increasing difficult logistical challanges. The Germans were seeking to traverse the Ardennes, not attampt a sustained campaign therein.



No, Belgium intended to defend its neutrality against all comers. The Belgiums had no intention of providing the Entente with access to Belgian fortresses or ports in the case of limited German excursion into Belgium (i.e. the Ardennes) and it would be no different if the French decided to tresspass. Similarly, the Germans would be welcome to play in Belgium's back yard (i.e. the Ardennes) , but would not get the keys to the house (forts and ports). A wider invasion or assualt on Belgium forts/ ports would change the calculus.

And I think Asquith steers dead center into that middle ground as the winds blow him further out to sea.Britain cordons the Channel and the Grand Fleet scurries off the Scotland, the BEF stands ready for some contingency. The Franco-German Armies begin their battles as the Russians meet Germany n East Prussia and A-H further South. The British lend aid to France and Russia, pressure Italy and the Ottomans to sit things out, watching events unfold, both hawks and more so doves crying "I told you so."

Arguably we do not know how the Battle of the Frontiers would turn out since the invasion of Belgium shifted the war to the West and into France. But we can look at how the Armies might align. Only the German Fourth fought over Luxembourg and near Southeast Belgium, the Third here is poised to move into Belgium or serve as the reserve. he French 4th was to move fully to join the drive into Lorraine, the 3rd would be pinning the Fourth and fortress Metz, only the 5th is poised to invade Belgium or stay the reserve, moving to the South once Germany proves not coming through Belgium. From this we begin the speculation and I find Joffre's inclinations to seek a way at Germany itself, the Ardennes are inviting, and we have some evidence he pressured for it, we know he intended the 5th to meet the Germans in Belgium as he assumed they were coming but South of the Meuse, here he has a wide open path but for the reluctant politicians in Paris. I think we can argue whether he violates Belgium, I think we should. Just as we should debate if the German Third attempts a similar move for similar reasons, attempt to flank the fighting hanging upon the Franco-German frontier.

I feel the consensus is that Belgium is defending its neutrality and opposing any incursions, but a violation far off in the Ardennes is far from the Belgian heart, distant from its forts and Army, the resistance will be token yet the implications weighty. A French offensive East by Northeast from France into Belgium Luxembourg towards Luxembourg will play out per OTL as the French 3rd and 4th tangled with the Fourth. Here the 4th likely is further South and it is the 5th moving on the West to East axis. The Third oves into Belgium along the border between Luxembourg and Belgium to find or flank the 5th. We can speculate if Germany moved first or Joffre but here is the anticipated war in Belgium south of the Meuse only.

I think this is the casus belli Belgium everyone presumed from years before right through to August 4. The arguments seem to be that paranoid Britain deploys the BEF upon DoW as Germany is the villain and threatens the Channel on one side versus Britain wrings its hands as the violation is minor, France cannot lose and Britain has no consensus its vital interests are at stake. Both are good arguments.

 

[Glenn239]

@Glenn239 : Going with the "Germans don't invade Belgium" POD the question is what will happen in 1914, not 1924 or 1934. Assuming the CP "win" WWI, big gains in the east and modest ones in the west, are you positing at some point Germany would invade Belgium to get the Channel ports? Even if the Germans were pressuring the Belgians to give them basing rights, the British would apply more pressure the other way.

If Germany does not invade Belgium in 1914 then France must. If France too does not invade Belgium, then Belgium is neutral territory and Germany will pivot east with its main strength and either cause Russia to denounce its alliance with France and join the Central Powers, or Germany will create a coalition of countries, (Germany, Austria, Ottomans, Romania, perhaps Japan) to dismember the Russian Empire. Chop it to pieces. Serbia will also be crushed as a factor in the Balkans. Once the Russians are dealt with, then the Germans have two options regards to France; either make a treaty where France recognizes Germany's leadership role in Europe, or crush France by force. In either case, Belgium will naturally fall into Germany's orbit and Britain must deal with the continent as a subordinate deals with its superior.

I can't see war being sold to the Cabinet, let alone the British public, on the basis of "the Germans are respecting Belgian neutrality now, but we are concerned that, should they defeat France, sometime in the future they may decide to use force to occupy Channel ports and therefore we declare war against Germany".

I don't think the average Briton trusted the Kaiser much in 1914.

If during "WWI" the Germans do drive for the Channel ports, Britain can have a ready force to prevent this - they can get there much faster than the Germans who have to fight across Belgium.

If the British have built up their army to 60 or 80 divisions during the period when Germany is crushing Russia, then that would be a factor in German calculations. But would the British do that, or continue to limp along with a tiny army? And, could they get it to the continent in time to matter? This would also be a factor in German calculations. Don't forget that Germany during WW1 consistently, habitually, chose to escalate the military ante in hopes of total victory. And that was with even the USA!

 

[Tibi088]

There is a school of thought that is wrapped up in the ideology that Britain alone of all the Powers in the world in 1914 was basing its policy on globalist legal rule of law, even if obeying those laws lead directly to geopolitical catastrophe for the British Empire. That's fine, but the obverse interpretation is that morality doesn't impact national strategy and whatever needed to be done must be done. The two facts of British policy were that Germany must not defeat France and neither France nor Germany can be allowed to dominate Belgium. Those would require Britain to side with France regardless of any other consideration. That logic chain is straightforward.

The Belgians are allied to Germany so the Germans are marching straight through Brussels into France. During the war the Germans can placate the British to their heart's content with statements about how Germany will not continue the alliance with Belgium after the war, yada yada yada. But once France is defeated, Germany can actually do whatever it wants on the Channel Coast, which is the exact one scenario that Britain must never allow.

Germany won't provoke anything with Britain until it wins the war against France and Russia. But once France is defeated and peace imposed, now Germany can move its ships to Antwerp and Brest. By your own admission, Britain must declare war. But France and Russia are already defeated. So, Britain's position would be hopeless - it cannot wait till France is defeated and it cannot trust Germany's intentions.

Germany will go through Belgium with the historical war plan, but this time with a Belgian corps or two on the very right flank. France may lose Paris and the war in short order.

Your whole argument is based solely on this: Germany will attack Brittain so Brittain must destroy it first. What makes France and especially Russia more thrustworthy in the long run? Because lets face it, if the entente wins without Russia collapsing the latter will attain positions Brittain fought for nearly a century to prevent. And do you suppose that Germany will be in a position to threaten Brittain after the war? Even if Germany wins the war in 2 years with Russia defeated and France giving up and asking for terms after it Germany lost a great many man and money - while Brittain just got far richer thanks to the war. The social structure of the country (Germany) will change and you will have most likely the socialist in power. Without the defeat and the humilating peace you wont have rabid nationalist or nazis in power. And the notion that give the germans a tank and they will try to conquer the world might be funny but taking it seriously is stupid. Germany had the power and the diplomatic system to easily defeat France between 1871 and 1890 - but know what, they never attacked it. They had a stellar and never returning opportunity to beat France in 1905 after Russia's defeat and revolutions. They didnt attack. What reason would a victorius Germany have to attack Brittain? For the lol's? Because I seriously dont see any.

Sorry to say this as i dont like to be insulting but I see it like this: You have an unresonable fear/mistrust of Germany and the notion that Geermany is hell bent on attacking Great Brittain for whatever reason the first chance he gets. History disagrees with you as I pointed out above.

And even if we lieved in a world were you were right, Germany couldnt conjure up a fleet capable of taking on Brittain in a night. Brittain would have ample warning and opportunity to react. And as long as the British have the stronger fleet they can easily win any limited war with Germany: set up blocade, pick up all the german colonies, make peace when Germany is ready to give up.

 

[BooNZ]

My opinion is that the German shift East will be secret and very hazy, it should not be until the Russians engage them that they fully know Germany is putting more weight towards her, in the critical first days I think very little looks different, the intelligence is increasingly confused, doubtful and suspicious. I think you can plausibly argue that not enough looks different to change course, only Germany is making new moves, moves that are revealed after the others have committed.

Agree. OTL it was not until 14 August 1914 that Joffre reluctantly contemplated the Germans were committed to a wider invasion (beyond the Belgium Ardennes), despite the Liege fortress coming under sustained attack from 6 August 1914. Confirmation bias was prevalent in everyone's thinking at the time. Even if the Entente receive accurate intelligence of German intent, it would also be receiving vast quantities of misinformation.

Maintaining the fog-of-war for several days after the decision to turn east creates a potentially interesting scenario within the British Cabinet. If the British Cabinet continue to proceed on the expectation of a wider German invasion of Belgium, then OTL steps will likely result in the resignation of a number of radical doves within Cabinet. Once the fog has lifted, the radical hawks are discredited, but those radical doves are gone. What happens next?

I am trying to figure out why 1913 alters German thinking to total commitment West when circumstances are clearly putting Russia more and more on the board, if anything, after 1913 the planning should increasingly look like what we debate here, an Eastern deployment and a Western containment. The planning until 1913 kept Russia very much in the sights, my question mark is what clicked in Moltke to essentially abandon all he knew and all he seemed to plan for to try the biggest gamble in the West?

You and I both!

I don't think it has anything to do with the British. OTL the Germans expected the war to be decided on the continent and no continental power took the British army seriously. Further, Anglo-German relations were on the improve during those times...

I don't think it was fear of the Russians, since the German pre-war assessment of the Russian strengths and weaknesses proved to be rather accurate and the A-H military was strengthening faster than any Entente power in 1914 in terms of size and quality.

I don't think it was a matter of resourcing, since subsequent commentary from Groener and Von Staab suggest an eastern deployment plan could have been put together in 2-3 days on the fly.

In my opinion:

Moltke was out of his depth - an opinion shared by Moltke. Moltke may have felt drawn to the "Schlieffen Plan" and comfort the certainty of such a plan provided (i.e. maintaining the initiative). The alternative was to rely on tradition German doctrines of mobility, counter attack and decisive battle, which essentially surrenders the initiative to the enemy. Commanding millions of men from hastily drawn reactive plans is likely to fill even competent commanders with dread.

Alternatively, if the German military anticipated Belgium willingly joining with the Entente, then the Schlieffen Plan (or something similar) looks almost compulsory.

 

[sloreck]

IMHO putting together a plan for German deployment to the east, rather than the west, even on the fly would still have resulted in German forces in the east sooner and more ready than the Russian forces. Also, dealing with a major German effort in the east will deplete the already inadequate Russian supplies even faster than OTL.

 

[BooNZ]

The Belgians can assure the British as to the post-war actions of the Germans on the Channel Coast? I think not.

If the Germans do not pass the Belgium fortress line - certainly.

There is a school of thought that is wrapped up in the ideology that Britain alone of all the Powers in the world in 1914 was basing its policy on globalist legal rule of law, even if obeying those laws lead directly to geopolitical catastrophe for the British Empire. That's fine, but the obverse interpretation is that morality doesn't impact national strategy and whatever needed to be done must be done.

No, the OTL blockade of Germany demonstrated Britain could be incredibly creative on matters of legal interpretation (or should I say the OTL application of a doctrine of retaliation, since everyone knew whatever the British were doing did not conform to contemporary expectations of a legal blockade).

The two facts of British policy were that Germany must not defeat France and neither France nor Germany can be allowed to dominate Belgium. Those would require Britain to side with France regardless of any other consideration. That logic chain is straightforward.

No, you are conflating the opinion of Grey with British Policy, which would have preferred France not to be destroyed, but defeated, meh. In respect of Belgium, it was all about the ports.​

The Belgians are allied to Germany so the Germans are marching straight through Brussels into France. During the war the Germans can placate the British to their heart's content with statements about how Germany will not continue the alliance with Belgium after the war, yada yada yada. But once France is defeated, Germany can actually do whatever it wants on the Channel Coast, which is the exact one scenario that Britain must never allow.

No, the Belgians were serious about their neutrality and would not be allied to the CP powers, unless the Entente attempted a wider invasion and threatened the Belgium ports, forts, Belgium heartlands. A French or German excursion limited to the Ardennes would result in a substantially symbolic Belgium co-belligerence - nothing more.

Germany won't provoke anything with Britain until it wins the war against France and Russia. But once France is defeated and peace imposed, now Germany can move its ships to Antwerp and Brest. By your own admission, Britain must declare war. But France and Russia are already defeated. So, Britain's position would be hopeless - it cannot wait till France is defeated and it cannot trust Germany's intentions.

Why would Germany pursue a war against a neutral Britain? As outlined above, in most scenarios the Germans would remain a long way from the channel.

 

[benben]

Shall I remind that even OTL, Belgium considered itself as a co-belligerent if its guarantors, and not an ally ?

 

[Glenn239]

Your whole argument is based solely on this: Germany will attack Britain so Brittain must destroy it first.

You're whole argument is this: I trust Germany of 1914, therefore British statesmen in 1914 must have too.

What makes France and especially Russia more thrustworthy in the long run?

Because there are two of them.

You have an unresonable fear/mistrust of Germany and the notion that Geermany is hell bent on attacking Great Brittain for whatever reason the first chance he gets.

The British flipped out in 1908 when they thought the Germans laid down 4 dreadnoughts before their scheduled building dates. They. Lost. Their. Shit. Zero trust.

 

[Glenn239]

If the Germans do not pass the Belgium fortress line - certainly.

If the Belgians ally with Germany then the Germans will deploy troops along their LOC - Brussels, Antwerp, Liege, Namur, etc. These would never leave and Belgium would be swallowed into the German orbit after the war.

the Belgians were serious about their neutrality and would not be allied to the CP powers, unless the Entente attempted a wider invasion and threatened the Belgium ports, forts, Belgium heartlands.

Belgium would not ally with Germany.

A French or German excursion limited to the Ardennes would result in a substantially symbolic Belgium co-belligerence - nothing more.

Belgium's mobilization essentially surrendered the Ardennes to the belligerent Powers, so if the war had remained there, the Belgians would have stayed north of the Meuse and used diplomacy to try and work things out.​

Why would Germany pursue a war against a neutral Britain?

Germany would obey anything a neutral Britain demanded and would continue to do so right up until the Russian Empire was smashed and the French army destroyed. After that, the Germans would be free to ignore British demands and start making their own.

 

[Tibi088]

You're whole argument is this: I trust Germany of 1914, therefore British statesmen in 1914 must have too.

Because there are two of them.1

The British flipped out in 1908 when they thought the Germans laid down 4 dreadnoughts before their scheduled building dates. They. Lost. Their. Shit. Zero trust.

If you have the belief - belief because there is no fact supporting it - that Germany will attack Brittain as soon as it can than yeah, Brittain shall attack Germany in any case in WWI whatever Germany does. As long as this belief stands than I dont see any point in continuing this.

 

[MichaelWest]

Agree. OTL it was not until 14 August 1914 that Joffre reluctantly contemplated the Germans were committed to a wider invasion (beyond the Belgium Ardennes), despite the Liege fortress coming under sustained attack from 6 August 1914. Confirmation bias was prevalent in everyone's thinking at the time. Even if the Entente receive accurate intelligence of German intent, it would also be receiving vast quantities of misinformation.

Maintaining the fog-of-war for several days after the decision to turn east creates a potentially interesting scenario within the British Cabinet. If the British Cabinet continue to proceed on the expectation of a wider German invasion of Belgium, then OTL steps will likely result in the resignation of a number of radical doves within Cabinet. Once the fog has lifted, the radical hawks are discredited, but those radical doves are gone. What happens next?



You and I both!

I don't think it has anything to do with the British. OTL the Germans expected the war to be decided on the continent and no continental power took the British army seriously. Further, Anglo-German relations were on the improve during those times...

I don't think it was fear of the Russians, since the German pre-war assessment of the Russian strengths and weaknesses proved to be rather accurate and the A-H military was strengthening faster than any Entente power in 1914 in terms of size and quality.

I don't think it was a matter of resourcing, since subsequent commentary from Groener and Von Staab suggest an eastern deployment plan could have been put together in 2-3 days on the fly.

In my opinion:

Moltke was out of his depth - an opinion shared by Moltke. Moltke may have felt drawn to the "Schlieffen Plan" and comfort the certainty of such a plan provided (i.e. maintaining the initiative). The alternative was to rely on tradition German doctrines of mobility, counter attack and decisive battle, which essentially surrenders the initiative to the enemy. Commanding millions of men from hastily drawn reactive plans is likely to fill even competent commanders with dread.

Alternatively, if the German military anticipated Belgium willingly joining with the Entente, then the Schlieffen Plan (or something similar) looks almost compulsory.

And I believe the bold is why the possibility exists for the British to commit the BEF, as other argue was a certainty, but on rather less solid foundations. Thus in my arguments I maintain the fog, I entertain the reality that as the events unfold the thinking see confirmation of fears rather than actual events, so indeed Britain can stumble into the war just as Germany is stumbling out of Belgium. And what next is the $64,000 question mark. Britain at war over nothing? Faith in Asquith should crumble, the call should be for this government to fold. Pride likely keeps Britain at war, at least for a time, but perhaps we see nothing but token British effort. Unless Germany unleashes the Third Army into Belgium to pre-empt the British aggression? We can spin things off in weird directions.

My suspicion is you are correct, Moltke lost his nerve, he lost faith in the German doctrine that demanded finesse, he was seduced by the glory of being on the offensive, in control of destiny and hoped to hand Germany a swift victory rather than painstakingly fight a hard war. Perhaps he grew too confident in German superiority over Russia, events in East Prussia bear him out, at least in the first weeks. Perhaps he did overestimate the Austrians too. And maybe he assumed Belgium was not neutral, going Entente and thus it was a fair accompli, Belgium was the weak link he had to exploit or be defeated upon.

I do believe Germany could adapt to the order to move East and eschew Belgium, the West would be more like the battle fought by the Fifth and Sixth, a withdraw and defensive battle that opens to a counter blow, the French forced back with heavy casualties. It might proceed to a German offensive against the now demoralized, damaged and weaker French forces who should be in more disarray.

I am not convinced Moltke was out of his depth, numerous exercises, staff rides and planning showed he knew the script and his orders to Fifth and Sixth as well as Seventh showed he was using the tricky German strategy of defeating his enemy by fighting withdraw. It is the gamble to swing far right that seems the bolt from the blue. To have nothing but that in your quiver is the mystery. It is as if he had surrendered to fate the war he simply accepted.

 

[NoMommsen]

If you have the belief - belief because there is no fact supporting it - that Germany will attack Brittain as soon as it can than yeah, Brittain shall attack Germany in any case in WWI whatever Germany does. As long as this belief stands than I dont see any point in continuing this.

Can I double-like this ?

"... belief..." I think is the key word to be applied on the argumentative base presented in posts #1315, #1314, #1308 and many others of their author :

• "demanding" from politicians long dead what to do ("Britain must ..", "France must ...") or
• ignoring the same politicians aired opinions and positions - as well as the men themself - by putting a ... "higher" authority above them ("global politics", the "needs of the british empire", "Britain"), as if they were real persons participating in the political processes
• presenting "illogical" arguments like :
  • Brtitain will attack Germany regardless if mayor conditions/factors (invasion of Belgium or not) are different
• lack of sources to support such positions ... without reading sources with colored glasses and distorting their wordings, as well as contents by sophistic interpretations

as only some of the ... debatable points in this argumentation.

 

[corditeman]

This TL is getting lost in arguments...

...Can we please have a story?

 

[Tibi088]

This TL is getting lost in arguments...

...Can we please have a story?

This is not a written timeline just one huge what if argument. Its very interesting and educative if you care about it but thats it.