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The first Corsican standing army did not prove to be a great success. Theodore’s best victories against the French, at San Pellegrino and Ponte Novu, had preceded its creation, and the Corsican forces succumbed to the French onslaught less than a year after its formation. Thereafter the “army” shattered; after Ponte Leccia it ceased to exist aside from a small remnant company which went with Theodore over the mountains. Its failure can be attributed mainly to the greater force which the newly-appointed General Lautrec was able to bring against it, the incompetence and treachery among some of the most senior officers, and a lack of training and professionalism among what was in fact little more than a paid militia.

Corsica’s second standing army was formed not because of any serious internal threat as the nationals had faced in the winter of 1739-40, but to fulfill a contract. By accepting Turin’s money, Theodore had committed himself to raising a force that would - at least in theory - soon fight on European battlefields. Nevertheless, Theodore and his officers agreed that a standing force of some kind would have internal value as well. The Corsican “Free Battalion,” originally a renegade Corsican regiment in Tuscan service, had served ably at Porto Vecchio and the siege of Ajaccio and demonstrated the value of a trained and uniformed corps. By 1744, however, the Free Battalion had ceased to exist as a cohesive unit. With the Genoese driven from the Dila (save for Bonifacio) the battalion had lost its primary raison d’être, and the government could not afford to pay their salaries anyway. Many of its soldiers had deserted to return to their homes, and those that remained were gradually amalgamated into local militias, the small garrison company of Ajaccio, or the second regular army once this force began assembling in the Spring of 1744.

Unlike the first iteration of the regular army (“Fabiani’s Army”), the second iteration (“Giappiconi’s Army”) was meant to be revolutionary rather than evolutionary. Marquis Fabiani had conceived the first army as a means to retain militia units already in service on a long-term basis so the government would not be bereft of men come springtime. Accordingly, his new force resembled the existing militia bands it was drawn from: small companies of around 50 men, each usually drawn from its own pieve, who were completely without uniforms save for the ubiquitous green cockade. In contrast, Giappiconi wanted to draw a clear distinction between the royalist militias and an actual standing army. Aware that the new force was intended to be a European regiment which might eventually serve alongside other European regiments, Giappiconi designed a force which hewed more closely to continental standards, standards which he was personally familiar with as a former colonel in the Venetian army who had administered his own regiment there. Compared to Fabiani’s organization, the size of the companies in the new army was nearly doubled (to 98 men) and a company of grenadiers was added to each battalion to bring the regiment in line with continental norms. Giappiconi made few changes to the officer structure but notably did away with the conch-horn trumpeters, believing that they would seem rustic and unprofessional in Europe.

National Regiment, 1744 (1,194 men)
First Battalion:
Second Battalion:
Grenadier companies were in essence “veteran companies” which drew as much as possible from veterans of various now-defunct National units (the Corsican Guard, Fabiani’s army, the Free Battalion) and those who had experience in continental armies, including a fair number of Giappiconi’s ex-Venetian troopers. The count intended for them to serve as “demonstration companies” to teach drill to the rest of the battalion and to function as elite troops when necessary. They were paid no more than the fusiliers but were exempt from certain menial tasks like guard duty at camp.

Giappiconi also established Corsica’s first regular artillery unit. Although Theodore was not expected to provide artillery to the King of Sardinia (and the Corsicans would undoubtedly have embarrassed themselves if they had tried), it was clear that some kind of dedicated artillery corps would be valuable for use against Genoese fortifications. Giappiconi’s “battalion of artillery” was in fact a company of artillery, and a small one at that, which was accompanied by its own company of fusiliers. In theory, these “artillery fusiliers” were to serve as a guard detail for the guns and magazines, which is probably why Giappiconi noted that the men in this special unit should be chosen for their “reliability and sobriety.” They were also expected to serve as non-specialist gunnery assistants when the guns were in action.

Owing to the lack of competent personnel, the artillery company was always under strength, often critically so. The army was so desperate for gunners that anyone who had even handled a cannon, whether Corsican or foreign, was potentially eligible, and on occasion captured Genoese bombardieri were forcibly conscripted into the unit. Giappiconi offered a bounty to any smugglers or privateers who managed to recruit a gunner at Livorno or elsewhere and brought him back to Corsica, although it is unclear whether anyone actually claimed this reward. The artillery had no logistical or ordnance staff aside from a handful of carpenters and ferriers to build and repair carriages, and in practice the Corsican artillery relied heavily on local volunteers and militiamen to obtain and drive draft animals, move pieces, construct gun emplacements, and even to assist in firing when the attached infantry company was unavailable or insufficient.

National Artillery Battalion, 1744 (150 men)

Aside from these units there was also the foreign Leibgarde of the king, but that unit was not placed under Giappiconi’s jurisdiction and was not subject to his reforms. The composition of that unit is unknown, and its size varied considerably over the course of the war.

Uniforms

Count Giappiconi firmly believed that a standing army had to have uniforms. They were in the first place a point of pride, both for the nation and the soldiers themselves, but they also discouraged desertion by making it harder for soldiers to disappear into the civilian population. In Fabiani’s army transforming into a civilian had been as easy as unpinning a cockade from one’s hat, and many of his soldiers had done exactly that after their defeat by the French.

Prior to 1744, uniforms were a rare luxury among the national forces. A few hundred green-coated uniforms were delivered by the Syndicate Armada and worn during the campaign against the French, but as far as is known no more were made. These uniforms had presumably been designed by Theodore himself, but green dye was expensive, and despite Theodore’s newfound funding it was necessary to provide a more economically sensible uniform for the kingdom’s new regular forces. Traditionally, “white” uniforms (actually various shades of off-white) were common on the continent, particularly in the huge armies of France and Austria, because they could be made with undyed wool. Theodore’s government sought to economize in the same manner, but this resulted in a different sort of uniform because the wool of the Corsican sheep (the Muvra) was mostly brown and black.
Accordingly, the uniform ordinance of June 1744 stipulated that the “truppa regolata” (regulated troops) were required to wear black overcoats and breeches, which were ideally made from the undyed black wool on the breast of the Muvra. Corsican production, however, did not prove equal to demand, and particularly after the end of the blockade the army's supply of uniforms was supplemented by raiment produced in Tuscany and shipped to Corsica. As the Tuscans did not have access to the black wool of the Muvra, such foreign-made uniforms were dyed, usually with oak galls and iron, ingredients commonly used in the production of black ink. “True” blacks used in continental formal wear were usually dyed with logwood and copperas, imported ingredients which were significantly more expensive than locally obtained gall and iron, and it is likely that only officers would have been able to afford them (although a Corsican felucca was recorded as capturing a Genoese tartane carrying logwood off the west coast of Corsica in October of 1744, which for all we know may have been taken by the army). In practice the army's uniforms must have varied considerably in shade based on whether they were dyed or undyed; if dyed, the age of the uniform, the type of dye, and the quality of the dye job; and if undyed, the exact color of the wool used.

The uniform overcoat was simply made with no lining or lapels, distinguished from an ordinary black coat only by red cuffs and collar. Underneath the overcoat soldiers were to wear a waistcoat of the same red color, which like the color of the “black” overcoat tended to vary from uniform to uniform. The reason for the choice of red is unknown, but it was certainly one of Theodore’s favorite colors, and as imported dyes went red madder was fairly common and inexpensive to obtain. The ensemble was completed by buff-colored (undyed) leather gaiters and a black tricorne with the green royalist cockade. The result was a uniform that was relatively cheap to produce and at least made an effort to distinguish the soldier from the civilian. Certainly the red and black uniform was a clear contrast with the whites and blues worn by many Genoese regular troops, which may have been the intent.

The overcoat of the artillery corps was identical to that of the national infantry, but their waistcoats and breeches were camoscio (“chamois,” buff-colored) and their gaiters black. As the Corsicans did not have bearskins or miter caps, grenadiers were originally to be distinguished by carrying sabres, but this proved to be a financially questionable choice and the army never seems to have acquired many sabers over the course of the war. By 1745, and perhaps earlier, Corsican grenadiers were distinguished only by a red neckstock. Officers’ uniforms were not highly regulated but they usually added some lace (if they could afford it) and were instructed to carry a sword and an officer’s stick or cane.

Arms

The Second Royalist Army does not appear to have suffered from a lack of muskets, although procuring gunpowder, ammunition, and spare parts was a constant obsession of Theodore’s government. The types of arms used were extremely eclectic, but in 1744 were probably dominated by Livornesi imports; leftover Dutch muskets from the Syndicate (many of which had been hidden away by the rebels during the French occupation); and Genoese muskets either smuggled from Genoa or captured from Genoese troops and armories, which included French and Spanish imports but were chiefly Brescia-made barrels stocked and finished in Genoa. Bayonets were mandatory but nevertheless not universally available in 1744.

The bayonet-musket was the only required and provided weapon for the regulated soldiers, aside from the aforementioned (and rarely obtained) grenadier saber. Commissioned officers were required to carry a sword and typically wore pistols as well, but were not required to. The soldiers nevertheless armed themselves to the teeth, to the point where a British observer writing in 1745 was under the impression that the standard armament of the Corsican infantry was a musket, a pistol, and either a cutlass or dagger, although only the musket was ever required in the ordinances.