VI: Fire in the Sky
Kennedy Space Center
March 15th, 1981
The crowd of journalists at the press site stood watching from across the water at the Space Shuttle, standing at the launch pad, nearly entirely white from the Solid Rocket Boosters to the External Tank and to
Columbia herself. “Coming up on just two minutes away from launch,” the Public Affairs Officer spoke, “T-minus two minutes mark and counting.”
A nervous energy filled the crowd,
Columbia having been so close to launch on the 10th, but then having been halted because of a timing issue between the Shuttle’s main computers and backup. The launch of the Space Shuttle seemed so close as the next words of the PAO came out, “T-minus one minute and twenty seconds, we can see the purges of the main engine as we prepare for ignition.”
The Space Shuttle stood waiting on the pad, ready and eager for flight as the next series of comments came from the PAO, “T-minus one minute mark and counting. The firing system for the sound suppression water will be armed in just a few seconds.”
And for the crowd of journalists, the energy shot forth even further as they waited for the launch of the America’s next manned spacecraft. “T-minus forty-five seconds and counting.”
“T-minus twenty-seven seconds, we have gone for redundant set sequencer start.” Then came the words indicating (per a brief from one of the NASA employees) that if an abort was made that it’d have to go back much further to a ‘stable’ configuration. The tension in the crowd was anxious as the Shuttle continued towards what would hopefully be its first flight.
“T-minus fifteen, fourteen, thirteen, ten, nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, we’ve gone for main engine start, we have main engine start.”
The sound of the main engines of the Space Shuttle rumbled and echoed from the launch pad, the sight of steam and smoke emerging from the three main engines from the Shuttle. Then came the sudden roar of a more ferocious noise from the launch pad, and a much greater sight of smoke from the launch pad, as something began to emerge and leap from the launch pad, with the words of the PAO echoing as the crowd stood in sight of the launch.
“And we have liftoff of America’s first Space Shuttle!”
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It had been nearly two years from when STS-1 had originally been scheduled for launch, but
Columbia had finally set forth roaring into space.
Columbia had undergone an extensive testing schedule prior to launch, including a month spent at the Vehicle Assembly Building (from early November to mid December), before finally rolling out to LC-39A for the continued series of tests prior to launch. This had included a twenty second firing of the main engines (known as the ‘Full Readiness Firing’) to ensure the SSMEs ran smoothly, and everything had appeared on time for the launch on the 10th. However issues with the Shuttle’s five General Processing Computers (GPCs), in regards to a ‘timing’ issue between the four main and the one backup had forced a delay in order to fix the issue, with poor weather conditions having delayed it from what was expected to be a twenty-four hour fix to one lasting five days. Finally on March 15th, the Space Shuttle had launched.
STS-1 was entailed as the first of four planned ‘orbital flight tests’
[1] to be flown by the Shuttle program prior to it becoming operational. The primary mission for STS-1 was both the safe ascent and then the safe return of both the Orbiter and her crew, astronauts John Young and Bob Crippen. It was entailed as a two-day mission, in which both Young and Crippen would check out the primary Space Shuttle systems along with other associated testing in orbit while verifying everything from launch and ascent to reentry and landing of the Orbiter was fine in terms of flight characteristics. Inside the payload bay of
Columbia, the Development Flight Instrument (DFI) was present as the first ‘payload’ of the Space Shuttle, meant to perform measurements and recordings of the Space Shuttle during all phases of flight (from launch to orbit to landing).
For both Young and Crippen, the ascent of
Columbia had been nominal, although it had flown a slightly steeper trajectory than what had been expected by the time SRB separation had occurred. The ascent had lasted eight minutes and thirty-five seconds, and beyond that of flying the steeper trajectory with the SRBs, everything had gone a-okay. After a pair of burns by the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) circularizing
Columbia’s orbit, the next step for Young and Crippen were the opening of the payload bay doors in order to deploy the radiators that would keep the Shuttle cool. Throughout the rest of the day and the next, tests would be continued to perform in orbit, with Flight Day 3 scheduled for the preparation for the deorbit burn and return home. Among the most important of preparations was to make sure that the payload bay doors could close successfully. If they could not, Crippen was scheduled to perform an emergency one-man EVA to manually winch them shut
[2]. The EVA would be proven to not be needed as both payload bay doors would be shut successfully.
For the crew of
Columbia, the time now came for reentry, the only other part that had yet to actually be tested (like that of both launch and ascent). During reentry, the Space Shuttle was required to ‘bleed off’ the excess speed that was accrued from being in orbit so as to prevent it from generating into lift from the wings of the Orbiter and both prolonging the reentry and causing it to ‘skip’ along the atmosphere. The required bleed offs of excess speed were known as ‘roll reversals’, and for both Young and Crippen they would be faced with the kind of testing that Ames Research Center had been unable to replicate (because the available wind-tunnels could not reach the actual speed that the Space Shuttle would be coming in at during reentry). During the roll reversals, Young and Crippen would wind up confronting that the expected airflows over the wings and OMS pods had been unpredicted. The usage of the RCS thrusters during the roll reversals that had been meant to ‘stabilize’ the orbiter were also contributing to the unpredicted airflows (and potential loss of control). Thankfully, it had managed to stay within tolerances for the first (and highest inclined roll reversal). It was not the first issue encountered during reentry, as the second found itself in the unexpectedly high deflection of the body flap during reentry. The body flap on the Orbiter was used for the most part for providing pitch control to the Space Shuttle’s elevons during reentry in order to maintain the forty-degree angle of attack during reentry
[3]. It had been expected in testing that the body flap would deflect to seven degrees during reentry, but to the significant concern of Young and Crippen, it had reached as high as sixteen degrees during reentry
[4]. Despite the initial issues encountered from thee first roll reversal and the concerns over the body flap,
Columbia had wound up getting through reentry successfully before proceeding towards a smooth landing at Edwards Air Force Base. The first flight of the Space Shuttle had concluded successfully, with John Young remarking after landing, “This is the world’s greatest all electric flying machine. I’ll tell you that. It was super!”
The review and aftermath of STS-1 however had shown that compared to how it had seemed to be successful, it was arguably anything but. On ignition of the solid rocket boosters, it had been
under-estimated for the amount of force that would be created resulting in an over-pressure wave from the solid rocket boosters that had struck the Orbiter on launch
[5], resulting in the deflection of the body flap at six degrees (unknown to either John Young or Bob Crippen on
Columbia or any of the NASA personnel watching the launch until after STS-1 had landed)
[6] alongside that of damage to the struts in the forward reaction control system (FRCS)
[7]. The post-launch fixes to LC-39A and the launch procedure would include both increasing the water suppression system at the pad (in part due to the underestimation of force from the SRBs) and also that of the ignition of the SSMEs at launch. On ignition of the SSMEs, the entire stack proceeded to do a ‘twang’ motion, which if doing without the ignition of the SRBs saw the entire stack lean with the angle of thrust from the SRBs then away before finally going back to a ‘vertical’ poise. In the case of STS-1, the ignition of the SSMEs had occurred at T-3.8 seconds, seeing the stack leaning towards the ignition and then at a ‘vertical’ position before the ignition of the SRBs. For STS-2 and every flight after, the SSMEs would be ignited at T-6.6 seconds to allow the stack to perform a full ‘twang’ motion (of leaning forwards and then backwards) before the ignition of the SRBs. The modification of the SSME ignition was seen as having contributed in part to the overpressure wave that had been generated at launch.
But nevertheless, the conclusion of STS-1 had proven the Space Shuttle program was indeed structurally fine and had gone from what had been a design that had not been tested from launch through reentry to one that had been successfully done. For NASA, it’s future following the launch of the first Space Shuttle would rest with the new Administration that had won in 1980. For much of NASA, it was still a question as to where the future of the space agency would set sail towards. Would it be akin to that of a ‘steady as it goes’, with only marginal improvements as the Space Shuttle began operation? Or would it be setting NASA towards a new goal to complete, like how the 1960s had been for the Apollo Program and the 1970s had been for the Space Shuttle? Only time would tell for NASA.
[1] The original 1979 flight schedule had called for a series of six orbital flight tests before continued delays with the Space Shuttle cut back two of the orbital flight tests for a total culmination of four in all. It should be noted that at the time, the fifth and sixth orbital flight tests proposed testing of hardware which were not necessary needed to enter into ‘operational’ service, including both an EVA and testing of satellite deployment.
[2] The capacity to manually ‘winch’ the payload bay doors shut in an emergency EVA would be available for every Shuttle flight, having been built into the design of the Shuttle.
[3] The body flap was also vital for protecting the three SSMEs from the thermal heat during reentry.
[4] The maximum angle of deflection the body flap could go to was twenty-one degrees. If the Space Shuttle still needed further deflection to maintain a forty degree angle of attack of reentry, it would’ve posed problems.
[5] The over-pressure wave in part was also contributed in part to a ‘delay’ of timing from the Shuttle GPCs to the SRBs along with that of the ‘twang’ (the entire stack moving with the motion of the SSMEs, then back and then in a vertical position) created from the ignition of the SSMEs.
[6] After the deflection of the body flap had been discovered after landing, John Young had said that if he had known about it after launch, he would’ve brought the Space Shuttle to a safe altitude after SRB separation and then ejected.
[7] The damage to the struts on the FRCS would not be discovered until processing began for STS-2, contributing in part to the delays between STS-1 and STS-2.