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IV: Bounding Problems

At the same time as preparation and efforts were underway on the testing of the numerous components of the Shuttle program, NASA found itself involved in the age-old need of working and dealing with both the OMB and Congress to maintain its budget. While the appeal post-transition had mostly kept NASA's budget intact from the OMB for the Fiscal Year 1978 budget, there was a more significant effort involved in trying to deal with Congress to retain the budget and prevent further cuts (most specifically in trying to retain both the Jupiter Orbiter Probe and the Large Space Telescope and prevent the loss of either program). For the next year's budget (FY1979) NASA had maintained budget levels similar to the previous one, again proposing a series of new development starts for planetary programs (the Lunar Polar Observer, a Mars Orbiter-Penetrator mission for 1984, initial start funds for the Inter Solar Planetary Mission (ISPM) and funds for the development of an ion engine for a Halley's Comet mission), alongside an increase in funds to help with the conversion of existing facilities and needed upgrades. The OMB's response to it would deny both the Lunar Polar Observer and the Mars Orbiter-Penetrator while preserving funding for the Inter Solar Planetary Mission citing European commitment to it. In addition to that, the OMB also issued a stinging recommendation for the 'cancellation' of any new technology starts for a Halley's Comet mission and that any such unmanned mission must not see any need for new research and development funding (which was intended to prevent the funding for either a 'solar sail' or 'ion engine' to be used for it). Little other funding had been targeted for the most part by OMB, with NASA seeming to have been caught in a 'holding action' with the Shuttle development, as Administrator Fletcher went to toe with Congress over it. But however the biggest matter which was soon to ensue between NASA, Congress, and the Ford Administration would be that of the matter of the procurement for the five-Orbiter fleet.

The question of the Orbiter procurement for NASA now dealt not with the number of Orbiters to be procured (as had already been established with the official recommendation by the National Space Council for a total of five), but specifically in terms of the fifth orbiter. Following the series of flight tests made by Enterprise, it had been decided in November of 1977 that considering both costs and time it would be both cheaper and faster for the conversion of STA-099 into an Orbiter, rather than the conversion of OV-101 (Enterprise) into a space-worthy vehicle. The decision to convert STA-099 had now presented something of a problem in the planning for a fifth orbiter, since it had seemed that OV-101 would've been converted for flight as the second orbiter, with OV-103, OV-104, and OV-105 to be the new builds to round out the Shuttle fleet to a total of five Orbiters. The question that had now emerged, would OV-101 be converted into the 'fifth' space-worthy Orbiter, or instead would it continue for procurement of OV-105 as the fifth Orbiter?

An inter-agency meeting (separate from that of the National Space Council) alongside that of a meeting from the National Space Council would work to resolve the debate, and place their own opinions on the matter. The inter-agency meeting would voice the view of procurement of OV-105 citing that “the weight of OV-101, OV-102, and OV-099 would present a detriment for the launch of defense payloads in the event of a loss of either OV-103 or OV-104”. The National Space Council meeting would again come into a debate over national security and economic matters for whether to go with OV-101 or OV-105 for a fifth Orbiter. The decision on whether the conversion of OV-101 or procurement of OV-105 would take place would be left to President Ford considering the divide that existed in the National Space Council over it. President Ford would select the procurement of OV-105 over the conversion of OV-101 as the fifth Orbiter after hearing the testimony from both sides over it.

With the executive decision made by President Ford towards the procurement of OV-105 over the conversion of OV-101, there was still the matter of dealing with the actual appropriations of it by Congress. The debates on appropriations for NASA would resound heavily, specifically in the House Appropriations subcommittee in charge of NASA [1] over why it had been chosen for the funding and construction of a fifth new orbiter (OV-105) rather than the conversion of Enterprise into a fifth orbiter. Both Director Fletcher and Secretary Thomas C. Reed [2] would testify specifically on the need for that of OV-105 rather than that of a conversion of OV-101, with it narrowly passing through the subcommittee for the funding of OV-105. Attempts to strip the funding of OV-105 via amendment to the budget would occur in both House and Senate and fail narrowly each time. For the space agency, they had barely managed to eek out the avoidance of winding up with the conversion of OV-101 to OV-105, or even facing a cut of a fifth Orbiter all together.

With the conclusion of the funding situation handled, NASA prepared for its next major announcement for January of 1979, the naming of the five Orbiters. Since the name change of OV-101 from Constitution to Enterprise, NASA had been working on a proposed naming scheme for the four (and then five) Orbiters in order to announce their names at once. Memos throughout NASA would speculate on potential naming conventions for which all three of the Orbiters could be chosen, such as after famous ships of exploration, American ideals, or named after famous stars. Administrator Fletcher's choice would eventually settle on that of famous ships of exploration, and in early 1979, the five Orbiters would be named as Columbia (OV-102), Challenger (OV-099), Discovery (OV-103), Atlantis (OV-104), and Resolution (OV-105).

However as 1979 began for NASA, the problems began to stack up. In mid January, an SSME test went awry and forced an immediate halt to testing to figure out what had went wrong. The analysis of the test had showed that the failure had started from a simple screw for a main oxygen valve having gone loose and caused the failure of the test, and brought about a new redesign to ensure that those screws wouldn't come out. The delays as a result of the investigation into the SSME failure had pushed the launch date of STS-1 into November of 1979, and concerns were starting to mount over the launch date slipping into 1980. Alongside that of the concerns over the delays of the Shuttle with the most recent SSME failure, the rate of installing the tiles that made up the thermal protection system (TPS) had been lower than expected by Rockwell. Nearly 80% were complete by the time that Columbia was supposed to arrive at Kennedy, and NASA was determined to keep their schedule of getting the Shuttle to the Cape on time. Throughout the end of March, Columbia was flown from Edwards to Kennedy where she would be expected to finish her tile installation and then hopefully onto flight. Unfortunately for NASA, testing of the thermal protection system had rapidly thrown a wrench into things. In April of 1979 it had been identified that on certain areas of the Space Shuttle, the tensile strength of the tiles seemed as if they were not going to be guaranteed to stay on for a single flight, and a solution would have to be found. The first flight of the Shuttle program, STS-1, had now officially slipped into 1980 with no potential launch date in sight for the program as NASA worked desperately to fix the tile problem that had sprouted.


[1] The House Appropriations subcommittee in charge of NASA would be the Housing and Urban Development—Independent Agencies Subcommittee.

[2] Thomas C. Reed was the Secretary of the Air Force in addition to being that of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.