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II: Seeking a Commitment

For Administrator Fletcher, his efforts through the 'transition' would be aimed at trying to hold back from any further proposed cuts to the NASA budget in the finalization of the budget along with trying to restore cut spending to future planetary programs. For the Administrator, his single meeting with President Ford and Director Lynn (of the OMB) over the budget would principally be aimed at resisting any other cuts while trying to restore additional funding to proposed planetary science programs. The appeal would be partially successful. Any additional cuts on NASA by OMB were thankfully prevented, along with the addition of five million to the follow-on Mars Viking study, but no money would be directed towards funding of the proposed Lunar Polar Orbiter. To the displeasure of both NASA and the OMB, there was no still clear indication for the number of Orbiters to be acquired and flown.

In the meantime for NASA, other changes were happening during the transition period between the President's first and second terms along with the beginning of his second term for NASA. Increased rumors and speculation had emerged throughout the news over the potential for the 'return' of the National Space Council which was to be headed by Vice President Dole, and to also help determine American space policy into the 1980s. This would emerge from rumor into reality with the creation of the National Space Council on April 19th, and was designated to include the Vice President, the NASA Administrator and a series of other major officials [1]. In remarks made by President Ford on the creation of the National Space Council that it would, “help set into motion a guidance for American space policies into the 1980s with the end of development on the Space Shuttle.” The President's remarks would give some at NASA hope for where the course of the National Space Council might proceed, but if it was, it was much more of a very cautionary hope considering recent history.

While NASA was fighting with Congress over the funding for both the Large Space Telescope and the Jupiter Orbiter Probe, work with the Space Shuttle was progressing. On September 17th, 1976, the first of the Space Shuttles, Enterprise, had rolled out of Palmdale to celebration as the first of the Orbiters. Following the rollout of the Orbiter, it was set to be moved to Edwards Air Force Base where it would undergo the 'Approach and Landing Tests' (ALT), which would encompass four forms: taxi tests (to verify the very low-speed dynamics of the mated vehicles), captive-inert flights (to verify the flight performance and stability of the mated configuration in free flight), captive-active flights (to determine the optimum separation profile based off the captive-inert flights), and the free-flights (to verify the Orbiter subsonic airworthiness and encompassed in testing with the tailcone on and off).

On January 31st, Enterprise would be towed from Palmdale to Edwards Air Force Base where it would begin the series of testing involved in the Approach and Landing Tests. After being mated, taxi tests would be performed on February 15th, and being shown as perfectly fine would be followed by the first 'captive-inert' flight on February 18th. Over the next two weeks, a total of five captive-inert flights would be flown and would indicate no problems present. On June 17th, the first 'captive-active' flight would be flown with Fred W. Haise and Charles Gordon Fullerton at the controls, followed up by one on June 27th flown with Joe H. Engle and Richard H. Truly. The orbiter would be stood down for a total of eleven days for modifications for preparations for free flight, which included “connecting the reserve hydraulic reservoir system, replacing the #1 and #3 APUs, swapping the #5 (spare) GPC, and various minor updates to other on-board systems. [2]” On July 28th, a third and final captive-active flight would be flown with Haise and Fullerton and the free flights now next. On August 14th, the first free flight with Haise and Fullerton would be undertaken to a complete success, and followed up with test flights on September 16th flown by Engle and Truly and September 27th by Haise and Fullerton. The next test flights would be flown without the tailcone, and the fourth test flight would be flown on October 17th by Engle and Truly, and the fifth and final test flight would be flown by Haise and Fullerton on October 28th. The Approach and Landing Tests had been met with a complete success and had for the most part validated that of the data and wind tunnel predictions.

October 18th, 1977
Washington D.C.

The meeting among the members of the National Space Council had been the third of the year, and one that had been rapidly continuing from where it had left off previously that it had been found deadlocked.

“Okay, so let's go with what OMB is suggesting for a fleet of four orbiters. We'll have one flying out of Vandenberg and three flying out of Kennedy. Two Shuttles, OV-103 and OV-104, will be capable of lifting the heaviest payloads that the Department of Defense would need to handle. But what happens if we lose one of them? Immediately, we're going to face issues as a result of a loss of one orbiter for both defense and commercial payloads, not to mention that of scientific missions that are manifested,” Administrator Fletcher spoke in a response to the Director of the OMB.

“And what are the chances of losing an orbiter? Miniscule, right? Not to mention, that the flight rates that provided the basis for the funding of the Shuttle as far as I am aware, would still be fine even with a four orbiter fleet rather than the five orbiter fleet as you suggest,” Director Lynn spoke back, “So considering that the risks of loss of an orbiter are minimal, and that the flight rates for the Shuttle would still hold fine at four orbiters, I don't see any reason for a need of five orbiters.”

“To weigh in from the perspective of Defense on this,” Secretary Rumsfeld began, “Considering the uh... litany of defense payloads that require the Shuttle's payload capability, a loss of an orbiter could present significant problems, especially if it was either OV-103 or OV-104. Such a loss would present significant national security concerns and could be untenable for the required need of defense payloads. I believe Director Bush could choose to weigh in on this?”

“In my view, a fleet of five orbiters presents the best capacity for national security. The loss of a single orbiter, even if it was to be either OV-103 or OV-104 would not result in any loss of national security, whereas with a fleet of four orbiters would present an impact to national security with the loss of an orbiter. This would be quite clear for the necessities of verifying the Soviets are in compliance of SALT II,” Director Bush spoke.

“I'd like to hear from both Scranton and Scowcroft on their opinions on this in terms of national security,” Vice President Dole spoke, weighing in on the matter.

“I think Treasury is going to need to weigh in here on our views of this,” Secretary Connally interrupted, “While the increase on the federal budget is probably going to be minor as a whole, considering the President's directives towards attaining a balanced budget, something like this is going to prove problematic as a whole with the relative increase in NASA's budget compared to the decrease from the other parts of the government.”

“That is being noted Secretary Connally,” the Vice President replied back, “Scowcroft, you want to go ahead on this?”

“Thank you Mr. Vice President. I'd agree with both the Defense Secretary and Director of Central Intelligence that a five shuttle fleet would be the best from a national security perspective. I have a recent memo from the ACDA here,” Brent Scowcroft paused to indicate the piece of paper, “And that in their view, we are going to need to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT II. Considering the statements from the ACDA to ensure Soviet verification, I believe it is imperative to have a five orbiter fleet, most especially in order to ensure a continued compliance of the Soviets with regards to the limits set by SALT II.”

“I think the position of a four versus five orbiter fleet has already been made clear on national security grounds Mr. Vice President,” Secretary Scranton spoke, “But there is also that of the role of the Space Shuttle in terms of American foreign policy and our own allies on it. For example, we have a significant commitment from our European allies on the development of an orbital laboratory for the Space Shuttle that is called... Spacelab I think it was? If we were to demonstrate that we were not to be fully committed to the Space Shuttle, then this could present an increase of strains on our relationship with our European allies in regards to spaceflight. Considering the recent private statements made over diplomatic channels after the ratification of SALT II, there is some cause to be concerned if it helps to worsen our relationship with Western Europe.”

The room paused for a moment before the Vice President broke the silence. “So considering the statements made on that for a four versus five orbiter Shuttle fleet complete, the National Space Council will recommend for the procurement of a five orbiter fleet, with a dissent from both OMB and Treasury on what this would mean for the budget. Moving onto the next item on the agenda...”



[1] The full list of people assigned to the National Space Council include the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce, Director of Central Intelligence, Director of Office and Management of Budget, Administrator of NASA, Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration, Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Agency, the Chief of Staff, the National Security Adviser, and the President's Science Adviser.

[2] This is quoted from Space Shuttle: The History of the First 100 Missions, Page 211. Much of the segment on the 'Approach and Landing Tests' was sourced from this book in terms of the details.