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FIRST REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE - SUMMARY
SUMMARY

(1) We have divided the risks of war into three classes. The Far Eastern Commitment, where we envisage an ultimate policy of accommodation with Japan, and an immediate and provisional policy of "showing a tooth" for the purpose of recovering the standing we have sacrificed of recent years. Secondly, we take Germany as the ultimate potential enemy against whom our "long range" defence policy has to be directed. And thirdly, the Defence of India—the largest of our Empire commitments (paragraph 12). In relating our requirements to these commitments we have not overlooked the more permanent elements in the problem of Imperial Defence, or the possibility of further changes in the international situation (paragraphs 2 and 3). We have recognised that there exists a general requirement to enable the Defence Services to fulfil their functions in the general scheme of Imperial Defence (paragraph 17).

(2) We attach the utmost importance to getting back to our old terms of cordiality and mutual respect with Japan, in order to strengthen the prospects of peace in the Far East and to bring Japan back to the League of Nations. We believe that our influence with Japan will be greater if we are in a position to protect our vast interests in the Far East. The question of our relations with Japan carries with it that of our relations with the United States of America, an aspect of the problem which we particularly commend to the Cabinet (paragraphs 7-9).

(3) In view of the existence at this moment of a menace to our position in the Far East, and of the probability that the German menace will grow to formidable proportions within the next few years, we have aimed at a programme to meet our worst deficiencies within the next five years; but in practice there will remain a considerable aftermath at the end of that period (paragraph 14).

(4) To make good the heavy deficiencies that have accumulated during the regime of the Ten-Year Rule we recommend the adoption of the five-year Deficiency Programme contained in Table A 1, the very approximate cost of which is as follows:—

Over five years: £71,323,580 (including all personnel charges).

Remaining to complete after five years: £11,057,400 (excluding maintenance charges) (paragraph 32).

Total (excluding maintenance after five years): £82,380,980.

Table A2 shows the annual increases involved by this programme over and above the sums provided for corresponding Services in 1933.

(5) In addition there will be:—

(i) The cost of maintenance of various services which we are not in a position to estimate,

(ii) The Naval Construction Programme, which depends on the Naval Conference, 1935. An Admiralty' sketch estimate (Appendix I, Table F (1)) indicates that in the next five years the annual expenditure may amount on the average to some £13,400,000 as compared with £9,331,000 in 1933 and £10,718,000 in 1934 (paragraph 33).

(iii) The extension of the Fleet Air Arm as part of the Naval Construction Programme, which is essential if we are not to be outclassed by the Japanese in this branch of the Service. The cost of this is estimated by the Admiralty and Air Ministry at £5,590,000 spread over the next five years (Appendix 1, Table F (2)) (paragraph 34).

(iv) A possible increase (or decrease) according to the result of the enquiry by the Principal Supply Officers Committee into the possibility of speeding up the manufacture of war material for the Expeditionary Force after the first three months of war (paragraphs 87-92).

(v) If the German menace becomes aggravated, adoption of measures to modernise, equip and supply the Territorial Army, which (apart from some minor and inexpensive preliminary measures) we have not included in our Deficiency Programme (paragraph 36).

(vi) Other Royal Air Force requirements, such as the protection of northern ports of the United Kingdom against air attack, the provision of aircraft for anti-submarine convoy work and coast defence at Home, and at such overseas ports as are not of first importance in a war in the Far East, will have to be provided in due course. A minimum of twenty-five Squadrons would be required for these purposes. We have made no provision for these items, which are a border-line case to which we invite the special attention of the Cabinet (paragraphs 28 and 29).

(vii) A relatively small expenditure on Air Raids Precautions, which will be borne on the Home Office Vote (paragraph 30).

Details of the Five-Year Deficiency Programme are contained in Part III, pages 13-29.

(6) Our programme for completing our "worst deficiencies," though perhaps not spectacular from a public point of view, is designed to produce the following results:—

(a) The Navy will not be increased by any large units, as this is ruled out by the Naval Treaties. But the Fleet will be provided with essential bases and fuelling stations defended on a reasonable, if rather modest, scale, which will put it in a position to fulfil its responsibilities for the protection of our vast Imperial interests. In addition, most of the older capital ships will gradually be modernised, and every year there will be an improvement in the position as to personnel, Fleet Air Arm, fuel supplies, modern equipment, reserve stores and supplies and ancillary services, all of which are of decisive importance to fighting efficiency.

(b) The Army will be enabled to place and maintain in the field in five years a well-equipped and modern expeditionary force of four divisions, one tank brigade and one cavalry division, which can be mobilised in a month, in place of the existing five divisions and one cavalry division, that require many months to take the field. A small start will also have been made to cope with the great deficiencies that now exist in the Territorial Army. In addition, the War Office will be able to fulfil its responsibilities for the defence of the naval bases and fuelling stations in the Far East and to make a beginning elsewhere in the renovation of our coast defences. Finally, after reconsideration of the general lay-out of air defence to meet the assumption of air attack by Germany, the provision of the Army's share in our scheme of anti-aircraft defences will be put in hand at once.

(c) The Royal Air Force will complete the 52 Squadrons scheme, which will enable it to provide for Home Defence against Germany, and, in addition, to send an appropriate Air Force abroad with the Army Expeditionary Force. The Air Force will also be enabled to take its share in the defence of Singapore and of other defended ports East of Suez; and the worst deficiencies in the Fleet Air Arm will be made good. Our proposals contemplate the following increases in the Royal Air Force:—

View attachment 372840

* Including one squadron to replace squadron loaned to Singapore from the Home Defence Force

When all these items have been completed, the total first line strength of the Royal Air Force, including India, will be 1,285 aircraft, as compared with 1,671 aircraft which France now possesses.

(7) We recommend that the Government of India should be urged to expedite the work of correcting their worst deficiencies, as a complement to our own efforts. This should include bringing up to date the defences of Indian ports in accordance with plans already drawn up, which is essential to complete our defensive arrangements in the Far East (paragraph 31).

(8) The programme recommended will barely bring our Defence Forces to " the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." Considered in relation to our world-wide interests, and by comparison with Foreign Powers, it is far from excessive. If it is not carried out we shall become every year even more at the mercy of Japan in the Far East than we are to-day, while in Europe in a few years' time we shall be in grave danger from Germany. Both in the Far East and in Europe our influence for peace will be promoted by making good our present deficiencies (paragraphs 152-154).

(9) With a view to the presentation of our Defence expenditure in a form more strictly in accordance with the facts than at present, we suggest that the Annual Estimates of the Defence Services should, if' possible, be relieved of the incubus of the non-effective vote. This, indeed, seems essential to a fair presentation of the case. There are some technical difficulties and objections, and we recommend that the whole question should be immediately explored with a view to a satisfactory solution (paragraph 160).

(10) As changes are liable to occur both in international relationships and in technical developments in all three Defence Services, we recommend that the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee should remain in existence in order to review the scheme, as finally approved by the Cabinet, at appropriate intervals.

(Signed) M. P. A. HANKEY (Chairman).
ERNLE CHATFIELD.
E. L. ELLINGTON.
N. F. WARREN FISHER.
A. A. MONTGOMERY-MASSINGBERD.
ROBERT VANSITTART.

(Signed) H. R. POWNALL (Secretary).
A. W. CLARKE (Assistant Secretary).

2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1,
February 28, 1934.

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