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FIRST REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE Part III. - THE PLAN IN DETAIL III.-AIR FORCE DEFICIENCIES
Part III. - THE PLAN IN DETAIL

38. In Part II we dealt with our proposals on general lines and from the point of view of the strategical objects that they are designed to fulfil. In this part of the Report we explain them in greater detail and show how the expenditure is apportioned between the three Defence Services.

39. Part III, therefore, is divided into three Sections, dealing respectively with —

I. Navy Deficiencies. [not included here]

II. Army Deficiencies. [not included here]

III. Air Force Deficiencies.

At the end of the Report will be found the three Tables summarising the respective requirements of the three Defence Services, which are constantly referred to in the text.


III.—AIR FORCE DEFICIENCIES

Completion of the Home Defence Scheme of 52 Squadrons
Cost: £2,340,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
(Table D, Item 1.)​

128. We have already referred in paragraph 27 to the need for the expansion of the Home Defence Air Force to 52 squadrons. Of the many necessary defence measures which we recommend, this is the most certain to receive popular support, since the vulnerability of our capital to attack by air is widely realised.

129. The costs of completing the Home Defence Scheme to 52[1] squadrons, together with one additional flying-boat squadron for coastal reconnaissance in Home waters, is shown as Item 1 on Table D, which gives the increments caused by this expansion on the cost of all items which are at present charged to the Air Force Vote. The cost has been spread up to the years 1940-41, for the reason that, although the provision of the necessary aircraft is well within the capacity of the industry, it is not feasible to provide the necessary works and buildings within a shorter time, working under the normal peace-time system (see paragraphs 28 and 29).

130. Apart from their primary duty of Home Defence it will be appreciated that the Air Force stationed at Home constitutes a reserve of force available, if circumstances permit, for employment in the general interests of Empire Defence. It is thus that the air forces required to implement the Defence of India Plan have always been assumed as being made available from the Air Defences of Great Britain. Similarly, the needs of an Air Force contingent to accompany a, British Expeditionary Force (apart from Army Co-operation squadrons which are specifically provided for) will have to be found from the Home Defence Air Force. It would therefore be inaccurate to regard the whole of this force as tied to the country in a fixed and immutable role.

Fleet Air Arm
Cost: £260,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
(Table D, Item 2.)​

131. Reference has been made in paragraph 40 to the necessity of making good the existing deficiency of 51 aircraft in the Fleet Air Arm. The annual costs to the Air Ministry, additional to that repayable by grant-in-aid from Navy to Air votes, are shown as Item 2 of Table D. The programme required to meet the projected expansion of Air Forces for the Japanese Navy has been dealt with in paragraph 34 (see also Appendix 1 and Table F (2)).

Air Requirements for Singapore
Cost: £1,430,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
(Table D, Item 3.)​

132. The Air requirements for the defence of Singapore have only been worked out by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee since our Inquiry began, and their Report is not yet before the Committee of Imperial Defence. Pending its consideration their recommendations must be treated as provisional, but as we have no other guide in this important matter we have, for the purpose of considering our worst deficiencies, adopted these proposals as a basis of calculation. The Chiefs of Staff estimate the total air forces required at

Singapore in war at —
6 land-plane squadrons,
3 flying-boat squadrons,
Aircraft for spotting duties with coast defence artillery.​

It is proposed, however, that the air forces normally located at Singapore in peace should consist of —
3 land-plane squadrons,
2 flying-boat squadrons,
Aircraft for spotting duties with coast defence artillery.​
The reinforcements to bring this force to the total required in war would be drawn at present from India, Iraq and the Persian Gulf. At present there are at Singapore —
2 land-plane squadrons,
1 flying-boat squadron.​
One of the land-plane squadrons, which has recently arrived, is temporarily detached from the Home Defence Air Force and will eventually have to be replaced. There remain to be provided, therefore —
1 land-plane squadron,
1 flying-boat squadron,
Aircraft for spotting duties with coast defence artillery, and the necessary operating and maintenance facilities.​

In accordance with the policy approved by the Cabinet, this programme should be complete in 1936 (Cabinet 27 (33), Conclusion 5, and C.I.D.258th Meeting, Minute 4), but as explained above, this programme has not yet been approved and consequently these additional units cannot be provided before 1937.The above aircraft do not include any provision for the Army needs of spotting for the guns of the defence. The Chief of the Air Staff is examining the possibility of training an auxiliary unit formed from the existing Flying Club at Singapore with a view to its employment in war on spotting duties. If this is not found feasible, and adequate spotting facilities cannot thereby be obtained, it will be necessary to provide an additional regular unit.

133. The Report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee will show that besides the two landing-grounds already approved, and a civil landing-ground which can be made available in war, a fourth landing-ground will be required to accommodate some of the reinforcing squadrons, Fleet Air Arm, &c, and this must, of course, be prepared in peace to be ready for use in emergency. It is probable that a suitable site could be obtained and prepared at a relatively low cost, which is included in our scheme.

134. The shore requirements of the Fleet Air Arm have not been taken into consideration in the above proposals it would be possible for them to make use of the new landing-ground proposed above, but we do not include in this Report any proposals for the construction of other shore facilities on their account. This is an important matter which will require later investigation by the Admiralty and Air Ministry.

Air Requirements for Hong Kong
Cost: £1,320,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
(Table D, Item 4.)​

135. As in the case of Singapore, so for Hong Kong, the air requirements have only been considered by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee since our Inquiry began, and their report is not yet before the Committee of Imperial Defence. For reasons which have already been given in paragraph 21, Hong Kong is second only to Singapore in importance to our strategical position in the Far East. It may happen that the conditions of the Washington Treaty will be amended in 1935, in which case the present restrictions on the defences of Hong Kong may be changed and the whole position will need fresh consideration. Although these restrictions do not apply to Air Forces, we do not make a recommendation for the addition of such forces to the existing defences until after 1935,since it is not possible to deal with it under peace conditions earlier than the dates proposed. Our estimate, as recommended by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, is:—

In 1938: One flying-boat squadron,
1939: One land squadron,
1940: Two land squadrons and a repair depot. One additional aerodrome and one spare landing ground will also be required.​

Air Requirements at Penang, Ceylon and Aden
Cost: £1,030,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
(Table D, Items 5, 6 and 7.)​

136. The question of the air requirements at Penang, Ceylon and Aden has recently been considered by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, whose report will in due course be before the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Naval Staff has strongly represented that seaward reconnaissance by aircraft is an especially valuable adjunct to other forms of defence, since it extends the area in which hostile raiders, including submarines, may be located and attacked. In this connection we are informed that the Japanese themselves have a highly organised system of air reconnaissance to seaward, and that they will have a force of some 200 aircraft by 1938, supported by a similar number in reserve, based upon the chain of islands from Japan to the south, whose primary duties will be reconnaissance of the sea approaches to Japan and attack of naval forces.

137. The Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee are still considering the details of the strength and functions of aircraft which will be needed. Provisionally, however, they assess the requirements in order of importance as follows:—
Penang: One flying-boat squadron.
Ceylon: One land squadron.
Aden: One flying-boat squadron.​

Details of the cobe found in Table D. We are satisfied that if these aircraft are not provided in time of peace there will be an immediate demand for them on the outbreak of war, when it is unlikely that they can be made available.

138. We recommend that the greater part of this expenditure, including the squadrons themselves, should be provided by 1940.This low priority we have had to accept owing to more urgent needs elsewhere.

Additional Training Costs for Overseas Air Units
Cost: £20,000 per annum, rising to £80,000 per annum.
(Table D, Item 8.)​

139. Arrangements will be necessary at Home for training the increased number of pilots and technical personnel required to maintain the additional units which, as we recommend, should be provided overseas, i.e., at Singapore, Hong Kong, Penang, Ceylon and Aden. The cost of this, as shown in Table D, rises from £20,000 per annum in 1935 to a maximum of £80,000 in 1940 and subsequent years.

War Reserves
Cost: £3,685,000, within the next five years, including personnel costs.
(Table D, Item 9.)​

140. The war reserves of all kinds, which have, so far been contemplated, were those estimated to be required for the despatch of a contingent amounting in all to eleven squadrons, to take part with an expeditionary force in a theatre of war outside Europe. No provision has so far been made to enable the remainder of the Air Force to be maintained in personnel and material until such time as the training of recruits and production of material in war overtakes the current requirements.

141. Under the plan hitherto considered it would not be possible to develop our available strength in the early stages of a campaign; expansion would be slow, and there would be no need to hold in peace such large reserves of equipment or ammunition as are now contemplated, nor to make allowance for high wastage by training personnel in the early stages of a campaign. The proposal to despatch an Expeditionary Force to the Continent complete within the first month, and the necessity to foresee attacks by German aircraft on the United Kingdom, has made it necessary to provide large reserves of equipment and ammunition, and to make arrangements to meet heavy wastage throughout the Air Force from the outbreak of war.

142. The estimated cost to enable our air forces to operate effectively in these conditions is given in Item 9 of Table D, and amounts to £4,625,000, which, it is suggested, should be spread over six years. The principal constituents of this item are as follows:—

143. Aircraft.—Reserves are necessary to enable the Home Defence Squadrons and any contingent sent overseas with the Expeditionary Force to be maintained at full strength until war production overtakes current consumption. We consider that these reserves are essential except in the case of heavy bomber squadrons. To maintain reserves for this type would mean the purchase and storage of some 140 of the largest and most expensive aircraft. Without this reserve heavy bomber squadrons will be able to operate, on the average, at only two-thirds of their full efficiency during the first twelve months. This is a position which would, normally, be most unsatisfactory, but in view of the costs involved,* and on the assumption that in a European war we shall have the co-operation of Allies, or at least of France, we do not consider, in present circumstances, that we would be justified in recommending the storage of this material. We consider that the position should be reviewed annually. It might, however, be possible to speed up war production by subsidising firms in peace, as is proposed in the case of the Army ammunition reserves.

144. Training Aircraft.—A reserve of training aircraft is required in order to enable training organisations to be expanded so as to produce sufficient pilots and observers who, with the pre-war reserves of such personnel, will be required to keep all squadrons up to strength.

145. Motor Transport.—A sum is included for the purchase of additional motor transport which, with vehicles to be purchased on the outbreak of war, will enable all squadrons to be mobilised with their complement.

146. General Stores.—Provision is necessary for the spares and general stores required at squadron parks and depots when mobilised.

147. Bombs.-The estimated requirements of bombs for the first six months of the war is 19,500 tons, on the assumption that the heavy bomber aircraft would only operate at two-thirds of their full efficiency. A sum of £310,000 has been included to bring the authorised reserves up to 8,000 tons, which it is estimated should be sufficient for the first two months of war.

148. Storage.—A sum has been included to cover the cost of additional storage necessary to hold in reserve the aircraft, motor transport, and bombs referred to above.

149. Should the investigations of the Principal Supply Officers Committeet show that it is not possible to accelerate post-mobilisation production so as to ensure that the supply of bombs will overtake expenditure after two months of war, then the war reserves will require to be correspondingly increased. As an indication of the financial importance of this subject it may be noted that if war reserves for six months have to be held (19,500 tons) the estimated additional cost would be approximately £3,000,000, exclusive of storage.

150. No provision is made for the aviation spirit required in war beyond the reserves normally held in peace, which would be sufficient for the first month only. Thereafter the Royal Air Force would have to depend on reserves held in the country, or fuel produced from coal, or imported.

151. It is significant to note that both the Army and the Royal Air Force have been compelled during the regime of the Ten-Year Rule to hold such small stocks of War Reserves that at the present time they are in the alarming position of being unable to take part in a major war with the prospect of maintaining themselves for more than a few weeks.

* Initial outlay £1,750,000. Training of additional pilots £700,000. Storage £200,000.

-f- The question of accelerating post-war production of bombs has not yet been referred to the Principal Supply Officers Committee. We strongly recommend that this should be taken up at the same time as the inquiry referred to in paragraph 90.


[1] The figure "52" includes one squadron which has been temporarily detached to Singapore. If that is to become a permanent commitment it will be necessary to replace it at Home.

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