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C.P. 64 (34).
CABINET
IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY
REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE
The attached Report, D.R.C. 14, by the Defence Requirements Committee, which was appointed by the Cabinet on the 15th November, 1933 (Cabinet 62 (33; Conclusion 5 (b)), is circulated to the Cabinet on the instructions of the Prime Minister and will be placed on the Agenda Paper for preliminary consideration on Wednesday, March 7th.
The Prime Minister instructs ma to invite the attention of the Cabinet to the great secrecy of this Report.
(Signed) M. P. A. HANKEY,
Secretary to the Cabinet.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,
5th March, 1934.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1934
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Copy No. 55
D.R.O. 14
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It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS SUB-COMMITTEE
REPORT
2, Whitehall Gardens; S.W. 1,
February 28, 1934
REPORT
INTRODUCTORY
ON the 15th November, 1933, the Cabinet
[1] approved the following proposals by the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.261st Meeting, Minute 1):—
"(a)—(i) For the present the expenditure of the Defence Departments should be governed by the Report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (CLD .Paper No.1113-B) and the following considerations of priority mentioned therein: the defence of our Possessions and interests in the Far East; European commitments; the Defence of India:
(ii) No expenditure should for the present be incurred on measures of defence required to provide exclusively against attack by the United States, France or Italy:
(iii) The above conclusions must be kept under careful observation by the Government Departments concerned, and in any event should be reviewed annually by the Committee of Imperial Defence.
(b) That on the basis of the above resolutions the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, with representatives of the Treasury and the Foreign Office, and the Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, should prepare a programme for meeting our worst deficiencies, for transmission to the Cabinet."
The latter resolution contains our Terms of Reference.
2. The first two resolutions quoted above prescribe the conditions by which the expenditure of the Defence Departments is to be governed "for the present." In preparing a long-range programme, however, there are certain more permanent elements in the problem that have to be taken into consideration. Our Imperial and foreign interests are unlike those of any other country. Not only are we responsible for the peace and well-being of many diverse races, widely scattered and living under all sorts of conditions, but also our home population is dependent to the extent of 60 per cent, on overseas trade for the food by which it lives. The structure of British interests overseas, which has been built up over the centuries, could not be sustained without the ships, bases, land and air forces, which we must maintain at all times, in peace as in war. Unless the representative forces so employed are adequately maintained, not only shall we fail abroad, but we shall starve at home. This little-advertised but essential peace commitment of our defence forces, if efficiently carried out, is the best possible deterrent to the ambitions of any potential enemy, and its efficient maintenance is a necessary starting-point for any war. Other considerations of a general order are contained in the Annual Review (1933) by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (CLD .Paper No.1113-B) and need not be repeated here.
3. Referring to the exclusion for the present of the United States, France and Italy (paragraph 1 (a)(ii)above),we would remark that our long-range policy cannot be founded exclusively on what might prove to be a temporary and shifting basis, and we cannot entirely ignore the possibility of changes in the international situation. Within recent years such changes have sometimes occurred at very short notice. They have arisen sometimes out of the external relations of States, as illustrated by the Far Eastern crisis of 1931-32; sometimes, as in the case of Germany, Italy and Russia, from internal upheavals, which are particularly difficult to foresee. While such possibilities need not, as a rule, be taken into account in immediate defensive plans and preparations, they ought not to be overlooked in providing the basic elements of our defensive system, such as programmes of construction extending over a long-term. In particular, at past Conferences on Naval Disarmament the strength of the navies of the United States and France have had to be taken into account, and at the forthcoming Naval Conference the large French cruiser and submarine forces will require careful consideration, as well as the possibility of the use by the United States of their navy for purposes of weakening our blockade in the event of a war in which we are belligerents and they are neutrals.
PART I. – GOVERNING CONSIDERATIONS
4. Within the limits of practical finance it is impossible for a world-wide Empire like our own to be equally secure at every point against every conceivable enemy. Consequently it has always been necessary in testing our defensive preparations to make certain assumptions on such matters as what countries have to be considered as potential enemies, allies or neutrals, and the time limits within which the different dangers are liable to develop. Throughout almost the whole of the post-war period the Estimates of the Defence Departments have been governed substantially by an assumption that no major war was likely to occur for ten years. The form of this assumption has varied from time to time and from Service to Service, but since July 1928
[2] until a comparatively recent date the approved formula has been "That it should be assumed for the purpose of framing the Estimates of the Fighting Services, that at any given date there will be no major war for ten years." It was under this assumption, which became gradually untenable, that our present and exceedingly serious deficiencies have accumulated.
5. In March 1932, in consequence of a menacing situation in the Far East and a general deterioration of the European position, the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.255th Meeting, Minute 4) accepted a recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee that the above assumption should be cancelled, and on the 11th October, 1932, the Cabinet decided
[3] to proceed with the completion and defences of the naval base at Singapore. Since then, apart from the Far East, the position has been rather nebulous. Owing to the protracted uncertainties of the Disarmament Conference it has not been found possible to lay down confidently a reasonable basis for a defensive programme of national armaments extending over a term of years. A further deterioration of the international situation, however, has made it possible within the last few months to define the position more clearly.
6. We do not propose to traverse again the ground covered by the latest Reports of the Foreign Office (C.I.D. Paper No.1112-B) and the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (C.I.D. Paper No.1113-B), in which the international position is examined in its political and defensive aspects respectively, since the Committee of Imperial Defence, after considering them, has instructed us to take as the basis of our Report the two assumptions quoted in our first paragraph, viz.:—
(i) Priority to the Far East; European commitments; and the Defence of India:
(ii)No expenditure on measures of defence required to provide exclusively against attack by the United States of America, France or Italy.
7. Referring first to the question of priority, after a study of the Minutes of the 261st Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, our understanding is that the intention of the Committee was not to lay down the three items mentioned above in order of priority, but merely to single them out as contingencies for which our defensive preparations ought at the present time to provide. Since the Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence the trend of events has been rather in the direction of accentuating the dangers of the European situation. This tendency results from the failure of France and Germany to come to terms on disarmament and from increasing evidence of Germany's intention to re-arm, with or without the consent of other Powers. In the meantime, Japan's relations with Russia in the Far East have deteriorated and should incline her to seek improved relations with other Powers generally and ourselves in particular. This inclination is at present confirmed both by letters and despatches from our Embassy at Tokyo and by outward and visible signs, among which may be quoted the successful issue of the Indo-Japanese cotton negotiations and the speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister in the Diet on the 23rd January, when he said that "the traditional friendship with Great Britain remains unshaken and the two island empires can by wholehearted collaboration effectively serve the cause of universal peace."
8. We consider that advantage should be taken of any opportunity to improve our relations with Japan. No student of the Memoranda and Proceedings of the Committee of Imperial Defence which led up to our Inquiry or of this Report can be under any illusions as to the gravity of the situation which would arise if we were faced with hostility by Japan in the Far East, especially if (as is by no means impossible) it coincided with trouble in Europe and perhaps in India. We cannot over-state the importance we attach to getting back, not to an alliance (since that would not be practical politics), but at least to our old terms of cordiality and mutual respect with Japan. There should be no insuperable difficulty in such a task, for which conditions are now favourable, though there is already some speculation as to the future extent of Japan's relations with Germany. Success on our part would not only bring us increased security, but might enable us to correct or obviate any unhealthy tendency of this kind in Japanese policy. Japan is more likely, however, to respect and listen to a Power that can defend its interests than to one that is defenceless.
9. The question of our relations with Japan inevitably carries with it that of our relations with the United States. There is much to be said for the view that our subservience to the United States of America in past years has been one of the principal factors in the deterioration of our former good relations with Japan, and that, before the Naval Disarmament Conference, 1935, we ought thoroughly to reconsider our general attitude. That opens up too large a subject for treatment in this report, but is an aspect of the question which we feel sure the Cabinet will not overlook.
10. At the present moment, however, pending a further improvement in our relations, we cannot overlook the danger created by our total inability to defend our interests in the Far East. Japan is fully armed, both in a material and moral sense. This is not our position. At the moment we are almost defenceless in the Far East. By the decision to proceed with the defence of Singapore the National Government has recognised that this state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue, but much remains to be done unless our vast interests in the Far East are to remain in considerable jeopardy. We do not consider that there is any immediate danger or any present aggressive design. There remains the risk, against which we must guard, that some unexpected emergency may arise, as in the autumn of 1931, or that Japan might yield to the sudden temptation of a favourable opportunity arising from complications elsewhere. And elsewhere means Europe, and danger to us in Europe will only come from Germany.
11. Germany, on the other hand, is not yet fully armed. She has considerable elements of force, but her permanent system, with its full complement of armaments and trained reserves, has not yet taken shape, though it is rapidly doing so. Surrounded by armed and suspicious neighbours she is not at present a serious menace to this country, but within, a few years will certainly become so. It will, indeed, be impossible to have any confidence in German gestures to the outside world so long as every German act at home belies them. In her case we have time, though not too much time, to make defensive preparations.
First Assumption
12. In these circumstances we have divided the risk of war into three classes. The Far Eastern Commitment, as to which we envisage an ultimate policy of accommodation and friendship with Japan, and an immediate and provisional policy of "showing a tooth "for the purpose of recovering the standing which we have sacrificed of recent years. Secondly, we take Germany as the ultimate potential enemy against whom our "long range "defence policy must be directed. And, thirdly, the defence of India — the largest of our "Empire" commitments.
Second Assumption
13. We have also strictly applied the second assumption laid down for us, that we need not incur expenditure on measures of defence required to provide exclusively against attack by the United States of America, France or Italy. But we recommend that this should not be interpreted to rule out the provision in certain localities of a limited amount of modern equipment required to enable personnel to be trained and exercised with modern weapons. For example, we accept the view of the Chiefs of Staff that it should be the aim to provide category "A "defended ports with at least one battery capable of engaging a capital ship. It would also be unsound to allow any of our Naval bases to fall to so low a degree of efficiency that it would be impossible to bring them up to a suitable standard within a reasonable time should changes in the political situation in Europe make this necessary.
Third Assumption
14. On a review of the international situation as described in earlier paragraphs, we are of opinion that our present deficiencies ought to be made good within the shortest practicable period. "We have therefore aimed, in principle, at a programme spread over a five-year period, though in practice we have found that for certain items it is not possible, or in some cases essential, to make good within so short a time limit deficiencies accumulated over a long term of years.