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Chapter IV: The British Crisis, Part II
CHAPTER IV: The British Crisis, Part II.
The CDP and Labour couldn’t go into coalition. The CDP realized it was still in a vulnerable position, and wanted to be seen as an independent party, not an adjunct of Labour. The CDP and the Tories couldn’t go into coalition. The bitterness and hatred between the leadership of both parties was too strong, especially after Keith Joseph was easily elected Party Leader. Labour and the Tories couldn’t go into coalition for obvious reasons. No other coalition had the numbers to work. Many Labour members desperately wanted Michael Stewart to call an election, but he refused. Years later, in an interview, Stewart said “We were in political turmoil. One of the major parties had been reduced to third place. We had gotten our worst result since the 30’s. I feared that if I called an election, we could be wiped out. So I waited.” The thing was, all the other parties were wary about another election as well. Almost 200 seats, belonging to all four parties, had been won by 2,000 votes or less. In late August of 1975, after the entire British political system had been in a strange Mexican Standoff for over two months, a series of fateful meetings between the leaders of all four parties was held.
View attachment 372144
The pundits began discussing words not heard since the Second World War- a National Government. Of course, this idea faced a serious problem right from the gate. Who could lead this government? Initially it was thought Peter Walker would be the most reasonable choice, but the personal bitterness between the Tories and much of the CDP quickly scuppered that idea. Jeremy Thorpe was considered briefly, but most felt that Thorpe, entirely lacking in ministerial experience as he was, wasn’t a man who could solve thorny issues like political violence in Northern Ireland and on the mainland. The Conservatives insisted that they would not serve under a government led by a Labour man, and Labour responded in kind. For a few days, Reg Prentice, a Labour-to-CDP defector, seemed like the most likely man, as his party switch hadn’t been terribly bitter or acrimonious, and the Tories had no grudge with him. However, then a dark horse candidate emerged. All four parties could agree on him with reasonable ease, and soon, a deal was hammered out. And on September 1st, 1975, Harold Macmillan announced his cabinet, known today by some columnists as “the Dream Team.”
View attachment 372143
The National Government of the 70’s had little impact on policy, they were mostly there to hold down the fort for a couple years, and that they did. In 1976, some feared it would come apart when Jeremy Thorpe suddenly resigned from his role as Home Secretary, and John Pardoe upset David Steel to win the Liberal Leadership. However, Pardoe ended up giving Steel Thorpe’s portfolio, and the government chugged on. However, many didn’t want it to.
Among both the Labour Left and the High-Church Tories, a theory had emerged known by some as the “Deep Roots Doctrine.” This held that Labour and the Tories had real roots in their communities, organized teams of activists, and thus were better equipped to survive the political storm ahead. But the Deep Roots faction of each party didn’t challenge leadership at first. The Labour Left wanted to bide its time, and the High-Churchers lacked a suitable candidate. But then, in January 1978, Guatemalan President Kjell Eugenio Lagerund Garcia launched an invasion of neighboring Belize. The British government talked a big game about stopping Garcia, but muddled about. Stewart, as Foreign Secretary, was blamed, and Soft Left Labourite Anthony Benn challenged him. Between the Deep Roots leftists and Labour members furious at Stewart’s seeming inaction, Benn was able to win by just a single vote, and announce that Labour was leaving the National Government. All the other parties soon followed.
View attachment 372145
It quickly became clear that the Deep Roots Doctrine was based on very flawed assumptions. The Tories ran a disastrously incompetent campaign, exacerbated by an informal alliance between the Liberals and CDP. Most infamous was the “Evil Eyes” advert, an ad with no coherent message that somehow managed to feature Jeremy Thorpe as the Liberal Leader instead of John Pardoe, a decision made by a remarkably tone-deaf adman who bought into some of the wild rumors of the circumstances around Thorpe's resignation. And then came the revelation, a week out from the campaign, that as Defense Secretary Keith Joseph had intentionally stonewalled Stewart’s efforts to intervene in the Guatemalan crisis.
View attachment 372146
A week later, Anthony Benn, immortalized even to the most Anglophobic Americans (and there are quite a few of those) as “The Iron Man,” was elected Prime Minister, and the Conservative Party, the oldest party in the UK, had blown away centuries as a governing party in just 5 years.
The CDP and Labour couldn’t go into coalition. The CDP realized it was still in a vulnerable position, and wanted to be seen as an independent party, not an adjunct of Labour. The CDP and the Tories couldn’t go into coalition. The bitterness and hatred between the leadership of both parties was too strong, especially after Keith Joseph was easily elected Party Leader. Labour and the Tories couldn’t go into coalition for obvious reasons. No other coalition had the numbers to work. Many Labour members desperately wanted Michael Stewart to call an election, but he refused. Years later, in an interview, Stewart said “We were in political turmoil. One of the major parties had been reduced to third place. We had gotten our worst result since the 30’s. I feared that if I called an election, we could be wiped out. So I waited.” The thing was, all the other parties were wary about another election as well. Almost 200 seats, belonging to all four parties, had been won by 2,000 votes or less. In late August of 1975, after the entire British political system had been in a strange Mexican Standoff for over two months, a series of fateful meetings between the leaders of all four parties was held.
View attachment 372144
The pundits began discussing words not heard since the Second World War- a National Government. Of course, this idea faced a serious problem right from the gate. Who could lead this government? Initially it was thought Peter Walker would be the most reasonable choice, but the personal bitterness between the Tories and much of the CDP quickly scuppered that idea. Jeremy Thorpe was considered briefly, but most felt that Thorpe, entirely lacking in ministerial experience as he was, wasn’t a man who could solve thorny issues like political violence in Northern Ireland and on the mainland. The Conservatives insisted that they would not serve under a government led by a Labour man, and Labour responded in kind. For a few days, Reg Prentice, a Labour-to-CDP defector, seemed like the most likely man, as his party switch hadn’t been terribly bitter or acrimonious, and the Tories had no grudge with him. However, then a dark horse candidate emerged. All four parties could agree on him with reasonable ease, and soon, a deal was hammered out. And on September 1st, 1975, Harold Macmillan announced his cabinet, known today by some columnists as “the Dream Team.”
View attachment 372143
The National Government of the 70’s had little impact on policy, they were mostly there to hold down the fort for a couple years, and that they did. In 1976, some feared it would come apart when Jeremy Thorpe suddenly resigned from his role as Home Secretary, and John Pardoe upset David Steel to win the Liberal Leadership. However, Pardoe ended up giving Steel Thorpe’s portfolio, and the government chugged on. However, many didn’t want it to.
Among both the Labour Left and the High-Church Tories, a theory had emerged known by some as the “Deep Roots Doctrine.” This held that Labour and the Tories had real roots in their communities, organized teams of activists, and thus were better equipped to survive the political storm ahead. But the Deep Roots faction of each party didn’t challenge leadership at first. The Labour Left wanted to bide its time, and the High-Churchers lacked a suitable candidate. But then, in January 1978, Guatemalan President Kjell Eugenio Lagerund Garcia launched an invasion of neighboring Belize. The British government talked a big game about stopping Garcia, but muddled about. Stewart, as Foreign Secretary, was blamed, and Soft Left Labourite Anthony Benn challenged him. Between the Deep Roots leftists and Labour members furious at Stewart’s seeming inaction, Benn was able to win by just a single vote, and announce that Labour was leaving the National Government. All the other parties soon followed.
View attachment 372145
It quickly became clear that the Deep Roots Doctrine was based on very flawed assumptions. The Tories ran a disastrously incompetent campaign, exacerbated by an informal alliance between the Liberals and CDP. Most infamous was the “Evil Eyes” advert, an ad with no coherent message that somehow managed to feature Jeremy Thorpe as the Liberal Leader instead of John Pardoe, a decision made by a remarkably tone-deaf adman who bought into some of the wild rumors of the circumstances around Thorpe's resignation. And then came the revelation, a week out from the campaign, that as Defense Secretary Keith Joseph had intentionally stonewalled Stewart’s efforts to intervene in the Guatemalan crisis.
View attachment 372146
A week later, Anthony Benn, immortalized even to the most Anglophobic Americans (and there are quite a few of those) as “The Iron Man,” was elected Prime Minister, and the Conservative Party, the oldest party in the UK, had blown away centuries as a governing party in just 5 years.
- Bulldoggus
- Word Count: 830