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The news of the emperor’s death, which reached the island in the first week of November, had no immediate effect on Corsica. It was not yet apparent that the new Habsburg heiress, Queen Maria Theresa, would have to fight for her patrimony. After all, the crowned heads of Europe had solemnly affirmed the Pragmatic Sanction during the reign of the late emperor, by which they had agreed to recognize the complete and indivisible inheritance of the Habsburg realms by his eldest daughter. When King Friedrich II of Prussia invaded Silesia on the 16th of December, four thousand Austrian soldiers under Otto Anton, Graf von Walsegg were still on the island, and there were no immediate plans to withdraw them. There was great confidence in Vienna that the perfidious Prussian king would soon be crushed by Austrian arms and the assistance of a grand anti-Prussian alliance which King George II of Great Britain was busily arranging. Maria Theresa had no great interest in Corsica, but her advisors counseled her that it would be both unwise and unnecessary to precipitously withdraw Walsegg’s force there.[A] They were concerned that such an act would make Austria look weak and fearful at a time when it needed to project strength and confidence.

As such, Corsica remained largely quiet through the winter of 1740-41. Although the French and Austrian troops withdrew to winter quarters, there was no new rebellion. The only insurgent activity was that of Lieutenant-General Johann Friedrich von Neuhoff zu Rauschenburg, still fighting his hopeless war against the oppressors with barely two dozen men under his command. Even he, however, used much of the season to rest his ragged and embattled force, taking refuge in remote mountain villages and vacant shepherd’s huts where the French and Genoese were unlikely to pursue him in winter. His continued resistance is difficult to understand; while the Genoese had sentenced him and his men to death in absentia and put a bounty on his head, it seems likely that he could have turned himself in to the Austrians and made an exit as Matthias von Drost had done after the fall of Zicavo. Either he doubted Walsegg’s mercy or he simply did not want to give up the fight. Although in military terms his actions meant nothing, his effect on Corsican morale was more significant. Though crushed beneath the heel of mighty continental armies, the highland Corsicans knew that one man yet fought for Corsica’s freedom, and he was not even Corsican. Once out of earshot of the Genoese and French, they exchanged rumors as to where “Ghjuvan Federicu” had gone now and laughed at the latest bungled attempts by his pursuers to catch him. If Theodore was Corsica’s King Richard, the good king away on crusade in distant lands, then Rauschenburg was their Robin Hood.

The position of Marquis Luca d’Ornano was more ambiguous. Although he had received a colonel’s commission from Franz Stefan, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, he continued to use the title of “marquis” which Theodore had bestowed upon him, occasionally gave his rank as “lieutenant-general” instead (another Theodoran bequest), and styled himself “Regent of Corsica,” leaving it vague as to which monarch he was acting as regent to. In principle he had submitted to the Austrians, allowing their troops to pass through and occupy his territory in the southwest, but he was also suspected of hoarding weapons and artillery in contravention of Walsegg’s demands as well as occasionally giving succor to Rauschenburg’s men.

The marquis resolved all questions as to his true loyalty and demands upon his person by temporizing. When Walsegg commanded him to disarm, he demanded to see orders from the Grand Duke which never came; when the Grand Duke instructed him to bring his regimental recruits to Livorno, he claimed they were not yet ready, and suggested that the weather was too dangerous to consider making the journey until spring. In the meantime, he continued to draw on his generous colonel’s salary and strengthen his “regiment” encamped outside Porto Vecchio, which by Christmas was nearly 400 strong. He was content, however, to frequently leave them in the hands of his subordinates, and split his time between Porto Vecchio and his base of power in Ornano. It seemed clear to everyone, except perhaps Franz Stefan, that d’Ornano did not intend to go anywhere at the Grand Duke’s bequest, but his long-term goals were opaque. Perhaps he had none and was simply finding the most advantageous position from which to await the future. If the Grand Duke were successful in his schemes to become Corsica’s king, d’Ornano’s role would be crucial and undoubtedly well-compensated, but if Genoa retained the island he was well-placed to either lead a new rebellion against them or demand sweeping concessions as the price for his reconciliation to the Republic.

For several reasons, d’Ornano had become a nuisance to Lieutenant-General Daniel François de Gélas, Vicomte de Lautrec, the French commander on Corsica. After the fall of Corti, d’Ornano had expressed his willingness to surrender to the French and approached Lautrec with the offer of handing over the entire Dila to them. The arrival of the Austrians, however, had caused him to abruptly rescind these offers and turn instead to Walsegg and Franz Stefan. That itself was only mildly irksome, but d’Ornano’s presence on the nebulous “border” between the Austrian and French zones was inconvenient. Outlaws and criminals, including (allegedly) Rauschenburg himself, regularly took advantage of the indifference of d’Ornano and the ambiguous sovereignty of his “regency” to use the territory as a safe haven when pursued by the Genoese or French. What’s more, the marquis was poaching Lautrec’s recruits, as the Régiment d’Ornano directly competed with the Régiment Royal-Corse for men. With Austrian troops in the territory of the “Regency,” however, a military response to d’Ornano’s provocations was not diplomatically feasible. Lautrec’s admonitions to Walsegg to deal with his wayward colonel were hampered by Walsegg’s reluctance to take action against a subject and favorite of the Grand Duke, particularly now that since the emperor’s death “the Grand Duke” was now also the king-consort of the Habsburg monarchy and the commander-in-chief of Maria Theresa’s armies, including the one which Walsegg commanded.

In other respects, however, Lautrec was riding high. His sector of Corsica was peaceful (save for Rauschenburg) and his administration well-regarded (save by the Genoese). In February, he attained the pinnacle of his professional career when King Louis XV, in gratitude for Lautrec’s cleansing of the national honor which had been besmirched under Boissieux’s tenure, made him a Marshal of France. Nothing could have been a clearer indication of the confidence in which he was held by his government or the powerlessness of the Genoese to dispute his position.

In contrast to the Austrians, who maintained Walsegg and his troops on Corsica for months to give the appearance of imperturbability, the French had been floating the possibility of a withdrawal as early as November, mere weeks after the emperor’s death. This process began with the assurance of Cardinal André-Hercule de Fleury to the Genoese that France would maintain "at least six battalions" on the island, but that itself opened the possibility of a drastic draw-down from their present sixteen. Having complained bitterly over the last few months of the liberties which Lautrec and his troops had taken in Corsica, the Genoese executed a swift volte-face and begged them to keep a robust troop presence. In one matter, at least, they were of the same mind as Lautrec - that only the presence of French forces could ensure peace. The Genoese ambassador to France, Agostino Lomellini, was instructed to do all in his power to convince the French to stay.
By the spring of 1741, however, the French position hard hardened. “At least six battalions” was clarified to mean “exactly six battalions,” and the French had very specific and non-negotiable opinions as to where they would be posted - specifically, Calvi, Ajaccio, and several fortified positions on the western coast between those two towns. Furthermore, the French troops would occupy the citadels of these towns, and exclusively so, in contrast to the present arrangement in which the Genoese had reserved those key positions for their own men. When the Genoese objected, the French government replied that the only alternative was a total withdrawal. Lomellini’s protestations that this would provoke a new uprising were met with indifference.

France’s strategic perspective was clearly shifting, and rapidly so. Lautrec had been urged to move quickly upon Corti in the summer of 1740 because of a desire to gain an advantage over the Austrians, who were thought to be in league with the British, and British influence on the island was to be avoided at all costs. Now, however, Corsica seemed to pale in comparison to matters on the continent. Moreover, the French court suspected British interference was now unlikely. Britain was absorbed in a war with Spain (which, come June, they appeared to be losing), while the timidity of King George II in the face of a prospective Franco-Prussian alliance seemed to support the notion that Britain was too cautious and their government too divided to make a play in Corsica. The chance that Britain would add to its commitments by waging war against neutral Genoa seemed remote, and the sizable French fleet in the West Indies - plus, in the coming months, a 40,000 man army on Hanover’s doorstep - seemed more than sufficient to keep Britain chastened and contained. As Fleury’s cautious statesmanship on the continent gave way to the sweeping, belligerent policy of Charles Louis Auguste Fouquet, duc de Belle-Isle, keeping thousands of French soldiers on peacekeeping duty in Corsica no longer made sense.

Either adamant in the preservation of their citadels or believing the French ultimatum to be a bluff, the Genoese refused to accept the French conditions for their continued presence. But it was no bluff, and in early May Marshal Lautrec announced the beginning of the withdrawal to Commissioner-general Domenico Maria Spinola, which would begin with Lautrec’s own departure along with four battalions at the end of May. Temporary command would be vested in Brigadier Jean-Baptiste François, Marquis de Villemur, who would supervise a phased withdrawal over the summer. Lautrec kept his word, and his last action as the governor of Corsica was to publish a very professionally done census of the island, which he had accomplished over the last several months with the cooperation of Walsegg.[1] Lautrec had no illusions as to the likely consequences of his departure. Before leaving, he reproached Spinola for his government’s intransigence, predicting that the rebellion would resume as soon as the last French boot was off Corsican soil.

Even as Lautrec departed, the Austrians remained firmly in place. Despite the alarming invasion of Silesia and Prussia’s upset victory over the Austrians at Mollwitz in April, the situation was not seen as threatening enough to justify a serious redeployment of troops from Italy. The Queen of Hungary was quite conscious of Spain’s ambitions on her territories in Lombardy, and despite recent setbacks in Germany she and her advisors felt secure in the support of Britain and Russia. All, it was believed, would be well, and Prussia would soon be humbled. In June, however, Europe learned of Britain’s catastrophic defeat at Cartagena de Indias, and towards the end of the month came the revelation that France and Prussia had signed a formal treaty of alliance. In early July, Austrian diplomats had the displeasure of reporting the refusal of Karl Albrecht, Elector of Bavaria and the rival of Franz Stefan for the imperial crown, to entertain any compromise with Austria, as well as the apparent defection of King George from Austria’s camp, who had renounced all his previous assurances and commitments to Austria and communicated to France his willingness to consider Karl Albrecht’s claim to the imperial crown. Vienna had finally woken up to the deadly seriousness of the situation it was in.

In the second week of July, Walsegg received orders from Vienna to cut his force by more than half. 2,500 soldiers would return to Livorno, leaving less than 1,500 men in the entirety of the Austrian sector. Around the same time, the French were drawing down to six battalions. Walsegg positioned his three remaining battalions at Corti, Porto Vecchio, and Sartena. While the phased French withdrawal had been conducted hand in glove with the Republic, ensuring a smooth transition of villages and fortified posts to Genoese control, the rapid Austrian evacuation had caught the Genoese by surprise. At the time, the Genoese had only two regiments in the Dila, Colonel Varenne’s Ligurian regiment and an oltramontane regiment (mainly Germans/Grisons) under Colonel Jost. Of these, most were at Ajaccio at the time of the withdrawal, and thus cut off from the rest of the Austrian Dila by d’Ornano’s territory. The commissioner of Bonifacio, responsible for the whole southeastern quadrant of the island, had one company of each regiment under his command, stationed at Propriano and Bonifacio, which together represented fewer than 400 men. Despite Genoese pleas, Walsegg was unwilling to delay his withdrawal long enough for the Republic to reinforce their positions, which left Ornano, Istria, Alta Rocca, Zicavo, Fiumorbo, and the entire Taravo valley without any garrisoning forces at all.

Despite his assurances to Franz Stefan over the winter that he would be able to depart in the spring, by mid-summer Luca d’Ornano was still in Corsica. Rumors of war and the beginning of the French withdrawal suggested that the situation would soon be in flux, and he did not want to miss any opportunities. He could not, however, resist the relocation of most of the Régiment d’Ornano to Livorno, having been at last compelled by pressure from Walsegg and the Genoese, neither of whom were satisfied with an unruly corps of Corsicans posted outside Porto Vecchio. D’Ornano remained behind, ostensibly to continue recruitment, and continued to draw on his stipend from Florence.

In the wake of Walsegg’s withdrawal, the Genoese commander at Propriano sent a detachment of around 40 men to to the village of Sollacaro, six miles away. A picturesque hilltop village overlooking the fertile plain of Istria, Sollacaro is known best today for its human-faced standing stones that provide striking evidence of Corsica’s prehistoric past. In 1741, the more relevant detail was that the village possessed held a commanding height overlooking the pieve of Istria and the valley of the lower Taravo. Istria had been something of a disputed territory during the occupation; Walsegg had invited d’Ornano to occupy it in order to deny the territory to the active rebels, only to vainly demand his withdrawal from it when the Genoese loudly voiced their objections. D’Ornano’s men had never really left, and effectively shared the pieve with the Austrians. The marquis, initially, did nothing, but on the 20th of July a firefight erupted in an Istrian village, allegedly as a result of the Genoese commander attempting to requisition cattle from the locals. A Corsican was killed and a Genoese soldier wounded. D’Ornano refused to attack the Genoese - he was no doubt aware that a battalion of the Hungarian Gyulai infantry was only ten miles away at Sartena - but he was not in full control of the local militias, and on the 23rd a clash between Istrian militia and the Genoese resulted in two dead Genoese soldiers. The Genoese demanded Walsegg’s assistance, but the general preferred to remain at his secure posts and took no action other than sending a stern reminder to d’Ornano that Austria demanded peace and condemned rebellion.

Fearful of a future without French or Austrian assistance, the Genoese Senate resolved to take extraordinary measures to tamp down the spirit of rebellion and prevent a new uprising. A decree was promulgated across the island in early August in which the Senate offered its broadest amnesty yet. All Corsicans, even those currently in exile, were pardoned of all their offenses against the Republic. Corsican political prisoners would be freed from the prisons and the galleys, the most hateful of the Republic’s taxes would be suspended, and the various land restrictions which had been repealed outright by Theodore - prohibitions on hunting and fishing, for instance - would be eased. Outside the loyalist regions of the north, however, these appeals were met with indifference. The Senate was not offering anything which Theodore, when he had ruled, had not already given them.

By August, the French had only three battalions left on the island, and were planning to complete a total withdrawal in the first half of September. Villemur, who was counting the days to the moment when he would be able to leave this godforsaken island for good, was accused of supporting a new rebellion; Spinola informed the Senate that the French commander was selling off surplus weapons to the Corsicans. If he was, it was mostly likely an attempt to make the best of his temporary command by lining his own pockets rather than any genuine sympathy with the Corsicans. Meanwhile, Walsegg was ordered to withdraw another two battalions to Italy, and at the end of August these orders were amended to withdraw Walsegg himself. On the 14th of August, Feldzeugmeister Karl Franz, Freiherr von Wachtendonk, commander of Livorno and enabler of the Corsican cause, died of a fever at the age of 46, and Walsegg was appointed as his replacement. Command on Corsica was passed to Obrist-Kommandant Anton, Graf von Colloredo-Melz und Walsee, formerly the commander at Corti, who now had fewer than 500 men on the whole island. His tenure was brief, for by September the desperate situation of Austria was such that even these men could not be spared, and they too were ordered to be withdrawn over the howling protests and pleas of the Genoese. Colloredo left with the last of his soldiers on the 19th of September, twelve days after the departure of Villemur with the last French forces. The foreign occupation of Corsica was over.

In one respect, at least, Lautrec was incorrect - the rebellion did not resume as soon as the last French boot left Corsican soil. The nationals were demoralized and and disunited, with most of their most prominent leaders in exile. Many Corsicans who had considered themselves patriots, particularly in the north, had been appeased by the arrival of peace and Lautrec’s “good government,” and dared to hope that it might continue under Genoese administration. There were promising signs: Spinola had demonstrated himself to be more open to compromise than his predecessor and the Senate seemed more conciliatory than ever before.

But there were also troubling signs. Too eager to buy peace with amnesty, the Senate’s decision to forgive the exiles soon led to the repatriation of dozens of rebel leaders who were anything but reconciled. The leniency of the Austrians in the south had allowed many other former rebel sympathizers and commanders to remain in place, ready to be reactivated in the service of independence. Nor had the disarmament of the Corsicans, a major objective of the Genoese since the rebellion’s beginning, been satisfactorily completed - while shiploads of confiscated muskets had been taken back to Genoa, many rebel militiamen had simply hidden their muskets and ammunition in the waning days of Theodore’s reign, and their arms awaited them under floorboards and in wood-sheds. Not even the rebels’ artillery had been entirely taken from them, thanks to d’Ornano’s fierce defense of his own autonomy and the indifference of Colloredo, as Corti's arsenal had been greatly diminished but never completely emptied. And in Europe beyond Corsica's shores, the stars were aligning: Within a few months of the final withdrawal, the Spanish would bring the war to Italy, a new and belligerent cabinet would sweep into power in Britain, and Sardinia would present a beleaguered Austria with its conditions for an alliance - in particular, the long-desired acquisition of Finale, a territory of the Republic of Genoa.


Footnotes
[1] According to this census, Corsica was divided into 339 parishes which contained 427 villages, and inhabited by 26,854 households with 120,389 persons in total. This amounts to an average of approximately 4½ persons per household and 282 persons per village.

Timeline Notes
[A] Since the forces on Corsica ITTL were drawn pretty much entirely from Austrian units already in Italy IOTL, the forces available to the Austrians in Germany/Bohemia/Silesia are basically the same as OTL, which is my justification for why Friedrich’s invasion and the subsequent Battle of Mollwitz ITTL proceed identically to how they did historically.