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Despite the fall of the Niolo and the corresponding loss of the last "rebel territory" in the French sector of Corsica, the troubles of Lieutenant-General Daniel François de Gélas, Vicomte de Lautrec were hardly over. It had been the expectation of the Genoese that once the rebellion was suppressed, the Republic's sovereignty would be restored in full, and the French would serve as no more than auxiliaries. Lautrec, however, was not prepared to play such a role, and relations between him and his counterpart, Commissioner-general Domenico Maria Spinola, soon began breaking down.

Spinola's appointment, following the Senate's removal of the irascible Giovanni-Battista di Mari, seemed at first to be an opportunity for reconciliation. The 74 year old Spinola was one of the Republic's elder statesmen who had served as Doge of Genoa from 1732 to 1734 and before then had been the Republic's ambassador to Vienna. He enjoyed the confidence of his government in no small part because his close relative Niccolo Spinola had been elected doge earlier in the year, a typical example of the Republic's incestuous political order. What was most relevant to the Corsican situation, however, was that he was viewed by many as a governor who was uniquely qualified to bring the wayward sheep back into the fold. In Genoa, Spinola's nickname was "Corsetto" because he was technically a native of the island; he was from among the oldest of Genoese aristocratic families, but he had been born in Bastia. From the moment of his arrival on the 1st of July, he expressed his desire to win back the Corsicans to their "natural allegiance" now that the rebellion, at least in the north, had been entirely quashed.

The Genoese overestimated Spinola's appeal. He was indeed popular in Bastia, and the French and Genoese alike took heart from his warm reception there. Bastia, however, was a Genoese colony through and through, and to the highland Corsicans there was not much difference between a Bastian and a Genoese. Nor did the nationals forget that it had been under Spinola's term as doge that the Republic had reneged upon the peace agreement forged by the Austrians in 1732, the most infamous example of which was the "Prisoners of Savona" affair, in which the Genoese had tried to execute the Corsican leaders who had willingly agreed to go into captivity as hostages. He had only been six years out of power, and the Corsicans were not a people known for swiftly forgetting offenses. In his defense, Spinola did go further than his predecessor ever had in trying to reconcile the islanders: He offered a general pardon to all those who had opposed the republic, excepting only the most notorious leaders of the rebellion, and curbed some of the more punitive practices of Mari. After generations of repression and a decade of war, however, this was simply too little, too late.

If the Corsicans could not be won over, Spinola could at least mend fences with the French, who had been constantly at odds with di Mari. By August, however—only a month into his tenure—Spinola and Lautrec were already at loggerheads. The main problem involved the nature of France’s role on Corsica. Now that the rebellion was suppressed, the Genoese expected the French to be their mere auxiliaries, serving only to enforce the Republic's commands. The French, however, scoffed at being ordered around by Genoese functionaries, and Lautrec dismissed the idea of an immediate transfer of control as not only premature but dangerous. Lautrec understood very clearly that despite Spinola’s attempts at reform, only the presence of thousands of French bayonets was actually stopping the rebellion from erupting anew. He expected to have provisional administrative authority commensurate with the importance of his forces, and believed this to be in the best interest of both Corsica and Genoa, as he was skeptical that the Genoese could provide the “good government” which was necessary to really reconcile the natives. His role as an administrator, he believed, was as much for the edification of the Genoese as the pacification of the Corsicans, as to keep their colony it was necessary for them to learn superior French methods.

What was sensible and fair to Lautrec was outrageous and intolerable to the Genoese. Spinola complained of the "abuse of power" of French officers who dared to interpose themselves in matters of justice and administration. Especially worrying to Spinola was the "fraternization" of the French and Corsicans which sprung naturally from these conditions of occupation. The French officers quite plainly looked down upon their Genoese allies, considering them venal, corrupt, effete, and militarily impotent. The Corsicans, in contrast, were crude but honorable, "noble savages" whom the French could at least respect as fellow men and warriors. For their part, the Corsicans had no particular quarrel with the French apart from their presence as an occupying army, and vastly preferred the French and their relatively mild governance to the hated Genoese. Spinola and his fellow Genoese officials feared that Lautrec's “good government” was in fact a ploy to lure the Corsicans into the allegiance of the King of France. An anecdote by a French officer regarding a dinner held by Lautrec at Bastia captures the awkwardness of the situation: Lautrec toasted His Most Christian Majesty, to the loud approval of all the French, Genoese, and Corsicans present; but when someone added "and to the health of our Serene Republic!" he was met with near silence. Only one man spoke up, a French officer, who replied with a scornful laugh: "But the Corsicans do not want to be under the republic, only the king!"

Another irritation to the Genoese was the continued activities of Johann Friedrich von Neuhoff zu Rauschenburg. Driven from the Niolo by French forces, Rauschenburg was down but not yet out, and with an "army" of a few dozen men he transformed himself into a true guerrilla. Unable to survive in the high mountain valleys, his band abandoned any pretense of holding territory and descended into the interior, relying on the covert support of the people to acquire food and elude pursuers in the ancient tradition of the Corsican bandit. Perhaps purposefully, Rauschenburg concentrated his attacks not on the French but on the Genoese and filogenovesi. These were, in the grand scheme of things, pinpricks—one week he would ambush and kill a Genoese soldier or two, and on the next he would steal some munitions from a Genoese outpost or burn down the house of a notorious collaborator. His continued existence produced a reaction from Spinola which was all out of proportion to his actual military effectiveness, and the commissioner-general angrily accused the French of not doing enough to hunt him down. Lautrec, however, saw no reason to devote an inordinate amount of resources to what was little more than a pack of bandits, and the return of his hussars to France earlier in the year made the job of tracking him down much more difficult. Efforts to catch Rauschenburg were further stymied by Austrian control of the Tavignano; the Austrians had few forces in the Diqua, and the single battalion at Corti under Obrist-Kommandant Anton, Graf von Colloredo-Melz und Wallsee could not prevent Rauschenburg from withdrawing temporarily into "Austrian" territory when things got too hot. There were also allegations that Count Gianpietro Gaffori, still acting as podesta of Corti under Colloredo’s occupation, gave covert support to Rauschenburg and his men.

The situation was hardly better in the south. Strategically, the position of Feldmarschall-Lieutenant Otto Anton, Graf von Walsegg had been improved by the deployment of additional Austrian forces in early August, bringing the total imperial complement to around 4,000 men. With bravery and advantageous terrain, the Corsicans could delay the Austrian advance, but there was no longer much doubt that it was within Walsegg’s power to subdue the rest of the south sooner or later. The rebel forces were not only considerably outnumbered but had been weakened by Theodore's departure, for not all the nationals still under arms knew of or understood the king's inscrutable plans and many suspected they had been abandoned. Grand Duke Franz Stefan urged Walsegg to be gentle with the rebel leaders and offer them generous terms, ostensibly to end the conflict more quickly, but for the moment the Zicavesi and other rebel remnants remained defiant.

Within days of Theodore’s exit from Corsica, Marquis Luca d’Ornano stepped boldly into the spotlight and claimed leadership of the entire national movement. This was not totally without merit—Theodore had not officially announced any regent before his latest departure, but during his previous absence from Corsica he had created a regency council consisting of d’Ornano and his fellow marquesses Luigi Giafferi and Simone Fabiani. With Giafferi in Naples and Fabiani in Livorno, d'Ornano was the last one left on the island. He declared the resumption of the regency council in the absence of the king, and as its only remaining member now titled himself "Regent of the Kingdom of Corsica." In a material sense, this declaration changed little; the rebels of Zicavo and La Rocca paid no attention to his self-appointed leadership. It did, however, improve his negotiating position with Walsegg, as he could now claim to be speaking on behalf of the entire national cause. These negotiations had been interrupted by Genoese objections, but Walsegg could now credibly resume them, claiming that he was merely negotiating the surrender of the rebels in total rather than striking a deal with some particular warlord.

D’Ornano was willing to formally surrender to the Austrians and consign himself to their authority. He wanted to remain in Corsica along with his lieutenants and followers, however, and he was unwilling to submit himself to the Genoese until the Austrians themselves handed over power. Walsegg, who disliked his job and assumed the occupation would be over as soon as he hoped it would, saw no great harm in this other than the offense it would give to Genoa. The most contentious issue was disarmament, which Walsegg insisted had to be both prompt and total, including both small arms and the artillery which d'Ornano possessed. The marquis dragged his feet, and as long as the rebels held out in Zicavo Walsegg could not spare the men to compel him, but Walsegg appeared to have the whip hand.

For reasons that will soon be apparent, it is necessary to return briefly to the spring of 1740, when Lautrec had received instructions from Paris to raise a regiment of Corsicans for service in the French army. King Louis XV himself was a keen supporter of the idea and proposed that he himself be the regiment’s nominal colonel. The French considered the formation of such a force doubly desirable, as it would not only provide the crown with a fresh battalion of fierce Corsican soldiers but would also take young men of fighting age off the island who might otherwise turn to banditry or provide fuel for the rebellion. In July, Lautrec announced the formation of the Régiment Royal-Corse and began enrolling recruits. Despite Spinola's blanket offer of amnesty, many former rebels doubted his sincerity and suspected that even if they were not pursued on charges of rebellion or treason the Genoese would find some way to make their lives intolerable once the French were no longer present to restrain them. Although the Genoese were uneasy about the unit's formation, they could appreciate the value of removing troublesome elements from their island, and Spinola made no serious objections to the plan.

The French, of course, were hardly alone in wishing to recruit Corsicans; the “Royal Corsican Regiment” of Naples, led by Luigi Giafferi, has already been mentioned. These examples proved to be an inspiration to the Grand Duke, who subsequently sought and received the blessings of Vienna to organize his own Corsican regiment. As the Austrian army did not really have the means, it was agreed that the unit would technically be Tuscan and under the Grand Duke's own command. The Grand Duke's government in Florence had made an attempt at creating a new Tuscan army after the Medici succession, but thus far without much luck. The provincial militia which had been inherited from the Medici, widely considered a useless money sink, was disbanded, and plans were drawn up for a modest but ideally well-trained and equipped army of 4,000 men in six battalions, to be composed of Tuscan soldiers led by experienced German and Lorrainer officers. The incompetence of the Tuscan regency, however, coupled with the hatred which the Tuscans possessed for their new rulers, meant that this plan never really got off the ground, and by 1740 the Tuscan army still existed largely on paper. The Corsicans seemed as though they might be more willing to serve, particularly considering the alternatives. All that was needed now was a famous Corsican officer to serve as colonel and attract Corsican recruits as the Neapolitans possessed in Luigi Giafferi. The Grand Duke had just the man in mind: Luca d'Ornano.

This no doubt explains why, in August, d’Ornano suddenly transformed from conciliatory to completely intractable. While the regiment’s formation was not actually public knowledge until early September, the Grand Duke appears to have been privately dangling a colonelcy in front of d’Ornano for some weeks beforehand. Assured that he had the confidence and support of Franz Stefan, d’Ornano now saw little reason to compromise with Walsegg. He not only stopped his painfully slow process of disarmament, but added new demands, insisting that Genoese troops not be posted anywhere in his territory until the final Austrian withdrawal.

The implications of this new force were sobering, particularly for the Genoese. The Grand Duke had essentially given d’Ornano license to keep hundreds of ex-rebels in the country and under arms until the unit was in a fit state to be dispatched to Tuscany (for even the Grand Duke did not seriously believe the Genoese would stand for a regiment of Corsican rebels being used as part of the Corsican occupation forces). Recruiting a regiment took time, however, and d’Ornano was in no particular hurry. While Spinola had not raised serious objections to the French raising such a regiment, the French had not placed a notorious rebel leader at the unit’s head,[1] and the ambitions of the Grand Duke were already quite suspect. Spinola feared, for good reason, that far from being a means to remove rebels from the theater, the “Régiment d’Ornano” might in fact be an expatriate army that could be trained, equipped, and then used to spearhead a new rebellion.

La Rocca was fully subdued by the Austrians by mid-August with the help of their newly arrived reinforcements. Aside from d’Ornano’s “regency,” that left only the upper Taravo and Fiumorbo in rebel hands. Here the Austrians met stiff resistance, and despite their numbers progress was slow. Zicavo, the last capital of the rebellion, repulsed an Austrian attack on the 8th of September, but its defenders realized the situation was now hopeless. After nearly a week of skirmishing in the vicinity of the town, Drost, Colonna, and Durazzo fled Zicavo, and on the 16th they surrendered themselves to Walsegg. Despite being among the last of the holdouts, their terms were generous. Only Drost, being a foreigner, was required to quit the island (and escorted off just as Theodore had been), while Colonna, Durazzo, and the rest of the Zicavesi commanders were permitted to remain so long as they disarmed. D’Ornano missed no opportunity to use his newfound patronage to reconcile with the other rebel leaders, offering Colonna a captaincy in his new regiment. A few weeks later “Captain” Colonna traveled to Livorno, ostensibly to gather recruits from among the expatriates, but the Genoese consul suspected he was using the opportunity to conspire with the other rebel leaders and act as an intermediary between them and d’Ornano. In all Corsica, only Rauschenburg and his die-hard followers, estimated by the French to be no more than 30 or 40 strong, remained in open rebellion.

The remainder of September and October passed without much violence, but tensions between the Genoese, the Corsicans, and the occupying powers remained high. D’Ornano relocated to Porto Vecchio, where he could organize his unit and be watched more closely by the Austrian garrison under the assumption that this would be less provocative to the Genoese, but Spinola did not derive much comfort from it. Through his lieutenants, d'Ornano continued to maintain his little fiefdom in the southwest in which only Austrian troops were permitted. The Genoese petitioned the emperor, claiming that the Grand Duke’s new regiment was a pernicious and dangerous force, but the emperor and the Hofkriegsrat had no particular desire to curtail the ability of the Grand Duke to recruit men as it was hoped that the Tuscan army would eventually become a capable allied force that could further Austrian revanchist ambitions in Italy. Nobody in Vienna, and certainly not Emperor Karl VI, seriously believed that the Grand Duke would betray imperial policy by using his new regiment against the Genoese, and thus felt safe in dismissing the Genoese concerns as mere paranoia.

Nor did the Genoese get very far in Paris. The protestations of the Genoese ambassador Agostino Lomellini to the French government went totally unheeded; Lautrec and his methods had his government's full support. General Lautrec thus maintained his firm command over most of the French-occupied zone. Only a few "loyalist" regions, most notably Calvi, Bastia, and Capo Corso, were ruled by the Genoese with little or no French presence or interference, causing the Corsicans (and some Frenchmen as well) to mockingly refer to Spinola as the “governor of Bastia.” Leaving matters of organizing patrols and supplying garrisons to his subordinates, Lautrec focused mainly on matters of administration. French engineers supervised work details building roads into the interior, while Lautrec organized a provisional justice system, run by the military, to handle the complaints and conflicts of the populace. While Lautrec was quick to clamp down on any sort of banditry or rebellious conspiracy, his "reign" in Corsica was widely considered just and light-handed by the Corsicans themselves. It no doubt helped that the French collected virtually no taxes.

Surprising some, relations between Lautrec and Walsegg were quite cordial. A possible territorial dispute in the Gravona valley failed to become a real point of contention, primarily because neither party was all that interested in occupying it. Lautrec did put pressure on the Austrians to deny the use of “their” territory to Rauschenburg, at one point threatening to send his own forces into the Austrian zone in pursuit of the renegades, but Walsegg eventually took some steps towards compliance; his failure to act had more to do with the relative scarcity of his forces than an unwillingness to cooperate with the French. Lautrec’s request came after the French gave Rauschenburg a close shave in early October, killing and capturing several of his men in the process, which inspired him to retreat into the territory of the Regency to recuperate. D’Ornano’s men made no attempt to hinder the Austrians in their pursuit of him, but neither did they assist, and it was generally rumored that they supported Rauschenburg with food and gunpowder. Despite Walsegg’s renewed efforts, the renegade German was ultimately able to give the Austrians the slip as well and return to the mountains of the Diqua.

In the days before the emperor's death, the Genoese Senate was primarily concerned with matters of finance. Despite continuing misgivings about their conduct, the Genoese had to admit that the French and Austrians had suppressed the rebellion as promised. The finances of the Republic had not improved, however, because the government remained on the hook for the foreign occupation forces. The Senate was faced with an impossible choice—request that the occupying powers draw down their troops, which might allow another rebellion to flare up, or continue the present levels, assuring peace but plunging the state into a chasm of debt that seemed to have no bottom.

The other obsession of the Genoese involved the attitude of Britain. Concerned about the evident hostility of the British towards them, stoked by rumors of meetings between British agents and the rebels at Livorno, the Senate had instructed their charge d'affaires in London, Giambattista Gastaldi, to do all he could to secure a pledge from King George II respecting Genoese sovereignty over Corsica. Gastaldi, who had been meeting with British ministers since April, found the attitude of the British to be favorable but frustratingly noncommittal. The British delayed any formal response for months, insisting that any guarantee they gave would be worthless unless such a guarantee was gained from the emperor first, which seemed like a strange objection since the emperor's forces were actively engaged in defending Genoese sovereignty over Corsica. Still, the Genoese dutifully sent a diplomat to Vienna to request that His Imperial Majesty order the Baron von Wasner, Vienna's minister in London, to convey his government's his support for such a guarantee. As this was still being discussed in Vienna, however, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle, summoned Gastaldi and informed him that the king, then at Hanover, had decided to flatly reject the Genoese petition. Shocked by this, the Genoese redoubled their efforts to push for a declaration in their favor by the emperor and von Wasner, only for Ambassador Lomellini to be informed by the French that the present talks between Gastaldi and the English government were "offensive to the king." By October, Gastaldi had returned to Genoa in defeat, reporting that another consultation with the king had only resulted in another refusal. Although King George had declined to meet with Theodore, he was evidently also unwilling to commit to Genoese sovereignty over the isle. The Genoese, who subsequently learned of Theodore's travel to London but not his earlier rejection by the king at Hanover, feared the worst.


Footnotes
[1] No Corsican held a rank higher than captain in the Régiment Royal-Corse.