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Although it had been a respectable showing by the Corsicans, the Battle of Pietralba did little to bolster the morale and confidence of the rebels. Marquis Simone Fabiani's conduct was generally praised, but soon jealousy and recrimination—which had never fully tamped down after the recent Aleria debacle—began dividing the royalists again. Colonel Carlo Felice Giuseppe, among others, accused Colonel Paolo Francesco Giannoni of cowardice. "Who has ever heard," Chancellor Sebastiano Costa recounts Giuseppe as saying, "of a captain fleeing the field twice in one battle?"[1] Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Buttafuoco, who already hated Giannoni, was quick to join in. This was especially injurious to the royalist cause because of the importance of Rostino and its militia to the defense of Ponte Leccia and the rest of the interior. The men of Rostino had already been aggrieved by the sacking of Brigadier Gio-Giacomo Ambrosi di Castinetta, and after having fought and bled on the field they bristled at Giannoni, another one of their native sons, being ridiculed as a coward.

It was inevitable that this conflict would escalate. On the 15th, just five days after the battle, King Theodore obtained a most damning letter. Allegedly sent by Castinetta to Giannoni, it bemoaned the state of the royalist command and proposed the assassination of Gianpietro Gaffori and Marc-Antonio Giappiconi, Theodore's secretaries of state and war, respectively. Two other captains of Rostino, Clemente Paoli and Marco Pasqualini, were also named as actual or potential co-conspirators. According to Costa, the letter was only found because Giannoni, being quite illiterate, had the letter read aloud to him by an aide, which was overheard by a militiamen who subsequently stole the letter and gave it to the king's men. Discovered two days before Easter Sunday, it became known in Corsican history as the "Good Friday Plot" (Congiura del Venerdì Santo).

Giappiconi advised the arrest of all those suspected of participation, but Theodore and Costa knew that this was very likely to start a civil war. Instead, Theodore rode to Ponte Leccia on the following day, and in a personal audience with Giannoni confronted him about the letter and asked him what he knew of the plot. Giannoni threw himself on the mercy of the king, insisting that he remained loyal and claiming that he had never agreed to support such a scheme. Theodore could not prove otherwise; he knew only that Castinetta had invited Giappiconi to the plot and mentioned Paoli and Pasqualini as sympathetic. It was certainly suspicious that Giannoni had not reported the letter immediately, but there was no proof that he had sent any reply. Paoli (who was Giannoni's nephew) denied having received any such letter and rejected any association with an assassination scheme, but Pasqualini vanished with a number of his kinsmen. That left only Castinetta, but removing him would be no less dangerous now than after Aleria. Conscious that his crown—and perhaps his life—balanced on the knife's edge, Theodore did nothing.

The day after Theodore confronted Giannoni and Paoli was Easter Sunday, and the king was determined to make a show of unity. Against the advice of his advisers, he chose to celebrate the holiday at Morosaglia, the very heart of Rostino, although for obvious reasons Gaffori and Giappiconi did not join him there. The day was peaceful; a large crowd gathered to take part in the traditional Easter procession and to see the king, and Theodore ate dinner at Clemente Paoli's home. He even exchanged a few polite words with Castinetta, whose home was only a short walk away. The king's display of fearlessness and clemency seemed to have a soothing effect. Underneath the surface, however, tension remained. This was not the jubilant Easter at Cervioni four years past, just before his coronation, when the people cheered for their immanent liberation; this was an Easter celebrated by a people under siege, who had been ground down by years of struggle and did not know who to trust even among their fellow Corsicans.

Despite stubborn resistance, Lieutenant-General Johann Friedrich von Neuhoff zu Rauschenburg was being steadily driven back by the concerted advance of the French. He retreated up the Asco valley, where the terrain was too difficult for the French to pursue him, but by occupying the village of Asco itself Brigadier Montrosier was able to trap him and his Niolesi followers in the high mountains. Surrounded by some of the highest mountains in Corsica, Rauschenburg had no easy escape, and while Montrosier dared not try and root him out of the Forest of Carozzica in the high Asco, he hardly needed to. With little food, the Niolesi would surely starve or be forced to surrender. The French, however, underestimated the mountaineers. Under cover of night, Rauschenburg and his column descended the valley and got within half a mile of the village of Asco, where the French sentries waited, but then turned south and climbed the small tributary valley of the Pinneta, where an old and difficult shepherds' trail led over the Valle Bonna Pass and into the basin of the upper Golo, the heart of Niolo. Rauschenburg had given the French the slip, but he had been effectively taken off the board for the time being. The mountaineers would be unable to render any assistance to the royal army in central Corsica. With this threat removed, Lieutenant-General Lautrec now felt confident enough to resume his southwards advance. Some of Montrosier's companies were reunited with the main force, along with further reinforcements from the northeast, bringing his force to approximately 2,800 foot and 100 horse. On April 22nd, twelve days after the Battle of Pietralba, the French army marched forth from its camp once more.

Fabiani once more led the Corsican army to face the threat. This time, however, King Theodore joined him, udnerstanding that this engagement was no less critical than Ponte Novu. If Ponte Leccia fell, there would be little to stop the French from reaching Corti, which was no more than a two day march further south. The Corsican army arrayed itself alongside the river Asco, across a half-mile gap between the mountains on either side. It was a well-considered defensive position which guarded against any flanking maneuvers, but it nevertheless required the Corsicans to hold their ground against a larger French force across an open field and drive them from it, a feat which they had never before accomplished. The odds against them were even worse than at Pietralba, for while French strength had grown the rebels had diminished. While hundreds of militiamen did come to the king's call, support from Rostino was anemic, and Castinetta himself failed to show up despite earlier promises. All told, the Corsicans had only around 1,800 men against nearly 3,000 French soldiers.

Approaching the gap required the French to cross the Asco. Fed by snowmelt from the high mountains, river was shallow enough to wade through but freezing cold. Theodore, recognizing that his army was at a serious disadvantage, directed Fabiani to use this crossing against the French. It was not enough to simply occupy the bank; the French could cross further up, and by way of Piedigriggio bypass the Corsican position entirely, provided they had sufficient knowledge of the local terrain. The king instead thought to lure the French across by positioning his army some distance back from the river. As the French were crossing, he would order an attack, catch the French off-guard, and turn them back in confusion.

As expected, the French began their crossing just after noon on the 22nd, and as ordered the Corsicans rushed forth to meet them. The Corsicans, however, were too far back, or perhaps the timing was botched; charging at the stream, they were dismayed to find that the first line of French soldiers was already lined up or very nearly so, and the French infantry was able to get off a largely coherent volley as they approached. The Corsicans turned out to be more disordered from their charge than the French were from the crossing. Some, warned off by the solid line of white coats and their volley of musketry, broke off the advance to fall back or return fire; others drove home the charge and fought fiercely, but were already winded from the long run over the field and were soon overwhelmed by ever-growing numbers of French infantry. When this chaotic attack failed to break the French, the Corsicans recoiled, and there was a general panic. Next the trumpets sounded on the French right as the hussars drove their horses across the river. It was the death knell of the royal army. In short order the whole royalist force collapsed.[A]

It was a crushing defeat. The hussars, though few in number, slaughtered men in droves. Hundreds threw down their arms and were taken prisoner. Those that escaped did so by scattering up into the hills, where there was some skirmishing after the main battle was over, or by reaching the bridge of Ponte Leccia a mile away where a reserve company of the Guard had been stationed. King Theodore escaped, as did General Fabiani despite being shot in the arm. Colonel Giannoni and Lieutenant-Colonel Silvestre Colombani also escaped, but Colonel Giuseppe was captured. Fabiani, despite being wounded, managed to rally a few hundred fleeing men at the bridge. Yet he knew that he could not hold it, and in any case the crossing at Ponte Leccia was easily bypassed. A guard of forty men, both foreigners and Corsicans, volunteered to remain as a rearguard, while Fabiani and the king rode southwards towards Corti. This small force held back a French battalion for two hours, finally surrendering when half their men were dead or wounded.

The carefully maintained coalition of Corsican royalists quickly began to unravel. Colonel Giannoni, who had run into Fabiani during the retreat, informed the general that he was going to Rostino to raise men for the defense of the kingdom. He did indeed go to Rostino, but made no further attempt at resistance and capitulated as soon as the French arrived. On the day after the battle, the French occupied Morosaglia, Piedigriggio, and Ponte Novu, which in turn cleared the way for the advance of French forces on the eastern coast into the interior. The Rostino, formerly a hotbed of resistance, was quickly pacified, with all the alleged "Good Friday" plotters surrendering themselves to the French. Although a large part of the Castagniccia was still in active revolt, the province was nearly encircled.

Having returned to Corti, Theodore and his ministers grappled with what had to be done in the wake of such a disaster. Much of the "regular army," which had only been in existence for a few months, was either killed, wounded, captured, or deserted; Fabiani estimated he had no more than 500 men left from all regiments, plus whatever local militia was still willing to fight. He recommended defending Omessa, a village at a chokepoint on the upper Golo valley six miles from Corti, but this was merely a delaying tactic. Corti itself could be defended, but its food stores were not great, and as it was essentially a medieval fortress it would not stand long once the French brought artillery to bear. Fabiani, Gaffori, Giappiconi, Colombani, Lieutenant-Colonel Drevitz, and Viscount Kilmallock pledged their loyalty to the king and promised to do all they could, but Costa and Theodore's secretary Richard Denis agreed that the mood was grim. None expected to win, and many expected to die.

All agreed that Theodore needed to leave. When it was suggested to him, Theodore initially refused to leave his capital—or at least went through the motions of protest—but eventually gave in to the entreaties of his generals. He would, he said, relocate to a safer locale to assuage their concerns for his person, but he assured them that he had no intention of leaving Corsica as long as his subjects still fought for him and their freedom. With respect to where he would go, it was agreed that a retreat down the Tavignano would be pointless; with Aleria still in Genoese hands, he would likely be captured. The only option was to escape over the mountains, going by way of Venaco up the valley of the Vecchio. The easiest pass was that of Vizzavona, which allowed a descent into the valley of the Gravona leading all the way to Ajaccio. That, however, was the domain of Marquis Luca d'Ornano, and Theodore's ministers were unsure if his loyalty would withstand the shock of the loss at Ponte Leccia. Gaffori urged the king not to place himself in the hands of the marquis, who he suspected would sell him to the French. The court concluded that it would be better if the king were to travel to Ghisoni and over the Pass of Verdi, which led into the valley of the Taravo. In that direction was Zicavo, where it was believed Theodore would be safe.

Having accepted this course of action, Theodore then declared that his ministers were released from their oaths. If they capitulated to the French to preserve themselves and their families, he said, he would never hold it against them, nor consider them anything less than perfectly faithful. There was then a sorrowful farewell, with, as Costa wrote, "tears shed as much for the fate of their beloved country as for a regretful parting from dear comrades." There was no time for a drawn-out goodbye, however, as much still had to be done, and the French were on the move.

Just as he had released his cabinet of their oaths, he did the same for his troops. Some indeed abandoned the army and returned to their homes or surrendered to the French. Many, however, chose to remain with the king. Even some eighty men of the Foreign Regiment stayed on—some were deserters who feared for their necks if they fell into the hands of the French or Genoese, but others were legitimately dedicated to the king and refused to abandon him. It was a testament to his personal charisma that even in the face of total defeat, the king was able to set out from Corti with a volunteer regiment of nearly 300 soldiers. Before leaving, they gathered all the donkeys and mules that were ready for travel and burdened them with muskets, pistols, gunpowder, bullets, and other military supplies; it was as much a supply caravan as it was a regiment. Cannon, however, was quite out of the question. To take even a few guns over the mountains was a major undertaking which the royalists did not now have the time or resources to attempt. The most valuable part of the syndicate fleet's cargo would have to remain in Corti, where it would likely fall to the French. That could not be helped, but to avoid the French having the use of potentially valuable pack animals, all the beasts of burden in Corti that were not taken by Theodore's men were slaughtered.

The French encountered only sporadic resistance on the march south. Fabiani's men, who must have numbered fewer than two hundred, held back an attack at Omessa as promised, but he only managed to delay the French by a day before being forced to flee. On the 27th of April, five days after the Battle of Ponte Leccia, a French column under the Comte de Montmorency approached Corti. As the French drew near the town, however, they saw the Moor's Head flying defiantly from the citadel, and soon they were warned off by cannon-fire. Montmorency sent a party under a flag of truce to demand the surrender of the town. Count Gaffori appeared at the gate and gave his reply: He had no quarrel with the King of France or his officers, but Corti belonged to His Majesty the King of Corsica, and as podesta of Corti and Major-General in His Majesty's army he was obliged to defend the castle as long as he was able. If the French insisted upon its capture, he would have no choice but to oppose them with force.

Footnotes
[1] He was presumably referring to the first engagement of Pietralba, when Giannoni and the Rostino militia were put to flight by the French (an engagement which Giuseppe was late for), and the second when the royalist right gave way after the death of Lt. Col. Giudicelli, Giuseppe's second-in-command.

Timeline Notes
[A] What did you think this was, a Corsica-wank?