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Part 23: Scourge No More


With the fall of Missolonghi accomplished, Ibrahim Pasha and his exhausted Egyptians made the short voyage across the Gulf of Patras and into the Morea where they would continue the conquest of the Peloponnese from the year before. This time, however, their efforts found surprisingly little success due in large part to the thorough depletion of his force. Of the original 17,000 men that Ibrahim arrived in Methoni with over a year ago, about 1,000 had been lost at Navarino, another 1,300 at Maniakion, 2,600 fell at Argos and Myloi, more than 1,600 had been killed in the Morea since his departure for Missolonghi in January, and nearly 9,000 were killed or wounded at Missolonghi.[1] While he had been reinforced with 4,000 fresh recruits in August, an additional 5,000 over the Winter, and another 2,000 a few weeks after returning to the Morea, these men tended to be raw, inexperienced, and generally proved to be poor substitutes for the battle tested veterans Ibrahim had lost thus far.

Worse still were the losses among his officer corps which suffered tremendous casualty rates, close to 70%. Unlike the vast bulk of his forces which could be easily replaced with new conscripts, Ibrahim’s officers had been extensively and exquisitely trained by the French and they had honed their craft even further through years of war in Arabia and Greece. Ibrahim’s brother in law, Hussein Bey, was one such officer, cut down at Missolonghi in the waning days of the battle. Ibrahim, himself had also been wounded at Missolonghi, an injury which sidelined him for much of the last month of the siege. As can be expected, the quality of his forces was noticeably lower in the Summer of 1826 than it was the year before, both in terms of discipline and the precision of their movements.

Reinforcement and resupply also posed a burgeoning problem for Ibrahim and his men. The Ottomans vehemently resisted assisting him in any capacity, if Ibrahim was to be Pasha of the Morea, then it was his responsibility to win it himself. More surprising was the lack of support he received from his father Muhammad Ali, the Wali of Egypt. Following Missolonghi’s fall on the 30th of April, the better part of the Egyptian fleet immediately departed for Alexandria where it would remain for the remainder of the year. Though Ibrahim did not know it at the time, Muhammad Ali had opened negotiations with the Russians and British regarding his potential exit from the war, and the withdrawal of his fleets had been a sign of good faith for these negotiations.[2] While the occasional supply and transport ships would cross the sea to the Morea, the machinations of his father had left Ibrahim without any clear direction and he became increasingly isolated in Greece. At most, he had 11,000 men to call upon if one included the few Ottoman auxiliaries that followed his commands. Many of these men were wasted holding the numerous castles, cities, and villages across the Western littoral of the Morea, a country which had continued to aggravate and oppose him.

At best Messenia had been thoroughly pacified, although some rebels remained in hiding in the hills. The coast running from Patras in the North to Kalamata in the South was also under his control, but most of his gains in the interior he had made over the last year had been lost to the Greeks. Ibrahim’s gains were only secure whilst he himself was present in the region. The moment he departed one area for another, the Greeks would come down from their hills and strike out against the garrisons that he had left behind. Over the Winter and early-Spring while Ibrahim was away at Missolonghi, the Egyptians were driven from Megalopolis, Mystras, Pellana, Sparta, and the area surrounding Tripolitsa. This sudden reversal in the Morea lies in large part with the vigorous campaigning of Panos Kolokotronis who took it upon himself to lead the resistance to Ibrahim with fire and axe. Striking from their hidden bases deep in the hills of the Morean interior, Panos and his band of men achieved as much success against the Egyptians as any had thus far.

The return of Ibrahim to the region, however, heralded the end of these reversals. Even with his diminished force and lacking the support and guidance of his father, Ibrahim remained a dangerous and cunning foe. Landing in Patras on the 6th of May, Ibrahim cut a swath of devastation southward towards Kalamata. Though the city was officially under his control, it was known to have provided refuge to Panos and his partisans who operated in the area. For this treachery, Ibrahim intended to scourge the Greeks of Kalamata. When the local inhabitants refused to give up the location of Panos or the names of their supporters, Ibrahim had the homes of suspected insurgents burned to the ground. When the people protested or resisted in any manner, the men were slaughtered, the women and children enslaved, and their farms salted and scorched. This act was repeated across the Morea from Patras to Pylos; wherever there were Greeks who opposed him, Ibrahim made sure that they suffered. Rather than spread dread and fear among the Greeks, it incited further resistance to the Egyptians and provided Panos with ever more volunteers with which to oppose him.

With Kalamata desolated, Ibrahim advanced eastward into Laconia, a region that had hitherto been mostly untouched by the war. Its people were among the most rebellious however, the Maniots of the Mani peninsula, located in the South of Laconia, were a warlike people, a rebellious people who had challenged the authority of the Ottoman sultans even at their height of power and glory. In all the years of Ottoman dominion over Greece, only the Mani had resisted the Turks with some degree of success.[3] When Ibrahim approached the Mani, he dispatched emissaries to demand the surrender of the Maniots, as to be expected the Maniots in no uncertain terms refused. Insulted, Ibrahim pressed on fully intending to pillage the region for its insolence.

The first confrontation between the Maniots and Ibrahim came on the 5th of July near the fishing hovel of Almyros. Nearly 2,000 Greek Maniots and refugees had amassed behind the long wall protecting the village which ran from the seashore uphill for over a quarter mile, where it was anchored on the steep slopes of Mount Kalathi. While some Egyptians would attempt to circumvent the obstacles by treading through the sea to the West or climbing the mountains to the East, they were generally few in number and extremely exposed to Greek sharpshooters who made quick work of them. The wall also followed a dried-up riverbed providing the assembled Greeks with a moderately deep ditch right before the wall. There did exist several holes existed within the walls, but when the Egyptians attempted to rush these gaps, they found several cannons waiting for them. The ensuing volley ripped the charging Egyptians to shreds.


For nearly two weeks, the Maniots of Almyros under the inspired leadership of Georgios Mavromichalis, son of former executive President Petros Mavromichalis, kept the Egyptians at bay. When Ibrahim attempted to force the walls with infantry, they were repelled with ease. When he attempted to go around their positions, they were thwarted in their efforts. When he concentrated his artillery fire upon the center of the wall, it surprisingly withstood the mighty barrage. When he brought in gunboats to shell the Greek positions from behind, the Greeks withdrew up the hill only to return when the Egyptians attempted to push through. Nine separate attempts were made against the walls of Almyros, and they were repelled nine separate times. Ultimately, Ibrahim was forced to withdraw when Panos Kolokotronis arrived on the scene with his men, attempting to catch the Egyptians between him and the wall at Almyros. While the loss at Almyros was an embarrassing setback for Ibrahim, the defeat at Areopolis was truly a horrendous failure for him.

Seeking to bypass the Greek defenses at Almyros, Ibrahim dispatched a squadron of ships and nearly 2,000 men, to take the town of Areopolis to the south, thus diverting the Maniots’ attention and resources with a second front. Unlike his prior stratagems, this gambit quickly backfired on Ibrahim. Though the Egyptians managed to successfully land at the bay of Diro on the 10th of July and achieved their goals of seizing and razing Areopolis, they were soon confronted by local Maniot women and children who delayed them long enough for help to arrive from neighboring villages. After three days in the outskirts and ruins of Areopolis, the Egyptians were forced to flee to their ships, only to find their vessels sinking into the bay and the Greek Navy waiting for them. Now under fire from both the land and the sea it was only a matter of time before they were destroyed.

Forced between the choice of abandoning his men at Areopolis or potentially losing more trying to save them, Ibrahim chose the latter. As the Greeks had positioned their ships near Diro, he was forced to landed a second force of 1,500 men 4 miles to the north near Itilo. Progress was slow for the Egyptians marching south as they too were bogged down by the Maniots and suffered horrendous losses attempting to reach their comrades at Diro. Eventually at dusk on the 15th of July they managed to meet with the survivors of the first expedition, who numbered no more than 900 men by this time, and began marching north once more. The return journey was just as, if not more perilous for the Egyptians as the Maniots constantly hounded them for the entire night. When they finally reached Itilo the next morning, the panicked and exhausted Egyptians crowded the boats in an attempt to escape to the ships. Those that couldn’t find room on the rowboats were forced to swim to the ships leaving them at the mercy of the Greeks who continued to fire upon them from the shore. When they finally departed from Itilo for Ibrahim’s camp outside Kalamata barely 1300 souls remained.

With half of his available manpower killed, wounded, or captured at Almyros and Areopolis, Ibrahim was forced to abandon his campaign against the Maniots for a time. For the next two months, Ibrahim remained on the defensive, fighting off frequent raids and stabilizing the frontier with the rebels, but with the arrival of fresh reinforcements in early September, 1,000 Egyptian infantrymen, 1,000 Arab infantrymen, and 400 Algerian, Berber, and Bedouin horsemen bringing his field army to a nominal strength of 6,500, he went on the offensive once more.

When he arrived at Almyros on the 22nd of September, he found the village abandoned, the fields scorched, the wells filled in, and the livestock slaughtered. The Maniots had retreated to the hills and mountains, the valleys and ravines of the Mani, as if goading Ibrahim to advance further into them. Though he would run the risk of constant attacks by the raiders hiding in the hills, Ibrahim had been laid low by these people and sought to make clear his superiority over them. As expected the attacks came and as predicted, the attacks were generally poorly organized and lacked the coordination needed to seriously challenge him. After three days in the North of the Mani, Ibrahim had yet to encounter any large concentration of Greeks and began to proceed South.

As they approached Kardamyli on their fourth day, the Egyptians began to encounter Greek ships off the coast. At first, they only exchanged blows with Ibrahim’s paltry fleet of gunboats, which acted as little more than a floating artillery detachment, but the further south Ibrahim went, the more daring they became. While his ships put up a good fight, they were no match for the proper warships the Greeks were utilizing. Many Greek vessels managed to break through Ibrahim’s naval screen enabling them to bombard the exposed Egyptian army as it marched along the coastal road. With the enemy ships shelling his column, Ibrahim was forced to turn inland where the steep mountains briefly gave way to rolling hills around Itilo. Ibrahim’s troubles did not end once he entered the hills, instead they worsened.

Almost immediately, Ibrahim encountered a band of Greeks who had holed up inside the old castle of Kelefa which overlooked the main route into the interior. Despite only being manned by some 56 Greeks, the castle managed to withstand the Egyptians’ assault for nearly 7 hours before finally being overrun during the night. The strong resilience of the Maniots at Kelefa had more to do with the rough terrain of the Mani which limited the effectiveness of Ibrahim’s artillery. The castle had been strategically located atop a steep hill, well above the sights of the Egyptian cannons and while a plain was located to the south and east of the castle, it was laden with boulders and rocks, making it impossible to move artillery through it.

Entering the hills on the 28th scarcely improved the Egyptians’ situation as the raids by the Maniots became deadlier and more frequent. The weather also began to turn against them as well as the Summer turned to Fall in Greece, the seasonal rains were especially incumbering, slowing their progress even further. On the 29th, Ibrahim’s scouts stumbled upon some Maniots who had hidden away within the castle of Old Karyoupolis and fired down upon the Egyptians as they approached, forcing Ibrahim to redirect to the south. 92 Greeks at old Karyoupolis resisted Ibrahim for nearly 2 days before finally fleeing in the middle of the night, and in the next village over another 58 Greeks obstructed the Egyptians at Drosopigi for nearly half a day before they were forced to retreat as well. The cost in lives needed to clear these obstructions were atrocious in relative terms with 282 dead and 475 more wounded between the three engagements. Despite the mounting casualties and the worsening conditions, Ibrahim pressed on.


After five arduous days in the mountains, Ibrahim Pasha and his force emerged on the other side of the peninsula near new Karyoupolis on the 2nd of October. As they had at every village since entering the hills, the Maniots had gathered at Karyoupolis to resist the Egyptian’s. Though it would take much of the day to finally subdue the Greeks, by evening, the city was secure. With Karyoupolis under his control, Ibrahim dispersed his forces to seize Skoutari, Neochori, and Vathi, which were surprisingly undefended unlike the previous towns they encountered. Ibrahim soon discovered why when he approached Gytheio with the remaining half of his force.

While Ibrahim was preoccupied with Karyoupolis and the villages to the South, a Greek army was fast approaching from the North under the command of Yannis Makriyannis. Meeting with Panos Kolokotronis, Georgios Mavromichalis and nearly 2,000 Maniots and Moreots, the Greeks finally managed to catch Ibrahim at Gytheio, which was itself defended by nearly 800 Greeks. Outnumbered 3,000 to 3,800, Ibrahim began a fighting withdrawal back up the winding road to Karyoupolis, but in the commotion of the battle some units began to waver. In a reversal of Maniakion, Ibrahim’s Arab infantry panicked when gunfire was heard to their rear and fled the field of battle in a complete rout. His position collapsing before him and his subordinates urging him to escape while he still could, Ibrahim for the first and only time during the entire war, fled the field of battle.

Most of those that remained were cut down where they stood. Those that opted to surrender generally fared no better as the Maniots and Moreots sought to avenge the crimes that had been committed against them, and slaughtered the enemy where they stood. Greek sources from the battle cite the total number of Egyptian dead at over 2,500, while the Egyptians sources list a more likely number of 1,359, which still represents a significant portion, nearly one half, of Ibrahim’s force in the battle. The defeat of Ibrahim at Gytheio caused the entire Mani to flare up in rebellion and in the coming days, the Egyptians were forced to abandon their gains in the region.

While Ibrahim would cling to his conquests in the north of the peninsula for several more days, by the beginning of November he had withdrawn to Kalamata as the Maniot attacks continued unabated. This too proved to be too much to hold with his available manpower and was ultimately abandoned in mid-November in favor of a defensive line across the Pamisos River to the West. Before leaving the Mani, Ibrahim, in one last act of defiance, razed every village under his occupation to the ground. Rather than demonstrating to the Greeks the futility of their resistance, Ibrahim’s invasion of the Mani did just the opposite. It had shown to all the Greeks that he was not invincible, it had shown them that they could really beat him, and it showed them that he was vulnerable now more than ever.



Next Time: The Prince of Egypt


[1] Had Missolonghi not fallen when it did in OTL and TTL, it is extremely likely that the siege would have been lifted in the next month as the Ottomans and Egyptians simply lacked the manpower available to continue the siege. It was a terribly pyrrhic victory for the Ottomans in OTL, and even more so in TTL. As a result, the Ottomans and Egyptians are essentially crippled offensively because of their incredibly high casualties and the death of Resid Pasha.

[2] Muhammad Ali also used the withdrawal of his fleet as leverage against the Ottomans, to gain even more concessions out of Sultan Mahmud II, namely appointing Muhammad Ali as Serasker and the ousting of Khosref Pasha, the Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman Navy.

[3] The Mani was effectively a lawless region of the Ottoman Empire, where the local Greek Maniots ruled themselves. The Porte generally viewed the region as poor and relatively worthless compared to the price needed to secure it. In the end, it was decided to let the Maniots retain some degree of autonomy so long as they remained loyal to the Empire.