WI "Modern" Tactics and Equipment used in 1861

[TacCovert4]

This is sort of a two part question. I saw some previous old threads that covered one bit in part, but I think that both parts together are a bit different.

The American Civil War has been called by some (emphasis SOME) as the first modern war. In the eventual use of railroads like Jackson's Valley Campaign (noticed by Prussia and put to use later) and other things like some of the sieges at the end it did have some modern elements. However, in a LOT of ways it was more of the last Napoleonic War, with both sides using Napoleonic tactics, albeit typically without the finesse of Wellington.

As for the question, and its associated departures from the OTL:

1) One or both sides decides against traditional linear warfare tactics. Companies are trained to fight from as much cover as can be gotten, whether by digging in or using available cover, with the emphasis on company and battalion level tactics instead of brigade centered tactics. Troops use the available range of their rifle-muskets and the typical engagement range for infantry extends a bit to around 150-200yds. How does this affect the length and/or outcome of the war, and how does this affect the casualties or even the number and type of battles fought?

2) In a departure from the wholly ridiculous scatterbrained manner in which procurement happened in the US (which continued right up until at least the Great War if not beyond), Lincoln saw the need early on for the government to focus production in a similar manner as the national arsenals of Europe. With an eye towards modernization, multiple small arms plants are given orders for a single breech-loading rifle for use by the infantry and cavalry, and US Ordnance Dept. engineers and inspectors are appointed to supervise production and quality control. For sake of this debate, we'll say that the Ordnance Dept. settles on the Sharps series as the most logical current small arm to standardize on (which if you were going to standardize in 1861 it has a lot of benefits, not the least of which being that you can use standard accoutrements and adapt standard bayonets and all other sorts of things to the system as opposed to trying to build a brass cartridge industry AND do war production at the same time). So by the time of the campaigns of mid-62, the older weapons like the 1855 Springfields are being withdrawn to second line service and many front-line infantry formations are deploying with a decent breech loader. How does this affect the tactics used and even the length of the war?

 

[Moglwi]

Will the confederates give you time for the complete retraining and can you produce enough ammo for this training?

 

[TacCovert4]

Not sure if you're asking that to question 1 or 2, so I'll try to answer both:

1) Tactics: That's a valid question. Do the Confederates focus on defending their states, or does Johnston get pressured into an invasion in say August of 61? Considering that practically EVERY Federal soldier in 1861 was a recruit of that same year, you're looking at maybe an additional 2 to 3 months of training for the soldiers. Officers might actually take longer to train, and there are quite a number of officers who were Mexican War veterans and had fought under the old system....would they be able to adapt to a less rigid and mass based organization to a more fluid and concentration of effort (as opposed to purely manpower) system.

2) Weapons: This shouldn't be such a big deal, as you'd train new incoming regiments on the weapon as they're issued it. So by mid-62 you have a number of regiments equipped with the Sharps (in this example), and units equipped with the older weapons like the 1855 springfield are rotated out of front line service to be re-issued and retrained on their new weapon as the war allows.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

2) In a departure from the wholly ridiculous scatterbrained manner in which procurement happened in the US (which continued right up until at least the Great War if not beyond), Lincoln saw the need early on for the government to focus production in a similar manner as the national arsenals of Europe.

He did- or rather, the ordnance chief Ripley did. Barring a few weapons contracted for at the very start of the war, the main infantry weapon produced in the US is the interchangeable machine-made Springfield rifle.

With an eye towards modernization, multiple small arms plants are given orders for a single breech-loading rifle for use by the infantry and cavalry, and US Ordnance Dept. engineers and inspectors are appointed to supervise production and quality control.

There aren't enough. There were 41 officers in the Ordnance Department at the start of the war, 44 in summer 1862, and 45 in summer 1863. As things stood, this wasn't nearly enough to supervise arsenals and depots as well as doing duty in the field. Asking them to supervise production, rather than to inspect and test weapons as they are delivered to the armouries, means you'll struggle to engage more than two or three small arms plants to do the work. It doesn't matter anyway, though, because your Ordnance Department inspectors don't have any more experience in making your chosen weapon (the Sharps) than do the factories themselves.

For sake of this debate, we'll say that the Ordnance Dept. settles on the Sharps series as the most logical current small arm to standardize on (which if you were going to standardize in 1861 it has a lot of benefits, not the least of which being that you can use standard accoutrements and adapt standard bayonets and all other sorts of things to the system as opposed to trying to build a brass cartridge industry AND do war production at the same time).

It's also got a lot of detriments, such as the fact that the Sharps company (the only company with any experience making the rifle) manufactured less than 6,000 guns by the end of 1861. By the end of June 1862, they had built 11,433 carbines and 2,100 rifles. When you consider that the US government ordered 854,000 Springfield rifles from private companies, but received only 14,336 weapons (of which only 9,960 were actually .58 Springfields) by mid-1862, it's clear that standardising on the mechanically complex Sharps rifle will produce fewer weapons at a similar point in time. So you're looking at fewer than 25,000 Sharps by mid-1862.

Are you also converting the Springfield armoury to produce these weapons? If so, will you be immediately uninstalling all the machinery that's currently in place but is designed for the Springfield rifle, and waiting for new machinery to be built based on Sharps' specifications? Or will you be producing Springfield rifles there for six months and then dismantling all the machinery just as you're getting into the swing of things?

So by the time of the campaigns of mid-62, the older weapons like the 1855 Springfields are being withdrawn to second line service and many front-line infantry formations are deploying with a decent breech loader. How does this affect the tactics used and even the length of the war?

The Springfield isn't old: it was designed less than ten years ago, and it's on a par with what most European armies had at the time. Moreover, despite every factory that could being used to turn out Springfields, it wasn't even universal in first-line service by Gettysburg, when 10.7% of regiments were wholly or partially armed with smoothbores and 15.8% were partially or wholly armed with second-rate rifles. The choice isn't between Springfields and breech-loaders: the choice is between Springfields and the vast quantities of muskets bought from the European market in the first year of the war, or brought out of storage in Federal and state arsenals.

The other choice, I suppose, is between an army of half a million armed with muzzle-loaders and an army of less than 30,000 armed with Sharps. But if you want to do more than hold the defences of Washington while the Confederates rampage through the North, the latter isn't really a viable option.

 

[takerma]

I am by no means expert especially on second point.

The first “modern” war was imo Crimean War.

Funny enough open order, precision shooting(WAY beyond the typical ACW ranges) all made appearance, trench raids, trench systems, telegraph etc

Even better McClellan was one of the three officers sent to study it. But it was too late they go there once Sebastopol has fallen, saw no actual combat. What IF they were sent a year or more earlier? Did not bother to go to Kronstadt and headed straight to Crimea?

Trained disciplined open order formation with good range estimation.. that would be letha. We are in the age of standing to reload.. unless behind some works you can inflict brutal casualties and suppress formation that has effective range of 100 yards if that very well.

What are the issues? Biggest is that US officer core is tiny, there are so very few officers of any kind let alone good ones. Controlling army based on something like that is harder. You need professional NCOs by the bucket, good officers, you need staff officers to develop more flexible plans, you need a ton more of them. Where do you get them?

Still I think marksman course administered to men who could shoot more or less straight to begin with, coupled with training on range estimation.. maybe hire a bunch of French and British Retired NCOs(can that be done?) it can make huge difference.

Think about it this way you can start engaging at 300-400 yards, effectively.. killing officers and men. Even smooth bore canons are in your effective range. At the time of First Manases level organization that is game changer. Confederates would get slaughtered and you would get decisive victory then and there.

 

[Grey Wolf]

Could you launch a mass recruitment campaign for European officers to come and serve with your army?

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Could you launch a mass recruitment campaign for European officers to come and serve with your army?

But only the British and French have extended range rifle experience.

The quick answer to 1 is the army that tries gets overrun by the army using proven tactics they can train people in. The next tactical evolution is Prussian platoon columns in the late 1860’s. What the ACW armies are using is really state of the art for the most powerful army in Europe, the French

 

[eltf177]

Both armies were, for the most part, amateurs. And neither side has the time to teach delicate maneuvers, particularly with the material they are forced to use. Arm them, teach them to load and shoot, give them the most basic training and hope for the best...

 

[RodentRevolution]

As for the question, and its associated departures from the OTL:

1) One or both sides decides against traditional linear warfare tactics. Companies are trained to fight from as much cover as can be gotten, whether by digging in or using available cover, with the emphasis on company and battalion level tactics instead of brigade centered tactics. Troops use the available range of their rifle-muskets and the typical engagement range for infantry extends a bit to around 150-200yds. How does this affect the length and/or outcome of the war, and how does this affect the casualties or even the number and type of battles fought?

Actually at the time of the Civil War modern linear tactics in several armies paid some attention to the use of cover and there were manuals on how to manoeuvre not merely companies and regiments but entire brigades as light infantry. The issue as people have pointed out is one of training. The US Government needed to accept that the war was not one campaign away from conclusion as the training to produce such a force would take time. Not necessarily European officers and NCOs as the cadre could be built up from native volunteers but that simply would take longer. The US had forces sufficient to hold the rebels in the field and hive off troops to be trained as an elite. Politically however this might have been a tough sell. It is likely the trained force would have to be under the auspices of the US Army as the enlistment provisions for the Volunteer portion of the Army of the United States were in general too short term for what was required, ideally you are probably looking at eighteen months not counting the building up of the training cadre before such a force can take the field. Convincing the state raised US Volunteer regiments to bleed and die to maintain pressure on the Confederate rebels while that was going might have proven tricky.

2) In a departure from the wholly ridiculous scatterbrained manner in which procurement happened in the US (which continued right up until at least the Great War if not beyond), Lincoln saw the need early on for the government to focus production in a similar manner as the national arsenals of Europe. With an eye towards modernization, multiple small arms plants are given orders for a single breech-loading rifle for use by the infantry and cavalry, and US Ordnance Dept. engineers and inspectors are appointed to supervise production and quality control. For sake of this debate, we'll say that the Ordnance Dept. settles on the Sharps series as the most logical current small arm to standardize on (which if you were going to standardize in 1861 it has a lot of benefits, not the least of which being that you can use standard accoutrements and adapt standard bayonets and all other sorts of things to the system as opposed to trying to build a brass cartridge industry AND do war production at the same time). So by the time of the campaigns of mid-62, the older weapons like the 1855 Springfields are being withdrawn to second line service and many front-line infantry formations are deploying with a decent breech loader. How does this affect the tactics used and even the length of the war?

As pointed out above the Sharps rifle was in comparison to the Springfield an expensive and complex beast. In addition the fault with the efficacy of the Springfield patterns in untrained hands was due to the untrained hands rather than an flaw in the weapon. In a marksman's grasp a Springfield shoots very well certainly out to around four hundred yards beyond which most human eyes tend to be aiming for massed targets anyway under the stress of battle. Without training in judging ranges much of the performance of the Sharps is going to be completely wasted on the average recruit and the same money could have armed three such recruits with Springfields. Considering the attrition rates due to sickness having three shooters makes a lot more sense than just one in the ACW.

 

[edgeworthy]

The American Civil War has been called by some (emphasis SOME) as the first modern war. In the eventual use of railroads like Jackson's Valley Campaign (noticed by Prussia and put to use later)

In all fairness the first large scale use of rail transportation by a military occurred in the Second Italian War of Independence. When in 1859 Marshal Canrobert moved half the French Army by train into Italy in two weeks, without disrupting the regularly scheduled civilian services.

This movement of 170,000 men and 300 guns was of considerably more notice to Prussia.

 

[longsword14]

his movement of 170,000 men and 300 guns was of considerably more notice to Prussia.

Indeed. And note that the Prussian rail network's expansion was always done while keeping the military objectives in mind. They got to use them only after the war in N. America was over.

 

[takerma]

I think to have any possibility of this happening you need to have army start training some “model” formations and men way before 1961. Seeing what such formation can accomplish might convince them that when war starts holding the line and training an army on a new standard is a way to go. I do not think it is impossible, McClellan and rest of the commission being present during original landing in Crimea and seeing all the battle that followed close up. Then they decide, holy crap this IS important and write a join report pushing army to test new doctrine. Same men could have invited/hired some advisors from the men then would have met during Crimean campaign.


In many way focus on small unit tactics and marksmanship makes a ton more sense for US Army as its mission was in 1850s.


The officer and NCO issue is really difficult. Look at the famous story of how Lee attempted to find the flank of the Union at Gettysburg, he sent one guy personally. Man who was a civilian before the war. That kindof tells you something about staff and officer situation.

 

[Thoresby]

There was a reason European's regarded the ACW as two mobs wrestling in the wilderness. You lack the institutions or personnel to fight a sophisticated conflict in the first few years and by the end of the war when a certain amount of knowledge had been bloodily acquired the development path was already well established.

 

[eltf177]

Reading RAILS OF WAR I was surprised to learn the first use of railroads for the military was the Crimean War...

 

[longsword14]

Reading RAILS OF WAR I was surprised to learn the first use of railroads for the military was the Crimean War...

Where else could that have happened ?

 

[NHBL]

IMVHO, it would be tough. However, if Gatling Guns were available in quantity, with sufficient ammunition, that would force a change of tactics where they were deployed.
Repeaters in quantity would take time, and how soldier proof are they?
That sort of war, in the end, would favor the Union, as there's a lot more industry up north.

 

[TacCovert4]

That was kind of my reason for a POD towards what I'd consider an intermediate breechloader like the Sharps. It's not requiring quite all the industry changes that going all the way to brass cartridges would require, but it could be converted to brass cartridges.

So, the POD will have to be along both tracks simultaneously:

1) The US Army, likely through better observation of the Crimean War, decides that it needs to make a shift in its doctrine. To that end the small professional Army develops a new doctrine pre-war and the officers and NCOs there are trained on it. At war's outset, the Federal Government recruits 3 year volunteers for the regular army, but also accepts State regiments for service. The 3 year troops go to the "I Corps" which is initially held in reserve while it's trained up to the new standard and equipped (as much as possible) with the newly selected standard weapon (whatever breechloader that might be....a rimfire conversion of the 1855....a la Trapdoor?). This "Corps" (probably more Division Sized for a while) is anticipated as seeing action no earlier than mid-late 62, and while sentiment is high that the war will be over by the proverbial Christmas, there's an anticipation that there will have to be some 'occupation' and this "New Model Army" can handle that so state troops can go home immediately upon the Confederate Surrender. With the failures of 61, the I Corps is decided to be Fully Trained before bringing into action, and it comes into action around the Fredricksburg Campaign timeframe.

2) Sharps might not be the right one to center around, but I have a hard time believing that US industry, which ironically wasn't behind the curve on designing weapons of war, was incapable of producing in a useful quantity (Corps sized quantity) a single standardized Breechloader for the infantry. Breechloaders being a LOT simpler to operate from behind cover or while prone, and having an increased rate of fire.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

At war's outset, the Federal Government recruits 3 year volunteers for the regular army, but also accepts State regiments for service... This "Corps" (probably more Division Sized for a while) is anticipated as seeing action no earlier than mid-late 62,

What has changed to make the government expect a longer war? The whole thing was supposed to be over in 90 days.

Incidentally, the Federal Government did increase the size of the regular army: from 10 infantry regiments of 1 battalion each to 19 of 3 battalions each. However, it turned out that nobody wanted to join the regular army for a long period when they could serve with their State for the duration of the war. As such, by December 1861 the actual strength of the regular infantry stood at just over a third of its authorised strength.

(whatever breechloader that might be....a rimfire conversion of the 1855....a la Trapdoor?).

It existed already. In 1861, the government had tested a breech-loading conversion for the Springfield rifle designed by S.W. Marsh. They ordered 25,000 in October 1861, but Marsh never managed to deliver any- probably because the Union had enough trouble manufacturing basic Springfield rifles as things stood.

while sentiment is high that the war will be over by the proverbial Christmas, there's an anticipation that there will have to be some 'occupation' and this "New Model Army" can handle that

The idea of states being under military occupation would have been pretty much unthinkable historically. Remember that the official Union stance is that the rebellion is highly unpopular, and as soon as the Union armies cross into the Confederacy they'll be welcomed by the hordes of Southern Unionists. Remember also that one section of the republic holding another down with military force is pretty much the antithesis of a government 'deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed'.

Furthermore, this corps is only an occupation and peacekeeping force: they're not intended to fight formed units of Confederate troops. As such, there's absolutely no point in arming them with breech-loading rifles or train them in advanced tactics- any more than there was to give the US army of 1860 or 1890 cutting edge weapons and training.

it comes into action around the Fredricksburg Campaign timeframe.

Are you sure you mean the Fredericksburg Campaign (November 1862) rather than the Peninsula Campaign (March 1862)?

I have a hard time believing that US industry, which ironically wasn't behind the curve on designing weapons of war, was incapable of producing in a useful quantity (Corps sized quantity) a single standardized Breechloader for the infantry.

As far as I can see, the history speaks for itself. If US industry was capable of producing a corps worth of infantry breechloaders, I struggle to suggest a reason that they wouldn't have done so. After all, not only were men were dying by the thousand, but the Union government were paying top dollar for these weapons. Instead, US industry wasn't even fulfilling the relatively small contracts which had been issued.

Really, if you don't have a hard time believing that Ireland might have a hard time building tanks, then you shouldn't be surprised that the US might have trouble building breech-loaders. Both are first world countries, but with tiny regular armies: as a result, they lag behind the procurement curve. 1861 America has no domestic market for military-grade breech-loaders, when a simple shotgun or a revolver will do for the majority of civilian purposes; at the same time, nobody overseas is buying them and only a few are even building them. You wouldn't expect the Union to instantly develop the capacity to issue breech-loaders to all its troops, any more than you would expect Republican Spain to arm all its troops with semi-automatics.

Reading RAILS OF WAR I was surprised to learn the first use of railroads for the military was the Crimean War...

Yes, the Grand Crimean Central Railway doesn't get enough coverage. Not a long line, but a significant one.

 

[takerma]

That was kind of my reason for a POD towards what I'd consider an intermediate breechloader like the Sharps. It's not requiring quite all the industry changes that going all the way to brass cartridges would require, but it could be converted to brass cartridges.

So, the POD will have to be along both tracks simultaneously:

1) The US Army, likely through better observation of the Crimean War, decides that it needs to make a shift in its doctrine. To that end the small professional Army develops a new doctrine pre-war and the officers and NCOs there are trained on it. At war's outset, the Federal Government recruits 3 year volunteers for the regular army, but also accepts State regiments for service. The 3 year troops go to the "I Corps" which is initially held in reserve while it's trained up to the new standard and equipped (as much as possible) with the newly selected standard weapon (whatever breechloader that might be....a rimfire conversion of the 1855....a la Trapdoor?). This "Corps" (probably more Division Sized for a while) is anticipated as seeing action no earlier than mid-late 62, and while sentiment is high that the war will be over by the proverbial Christmas, there's an anticipation that there will have to be some 'occupation' and this "New Model Army" can handle that so state troops can go home immediately upon the Confederate Surrender. With the failures of 61, the I Corps is decided to be Fully Trained before bringing into action, and it comes into action around the Fredricksburg Campaign timeframe.

The occupation part is a political suicide I think as was mentioned.

For triggering change I think direct observation of the action during Crimean campaign would trigger massive ripples. All 3 men sent were good officers, observing each of the battles they would most definitely see that changes can and should happen. What direction that would take is hard to say. French and British approach differed a lot, it is possible that they would consider Zouave and french attacking tactics to be the model to use. In any case the importance of marksmanship would have been recognized I think.

Other possibility Algerian war and lesson French learned from that, would it have been possible that observers were sent there? I do not know much of anything about that one though.

2) Sharps might not be the right one to center around, but I have a hard time believing that US industry, which ironically wasn't behind the curve on designing weapons of war, was incapable of producing in a useful quantity (Corps sized quantity) a single standardized Breechloader for the infantry. Breechloaders being a LOT simpler to operate from behind cover or while prone, and having an increased rate of fire.

Unfortunately they were not capable of doing it, they were not even capable of fulfilling orders in muzzle loader they had. Same for canons, they were using anything that could shoot and they could buy in Europe. Muzzle loader with good sites, good training for the soldier and good range estimation for the unit is enough to cause massive slaughter in line formations. Problem is same though you need to train soldiers to actually hit stuff, that is hard when they were struggling with basic movement, reloading etc.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

What direction that would take is hard to say. French and British approach differed a lot, it is possible that they would consider Zouave and french attacking tactics to be the model to use.

They already had- at least according to McClellan's report, which said 'The tactics of the French infantry have not been changed since they were adopted in our service.' If they'd actually seen the effect of rifles in the Crimea, however, and appreciated that their most likely enemy was the British, it's possible they'd have amended those tactics somewhat. I saw a thread a while back about one side or the other using mixed brigades, with a light infantry battalion with rifles providing covering skirmishers for line infantry battalions with muskets attacking in columns. That seems far more achievable than equipping whole corps with breech-loaders, even if it isn't the "modern" tactics that people were hoping for.