George B. McClellan (December 3, 1826 – October 29, 1885) Part I
George Brinton McClellan was born in Philadelphia, the son of a prominent surgeon, Dr. George McClellan. His mother was Elizabeth Sophia Steinmetz Brinton McClellan (1800–1889), daughter of a leading Pennsylvania family. The couple had five children: a daughter, then three sons. McClellan was the great-grandson of Revolutionary War general Samuel McClellan, of Woodstock, Connecticut. As a child the young McClellan was considered a prodigy. He attended the University of Pennsylvania in 1840 at age 13, resigning himself to the study of law. After two years, he changed his goal to military service. With the assistance of his father's letter to President John Tyler, young George was accepted at the United States Military Academy in 1842, the academy having waived its normal minimum age of 16.
At West Point, he was an energetic and ambitious cadet, deeply interested in the teachings of Dennis Hart Mahan (father of President Alfred Thayer Mahan) and the theoretical strategic principles of Antoine-Henri Jomini. His closest friends were aristocratic Southerners such as James Stuart, Dabney Maury, Cadmus Wilcox, and A. P. Hill. These associations gave McClellan what he considered to be an appreciation of the Southern mind and an understanding of the political and military implications of the sectional differences in the United States that led to the Civil War. Like his future opponent Robert E. Lee he graduated second in his class of 59 cadets. Again like Robert E. Lee he was commissioned a brevet second lieutenant in the the prestigious U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
McClellan's first assignment was with a company of engineers formed at West Point, but he quickly received orders to sail for the Mexican–American War. He served as an engineering officer during the war and was frequently subject to enemy fire. He was appointed a brevet first lieutenant for his services at Contreras and Churubusco and to captain for his service at Chapultepec. He performed reconnaissance missions for Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, a close friend of McClellan's father. McClellan's experiences in the war would shape his military and political life. He witnessed Scott's success in balancing political with military affairs, and his good relations with the civil population he invaded, enforcing strict discipline on his soldiers to minimize damage to property. McClellan also developed a disdain for volunteer soldiers and officers, particularly politicians who cared nothing for discipline and training.
Peacetime Service
McClellan left the military in 1857 and became chief engineer of the newly constructed Illinois Central Railroad. By 1860, he had become president of the Ohio and Mississippi River Railroad, headquartered in Cincinnati. During this time, McClellan met and wed Mary Ellen Marcy, the daughter of one of his former commanders. The couple would go on to have two children: Mary “May” McClellan (1861-1945) and George B. McClellan Jr. (1865-1940).
War of Secession
At the start of the American Civil War, McClellan's knowledge of what was called "big war science" and his railroad experience suggested he might excel at military logistics. This placed him in great demand as the Union mobilized. The governors of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York, the three largest states of the Union, actively pursued him to command their states' militia. Ohio Governor William Dennison was the most persistent, so McClellan was commissioned a major general of volunteers and took command of the Ohio militia on April 23, 1861. Unlike some of his fellow Union officers who came from abolitionist families, he was opposed to federal interference with slavery. For this reason, some of his Southern colleagues approached him informally about siding with the Confederacy, but he could not accept the concept of secession. These facts would come out in his post war trial.
Initial Command
McClellan's first mission was to occupy the area of western Virginia that wanted to remain in the Union and subsequently became the state of West Virginia. He had received intelligence reports on May 26 that the critical Baltimore and Ohio Railroad bridges in that portion of the state were being burned. His forces moved rapidly into the area through Grafton and were victorious at the tiny skirmish called the Battle of Philippi. His first personal command in battle was at Rich Mountain and later Philippi propelled McClellan to the status of national hero.The New York Herald entitled an article about him "Gen. McClellan, the Napoleon of the Present War." Earning him the monicker the “the little napoleon.” However it was in these battle that McClellan displayed a strong sense of caution and a reluctance to commit reserve forces that would be a hallmark of the rest of his career.
Commander of the Army of the Potomac
Because the west virginian campaign was arguably the only successful operation of any union army at the time, President Lincoln called McClellan to Washington to help re-organize and train the Army of the Potomac. During the summer and fall, McClellan brought a high degree of organization to his new army, and greatly improved its morale with frequent trips to review and encourage his units. It was a remarkable achievement, in which he came to personify the Army of the Potomac and reaped the adulation of his men. He organized defenses for Washington that were almost impregnable, consisting of 48 forts and strong points, with 480 guns manned by 7,200 artillerists. The Army of the Potomac grew in number from 50,000 in July to 168,000 in November, becoming the largest military force the United States had raised until that time. But this was also a time of tension in the high command, as he continued to quarrel frequently with the government and the general-in-chief, Lt. Gen. Scott, on matters of strategy. McClellan rejected the tenets of Scott's Anaconda Plan, favoring instead an overwhelming grand battle, in the Napoleonic style. He proposed that his army should be expanded to 273,000 men and 600 guns and "crush the rebels in one campaign."
The immediate problem with McClellan's war strategy was that he was convinced the Confederates were ready to attack him with overwhelming numbers. On August 8, believing that the Confederacy had over 100,000 troops facing him (in contrast to the 35,000 they had actually deployed at Bull Run a few weeks earlier), he declared a state of emergency in the capital. By August 19, he estimated 150,000 rebel soldiers on his front. McClellan's subsequent campaigns were strongly influenced by the overblown enemy strength estimates of his secret service chief, detective Allan Pinkerton, but in August 1861, these estimates were entirely McClellan's own. The result was a level of extreme caution that sapped the initiative of McClellan's army and dismayed the government.
Commander of the Army of the Potomac
By late 1861 Lincoln had become exacerbated by McClellan’s unwillingness to employ the army. He repeatedly visited the camp to pressure McClellan into using the army. McClellan believed Lincoln and other antislavery republican were just as much an enemy to the republic as the Confederates. He consistently tried to outmaneuver the President politically and be the dominant voices among his political council and to Congress. McClellan was utterly contemptuous of Abraham Lincoln’s character, intelligence, social origins and morals. He dismissed the president as “the original Gorilla,” a well-meaning but weak-minded “baboon” surrounded by fools and traitors. He even flirted with idea of a Congressionally sanctioned “dictatorship,” which would give him control of war policy, leaving Lincoln as a figurehead. He stuffed his headquarters with sycophants and loyalists who mirrored and even exaggerated his moods. This only fueled his delusions of grandeur.
In March Lincoln threatened to remove McClellan if he did not move on Richmond. It was just this moment that McClellan laid out for him the peninsula campaign. Lincoln preferred an overland campaign toward Richmond, but McClellan proposed an amphibious maneuver in which the Union Army would land on the Virginia Peninsula, effectively circumventing General Joseph E. Johnston’s Confederate army. McClellan put his Peninsula Campaign into action in March 1862, landing over 120,000 men on the coast and proceeding east toward the Confederate capital. The Confederates withdrew toward Richmond, and McClellan’s troops fought their way to within only a few miles of the city. Despite his strong position, McClellan failed to capitalize on his tactical advantage, once again believing that he might be outnumbered. When General Robert E. Lee took control of Confederate forces on June 1, he launched a series of bold offensives that culminated in the Seven Days Battles. Furious at Lincoln’s refusal to send him reinforcements, McClellan retreated to the base of the James River, at which point his army was ordered to return to Washington. When Lincoln confronted him on the decision to return to Washington, McClellan instead gave him ultimate in the guise of a policy about the new civil military relations. This proposal would effectively make McClellan as General and Chief responsible for all military decisions and bind the president to policy which would prevent abolition.
Lincoln responded by removing McClellan as General and Chief and Commander of the Army of the Potomac. But after Lee scored a decisive victory at the Second Battle of Bull Run, disgracing General Pope and threatening Washington in the process. In August 1862, he grudgingly called McClellan back into command.
Maryland Campaign
Several motives led to Lee's decision to launch an invasion. First, he needed to supply his army and knew the farms of the North had been untouched by war, unlike those in Virginia. Moving the war northward would relieve pressure on Virginia. Second was the issue of Northern morale. Lee knew the Confederacy did not have to win the war by defeating the North militarily; it merely needed to make the Northern populace and government unwilling to continue the fight. With the Congressional elections of 1862 approaching in November, Lee believed that an invading army wreaking havoc inside the North could tip the balance of Congress to the Democratic Party, which might force Abraham Lincoln to negotiate an end to the war. He told Confederate President Jefferson Davis in a letter of September 3 that the enemy was "much weakened and demoralized."
There were secondary reasons as well. The Confederate invasion might be able to incite an uprising in Maryland, especially given that it was a slave-holding state and many of its citizens held a sympathetic stance toward the South. Some Confederate politicians, including Jefferson Davis, believed the prospect of foreign recognition for the Confederacy would be made stronger by a military victory on Northern soil. The news of the victory at Second Bull Run and the start of Lee's invasion caused considerable diplomatic activity between the Confederate States and France and the United Kingdom.
After the defeat of Pope at Second Bull Run, President Lincoln reluctantly returned to the man who had mended a broken army before—George B. McClellan, who had done it after the Union defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas). He knew that McClellan was a strong organizer and a skilled trainer of troops, able to recombine the units of Pope's army with the Army of the Potomac faster than anyone. On September 2, 1862, Lincoln named McClellan to command "the fortifications of Washington, and all the troops for the defense of the capital." The appointment was controversial in the Cabinet, a majority of whom signed a petition declaring to the president "our deliberate opinion that, at this time, it is not safe to entrust to Major General McClellan the command of any Army of the United States." The president admitted that it was like "curing the bite with the hair of the dog." But Lincoln told his secretary, John Hay, "We must use what tools we have. There is no man in the Army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he. If he can't fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight.”
On September 3, just two days after the Battle of Chantilly, Lee wrote to President Davis that he had decided to cross into Maryland unless the president objected. On the same day, Lee began shifting his army north and west from Chantilly towards Leesburg, Virginia. On September 4, advance elements of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed into Maryland from Loudoun County. The main body of the army advanced into Frederick, Maryland, on September 7. The 55,000-man army had been reinforced by troops who had been defending Richmond. The divisions of Maj. Gens. D.H. Hill and Lafayette McLaws and two brigades under Brig. Gen. John G. Walker, but they merely made up for the 9,000 men lost at Bull Run and Chantilly.
Lee's invasion coincided with another strategic offensive by the Confederacy. Generals Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith had simultaneously launched invasions of Kentucky. Jefferson Davis sent to all three generals a draft public proclamation, with blank spaces available for them to insert the name of whatever state the invading forces might reach. Davis wrote to explain to the public (and, indirectly, the European Powers) why the South seemed to be changing its strategy. Until this point, the Confederacy had claimed it was the victim of aggression and was merely defending itself against "foreign invasion." Davis explained that the Confederacy was still waging a war of self-defense. He wrote there was "no design of conquest," and that the invasions were only an aggressive effort to force the Lincoln government to let the South go in peace. "We are driven to protect our own country by transferring the seat of war to that of an enemy who pursues us with a relentless and apparently aimless hostility.
Dividing Lee's army
Lee divided his army into four parts as it moved into Maryland. After receiving intelligence of militia activity in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, Lee sent Maj. Gen. James Longstreet to Boonsboro and then to Hagerstown. (The intelligence overstated the threat since only 20 militiamen were in Chambersburg at the time.) Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson was ordered to seize the Union arsenal at Harpers Ferry with three separate columns. This left only the thinly spread cavalry of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart and the division of Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill to guard the army's rear at South Mountain.
The specific reason Lee chose this risky strategy of splitting his army to capture Harpers Ferry is not known. One possibility is that he knew it commanded his supply lines through the Shenandoah Valley. Before he entered Maryland he had assumed that the Federal garrisons at Winchester, Martinsburg, and Harpers Ferry would be cut off and abandoned without firing a shot (and, in fact, both Winchester and Martinsburg were evacuated). Another possibility is that it was simply a tempting target with many vital supplies but virtually indefensible. McClellan requested permission from Washington to evacuate Harpers Ferry and attach its garrison to his army, but his request was refused.
Reactions to invasion
Lee's invasion was fraught with difficulties from the beginning. The Confederate Army's numerical strength suffered in the wake of straggling and desertion. Although he started from Chantilly with 55,000 men, within 10 days this number had diminished to 45,000. Some troops refused to cross the Potomac River because an invasion of Union territory violated their beliefs that they were fighting only to defend their states from Northern aggression. Countless others became ill with diarrhea after eating unripe "green corn" from the Maryland fields or fell out because their shoeless feet were bloodied on hard-surfaced Northern roads. Lee ordered his commanders to deal harshly with stragglers, whom he considered cowards "who desert their comrades in peril" and were therefore "unworthy members of an army that has immortalized itself" in its recent campaigns.
Upon entering Maryland, the Confederates found little support; rather, they were met with open hostility. Robert E. Lee was disappointed at the state's resistance, a condition that he had not anticipated. Although Maryland was a slaveholding state, Confederate sympathies were considerably less pronounced among the lower and middle classes, which generally supported the Union cause, than among the pro-secession legislature, the majority of the members of which hailed from Southern Maryland, an area almost entirely economically dependent on slave labor. Maryland and Pennsylvania, alarmed and outraged by the invasion, rose at once to arms. Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin called for 50,000 militia to turn out, and he nominated Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, a native Pennsylvanian, to command them. (This caused considerable frustration to McClellan and Reynolds's corps commander, Joseph Hooker, but general-in-chief Henry W. Halleck ordered Reynolds to serve under Curtin and told Hooker to find a new division commander.) As far north as Wilkes-Barre, church and courthouse bells rang out, calling men to drill.
In Maryland, panic was much more widespread than in Pennsylvania, which was not yet immediately threatened. Baltimore, which Lee incorrectly regarded as a hotbed of secession merely waiting for the appearance of Confederate armies to revolt, took up the war call against him immediately. When it was learned in Baltimore that Southern armies had crossed the Potomac, the reaction was one of instantaneous hysteria followed quickly by stoic resolution. Crowds milled in the street outside newspaper offices waiting for the latest bulletins, and the sale of liquor was halted to restrain the excitable. The public stocked up on food and other essentials, fearing a siege. Philadelphia was sent into a flurry of frenzied preparations, despite being over 150 miles from Hagerstown and in no immediate danger.
McClellan's pursuit
McClellan moved out of Washington starting on September 7 with his 87,000-man army in a lethargic pursuit. He was a naturally cautious general and assumed he would be facing over 120,000 Confederates. He also was maintaining running arguments with the government in Washington, demanding that the forces defending the capital city report to him. The army started with relatively low morale, a consequence of its defeats on the Peninsula and at Second Bull Run, but upon crossing into Maryland, their spirits were boosted by the "friendly, almost tumultuous welcome" that they received from the citizens of the state. The Army of the Potomac reached Frederick, Maryland, on September 13. By then Longstreet’s Corp had reached Hagerstown and Jackson’s Corp was attacking Harper’s Ferry. Without a clear picture of the size or destination of the Army of Northern Virginia, McClellan remained in Frederick Maryland. It was not until the new of the garrison at Harper’s Ferry surrendered that McClellan ordered the Army to move on September 16th.
Lee had ordered Jackson and Longstreet’s regroup at Chambersburg Pennsylvania. Lee’s ultimate destination was Harrisburg. It was not until news that Lee’s soldiers had crossed Pennsylvania border that McClellan ordered the army to move September 18th that McClellan ordered his army to move. McClellan had successfully deduced that Lee’s ultimate objective was Harrisburg. McClellan however believed that Lee’s force was much larger than it was. He wanted to take adopt a fabian strategy wearing the Army of Northern Virginia down and block any confederate attempts to return to Virginia. However Lincoln and Stanton ordered McClellan to intercept the Army before it reached Harrisburg. McClellan wanted all troops defending Washington placed under his command and shipped to Harrisburg via rail. Lincoln and Stanton denied this request, again believing McClellan was over inflating Lee’s strength. Stanton and Lincoln made it clear that if McClellan failed to prevent the fall of Harrisburg he would be relieved of command. Fearing that his removal permanently would end his career, McClellan ordered the 100,000 strong Army of the Potomac to move to Harrisburg, traveling up the Gettysburg road to Gettysburg, Pillsburg and finally Camp Hill. The Army of the Potomac’s route was only 67 miles, as compared to Lee’s 80 miles. Averaging 8 miles a day McClellan took pains to keep the army between Lee’s Army and Washington while still keep ahead of Lee’s force.
Upon his arrival at Gettysburg McClellan received orders to detach two divisions or 10,000 men to defend Baltimore. This along with the attrition and during the march meant that when McClellan actually arrived at Camp Hill his force numbered only 52,000 men on September 29th. Lincoln telegraphed McClellan to congratulate him on beating General Lee to the Susquehanna. McClellan's only response was to beg for more men. Lincoln assured him that he outnumber the Confederates and that he must give battle. McClellan personally crossed the river to beg Governor Curtin for as many militiamen as he could gather,but was told they were still mustering and only had several companies on hand to keep order in the city.
Lee’s forces remained divided. Upon converging at Shippensberg on September 22nd. Lee believed that McClellan would foolishly give battle south of the Susquehanna, knowing McClellan was ordered to keep his army between Lee and Washington and Baltimore. Lee ordered the army reorganized creating a third Corp under A.P. Hill, Lee believed the battle would take place around New Cumberland just south of Harrisburg and the river. Lee ordered that General Jackson should enter the battle from the far left flanking the yankees and cutting off their access to the only bridge across the river. A.P. Hill would command the center and Longstreet would command the right.
Battle of Camp Hill
On the Afternoon of September 30th both Armies arrived at Camp Hill. With only an hour of daylight left Lee ordered his men to refrain from attacking. The naturally timid McClellan also ordered his men to hold. Lee used the night to reorganize his forces. Lee ordered the transfer of D.H. Hill’s division to A.P. Hills Corp. McClellan ordered the five corps of his army to take up a defensive position between the Yellow Breeches creek on the south and the Conodoguinet Creek in the North. McClellan’s battle plan for the next day was to take up a strong defensive position between the Conodoquinet Creek and the Yellow Breeches Creek. The Army of the Potomac numbered 61,000 men arrayed in five Corp, with four Corps of 45,000 men making up the main defensive line and one corp of 15,000 men in reserve. First Corp commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker, Second Corp under Edwin Sumner, Third Corp under William B. Franklin, Fourth Corp under Ambrose Burnside and Fifth Corp under Fitz John Porter.
Anticipating an attack by Lee, McClellan ordered all Corp commanders to remain on the defensive. His primary objective was to protect the only bridge spanning the Susquehanna River. Once Lee had fatally weakened the Army of North Virginia through repeated assaults. McClellan would commit his reserve corp and counter attack. Forcing Lee to withdraw and ultimately retreat south towards Virginia. Meanwhile Union forces in Maryland would occupy all the strategic crossing along the Potomac. Trapping Lee in the North, cut off from reinforcement and ultimately destroying him. McClellan’s senior Corp Commanders Burnside and Hooker suggested the army withdraw north of the river and prevent a crossing. They argued if Lee tried to cross the Susquehanna they could stop it and if he turned south to threaten Baltimore or Washington they could use the Baltimore Ohio railroad to reinforce either city. McClellan however refused to withdraw, relying on the military maxim “this is where we met them and this is where we fight them.”
Lee’s battle plan was far more aggressive and complex. Lee’s 42,000 men were divided into two Corps. The right Corp made of 20,000 men under Lieutenant General Longstreet and the left Corp of under Lieutenant General Jackson made up of 15,000 men. Key to Lee’s plan was a third smaller element in the center under the command of Major General A.P. Hill of 5,000. Lee’s plan was to attack the Union right wing with Longstreet’s element at daybreak. After several hours of attack, A.P. Hill’s force would join the attack, making it seem that this attack constituted the entire rebel force. After several hours of this feigned attack, the rebels would wait. When McClellan committed his reserves for a counter attack against the Longstreet’s supposedly weaned corp, Jackson’s corp would cross the Yellow Breeches Creek and outflank the union’s force. Key to Lee’s whole operation was J.E.B. Stuart’s Cavalry Corp whose mission was to screen Jackson’s left wing preventing union forces from discovering Jackson’s surprise attack.
Neither General Lee or McClellan slept the night of September 30th.That night McClellan gave overall command of first and second corp to Lt. General Joseph Hooker, and third and fourth corp to general Ambrose Burnside. Each senior corp commander was ordered to hold their positions at all cost. McClellan made camp near the village of Camp Hill by his reserve forces. Meanwhile, Lee situated his command with General A.P. Hill to oversee the army’s feint.
Union Order of Battle:
I Corp Joseph Hooker
II Corp Edwin Sumner
III Corp William B. Franklin
IV Corp Ambrose Burnside
V Corp Fitz John Porter
Confederate Order of Battle:
A Corp James Longstreet
B Corp A.P. Hill
C Corp Thomas Jackson
At 0700 on October 1st Lt. General Longstreet Corp attacked the right wing of the Union forces commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker. Longstreet’s attack targeted the separation between first and second corp. The attack went on for six hours by 1pm, Longstreet’s forces had suffered 2,000 casualties and pushed the union forces back 500 yards. After the six hour feint Lee ordered his forces to hold. Perceiving this to be the end of the attack, McClellan ordered Maj. General Hooker to counter attack, along with the V Corp. For three hours the union army counter attacked, targeting Lt. General Longstreet’s Corp. Just as McClellan's army was making head way to push Longstreet’s Corp’s back to its trenches, General Jackson launched his surprise attack. By 1650 Jackson’s Corp had crossed the Yellow Breeches Creek and was pushing towards the Susquehanna. McClellan had completely fallen for Lee’s faint. During this time his eyes and ears on the battlefield was future Great War hero Captain George Armstrong Custer. Custer was tasked with riding between the lines relaying General McClellan’s orders. Lieutenant Custer was there to observe the collapse of General Burnside's left wing under General Jackson’s assault. The combination of J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry and Jackson’s 15,000 moved into the union’s rear. With the left collapsing Lt. General Longstreet renewed his assault and had completely unnerved Maj. General Hooker. By 1700 Confederate Light Horse artillery was firing on the only rail bridge over the Susquehanna.
By nightfall the Army of the Potomac was cut off and surrounded. Low on water and having suffered more than 8,000 casualties McClellan called a council of war. McClellan was inclined to seek terms with General Lee; Generals Burnside, Fitz Porter and Franklin all wanted to fight. They believed the Army of Northern Virginia had fatally weakened itself and would not be able to renew the struggle in the morning. Sumner who suffered the heaviest casualties wanted to ask for terms, but it was when the usually bellicose Hooker whose corp had been shattered that McClellan decided to ask for peace. This was enough for McClellan to ask for peace. McClellan tasked the young Captain Robert Gould Shaw with carrying the white flag across Confederate lines to ask for terms. Many say the injuries during the battle and the shame of this assignment is what drove him to alcoholism. Lee’s terms were lenient, the army was to surrender all weapons, all enlisted were paroled on the promise they would return home and not rejoin the war, officers were to be held briefly to ensure compliance. At 0800 October 2nd, McClellan and his staff met General Lee at his headquarters at the Camp Hill courthouse. McClellan and Lee entered the courthouse together and after a brief chit chat over their mutual service in the First Mexican War, Lee got down to business. McClellan surrendered offering Lee his sword, which Lee gladly took.
After two hours, both Generals emerged from the courthouse, to cheers and volley after volley of celebratory artillery fire. McClellan placed himself into Lee’s custody in front of his men. McClellan watched as his men stacked their weapons and his officers placed themselves into Lee’s custody. Lee then granted McClellan a parole and turned his army north to sack Harrisburg. Not knowing where to go or what to do McClellan turn his horse south towards Washington D.C.