Ottoman stagnation debate continuation

[Lampiao]

Please explain how my specific examples of bad luck is the Ottomans failing to understand geopolitics.

Not only geopolitics, but also economy. Example: signning an unequal treaty with the UK just to criple Egypt's economy. That was pretty stupid way to handle a rogue governor and killed every possibility of industrialization in Egypt and in the OE.

-

I think you're underestimating how many times the Ottomans could easily be over (not simply get in worse conditions, literally over), off the top of my head I can think of: Mehmet Ali's rebellion, the Auspicious Incident, the Crimean War AND the two others events that you mentioned.

There certainly was a vicious cycle, but the exercise of counterfactual history is to think why it all happened and how can we avoid it. However, as you said, there are simply too many problems internally and externally to point out one crucial reform.

You say that they did their best under the circunstances, I can agree with that. Still, if you lose in end, you haven't succeeded. As we can trace back the causes of the Ottoman defeat to their half-minded reforms (or the lack of thereof), I do think that they failed to become a functional modern nation. I guess it's a matter of point of view.

 

[Kyro92]

In regards to nationalism, it was, in my view, the result of Ottoman decline rather than its cause. For instance, the first Serbian revolt was caused by the harsh rule by the local Janissary clique, which had long grown into a corrupt institution. Other nationalisms arose due to similar reasons. So no, it was not going to inevitably break the Ottoman Empire apart; as long as it got its shit together, the decline would stop and thus so would nationalism.

I believe that the examples of the Quebecois, Catalonian and Scottish independence movements illustrate that prosperity and liberal governance are no guarantor against nationalist independence movements. Of course competent governance can limit unrest, even limiting it to peaceful political activism. Alternatively a sufficiently strong country can crush secessionist resistance and deter foreign intervention. But, as a general rule, nationalist activism grew stronger not weaker since the 19th century. I see no reason to think a liberal and industrialized Ottoman Empire would be the exception to this.

 

[Indicus]

I believe that the examples of the Quebecois, Catalonian and Scottish independence

A totally different time, with entirely different countries and cultures.

 

[RGB]

I will grant that there's certainly a good case to be made that the Ottomans suffered from a lot of geopolitical bad luck circa the 19th century, and that with a bit of better luck (say during the 1877 War) they could have emerged a modern, functioning state.

They had all of the rest of Europe diplomatically on their side. European powers armed and reformed their army and when that wasn't enough threatened Russia and its allies to roll back the gains. What other "luck" did they need? Actual military "luck"? They would need to keep rolling lucky over and over and over for 1877 to be anywhere close to "winnable". In real life such things do happen but any AH writer would rightly be criticised for loading the dice that badly

In fact you make that same broad point rather convincingly and at length in the subsequent paragraph. Rather than Europeans ganging up to dismember the Ottomans, the real narrative of the 19th c. is Europeans repeatedly ganging up on Russia to prevent Russia from dismembering the Ottomans, for which it needed no help at all from 1820 onwards and arguably earlier.

 

[Nassirisimo]

They had all of the rest of Europe diplomatically on their side. European powers armed and reformed their army and when that wasn't enough threatened Russia and its allies to roll back the gains. What other "luck" did they need? Actual military "luck"? They would need to keep rolling lucky over and over and over for 1877 to be anywhere close to "winnable". In real life such things do happen but any AH writer would rightly be criticised for loading the dice that badly

In fact you make that same broad point rather convincingly and at length in the subsequent paragraph. Rather than Europeans ganging up to dismember the Ottomans, the real narrative of the 19th c. is Europeans repeatedly ganging up on Russia to prevent Russia from dismembering the Ottomans, for which it needed no help at all from 1820 onwards and arguably earlier.

I don't know, I suppose if there was a figure in the Ottoman Military who could at least try to make the Ottoman Generals cooperate in Rumelia rather than running around doing their own thing, the Ottomans may be able to group together their forces and, oh, I don't know, use their excellent American-made Peabody-Martini rifles to even greater effect than OTL. But yeah, any AH writer who would run with that concept would probably be a hack...

I think your point is as guilty as generalisation as the point you are arguing against. While other Europeans did sometimes help the Ottomans against Russia, at other times Europeans were happy to sit back, or to intervene in the Empire itself, such as at the Battle of Navarino. European-Ottoman relations were a very complicated game, and there were a number of examples of when the European concert acted against Ottoman interests, not just in favour of.

 

[RGB]

I don't know, I suppose if there was a figure in the Ottoman Military who could at least try to make the Ottoman Generals cooperate in Rumelia rather than running around doing their own thing, the Ottomans may be able to group together their forces and, oh, I don't know, use their excellent American-made Peabody-Martini rifles to even greater effect than OTL. But yeah, any AH writer who would run with that concept would probably be a hack...

So a fundamental positive change followed by multiple minor positive changes, keep rolling them sixes then, why not. Yes, some of the older timelines have had a weird distortionary effect of elevating unlikely outcomes into some AH.com orthodoxy.

I think your point is as guilty as generalisation as the point you are arguing against.

It's not a real analysis on the level you want to critique, it's just a counter-thesis. It's overly broad but I think more accurate than the overly broad original thesis.

Yes, the political situation was nuanced and changed according to the time, the place, the players and the conflict. For most part Russia itself wasn't too interested in dismembering all of the Ottoman Empire no more than it wanted to dismember all of Persia.

At other times Europeans were happy to sit back, or to intervene in the Empire itself, such as at the Battle of Navarino.

So this example is itself a good example of "complicated" - the British and French governments intervened party to keep Russia from winning the war alone so that they'd have a stake in Greek politics post-independence. The treaty of London is mostly Britain applying restrictions on Russia. Even the Egyptian fleet the allies fought against was armed and trained by the French.

And of course Admiral Codrington, for having failed to avoid the battle, was kicked upstairs for the rest of his career. So in short, I can use Navarino for my thesis just as easily as otherwise.

 

[123456789blaaa]

Not only geopolitics, but also economy. Example: signning an unequal treaty with the UK just to criple Egypt's economy. That was pretty stupid way to handle a rogue governor and killed every possibility of industrialization in Egypt and in the OE.

-

I think you're underestimating how many times the Ottomans could easily be over (not simply get in worse conditions, literally over), off the top of my head I can think of: Mehmet Ali's rebellion, the Auspicious Incident, the Crimean War AND the two others events that you mentioned.

There certainly was a vicious cycle, but the exercise of counterfactual history is to think why it all happened and how can we avoid it. However, as you said, there are simply too many problems internally and externally to point out one crucial reform.

You say that they did their best under the circunstances, I can agree with that. Still, if you lose in end, you haven't succeeded. As we can trace back the causes of the Ottoman defeat to their half-minded reforms (or the lack of thereof), I do think that they failed to become a functional modern nation. I guess it's a matter of point of view.

The treaty of Balta Liman was the price the Ottomans had to pay for British aid in fending off Mehmet Ali. The Ottoman market had become one of the primary draws in British interest in the preservation of the OE, as trade between the two greatly increased through the 19th c. Granting the treaty both gained crucial aid and also increased British OE preservation incentive in the area they were most interested in. Given the situation of the time, how was it a "pretty stupid way"? Especially considering that full benefits and impact of the Industrial Revolution (which as a term wasn't even coined until 1837 and not popularized until decades later) wasn't apparent outside Britain. What would you have done?

The OE succeeded in all the events you bring up so I don't understand the significance of bringing them up. In more successful circumstances, these events would either go even better or the need for them in the first place would go away. if anything, doesn't being able to successfully navigate these terrible circumstances show that the Ottomans weren't as short-sighted and sluggish as you say?

I never said that the OE succeeded. My entire argument is that the OE basically had the right ideas and could more fully implement those ideas given better circumstances. Meanwhile, you appear to think OE reforms weren't implemented optimally because of...stupidity/decadence? I just don't see how the reforms were "half-minded" given the circumstances. It's simply unfeasible to implement religious equality in 1801 for example.

I believe that the examples of the Quebecois, Catalonian and Scottish independence movements illustrate that prosperity and liberal governance are no guarantor against nationalist independence movements. Of course competent governance can limit unrest, even limiting it to peaceful political activism. Alternatively a sufficiently strong country can crush secessionist resistance and deter foreign intervention. But, as a general rule, nationalist activism grew stronger not weaker since the 19th century. I see no reason to think a liberal and industrialized Ottoman Empire would be the exception to this.

While I think you're correct in general, I also think you're somewhat neglecting the fact that ethnonationalism as a principle was boosted by the big problems of multiethnic regimes and the success of ethno-nationalist secessionist movements. The success of countries like Greece and Bulgaria in seceding provided a big boost to the legitimacy of other such movements. We can see this very starkly with the Armenians who were actually considered one of the most loyal Christian minorities before the 1877-78 war. It goes back to this vicious cycle thing I talked about-all these problems fed into each other. More success in general would weaken separatist nationalism in all kinds of ways. For example, being able to rid themselves of Christian-favoring predatory economic practices by the Christian Powers would turn Christian commercial dominance into an asset because it would give Christian merchants and bankers a huge stake in a continuing, healthy OE economy. Minorities would also be much more incentivized to embrace Ottomanism in general-it's actually amazing how much it persisted even in the 20th century OTL (see post #33 in the original thread). Railroads would greatly increase Muslim migration into the Balkans, thus changing demographics. A continuing parliament would heavily incentivise compromise and coalitions with Muslims...I could go on and on.

So I agree that more success wouldn't eliminate ethnonationalist separatism completely, I don't agree that it would get stronger over time. I think it would get much weaker. The OE is also just in a very different situation compared to the examples you cite.

They had all of the rest of Europe diplomatically on their side. European powers armed and reformed their army and when that wasn't enough threatened Russia and its allies to roll back the gains. What other "luck" did they need? Actual military "luck"? They would need to keep rolling lucky over and over and over for 1877 to be anywhere close to "winnable". In real life such things do happen but any AH writer would rightly be criticised for loading the dice that badly

In fact you make that same broad point rather convincingly and at length in the subsequent paragraph. Rather than Europeans ganging up to dismember the Ottomans, the real narrative of the 19th c. is Europeans repeatedly ganging up on Russia to prevent Russia from dismembering the Ottomans, for which it needed no help at all from 1820 onwards and arguably earlier.

The entire reason this thread exists is because a debate was derailing the topic of a previous thread. The entire point of this thread is to continue a debate between those who believe the Ottomans were inevitably doomed and those who don't. Not to debate on whether the Ottomans had "good luck" or "bad luck". Debating about "narratives" is irrelevant to the actual topic as I've said multiple times now (I said it to the guy you're replying to as well!). I had no "overly broad original thesis". When I say that the OE only fell due to bad luck, I'm speaking from the baseline of OTL, which includes things like Mahmud II not dying early. If you want, you can say that the Ottomans only survived as long as it did OTL because of good luck. I really don't care because it doesn't really matter.

If you disagree with my interpretation of the historical facts and the specific What If scenarios I've proposed, then please address me directly. Right now, I can't properly respond because you haven't clearly laid out what (if any) disagreements you have with me. Do you think the Ottomans were inevitably doomed to stagnation and failure in the 19th c?

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

You know, we've mainly been focusing on Ottoman challenges and reform efforts of the 19th Century this thread, but I'm kind of curious about the 18th Century myself -- right now, my knowledge of this period in particular is pretty much what I can find on Wikipedia,* but FWIG the 65 years preceding the disastrous Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74 could be the closest thing the Ottomans came to true "stagnation" -- mind you, it's just a vague impression I have at the moment, between the zenith of the Chiftlik system, failed attempts to rationalize the government (e.g. curbing the influence of the Kizlar Agha), the coup of 1730, and some mentions of persecutions of non-muslims and rebellions.

I imagine at least a few people on this thread know more about this particular period (1703-68) of Ottoman history than I do; for them, do you think there was more potential during this period for the Ottomans to reform themselves (as opposed to getting more "lucky" breaks from beyond their borders) than the 19th century posed?

*as opposed to the 17th and 19th Centuries, which I've been able to find and read actual history books on

 

[RGB]

The entire reason this thread exists is because a debate was derailing the topic of a previous thread.

Fair and I apologise. I had not read the original topic.

Do you think the Ottomans were inevitably doomed to stagnation and failure in the 19th c?

I think very few things are inevitable, and this isn't one of them. Like Austria-Hungary and Russia the OE missed a few opportunities to get on even footing (or remotely catch up, to be honest, since this is the 19th c.) with the leading powers of the day, but that doesn't have to mean that it had to be final. In fact the diplomatic situation it inhabited through the 19th c. was in my estimation pretty favourable, and could be leveraged into longer survival which in turn could buy time for more reform.

It's just that it was imo a much harder task of reforming than the one faced by Russia or Austria or Spain, and all three of those still had a hard time of it.

 

[Lampiao]

The treaty of Balta Liman was the price the Ottomans had to pay for British aid in fending off Mehmet Ali. The Ottoman market had become one of the primary draws in British interest in the preservation of the OE, as trade between the two greatly increased through the 19th c. Granting the treaty both gained crucial aid and also increased British OE preservation incentive in the area they were most interested in. Given the situation of the time, how was it a "pretty stupid way"? Especially considering that full benefits and impact of the Industrial Revolution (which as a term wasn't even coined until 1837 and not popularized until decades later) wasn't apparent outside Britain. What would you have done?

As a matter of fact, they were supposed to know a thing or two about the possible consequences. Don't you honestly think that crippling your enemy's economy by crippling your own isn't a little bit short-sighted? That's the very definition of throwing the baby out with the bathwater (Yup, I love old sayings).

I never said that the OE succeeded. My entire argument is that the OE basically had the right ideas and could more fully implement those ideas given better circumstances.

Which circunstances? We're walking in circles here.

To reform means to improve what's wrong (I guess we agree on the definition of the word reform?) due to "the circunstances" (I'll use your wording here), that's the logical assumption of the very definition of the word reform applied in the context. Thus, The Ottoman Empire needed to reform because of "the circunstances" - We can all agree that without "the circunstances" there's no need to reform, right? However, it seems to me that in the bolded sentence you're claiming otherwise.

1. The Ottomans needed to reform because of "the circunstances"; (I'm assuming that we agree on that)
2. "The circunstances" prevented the Ottomans from reforming. (That's what I understood from your sentence there)

Non sequitur. You do see that your argument is at least circular?

 

[123456789blaaa]

As a matter of fact, they were supposed to know a thing or two about the possible consequences. Don't you honestly think that crippling your enemy's economy by crippling your own isn't a little bit short-sighted? That's the very definition of throwing the baby out with the bathwater (Yup, I love old sayings).



Which circunstances? We're walking in circles here.

To reform means to improve what's wrong (I guess we agree on the definition of the word reform?) due to "the circunstances" (I'll use your wording here), that's the logical assumption of the very definition of the word reform applied in the context. Thus, The Ottoman Empire needed to reform because of "the circunstances" - We can all agree that without "the circunstances" there's no need to reform, right? However, it seems to me that in the bolded sentence you're claiming otherwise.

1. The Ottomans needed to reform because of "the circunstances"; (I'm assuming that we agree on that)
2. "The circunstances" prevented the Ottomans from reforming. (That's what I understood from your sentence there)

Non sequitur. You do see that your argument is at least circular?

I don't understand how either of your Wikipedia links relate to your point at all. Neither have anything to do with the Ottomans in the 19th c. Please explain. Secondly, you haven't answered my question or really engaged with the points I brought up. Yes, I think that given situation and knowledge of the time, the treaty was a fairly reasonable thing to do. I explained why I think that already. You haven't even answered what you would have done instead.

That's...not my argument. Do you believe the circumstances of the 18th and 19th centuries are exactly the same? Do you think that they're literally the same thing? That the lack of a strong "wake-up call" throughout most of the 18th century is somehow exactly the same as Napoleons invasion of Egypt being a huge wake up call, for example? Your presentation of "my argument" is so baffling that I was actually at a loss for how to reply to it for a while.

You know, this whole time you've been continually avoiding my specific scenarios despite multiple prompts on my end. Instead you keep talking about these really vague generalities. Do you know enough about Selim III's reign or the 1877-78 war to even debate them?

 

[Lampiao]

I don't mean to sound rude, but I honestly don't understand your specific points. You do know a lot about the subject, I give you that. However, you cite countless events from the 18th century to the 19th century without establishing context or even a resonably understandable proposition (i.e. a logical conclusion, opinion, etc.) behind your factual knowledge of theme.

I'm sorry, I'm lost here. I guess we'll agree to disagree.

 

[Roger II]

Would a better argument be “this event could have lead to greater reform with x, y, and z changes”.

 

[123456789blaaa]

I don't mean to sound rude, but I honestly don't understand your specific points. You do know a lot about the subject, I give you that. However, you cite countless events from the 18th century to the 19th century without establishing context or even a resonably understandable proposition (i.e. a logical conclusion, opinion, etc.) behind your factual knowledge of theme.

I'm sorry, I'm lost here. I guess we'll agree to disagree.

I didn't establish much context because I assumed you had a working knowledge of the context already. You never asked for clarification or an explanation of how my examples boosted my argument. In post #39 of this thread, you even say that you don't have the time to answer my specific historical arguments-nothing there about not understanding them. This was itself a reply to my rebuttal to your points regarding harsh rule and foreign influence in nationalistic revolts (as well as whether change past the mid 1800's was "too late")-something which you did debate briefly before moving into generalities.

I mean, when you respond to my last quoted post in this threads OP by saying "Well, I stand by my opinion. They took too much time to change. By the mid 1800's the "perfect storm" was already created, they'd a much more radical change than they were willing to do.", that gives me the expectation that you have an understanding of the reasons for why the Ottomans ultimately fell. I can trace a direct line from the outcome of the 1877-78 war to WW1 and the final dismemberment of the Ottomans. I don't see how there's no context to asking how the Ottomans would fall without that outcome.

We can agree to disagree if you'd like but I have no problem going into extensive detail on the events I cite. I've been thinking about a specific PoD regarding Napoleon dying in Egypt for months and can expand on both the numerous short term positive impacts and long-term positive trends.

 

[Lampiao]

Fair enough. I did said that I'd answer it later. However, I'm (quickly) re-reading the thread and I still don't see an argument about the 1877 War. I mean, I already mentioned what I think, I don't see how a different outcome in the war can change the Ottoman context, internally or externally. It would be very interesting if you could clarify that.

OTOH I think that a POD with Napoleon could actually work.

 

[Indicus]

I've been thinking about a specific PoD regarding Napoleon dying in Egypt for months

Does France still temporarily conquer Egypt? Because if it doesn’t, I don’t see reformist currents in the Muslim world being as strong.

 

[123456789blaaa]

Fair enough. I did said that I'd answer it later. However, I'm (quickly) re-reading the thread and I still don't see an argument about the 1877 War. I mean, I already mentioned what I think, I don't see how a different outcome in the war can change the Ottoman context, internally or externally. It would be very interesting if you could clarify that.

OTOH I think that a POD with Napoleon could actually work.

There are many changes. The Ottomans avoid the loss of the most productive core territories of the Empire in the Balkans (also the territories which were the origin of many Ottoman reformers). They avoid having almost the entire army utterly destroyed by the Russians through winter death death marches (retaining around 200,000 elite troops instead of having to start from scratch). They aren't left with terribly indefensible territory in Europe. Millions of muslim refugees aren't massacred and expelled with the OE having to deal with a huge refugee burden throughout decades. The Empires Muslims gain renewed faith in the Empires ability to protect them instead of losing faith as in OTL. Instead of being encouraged by the loss and the creation of Bulgaria, separatist Christians will be far more inclined to work with the OE (the urban bourgeoisie Armenians remaining the loyal millet for example). Being able to defeat a European Christian power like Russia will be a huge blow against the "Sick Man of Europe" idea and will cause the building of relations instead of seeing the destruction as inevitable and pushing to grab as big a slice as possible (we actually saw a lesser version of this in OTL when the unexpected OE victory against the Greeks caused Germany to move to build ties). Russia had relatively good relations with the OE anyways during the OTL Hamidian period. in ATL, the loss will severely damage Russian-led Pan-Slavism (which-again-didn't do great in OTL anyways). Factions in the government which fear the chaos that an OE partition would result in will gain the upper hand. Russia will probably still support the ambitions of certain Christian groups in the Empire but that's manageable.

The Ottoman debt (lack of money was one of the biggest problems in the OE) isn't horribly exacerbated due to the mentioned loss of the Balkans territories, war indemnities, massacre of the army, etc. Revenue will be around double that of OTL and the OE won't have to run its empire with revenues on the scale of Belgium's. The huge navy isn't completely dismantled due to lack of money meaning the OE won't have to start from scratch there either. The Ottoman parliament isn't prorogued like it was in OTL and continues to develop. This not only improves opinion in Europe but also incentives coalitions and cooperation with the OE government and has many other very beneficial effects. Both Christians and Muslim liberals will be able to support and work with the government instead of having to fight it. This means the Young Ottomans continue to flourish. The mixed Balkan territories being retained means a huge continued impetus for Ottomanism instead of Turkish nationalism slowly starting to form. With their greatly improved position, the OE can respond to the British invitation into Egypt which has many beneficial effects. For one, it has a big impact on their OTL African plans. The ability of the OE to build ties with other Muslim states will be greatly improved in general. The Balkan Wars are butterflied away and the horrible effects of that aren't there. WW1 is also butterflied away of course with the far stronger OE position in the Balkans and Austria and Russia not having nearly as much influence.

.If you don't agree that these are enough to change the OE context, than you have to give me some kind of scenario in which the OE dies anyways. It's impossible to envision their OTL dismemberment with this PoD.

Does France still temporarily conquer Egypt? Because if it doesn’t, I don’t see reformist currents in the Muslim world being as strong.

Yes. Napoleon dies at Acre (which he failed at conquering in OTL anyways).

 

[Lampiao]

You do make an interesting point, however, my disagreement here is actually quite simple: the problem of nationalism isn't simply butterflied away. It doesn't matter how great the Ottomans do, national fervor will always be a Damocles' Sword over the Sultan's head (you can also include the Tsar and the Austrian Emperor in the metaphor) and IMHO 1877 is way too late to butterfly away nationalism in the Balkans.

Personally, I think that the possibility of the development a Pan-Ottoman identity was lost after Greek independence; if you somehow manage to butterfly away the Greek Independence War, both Turks and Greeks can slowly create a common identity (which isn't impossible, after all they lived together for centuries) and the Greek could eventually co-opt their Orthodox "brothers", counterbalancing Russian Slavism.

 

[123456789blaaa]

You do make an interesting point, however, my disagreement here is actually quite simple: the problem of nationalism isn't simply butterflied away. It doesn't matter how great the Ottomans do, national fervor will always be a Damocles' Sword over the Sultan's head (you can also include the Tsar and the Austrian Emperor in the metaphor) and IMHO 1877 is way too late to butterfly away nationalism in the Balkans.

Personally, I think that the possibility of the development a Pan-Ottoman identity was lost after Greek independence; if you somehow manage to butterfly away the Greek Independence War, both Turks and Greeks can slowly create a common identity (which isn't impossible, after all they lived together for centuries) and the Greek could eventually co-opt their Orthodox "brothers", counterbalancing Russian Slavism.

Ethno-nationalism won't go away but it will be severely weakened. Nationalism alone can't guarantee success-just look at the Basques. Before the war, the majority of Christians in the OE were trying to pursue national aspirations within an Ottoman framework. There will probably be devolved autonomy at some point for various areas.

I don't agree that Ottomanism was doomed to fail after Greek Independance.

 

[Lampiao]

So, the Bulgarian revolt is suppressed and the regained Ottoman prestige makes people simply stop thinking about independence?