10 reasons why Op. Sealion could not succeed

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When the "Cromwell" codeword was issued, men from RAF training units were hustled out of their pubs/beds and sent back to base, where they found their training aircraft ready to take off with bomb racks full.
 

hipper

Banned
When the "Cromwell" codeword was issued, men from RAF training units were hustled out of their pubs/beds and sent back to base, where they found their training aircraft ready to take off with bomb racks full.

If you could source that we would all be interested.
 
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Of course even if they do successfully land they still have to deal with Britain's greatest deterrent to invasion ... the W.I!
And nobody crosses the Women's Institute, its like the Freemasons for girls, only they actually do control everything.
 
If you could source that we would all be interested.
That comes from one of the Sealion books but I will have to look through them to find it. Anyway, there's no mention of gas bombs or sprayers, just being bombed up and ready to go. I know from reading an autobiography of a Spitfire pilot that it was difficult to navigate, it took a lot of training to get navigation right, and even experienced pilots got lost - I'm thinking that would probably happen to the banquet pilots, too, so that many would not arrive in the target area at all. OK I found the quote but not the source:

"On 7th September, the “Cromwell” code word was issued. Police rounded up trainee pilots, some barely able to fly, from pubs, dance halls and cinemas and as they reported back to their airfields, they were shocked to see bombs being loaded onto their flimsy training aircraft."

Gas would have been bad for the RN, too. Royal Navy ships often had open gun shields and open bridges so gas bombs dropped on them would not have needed to penetrate their armour. The Germans planned to include gas protection personnel and gas firing mortars (the original nebelwerfers – they fired smoke projectiles) in the first wave of their invasion landings.

Most of the following comes from previous posts on this or the Axis History forum:

By the summer of 1940, the army had 10 companies that were trained to handle chemical weapons. Their substantial stores were made up of 25,000 shells filled with mustard gas, 15,000 ground bombs, and 1,000 chemical mines, as well as 10 ‘Bulk Contamination Vehicles’ and 950 projectors that could fire chemical-filled drums. A huge part of the British stocks of gas bombs had been lost, abandoned unfilled, in France. After a crash programme in manufacturing more gas bombs (and the designing/testing of new types), Bomber Command had 16 squadrons that were designated for duty in either spraying gas or dropping chemical bombs on the enemy. By the autumn of 1940, Britain’s stock of chemical weapons amounted to 13,000 tonnes, though in September 1940 most of it would have had to be sprayed.


The beaches/locations that were suitable for landings were to be sprayed before the landings , as soon after the "STAND TO" order as appropriate, to deny use of them to the enemy. That assumes that enough warning could be given for the high command to authorise the use of chemical weapons and for the spraying to commence. The countryside just inland of them, and roadways etc. were in 1940 to be sprayed by the Chemical Warfare (CW) Companies (Royal Engineers) with their specifically-designed sprayer lorries and converted tar-sprayers; by 1941, the RAF was able to do the job rather than it having to be done on the ground.

The locations that were to be sprayed and/ or bombed with gas are shown in this 1941 list:

Location of beach | Area (square yards) | No. of 65 lb bombs to be used|

Broadstairs

80,000

52

Ramsgate

80,000

52

Richborough (part)

400,000

265

Sandwich Village

80,000

52

Sandwich

800,000

532

Sandown Castle

360,000

243

Deal Pier

160,000

108

Walmer

8kg. 600,000

403

Ringwold

120,000

80

St Margarets (exit)

80,000

52

Dover (quays and town)

560

364

Folkestone Leas

800,003

532

Seabrooke

400,003

265

Hythe

1,000,003

675

Dymchurch Redoubt

800,000

532

Dymchurch

400,000

265

St Mary’s Bay

700,003

467

Littlestone

1,200,000

803

Dungeness (part)

400,030

265

TOTALS

9,315,000

5,998



(Source: Contamination of Beaches by Gas Bombing as an Anti—Invasion Measure. From Ait Commodore, Air Staff, GHQ Home Forces, to Air Ministry, 1st November 1941. In PRO file AIR 2/5200).
 
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C) gassed
Poisoned, not all of the agents they were planning to use were gaseous.

Anything else we can at chuck at them?

Wasps? Rabid dogs? Cricket bats?
High explosives. Shrapnel.

The Germans planned to include gas protection personnel and gas firing mortars (the original nebelwerfers – they fired smoke projectiles) in the first wave of their invasion landings.
Gasmarks save your life, but mustard gas would be pretty difficult to deal with, even with that.
 
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I would hope, from a point of view of military competence, that if any side in a prospective 'Sea Lion' did plan to potentially disregard any applicable conventions and to use gas, that instructions for use included 'check wind directions first, and do not use if wind direction is erratic and friendly troops are in the vicinity'...
 
On the subject of gas, what was the chance of the French doing what Britain planned to do and use chemical agents against invading Germans?
 
That comes from one of the Sealion books but I will have to look through them to find it. Anyway, there's no mention of gas bombs or sprayers, just being bombed up and ready to go. I know from reading an autobiography of a Spitfire pilot that it was difficult to navigate, it took a lot of training to get navigation right, and even experienced pilots got lost - I'm thinking that would probably happen to the banquet pilots, too, so that many would not arrive in the target area at all. OK I found the quote but not the source: ...

(Source: Contamination of Beaches by Gas Bombing as an Anti—Invasion Measure. From Ait Commodore, Air Staff, GHQ Home Forces, to Air Ministry, 1st November 1941. In PRO file AIR 2/5200).

Excellent, this is what I was interested in. However it is from November 1941.

Again the source of my objection isn't so much that I think Churchill was morally above using chemical weapons. I am quite certain that Britain would do so if the government felt it necessary and I see that by the following year it was built into the plans.

Which was just my point about 1940. If Sea Lion happens in 1940, which it clearly won't in 1941, and if the British response is as many have predicted here, then by the time the remnants of the German force struggle ashore, after having been spotted forming up on the south side of the Channel and repeatedly struck by the RN there and on the way over, then it should be increasingly clear by the time they're ashore that the invasion has already failed. The British government will be more invested time-wise in managing what is already working than in desperately inventing alternatives to what isn't working.

That's the question I'm left with regarding gas, because if the gas wasn't already part of the specific plans to respond to an invasion in the way seemingly quoted in this memorandum, it's less likely someone will take the time to improvise how to get them into the battle when Britain's victory already seems assured. Now if the Germans are advancing on London or the British cannot seem to reduce the German beachhead over an extended period, that is quite another matter entirely.

Of course there is another alternative here, which is that depending on what preparations there are on the British side, the extra warning time when they see the convoys forming up also gives Churchill extra time to decide to try to contaminate the beaches in advance. I don't think the possibility can be dismissed out of hand.
 

Asian Jumbo

Monthly Donor
Excellent, this is what I was interested in. However it is from November 1941.

Which was just my point about 1940. If Sea Lion happens in 1940, which it clearly won't in 1941, and if the British response is as many have predicted here, then by the time the remnants of the German force struggle ashore, after having been spotted forming up on the south side of the Channel and repeatedly struck by the RN there and on the way over, then it should be increasingly clear by the time they're ashore that the invasion has already failed. The British government will be more invested time-wise in managing what is already working than in desperately inventing alternatives to what isn't working. "

So basically gas is unnecessary as those troops who have finally managed to reach dry land can be left to the W.I to deal with? Presumably aided by the wasps attracted by the jam sandwiches they will be wielding?
 
Which was just my point about 1940. If Sea Lion happens in 1940, which it clearly won't in 1941, and if the British response is as many have predicted here, then by the time the remnants of the German force struggle ashore, after having been spotted forming up on the south side of the Channel and repeatedly struck by the RN there and on the way over, then it should be increasingly clear by the time they're ashore that the invasion has already failed. The British government will be more invested time-wise in managing what is already working than in desperately inventing alternatives to what isn't working.

My take exactly.

That's the question I'm left with regarding gas, because if the gas wasn't already part of the specific plans to respond to an invasion in the way seemingly quoted in this memorandum, it's less likely someone will take the time to improvise how to get them into the battle when Britain's victory already seems assured. Now if the Germans are advancing on London or the British cannot seem to reduce the German beachhead over an extended period, that is quite another matter entirely.

Yes, and that's what I said about Tiger Moths.

Of course there is another alternative here, which is that depending on what preparations there are on the British side, the extra warning time when they see the convoys forming up also gives Churchill extra time to decide to try to contaminate the beaches in advance. I don't think the possibility can be dismissed out of hand.

OK, a possibility I probably underestimated. And yes, they would have plenty of advance warning.
 
It is clear that Britain had seen how continental allies had fallen and were determined to throw whatever was available at any invasion. Gas was not just an option. It was an option to commanders with supplies forward loaded and with the methodology and targeting decided with the logistics and users identified. It was an option that could be delivered from a cold start in single hours. Losses were accepted as necessary under all circumstances. RN Battleships on the French coast, trainee Tiger Moth pilots and all.

Dug in positions pre planned were being put in right through England and can still be seen including Home Guard anti tank defences and the Auxilliary Units are evidence that a landing was going to be engaged by all and every means. Surrender was not going to be an option. This is a very different situation to the experiences on the continent. More Stalingrad than Sedan. A successful Sealion as planned would be meeting resistance every mile across the whole front all the way to the Thames and beyond. Even an unopposed invasion would be hard put to pump the resources into the field faster than the losses especially with any turn in the weather as is inevitable as autumn arrives while the fighting rages.

BTW if you are going to use area denial chemicals then the beaches are the best option. The enemy must use them and they are limited in size (albeit long). The second best is the barges forming up and loading. Using it against an army in the field is much more of a hit and miss job and are denial agents are less appropriate. It might have been better to use it after the landings have happened and intelligence has established where the supplies and barges are being offloaded, leaving ground forces to deal with the first wave or two on the ground; isolated from logistical support. If the other resources have contained the invasion anyway then gas would not need to be deployed, so I suspect (with no evidence) that the gas option was one to be exercised as the need required and not a pre-planned and inevitable response. To be fair the risk is that, by that time you may have lost much of the delivery capacity as light bombers are shot down.
 
So basically gas is unnecessary as those troops who have finally managed to reach dry land can be left to the W.I to deal with?

Worked the last time the French invaded.

yvonne-fox-portrays-heroine-jemima-nichols-with-her-pitchfork-fishguard-B49CBH.jpg
 
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