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Chapter Six: Operation Tannenbaum
Defeat in the Battle of Britain left significant changes on Germany – in a single day, the Germans had seen their navy and the air force crippled, and their soldiers humbled. The aftermath of the Battle, therefore, was just as significant in Continental Europe as it was in Britain.
As 1941 dawned, Germany was in quite a state – the destruction of the river barges in the Battle of Britain meant that the economies of certain occupied territories where the barges had been extracted from (such as the Netherlands) entered a significant downturn, and thus the Nazi Government found itself deploying more troops to occupied territories to prevent uprisings breaking out. Meanwhile, in France and Poland, outcome of the Battle was met with secret joy – Resistance fighters knew that the enemy occupiers could be beaten, and so, throughout 1941, German forces in occupied Europe found that the number of attacks and sabotage operation organised by Resistance forces drastically increased. The impact of the defeat did not end domestically – the crippling defeat endured by the Wehrmacht meant that German plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union, code-named Operation Barbarossa (which had always been the Nazis’ main goal), had to be delayed, with its launch date moving from June 1941 to June 1942.
Although German forces were able to successfully invade Yugoslavia and Greece April 1941, this victory was weakened somewhat by the inability to capture Crete, while the invasion of these countries failed to lift the morale of the German people – it was seen (correctly) as Germany rescuing its ally, Italy, from catastrophe, rather than an event on par with the Battle of France. And so, with morale amongst Germans at a significant low, Hitler and the Nazis recognised that, although they had eliminated the threat from within the Government via the Second Night of the Long Knives, discontent with the Nazi regime was simmering below the surface amongst the German people, and no amount of propaganda or brainwashing could sort such discontent out. Therefore, it was decided that a major German victory was needed, one which would occur quickly and come across as decisive, to boost morale and support for the regime. It was eventually decided by the Nazis to launch Operation Tannenbaum – an invasion of Switzerland.
Hitler and other prominent Nazis had made no secret of their disgust for Switzerland in the past, and so, when the Führer announced to his joint Chiefs of Staff that Tannenbaum was to be launched during mid-1941, there was little surprise. There was, however, a large degree of wariness – Hitler’s orders had cost the German military significantly during the botching of Sealion, and so there was scepticism as to whether or not an invasion of Switzerland would be worth the expected cost. Yet none of these concerns were raised, at least not in front of any prominent Nazis, for the officers in the German military still remembered the Second Night of the Long Knives vividly, and were aware of Hitler’s wrath. So, preparations to launch Tannenbaum were put in place, and German troops began to move towards the Swiss border.
On July the 23rd, Tannenbaum was launched. The German 12th Army, numbering roughly 150,000 men, under the command of Wilhelm List, began to advance into Switzerland from Southern Germany, with the intention of capturing Zurich, and then advancing southwest to Bern. While the German forces began to march into Switzerland, the Luftwaffe began assaults on major Swiss cities – this was the first major action of the German air force since the Battle of Britain. Yet, as List’s troops would soon find out, the Swiss had been conducting their own preparations in the event of a German invasion.
The defence of Switzerland had been put in the hands of General Henri Guisan, who had begun the mobilisation of the Swiss armed forces almost immediately after the war broke out in September 1939, and eventually the Swiss army numbered roughly 430,000 soldiers, along with another several hundred thousand in reserve if necessary. Guisan developed a strategy known as Defence du Reduit (‘National Redoubt’), whereby Swiss forces, if German troops captured the flat lands of Switzerland where most population centres stood, would retreat to the Alps and continue to fight the Germans in a terrain which heavily favoured defence. Soon enough, Guisan found this strategy was put to the test.
Unsurprisingly, List was able to capture Zurich, yet only after heavy fighting which took place between July the 25th and August the 1st. And even after the largest city in Switzerland was captured, the Germans found themselves with the unenviable task of maintaining control over the city – Swiss forces which were stuck behind enemy lines began a guerrilla warfare against German forces, often conducting night-time raids against German patrols which damaged German morale. This was another aspect of Guisan’s strategy – Swiss soldiers were ordered to dismiss all proclamations that the Swiss Government had surrendered as Nazi propaganda, and continue to fight, even if the entire country was occupied. As a result, List and the 12th Army found that such attacks were not limited to Zurich, as when they advanced into other areas of Switzerland, similar attacks and raids occurred.
On the 3rd, List and the 12th Army began to advanced out of Zurich and towards Bern, which was captured on 9th. Yet, once again Swiss forces which had not retreated from the city in time continued to hassle the Germans through similar strategies to those deployed in Zurich. This resistance frustrated List incredibly, who had initially hoped that the Swiss Government would surrender upon the capture of the nation’s capital – yet no such surrender came, and instead Guisan launched National Redoubt, with most Swiss forces entering fortifications in the Alps to continue resistance against the Germans. As a result of this, List now had to advance into the Alps, a task made incredibly difficult by the fortifications made by the Swiss, which had been constructed along nearly the entirety of the Alps’ borders within Switzerland. Initially, the German forces hoped that an Italian offensive into Switzerland would relieve a large amount of pressure on them – such an offensive began on the 10th, as three Italian divisions, numbering roughly 45,000 men, began to march into Swiss territory. Yet, after an initial advance which saw the Italians successfully capture Lugano on the 14th, Italy soon found itself in a similar position to Germany – unable to penetrate Swiss defences along the Alps.
Eventually, starting on the 12th, List decided to embark on a strategy of constantly attacking Swiss fortifications, with the intention of gradually wearing down the Swiss forces until they could no longer hold the line and had to retreat. This strategy continued throughout August and September (both German forces in the North and Italian forces in the South used this strategy), until, by September the 22nd, Swiss soldiers along the fortifications began to run low on ammunition, and consequently List and the 12th Army were able to penetrate the Swiss defensive line, and soon enough brutal fighting took place in the Alps, as the remaining Swiss forces continued to hassle the Germans and Italians as they advanced through the mountains. Yet, by the end of October, even these soldiers were running low on supplies and munitions, and so, on October the 30th, List declared Switzerland to be completely under Axis control.
Shortly after the end of Tannenbaum, occupied Switzerland was partitioned between the Axis Powers – German-speaking Switzerland was directly annexed into the Third Reich, Italian-speaking Switzerland was directly annexed by Italy, while French-speaking Switzerland was jointly occupied by German and Italian troops (the Vichy French Government protested that they should receive a share of the spoils, yet when their demands were rebuked, Pétain once again went quiet, recognising that the Vichy state could do little to assert its demands). The invasion of Switzerland had cost the Germans 47,189 men, and the Italians 11,681 men, significant casualties for invading a country the size of Switzerland, while the amount of ammunition spent on destroying Swiss fortifications in the Alps was also heavy. Yet fighting in Switzerland did not end with the partition of the country – the Swiss Resistance, well-armed and following Guisan’s order to ignore all reports of a Swiss Government surrender, organised a prolonged guerrilla warfare, often ambushing German patrols and destroying ammunition and other supplies brought to Switzerland by the Germans. Meanwhile, the Swiss were inspired by the story of their Government’s escape – Guisan, and other senior military figures, were able to escape the Alps in disguise and, by trekking through rural France, crossed the Pyrenees into Spain, where they secured a ship to London, and formed the Swiss Government-in-exile. Consequently, Germany found itself having to pour more and more troops into Switzerland simply to perform garrison duties, yet this did not end the Swiss’ determined resistance.
Of course, in Germany itself, none of this was reported – upon the 12th Army’s return to Berlin, Goebbels and the Ministry of Propaganda were quick to portray Tannenbaum as a quick and decisive route, and a show of Germany’s military might. As a result, the German people, with few other available news sources, believed this, and so the Nazis had achieved their morale-boosting exercise. Yet while this had been achieved, the Nazi Government was aware that Tannenbaum was in fact something of a pyrrhic victory, and the resistance of the Swiss people would continue.