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Plan Boissieux
Hussar of the Esterhazy Regiment c. 1740
Despite fielding more regular soldiers on Corsica than the Genoese Republic had ever managed, by April of 1739 the French had embarrassingly little to show for it. The corps commander, the Marquis de Boissieux, had spent most of 1738 in fruitless negotiations between the Republic and the revolutionary government of King Theodore von Neuhoff, an exercise doomed to failure because of both the incompatibility of their respective demands and the perceived bias of the French in favor of the Genoese. After the final rejection of the terms of Fontainebleau in October of 1738, Boissieux's military efforts had been uninspired, although admittedly he was hampered both by an initial lack of troops and the tactical limitations imposed upon him by the virtual captivity of the French forces in their three occupied ports. A costly assault was necessary to break out of Calvi, and any initial strategic momentum was bled away by the necessity to garrison western Balagna against raids from Corsican mountaineers under Theodore's young and surprisingly redoubtable cousin, the Baron Neuhoff zu Rauschenburg.
The French reinforcements which arrived in the first week of May increased Boissieux's force to sixteen battalions of infantry (from ten),[1] and added three squadrons of hussars and a company of light infantry. Thus bolstered, Boissieux resolved not merely to redouble his efforts but to shift his strategy. His previous military efforts had been heavily compromised by political considerations, for he was mindful of his initial orders to avoid undue "rigor" and wanted to conciliate, rather than crush, the Corsican rebels. By May of 1739, however, he was aware of the tenuousness of his position in Paris, where the government was impatient to resolve what had been expected to be a quick and relatively bloodless conquest. His superiors were now more concerned with restoring French honor than exemplifying French mercy, and urged Boissieux to assert control of the situation by whatever means necessary.
Calvi and the western Balagna had been, up to now, the primary theater of operations, while French forces elsewhere had been something of a sideshow. The Ajaccio brigade had been reasonably successful in engagements with the Corsicans but wanted for purpose or direction; after breaking the siege of the rebel general Marquis Luca d'Ornano, there seem to have been no clear objectives other than to expand French control in whatever direction it could be maintained, which was not terribly far. Relatively isolated from the rest of the island by tall mountains and steep valleys, French struggles here had contributed little to Boissieux's position in the north. The Porto Vecchio force had amounted to a single battalion, whose presence put the minds of the Genoese at ease but was insufficient to undertake offensive operations.
Although Boissieux still rejected the scorched earth tactics recommended to him by his argumentative Genoese host, Marquis Giovanni-Battista de Mari, he had come to the conclusion that the surest way to reduce the Corsicans to submission was to strangle them by cutting them off from all resupply. This would require the occupation of the island's chief agricultural provinces in the north, the Balagna and the Nebbio, as well as the main rebel ports of Bastia, San Fiorenzo, and Isola Rossa, and the long stretch of eastern coastline whose lagoons and streams were havens for smugglers. This plan also had the advantage of avoiding an invasion of the mountainous highlands where the French would be at a relative disadvantage. Ajaccio, being nowhere near these key objectives, was thus superseded in Boissieux's new plan by Porto Vecchio, which could offer a staging point for French forces to not only take key fortresses on the eastern coast but to traverse the coastal plains all the way to Bastia. Thus, the number of French battalions in Ajaccio actually decreased in May, from four to three, while the Porto Vecchio detachment received the largest share of the new wave of Frenchmen, increasing from a single battalion to five battalions with an accompanying squadron of hussars.
The "eastern" brigade under the Marquis de Villemur, consisting of five infantry battalions and a company of hussars based initially in Porto Vecchio, would drive north along the coast with Bastia as its objective. Although not equipped with artillery, this was considered to be a much stronger force than anything the rebels possessed in the east, and rapid progress was expected. At the same time, a much smaller group—a brigade only in name—consisting of the Montmorency Infantry regiment and the small company of miquelets under the Comte de Montmorency would proceed in the opposite direction, landing at Rogliano and attempting to force the Capo Corso. They would be joined by several Genoese companies of Ligurians, grudgingly yielded by Mari, the only Genoese forces in Boissieux's plan not relegated to the status of rear-echelon or garrison troops. Finally, d'Ornano's royalist army in the Dila would face a brigade of three battalions under the Marquis du Châtel; Châtel's job was not to defeat his enemy or even come to grips with him, but merely to pose enough of a threat to prevent d'Ornano from coming to the assistance of the rebel forces in the Diqua.
Planned major axes of operations, Summer of 1739 (Click to expand)
The intent of the plan was to force the Corsicans into an impossible choice. They could devote their full forces to the Balagna and perhaps even hold back Rousset's newly reinforced brigade, but only at the cost of leaving their vital territory in the northeast open to a two-pronged attack from the rear. Alternatively, they could divide their forces to try and face every threat, but Boissieux suspected they had neither the organization nor the experienced troops and officers to make a stout defense everywhere, and a miscalculation on any front could create an opportunity for a French breakthrough. In due time, the northeast would face simultaneous pressure from west, north, and south, and the Corsican position would crumble. Once shorn of their coastal territories, the rebels would be denied any means of rearmament or resupply, and would inevitably be compelled to lay down their arms and accept French terms.
Strategically, the plan was sound enough, and the French made significant headway against the rebels in the weeks that followed. No plan survives contact with the enemy, however, and in 1739 Boissieux's enemy turned out to be the island itself as much as the natives. Operational difficulties were soon encountered which the French command had not fully anticipated. Montmorency's attack, decoy or not, soon proved to be impractical. Advancing down a narrow band of mountains was difficult enough on its own and provided the Corsicans with endless opportunities to delay his advance with a token force, but supply was also an issue; the roads were extremely poor, the Genoese at Rogliano had few mules or carts to offer, the rebels had already plundered the cape of much of its stores, and each of these difficulties was only compounded as Montmorency advanced and stretched his supply line further. Supply by water was complicated both by the absence of good ports and Corsican privateers based out of nearby Bastia and San Fiorenzo who proved very able to dash out of port and attack any unescorted supply ships. Meanwhile, Villemur would meet with early success in his eastern campaign, but was to find out firsthand why the Corsicans had not settled in most of the flatland he was using as a thoroughfare. It was fringed from top to bottom with shallow, mosquito-infested marshes and lagoons, and his brigade would be tramping along their shores just as the hot and pestilential Corsican summer was getting underway.
Footnotes
[1] The French army had 122 infantry regiments consisting of 193 battalions on its rolls in 1740. Assuming consistent battalion size—which was generally true, although the infantry battalions of the Maison du Roi, the French household troops, varied somewhat from the norm—Boissieux's expeditionary force amounted to approximately 8.3% of the overall infantry strength of the French army.
"Plan Boissieux" - May 1739
Excerpts from Merganser Publishing's "Rebellion!" Series #24: The Corsican Revolution
Excerpts from Merganser Publishing's "Rebellion!" Series #24: The Corsican Revolution
Hussar of the Esterhazy Regiment c. 1740
Despite fielding more regular soldiers on Corsica than the Genoese Republic had ever managed, by April of 1739 the French had embarrassingly little to show for it. The corps commander, the Marquis de Boissieux, had spent most of 1738 in fruitless negotiations between the Republic and the revolutionary government of King Theodore von Neuhoff, an exercise doomed to failure because of both the incompatibility of their respective demands and the perceived bias of the French in favor of the Genoese. After the final rejection of the terms of Fontainebleau in October of 1738, Boissieux's military efforts had been uninspired, although admittedly he was hampered both by an initial lack of troops and the tactical limitations imposed upon him by the virtual captivity of the French forces in their three occupied ports. A costly assault was necessary to break out of Calvi, and any initial strategic momentum was bled away by the necessity to garrison western Balagna against raids from Corsican mountaineers under Theodore's young and surprisingly redoubtable cousin, the Baron Neuhoff zu Rauschenburg.
The French reinforcements which arrived in the first week of May increased Boissieux's force to sixteen battalions of infantry (from ten),[1] and added three squadrons of hussars and a company of light infantry. Thus bolstered, Boissieux resolved not merely to redouble his efforts but to shift his strategy. His previous military efforts had been heavily compromised by political considerations, for he was mindful of his initial orders to avoid undue "rigor" and wanted to conciliate, rather than crush, the Corsican rebels. By May of 1739, however, he was aware of the tenuousness of his position in Paris, where the government was impatient to resolve what had been expected to be a quick and relatively bloodless conquest. His superiors were now more concerned with restoring French honor than exemplifying French mercy, and urged Boissieux to assert control of the situation by whatever means necessary.
Calvi and the western Balagna had been, up to now, the primary theater of operations, while French forces elsewhere had been something of a sideshow. The Ajaccio brigade had been reasonably successful in engagements with the Corsicans but wanted for purpose or direction; after breaking the siege of the rebel general Marquis Luca d'Ornano, there seem to have been no clear objectives other than to expand French control in whatever direction it could be maintained, which was not terribly far. Relatively isolated from the rest of the island by tall mountains and steep valleys, French struggles here had contributed little to Boissieux's position in the north. The Porto Vecchio force had amounted to a single battalion, whose presence put the minds of the Genoese at ease but was insufficient to undertake offensive operations.
Although Boissieux still rejected the scorched earth tactics recommended to him by his argumentative Genoese host, Marquis Giovanni-Battista de Mari, he had come to the conclusion that the surest way to reduce the Corsicans to submission was to strangle them by cutting them off from all resupply. This would require the occupation of the island's chief agricultural provinces in the north, the Balagna and the Nebbio, as well as the main rebel ports of Bastia, San Fiorenzo, and Isola Rossa, and the long stretch of eastern coastline whose lagoons and streams were havens for smugglers. This plan also had the advantage of avoiding an invasion of the mountainous highlands where the French would be at a relative disadvantage. Ajaccio, being nowhere near these key objectives, was thus superseded in Boissieux's new plan by Porto Vecchio, which could offer a staging point for French forces to not only take key fortresses on the eastern coast but to traverse the coastal plains all the way to Bastia. Thus, the number of French battalions in Ajaccio actually decreased in May, from four to three, while the Porto Vecchio detachment received the largest share of the new wave of Frenchmen, increasing from a single battalion to five battalions with an accompanying squadron of hussars.
In the Balagna, the new strategic plan differed little from the old. A brigade under the Chevalier de Rousset, with five infantry battalions, two squadrons of the Rattsky Hussars, and accompanying artillery would move east to take Isola Rossa and if possible force a decisive battle with the Balagnese militia under Marquis Fabiani. Genoese forces would provide garrisons in "liberated" villages, and they would be supported by a reserve brigade under the Chevalier de Sasselange consisting of two under-strength battalions (the first Auvergne battalion, mauled at Madonna della Serra, and the Cambrésis battalion, which had lost more than a third of its strength to Corsican captivity in its botched landing) and a reserve company of artillery possessing most of the heavier guns (8-pounders and mortars) which were deemed to be impractical in Rousset's brigade but might be of some use in hardening Balagnese garrisons against attack.
The "eastern" brigade under the Marquis de Villemur, consisting of five infantry battalions and a company of hussars based initially in Porto Vecchio, would drive north along the coast with Bastia as its objective. Although not equipped with artillery, this was considered to be a much stronger force than anything the rebels possessed in the east, and rapid progress was expected. At the same time, a much smaller group—a brigade only in name—consisting of the Montmorency Infantry regiment and the small company of miquelets under the Comte de Montmorency would proceed in the opposite direction, landing at Rogliano and attempting to force the Capo Corso. They would be joined by several Genoese companies of Ligurians, grudgingly yielded by Mari, the only Genoese forces in Boissieux's plan not relegated to the status of rear-echelon or garrison troops. Finally, d'Ornano's royalist army in the Dila would face a brigade of three battalions under the Marquis du Châtel; Châtel's job was not to defeat his enemy or even come to grips with him, but merely to pose enough of a threat to prevent d'Ornano from coming to the assistance of the rebel forces in the Diqua.
Planned major axes of operations, Summer of 1739 (Click to expand)
The intent of the plan was to force the Corsicans into an impossible choice. They could devote their full forces to the Balagna and perhaps even hold back Rousset's newly reinforced brigade, but only at the cost of leaving their vital territory in the northeast open to a two-pronged attack from the rear. Alternatively, they could divide their forces to try and face every threat, but Boissieux suspected they had neither the organization nor the experienced troops and officers to make a stout defense everywhere, and a miscalculation on any front could create an opportunity for a French breakthrough. In due time, the northeast would face simultaneous pressure from west, north, and south, and the Corsican position would crumble. Once shorn of their coastal territories, the rebels would be denied any means of rearmament or resupply, and would inevitably be compelled to lay down their arms and accept French terms.
Strategically, the plan was sound enough, and the French made significant headway against the rebels in the weeks that followed. No plan survives contact with the enemy, however, and in 1739 Boissieux's enemy turned out to be the island itself as much as the natives. Operational difficulties were soon encountered which the French command had not fully anticipated. Montmorency's attack, decoy or not, soon proved to be impractical. Advancing down a narrow band of mountains was difficult enough on its own and provided the Corsicans with endless opportunities to delay his advance with a token force, but supply was also an issue; the roads were extremely poor, the Genoese at Rogliano had few mules or carts to offer, the rebels had already plundered the cape of much of its stores, and each of these difficulties was only compounded as Montmorency advanced and stretched his supply line further. Supply by water was complicated both by the absence of good ports and Corsican privateers based out of nearby Bastia and San Fiorenzo who proved very able to dash out of port and attack any unescorted supply ships. Meanwhile, Villemur would meet with early success in his eastern campaign, but was to find out firsthand why the Corsicans had not settled in most of the flatland he was using as a thoroughfare. It was fringed from top to bottom with shallow, mosquito-infested marshes and lagoons, and his brigade would be tramping along their shores just as the hot and pestilential Corsican summer was getting underway.
Footnotes
[1] The French army had 122 infantry regiments consisting of 193 battalions on its rolls in 1740. Assuming consistent battalion size—which was generally true, although the infantry battalions of the Maison du Roi, the French household troops, varied somewhat from the norm—Boissieux's expeditionary force amounted to approximately 8.3% of the overall infantry strength of the French army.
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