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Captain Pierre Keelmann was upset at Theodore's apparent inability to pay him, or at least his inability to pay him more than a fraction of what the syndicate was owed. Neither he nor the other captains, Cornelius Roos and Adolphe Pereson, desired to remain on Corsica any longer than was absolutely necessary. At the moment, however, they were not going anywhere. The Marquis de Sabran, who had chased them into the Bay of San Fiorenzo on the frigate Flore, ordered the ships he had available to patrol as close to the bay's entrance as they dared and enforce a close blockade. Sabran had failed to stop the syndicate flotilla from landing, but he might yet prevent them from leaving, and for now the weather was in his favor. The Flore alone had lacked the firepower to take on the Africain, but with additional frigates and galleys he could very well manage it. The Africain's considerable battery concealed the fact that its merchant crew was under-strength and not well trained for battle.

All they could do was wait for Theodore to deliver, and until then Keelmann refused to land the bulk of the cargo. Finding that even his powers of persuasion were no match for the flinty Captain Keelmann, Theodore sent word to Captain-General Marquis Simone Fabiani, the governor of the Balagna, requiring him to gather and transport as much olive oil as possible to the Nebbio. That was not an easy operation, for it involved crossing what the Corsicans called the Agriate, a rugged region of coast dotted with fields and orchards but traversed mainly by shepherds' tracks over hills of broken granite.[A] That would take time, not simply to move the goods but to round up the men and mules to accomplish the task.

Lieutenant-General Count Louis de Frétat de Boissieux had been informed of the progress of the syndicate fleet ever since it had sailed into Cagliari. Nevertheless, there was still some confusion; the Genoese off Calvi had reported four ships flying the Dutch flag, while Sabran sent a dispatch boat back to Calvi describing his encounter with three ships flying the Spanish flag. This was recognized as a thin disguise, however, probably intended to make any Genoese vessels think twice before shooting at Spaniard ships, and Boissieux sent all these observations back to Versailles. In the meantime, he took matters into his own hands.

Although Boissieux clearly sympathized with the rebels and complained constantly of the ingratitude, brutishness, and incompetence of the Genoese, he was nevertheless determined to do his duty, and the landing of several ships purported to be carrying arms angered him. Had not Theodore and his deputies sworn that they had absolute faith in the honor and good-will of France? Had they not promised to uphold a cease-fire? Why, then, were they apparently now arming themselves for war? Boissieux summoned Theodore's delegates, Father Erasmo Orticoni and Gianpetro Gaffori, and demanded an explanation. Orticoni and Gaffori had not been privy to the syndicate's plans, and weakly explained that merchants often ran the Genoese blockade to deliver "needed goods" to the Corsicans, who would otherwise starve. Boissieux was not fooled—smugglers came to Corsica in little tartanes and barques, not in Indiamen and convoys escorted by Dutch ships of the line.

Boissieux took his strongest action yet and issued a proclamation against Theodore. The rebels, he said, only endangered themselves and risked forsaking the friendship of the King of France if they had dealings with this charlatan. Boissieux threatened severe consequences to those that followed or harbored the so-called king. He no doubt remembered Theodore's letter, in which the baron had seemingly had been most conciliatory and desirous of preserving his own safety, and thought that stern threats might flush him out. Had this proclamation been made earlier, perhaps he would have succeeded. Before it was drafted, however, there were already rumors spreading throughout Corsica that Theodore's long-promised aid had finally come. It was said that a heavily armed "Spanish fleet" had come to Theodore's succor, and that the king had finally brought his great fortune from abroad along with a great arsenal of weapons. The Genoese had long threatened to put Theodore's head on a pike and destroy those who consorted with him, to no avail, and Boissieux's threat was scarcely more effective.

The count was hamstrung by a lack of orders from Paris. He was waiting on a settlement being negotiated at Fontainebleau between French, Genoese, and Austrian representatives regarding the terms that were to be imposed upon the Genoese and Corsicans. The fleet had arrived on the 29th of August, but the "Terms of Fontainebleau" would not be ratified for three more weeks, and Boissieux would not receive them until the 4th of October. He was loathe to begin hostilities until the final terms arrived and an ultimatum could be delivered to the Corsicans. He did, however, order his troops to expand their holds on the two beachheads they possessed, and the French forces occupied several strategic villages around Calvi and Ajaccio. In the north, Fabiani obeyed Theodore's commands not to confront the French and there was no armed resistance, but sporadic fighting began in the south, where militiamen in Celavo skirmished with the French and their allies. Boissieux was cautious; he did not want his companies to run headlong into an ambush like the Genoese had done quite recently, and the French stuck largely to the coastal zones. The first blood, however, had been shed.

Captains Peresen and Roos did not want to be in the middle of a rebellion and doubted that Theodore actually intended to pay them. Keelmann was having increasing difficulty keeping them in check. They had their own ships, after all, and the sailors were largely of the same mind as their captains. Keelmann was also afraid that the growing crowds of Corsicans, gathering to gawk at the "Spanish fleet" or impatiently awaiting their long-promised guns and money, might try to take the cargo by force. To placate his comrades, Keelmann promised Peresen and Roos that he would allow them to depart in one week if there was still no sign of payment.

Although often passed over in modern Corsican historiography, Fabiani's extraction of the Balagna's agricultural wealth was frequently neither voluntary nor compensated. The Balagnese had always been mixed in their sympathies and allegiances, and as the rebel forces withdrew eastwards in the face of the creeping French advance, rounding up livestock, looting storehouses, and otherwise taking everything which might settle the bill with the syndicate or sustain the rebel army, some locals must have wondered whether it would not be better to be under the rule of the French. No doubt Boissieux's troops lived off the land where practicable, but at least the French were not selling off the fruits of the country to foreign merchants, as they were already quite well compensated by the Bank of St. George.[1] On the 18th of September the French occupied Calenzana, a key town which was the site of two major rebel victories, and reported being greeted warmly by the populace. Boissieux probably could have recruited auxiliaries from the population if he had been of such a mind, but he continued to demand disarmament and rejected appeals from some Balagnese who asked to be able to keep their weapons to protect themselves against the "men of the mountains" (probably the Niolesi), believing this to be a ploy.

Soon the produce of the Balagna was trickling through the mule-tracks of the Agriate to the Nebbio. Keelmann wanted to trade as the supply came in—a certain number of barrels for these muskets or those cannons—and at first Theodore was willing to go along with that, but soon he started withholding his supply. He wanted, he said, to settle the bill, and buy all of what the syndicate carried. Theodore seems to have known that he could not deliver all the oil the syndicate had hoped for. Perhaps it was a bluff—Theodore may have known that although Roos and Peresen suggested sailing to Naples instead, there was no guarantee that the Neapolitan government would simply buy up such a large quantity of munitions (for certainly no private individual would be making that purchase). Nor could they be confident that they would get a good price at Naples. They could take Theodore's offer, which was below expectations but still significant, or they could leave with nothing and possibly get even less elsewhere.

The syndicate had not appointed Keelmann as the fleet's leader because he was easily persuaded. The longer he waited, however, the more disgruntled his captains and crewmen became. He was dependent on Theodore for food, too, as his ships had not been supplied with the expectation that they would remain at Corsica for weeks on end. Roos and Peresen, after all, were not investors; they had no skin in the game. He held out for a while, pressing Theodore for more and threatening to take his cargo elsewhere, but ultimately Keelmann agreed to disgorge all the cargo in exchange for the oil Theodore had amassed. He procured from Theodore a promise to repay the difference at a later date. Presumably Keelmann knew that such a promise from Theodore didn't mean much, but it was better than nothing. When a favorable wind finally came and the coast seemed clear, the syndicate ships left San Fiorenzo on a northerly heading, intending to come around Capo Corso and make for Livorno rather than to return through the waters between Calvi and France.

On October 5th, Boissieux made the terms of Fontainebleau known to the Corsican delegates. They were not dramatically different from those which Fleury and Boissieux had already offered. The only major additional concession offered was the abolition of galley slavery as a judicial punishment, which was right out of Theodore's playbook. The bottom line, however, was that Boissieux's ultimatum—for that was what it was—still required the Corsicans to accept Genoese sovereignty and give up their weapons. Gaffori and Orticoni knew this to be unacceptable, but they nevertheless promised to take the proposal back to the "Corsican nation." Another consulta was convened, this time as Corti, on the 13th of October. Once more it was chaired by Theodore, but this time the king was in better spirits, for he was armed.

The mood of the delegates arriving at the consulta varied between desperation and resignation. The Corsicans very sensibly feared French power, but rumors of the terms of the Fontainebleau ultimatum had filtered out and the rebel leaders could see no alternative to resistance. Rumors of Theodore's foreign aid, however, had also spread. There was uncertainty as to whether this "armada" was real, or just another empty promise by the king who had already made quite a few. The delegates, from the staunch royalists to nationalists flirting with the indifferenti, looked to Theodore to see if he offered any hope.

It was one of the pivotal moments of Theodore's reign: this time, he delivered. The conciliatory king of the previous consulta was replaced by a defiant sovereign, accompanied by his recently-arrived cousin Johann Friedrich von Neuhoff zu Rauschenburg, Corsican guard officers, and his foreign leibgarde, dressed in the green uniforms which had been sent by the syndicate. He enumerated to the delegates the extraordinary quantity of weapons, money, and supplies he had procured, and promised that as long as he lived he would never cease fighting for the freedom of Corsica from tyranny and slavery. There was only one course of action remaining for a self-respecting people: to drive the French and Genoese out of their country once and for all.

The consulta drafted a response to King Louis which was soon to be marveled at by the European gazettes. It referred to the king with the greatest respect, but abandoned the conciliation of their last missive entirely. They rejected the terms of Fontainebleau, and indeed their very premise, as they had been negotiated with French, Imperial, and Genoese diplomats but without a single representative of the Corsican nation. They would never suffer to return to the Genoese yoke, and if necessary would fight the Genoese, the French, and indeed the whole of Europe to gain their freedom. They welcomed and prayed for the friendship of the King of France, but if he sent his armies against them and destroyed them utterly, so be it; they would at least die as free men. Their response ended memorably with a Latin quotation: Melius est nos mori in bello quam videre mala gentis nostrae; "It is better for us to die in battle than to behold the calamities of our people."[2]

Boissieux, exasperated by what he considered an overly dramatic reply, ordered the occupation of the Balagna starting with the recently-captured port of Algajola. His error was in assuming that these conquests would meet with the same lack of opposition which the French had encountered at Calenzana and elsewhere thanks to the pacifying influence of King Theodore. On the 20th, the French advanced on Algajola only to find several hundred Balagnese militia who were dug in and well armed with small arms and artillery. The French force, only about 300 strong, engaged the defenders but withdrew as it became obvious they had neither the numbers nor the preparation to take the position.

This first shedding of blood, alongside the words of the consulta and the king, animated the nation to action. Although the matter of who fired first at Algajola is uncertain, Theodore proclaimed that the French, in "attacking" the nationals at Algajola, had broken their own truce and were attempting to "enslave" the Corsicans by force of arms. Goaded into resistance, within days rebel militia struck French positions around Ajaccio and Calvi in near simultaneous attacks. In the Balagna, they were soon joined by Niolesi fighters streaming down from the mountains as well as Theodore's "regular" forces. On October 24th, French pickets around Calenzana came under attack, and by the following day the French commander there was reporting that his 500-man battalion was being assaulted by more than a thousand Corsicans. They included not only Balagnese militia but Niolesi fighters streaming down from the mountains. The French succeeded in holding their position after a full day of intense fighting, but although Boissieux sent another battalion the rebel attacks only grew more fierce. Rebel militias from further east arrived, and eventually so too did Theodore's "regular" forces, who came bringing muskets for the insurgents and with several pieces of artillery. The French, without any artillery of their own, had no response to this bombardment, and Boissieux wrote that the garrison was now in danger of being surrounded and cut off by more than two thousand Corsican rebels. Outnumbered and outgunned, the French withdrew from the town on the 28th, and were subject to aggressive skirmishing by rebel troops all the way back to Calvi.[B] A similar story played out in the south, where local miltias under Lieutenant-General Marquis Luca d'Ornano drove the French back to the safety of Ajaccio. In the space of one week, the French had been ejected from all positions they had "peaceably" seized from the rebels and had suffered more than 300 casualties.

The shocking news was impossible to suppress, and the continental newspapers began calling it the "Corsican Vespers" in analogy to the Silician Vespers, the 13th century island-wide popular rebellion against French rule in Sicily. In truth, they did not have much in common; although often described as a spontaneous popular uprising, the Corsican Vespers were substantially inspired and backed by Theodore's rebel government and its officers. Nor were they "island-wide," for the French had occupied only a small fraction of Corsican territory. Yet the similarities—a sudden and bloody rebellion by the people of a Mediterranean island against French occupiers—were similar enough for the journalists and coffee-house intellectuals. The name stuck on the continent, and soon on Corsica, for Theodore knew that the Sicilian rebellion had succeeded and actively encouraged the comparison.[C]




Footnotes
[1] The state bank of the Republic of Genoa.
[2] A slightly abridged Maccabees 3:59.
[3] The first description of the "1738 uniform" describes it as "green with gold braid," but presumably the "gold braid" was only on uniforms for officers as it is hard to imagine the syndicate falling in for such extravagance otherwise. Green as the choice of color must have originated with Theodore. An earlier report mentions that his servants wore "green livery" and the ribbon of the Order of Deliverance was also green. As noted, the vast majority of rebel fighters did not have uniforms, but by early 1739 royalist militiamen often identified themselves with a green cockade.

Timeline Notes
[A] Today, the "Agriates Desert" is a dry, maquis-covered wasteland. In Theodore's time, however, the Agriate—the very name comes from its history of cultivation, as in "agrarian"—was a productive area where wheat, fruit, and olives were grown. In the early 20th century, abandonment owing to the general demographic collapse of Corsica and over-intensive land use (particularly the use of fire for land-clearing) led to desertification and desolation, to the point where the Agriates was apparently considered by France as a possible (underground) nuclear test site. Thus, while hauling barrels of olive oil through the Agriate on the backs of mules ITTL isn't exactly a walk in the park, it's not nearly as daunting as it would be today.
[B] For those keeping track, this is now the Third Battle of Calenzana.
[C] Analogous to OTL, although the key incident of the "vespers" IOTL was the rebel attack on the French garrison at Borgo, which unfolded in a similar manner—the French repulsed the initial attacks, but came under such pressure that even with reinforcements they had to retreat to Bastia. Spread out over various points on the island, Boissieux's 3,000 men was insufficient to defend any one point from a concerted rebel attack, particularly so near the Castagniccia. ITTL, Calenzana is further from the rebels' center of gravity than Borgo, but the rebels now have the benefit of Theodore's arms and "regular" troops.
[D] Blank uniform template courtesy of Not By Appointment.