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Chapter 6: Plantagenets Victorious (1224-1227)
Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
Chapter 6: Plantagenets Victorious (1224-1227):
Before the events surrounding Louis' return to England in 1228 can properly be considered, we need to turn out attention to the events of Henry's four year stretch as King of England from 1224 to 1228 so that we understand the situation in England upon Louis' return. As of September 1224, Henry finally sat in London as the King of England in his own right and yet, despite his successes over the last few months, resistance remained strong in a number of areas throughout the country. The two primary regions of resistance at the time of the fall of London were the South-East (from Winchester in the West to Kent in the East) held by Saer de Quincy and Thomas of Kent and Cornwall, held by Robert Fitzwalter. In the West, Reginald de Braose (who had been given estates by Louis that had been confiscated by King John) continued his resistance against Henry with the help of Llwellyn the Great (who had often fought with Braose against King John). In the North, resistance was headed in both Leicester and Lincoln by Amaury de Montfort. What this meant was that, even as Henry controlled much of the North-West and a sizeable portion of the Southern coast as well as London, he was surrounded on every side by enemies. This was a situation worsened for Henry by the nature of these enemies, many of whom were stronger supporters of Louis' claims to the throne and stood to potentially lose a lot in the wake of Henry's statement upon returning to England. Montfort, Kent, Quincy and Fitzwalter all stood to lose Earldoms should they be defeated while Braose was effectively kept in resistance to Henry by Llwellyn's sizeable influence throughout Wales. Correspondence between Louis and his English supporters continued extensively between 1224 and 1228 and, in the French king's absence, was the main method by which Louis could provide support and moral boosting to his allies on the English mainland. While the French nobility would not support an actual conflict in England, this also didn't prevent Louis from providing some actual help for his allies through the occasional deposit of money and even, on one occasion, helping them to hire some mercenaries to help resist Henry. Combined with the tendency for both France and Scotland to provide refuge for rebellious nobles should Henry manage to oust them from their lands and the French domination of the seas between England and France (Henry hadn't had much of a chance to really recover any naval strength after Dover, having been on the back foot until his defeat in 1219 and then in exile until 1223), these factors all effectively played into why, despite being free from the risk of Louis actually invading until 1228, Henry never managed to actually defeat the rebellious vassals.
This doesn't mean that, contrary to what some people have come to believe, Henry had no chance of ever actually defeating the rebels in the first place. After the sweeping successes of 1224 and the defection or subjugation of a number of Louis' 'supporters', Henry was very much winning the war. Upon taking London in September 1224, Henry issued a letter calling for the surrender of the still-rebellious vassals, offering a pardon if they laid down their arms and renounced their support for Louis. Possibly still confident that Louis would return imminently or worried about losing the lands they had only just gained, the response from the still-resisting nobles was lukewarm at best. It's very possible that Henry anticipated this very response and, by refusing to lay down their arms, the remaining nobles had allowed themselves to be branded traitors to the crown, legitimising whatever punishment Henry saw fit upon their defeat. Henry, of course, wasted no time in pointing this out, denouncing all of them as traitors to the crown and calling for their capture. Some have argued that Henry's choice to denounce them as traitors was probably his biggest mistake because it made his enemies desperate and only drove them to resist all the harder. But, in context, it's a problematic argument to make because Henry had little reason to think that he wasn't going to win given the circumstances which, seemingly, were very much against Louis as of 1224 and by branding them traitors there and then, he was making a statement that disloyalty wouldn't be tolerated. There's little doubt this was aimed at people who had defected from Louis to Henry in 1223, whether voluntarily or under duress. That said, the response was what Henry possibly should have expected: resistance. By declaring Fitzwalter and his allies traitors, he gave them little to lose and, in turn, drove them to subsequently denounce Henry as king (on the basis that King John had forfeited his right to rule when he broke faith with the nobles and refused to uphold the Magna Carta, which Henry had followed through on by altering the terms when he reissued it) and pronounce Louis the rightful king. With the onset of winter, the two sides settled in for a protracted game of diplomacy throughout the British Isles.
As Henry moved to undermine Louis both in England and in France, Louis' barons worked just as hard to undermine Henry in their own favour. Correspondence continued between Louis and King Alexander II of Scotland with the assistance (and often use) of the pro-Capetian nobility in England which, in turn, led to the 'Treaty of Edinburgh' between Louis and Alexander in December 1224 in which Alexander promised to recognise and assist Louis with his claims to the throne of England in return for Louis' support against Scottish enemies to the North. Beyond this, the two kings established a trade deal. For the time being, the importance of this treaty was in how it effectively gave the barons a powerful ally in the British Isles who could not only provide soldiers when the time came but potentially refuge and even diplomatic or financial support. Correspondence between Reginald and his sister Margaret (Lady of Trim) and her husband, Walter de Lacy (Lord of Meath) show a distinct hope to try and undermine Henry's support back in Ireland and it seems likely that there may have been some correspondence between the still-rebellious vassals and those who had been forced to side with Henry under duress in 1223-4. Further issues in Ireland for Henry probably came from correspondence between the pro-Capetian nobles and the Irish lords and petty kings, possibly hoping to distract Henry with another conflict in Ireland to further stretch his resources. Many of these attempts fostered by the pro-Capetian nobles wouldn't actually come into proper effect until as late as 1228 as we'll see during the Capetian Resurgence and, when campaigning began again in 1225, their efforts were hindered by their inability to actually defeat Henry.
Determined to secure Kent and prevent Louis from maintaining control of the most easily accessible landing point in Britain, the bulk of Henry's efforts were concentrated in the South-East under his own command as he swept down upon Quincy and Thomas of Kent in the hope of quickly crushing them and securing his position so that he could turn elsewhere. The campaign was to be decided at Rochester Castle because it formed the lowest crossing point of the River Medway and, as such, the quickest route by which Henry could hope to reach the Cinque Ports and capture Kent and everyone knew that. While Henry was determined to capture the castle, Louis was just as determined to prevent it from falling and, according to some sources, invested his own money into hiring Brabantian mercenaries to support the barons at Rochester. The two forces met at the Battle of Rochester Castle and, after a quick engagement, Henry drove the baronial forces back and laid siege to the castle, a siege that would drag on far longer than Henry had probably hoped. Ultimately, Rochester wouldn't fall until November 1225 by which point it was too late for further campaigning until spring 1226. While Henry's return to campaigning in 1226 proved successful, driving quickly through most of Kent and making significant inroads (with the help of Redvers in Devon) into Winchester by June, the onset of winter and the time spent at Rochester in the first place had allowed Kent and Quincy to fall back upon Dover Castle and to hold it against Henry. The focus on the South-East, however, proved detrimental elsewhere in the country. While Montfort was soundly defeated by Blondeville at the Battle of Leicester in July 1225 and then driven fully out of both Leicester and Lincoln by July 1226, the campaigns in Cornwall didn't go quite as well. By December 1226, Leicester and Lincoln had fallen while Dover Castle was under siege, a siege that floundered due to the skills of Eustace the Monk. Given French naval dominance and Eustace's skills as a pirate, the siege of Dover Castle dragged on and on due to the constant smuggling in of food and even reinforcements to the castle. Fitzwalter had fallen back further into Cornwall but still held a number of castles with plans to flee to France should the need arise and constant correspondence requesting whatever help Alexander or Louis could provide. In Wales, the situation hadn't gone well at all for Henry and the forces led by the Marshals had found themselves bogged down and soundly defeated by the Welsh and Braosian forces in a number of engagements, culminating in a few incursions into Pembroke throughout 1226.
The shifting events and attitudes in France in 1227 began to mark the point at which the tide began to turn in England. Worries of a shifting papal attitude towards the conflict and the inability of Henry to seemingly gain a decisive victory began to undermine his situation back home as the costs began to mount (and, given his lack of control in the country he didn't have money to spare) and Louis was finally freeing himself up to possibly return. This wasn't helped by the fact that not only was Louis building support back in France but he was increasingly appearing like a better option, having taken the cross of crusade and having restored order to France by crushing Theobald's rebellion by 1226 (something Henry had failed to do in 4 years). The toll this began to take was more than just psychological, there were a number of nobles whose loyalty to Henry wasn't exactly firm and with events in France suggesting that Louis might soon return to take back the throne, events began to shift into motion. Correspondence began to pick up once again between Reginald and his sister as well as between Fitzwalter and the Earls of Hereford and Gloucester. Montfort finally resurfaced in France in 1227 and the siege of Dover Castle began to fall into a slump as discontent began to spread amongst the nobility within Henry's army. Discontent and rumour abound throughout the country and, just across the Channel, the French King engineered his return.