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Chapter 5: The Capetian Interregnum (1224-1228)
King Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
Chapter 5: The Capetian Interregnum (1224-1228)



France in 1223 upon the ascension of Louis VIII (note: It doesn't acknowledge the annexation of Gascogne by Philip II in the 1220s which still wasn't fully complete as of 1223 and would be completed in the period between 1224 and 1228)
Many of the pro-Capetian historians of the period covering Louis' rise from Prince of France to King of France and England have come to refer to the period between Henry's capture of London in September 1224 and the Capetian Resurgence in 1228 as the 'Capetian Interregnum' with some even refusing to accept Henry as being a legitimate king. Other historians simply refer to this entire area of study as one of two kings between whom the throne shifts with King John up until 1216 and then Henry until 1219 followed by Louis until 1223 and then Henry again until 1228. Part of Henry's success during this period was built upon how effectively he played upon divisions within France to effectively hold Louis at bay and to prevent him from being able to actually return to England, buying Henry valuable time to move against the resisting barons in England. As of September 1224, Louis had no option to return to England, facing discontent amongst his vassals for the expenses and perceived failure of the campaigns in England thus far as well as a distinct lack of legitimacy in the eyes of many of the more powerful figures in European politics at the time. In France, the general feeling was that Louis should make a peace treaty with Henry which would have Henry cede the former Angevin lands in France to the French and have Louis drop his claims to the throne of England. Instead, the prevailing view amongst both the French nobility and within the Papacy was that Louis should turn his attention South towards Languedoc and the Albigensian Crusade against the Cathars in the region. Nobody would support a return to England because it seemed to be nothing but costly, dangerous and not even legitimate according to either the rules of succession nor the Pope and Henry was well aware of this. In October 1224, Henry sent an emissary to Louis offering relatively favourable peace terms under which Louis would be allowed to keep the former Angevin lands and would receive significant compensation from Henry in return for dropping any and all claims to the throne of England and denouncing Fitzwalter and the other 'rebel' barons. By doing this, Henry was effectively putting Louis in a no-win scenario in which acceptance forced him to drop his claims to the throne of England and isolated the barons who continued to resist but refusal simply alienated the nobility of France. As an added incentive, Henry made an offer to contribute to any attempts by Louis to involve himself in the Albigensian Crusade, helping secure Papal legitimacy and support for his peace terms and thus helping drive Louis closer to an acceptance of the terms Henry proposed. The situation was further complicated for both sides by constant correspondence between the resisting English barons and King Louis including visits by both Thomas of Kent and Amaury de Montfort in an attempt to convince Louis that the situation in England could still be salvaged and not to abandon his attempts to take the throne. Brittany formed another complicating factor, as Peter of Dreux (former Peter I of Brittany jure uxoris and regent for the young John I) effectively posed a party with a vested interest that could swing either way. As it was, Peter had spent much of his life trying to secure his position as the Earl of Richmond as well as the associated income from the Earldom which meant that both Henry and Louis, depending on who won the war, had the power to ensure Peter's position as Earl and, as a result, to ensure that Richmond would pass to John upon Peter's death. This was further made difficult for Peter because the tradition in France was that John would only become ruler, upon his majority, of whatever lands he had inherited which meant that, contrary to 1214 where Peter seemed to have allowed John to pass through his territory for free, he couldn't risk angering Louis without risking Louis depriving John of certain gains made after Peter's wife's death. What this effectively meant was that the situation in England didn't appear hopeless to Louis as of September 1224 and this effectively increased his determination to effect a return to the country as soon as possible as he knew he had supporters in England and had a basis for support from Brittany (as well as Perche and Montfort) to effect a potential return.

Even in England, the situation was far from desperate for Louis' supporters. On one hand, his continued absence from the country demoralised his supporters and the increasing pressure from Henry on their respective territories as well as the fact that they were spread out across the country effectively served to demoralise and weaken them further. But resistance remained heavy from Louis' supporters along the Southern coast and with the French still holding the English Channel, communication could be continued between Louis and his supporters in England as well as, if the need should arise, transport for the nobles to flee the country. The problem was that with Louis' supporters spread out, Henry's forces were effectively spread thin trying to push back all of them at once as well as to prevent any counter-attacks which, in turn, would leave him vulnerable should Louis manage to actually raise a force to move against Henry. While Henry attempted to facilitate resistance to Louis' plans to return to England, Louis in turn moved to secure his position in the country even in his absence. In late 1224, he signed a treaty with King Alexander II of Scotland in which Alexander would recognise Louis' claim to the throne of England and would provide a contingent of soldiers in return for potential support from the French king against the Norwegians to the North as well as securing other concessions such as a trading agreement and possibly some financial compensation (details are sometimes sketchy on the exact nature of the treaty).

In many ways, the period between September 1224 and April 1228 is fascinating because it largely devolves into this game of politics played throughout Europe as both Louis and Henry begin to weave these webs of alliances in order to secure recognition for their various claims and to ensure allies against the other. In France, the main point of resistance to Louis came in the form of Theobald IV of Champagne, a powerful vassal who had begun to butt heads with Louis over the rights of the Jews within France. During Theobald's minority, Champagne had been involved in a succession dispute and the local Jewish population had played a large role in securing his victory and so Louis' policies against the Jews early in his reign quite quickly led to disputes between Theobald and the King. When Louis passed his anti-Jewish policies in 1223, Theobald refused to enact them and the feud grew ever deeper when Theobald became a major advocate against a return to England. Henry was only too keen to play upon this division and rumours soon began to spread amongst those in support or, at least, less opposed to a return to England of collusion between Theobald and Henry to prevent Louis enforcing his claims to England. Henry's successes in England throughout 1224 worsened these accusations in Louis' eyes and growing enmity between Theobald and Louis throughout the period led to both Theobald and Hugh X of Lusignan (who was married to King John's widow and had been accused of being influenced by Isabella to support Henry) being called to answer charges of treason in November 1224 for the alleged collusion with Henry III. Possibly fearing that they would be found guilty if they did appear before the king, Theobald and Hugh of Lusignan refused to appear before Louis, rather sending letters denying the charges and professing their loyalty to the crown. It wasn't enough. After they refused a second summons to appear before the court, Louis issued a statement to the effect of branding both Theobald and Hugh of Lusignan as traitors to the crown in December 1224.

Whether or not the accusations that Theobald and Hugh of Lusignan had been working with King Henry III is up for debate and nobody has ever been able to establish conclusive evidence either way in the build-up to Theobald's Revolt. Nevertheless, the revolt was seemingly a perfect scenario for King Henry and one that seemed likely to distract Louis for long enough for him to finish up in England. Beginning with Louis' statement in December 1224, Theobald's revolt was an event marked more by its impact rather than its effectiveness as resistance to Louis. The issue for both Theobald and Hugh (and his wife Isabella of Angouleme) was that the lands revolting were relatively small in number. The entire revolt was basically the Count of Champagne (Theobald IV), the Count of Lusignan and his wife the Countess of Angouleme. Furthermore, Champagne was pretty much isolated from Lusignan and Angouleme by the royal demesne which cut right between the two as well as the sheer distance between Champagne and the two other counties. As a result, some historians have gone so far as to divide the entire revolt into two smaller rebellions: Hugh and Isabella's Revolt (1224-1225) and Theobald's Revolt (1224-1226). The differences in dates only actually support this idea further as both Hugh and Isabella were beaten long before Theobald was. This isn't to say, however, that Theobald was entirely lacking in advantages as he still had a very powerful county under his command and the financial backing of the Jewish population in Troyes as well as being a capable commander himself. Furthermore, he wasn't actually that far from Paris itself (with Troyes and Paris being separated by only 178 km).

Campaigning, of course, wouldn't actually begin until Spring 1225, by which point both Louis and Theobald had made significant moves gearing up towards a war. Problems emerged very quickly for Theobald who found that Louis hadn't wasted his winter, having opened up communication with Erard of Brienne-Ramerupt (Theobald's former enemy in the War of Champagnian Succession), promising Erard Champagne in return for support against Theobald. As a result, with the arrival of Spring in 1225, Theobald found himself much closer to the enemy than he had initially expected with Erard of Brienne-Ramerupt (Lord of Ramerupt and Venizy, both of which were more-or-less on the doorstep of Troyes). The two forces met in March 1225 at the Battle of Ramerupt where Theobald's larger force (and his greater tactical skill) swept Erard's army aside in a bloody yet quick engagement that sent Erard back very quickly towards Paris. The surrender of both Ramerupt and Venizy shortly afterwards further solidified this victory. But Erard's flight took him right into the path of the advancing King Louis (who was leading the larger part of his force towards Troyes while his forces in the West fought against Hugh and Isabella under the command of John Tristan, Count of Maine.

Tristan, like Louis, swept South almost immediately in March 1225 with the intent of crushing Isabella and Hugh quickly so that the force under his command might go to support Louis' forces in the East. Tristan was a new vassal, having been given the County of Maine following its annexation by Philip II and this meant that he was a man very much seeking to secure recognition and support of King Louis and an important supporter in Northern France, especially if Louis wished to return to England. Isabella and Hugh hadn't been idle either, having raised their forces in preparation for an engagement against any potential invasion from the North. The two forces met at the Battle of Thouars in April, an ultimately indecisive battle between the relatively equal forces under Tristan (composed of his own retinue from Maine as well as further reinforcements from Normany, Anjou and Poitou) and those under Isabella and Hugh (composed of forces from Angouleme and Lusignan). While the Battle of Thouars was ultimately a stalemate, Isabella and Hugh had no scope to actually remain North of Poitiers for long and were forced to retreat, meeting Tristan once again at the Battle of Poitiers in May where they were soundly defeated. From here, Tristan pushed ever further South, capturing Angouleme after a short siege in August and laying siege to Lusignan in November, leading to the surrender of Hugh and Isabella in late November 1225.

Theobald was much harder for Louis to deal with, having greater resources than Hugh and Isabella could muster as Champagne had emerged from the succession crisis, much stronger than before. That said, Theobald was at risk of being surrounded very quickly should Erard convince his cousin (Count Walter IV of Brienne) to invade Champagne from the East (Walter was heavily involved in affairs in the Holy Lands at the time however). As a result, he needed a decisive victory quickly if he were to actually win the war because time was plainly not on his side. Ultimately, it has been argued that Theobald never really stood a chance against Louis because, at the end of the day, Louis had much greater financial and military resources than Theobald could ever hope to muster. The result of this was that when Louis and Theobald finally met on the battlefield at the Battle of the Seine (on the banks of the eponymous river which flows through both Troyes and Paris) in April. As compared to the previous Battle of Ramerupt, the Battle of the Seine was not a clear nor decisive victory for either side and, while Louis did end up holding the field at the end of the day and routing a significant portion of Theobald's left wing, the Champagnian forces were by no means entirely destroyed. This situation was ultimately not resolved with the even more indecisive Second Battle of the Seine only two months later in July.

Theobald and Louis would meet one more time on the battlefield at the infamous Battle of Troyes in August 1225 which preceded the bloody and long Siege of Troyes. The basic outline of the battle is that Theobald's forces initially pushed Louis back, even managing to almost overwhelm a significant portion of his army. However, Theobald's centre ended up dangerously overextended due to having managed to push the enemy further and faster than the two flanks. The result of this was that the centre ended up cut off from the two flanks, surrounded and almost annihilated. The battle, however, continued on into the evening as poor communication on both sides prevented either Louis or Theobald from really appreciating the scale of what had happened to Theobald's centre. In turn, the two flanks continued fighting for hours even after the centre had been annihilated and the battle descended into a bloodbath on both sides before Theobald, realising he was getting the worst of the situation, retreated back into the city and barred the gates. It was only in the aftermath of the battle that Theobald could finally appreciate just what had happened in the battle with some estimates putting the number dead overall (across both armies) at about 5-6000 (a significant number in Medieval Europe). Realising that Theobald had lost a very significant portion of his force in the battle, Louis sent an emissary calling for Theobald's immediate surrender. Theobald, seemingly, refused although stories that he sent back the emissary's head with its eyes gouged out and teeth missing (or a dozen other variations on the story) are undoubtedly myths. The result was the Siege of Troyes which, due to the onset of winter and the fact that Tristan wouldn't arrive until May 1226 as well as Theobald's own determination and tactical command, wouldn't actually conclude until the defenders finally surrendered in July 1226.

Theobald was promptly taken in chains to Paris where he was tried before the king and court and found guilty of treason and rebellion and sentenced to death. He was executed in Paris in August 1226. On one hand, the conflict was devastating for Louis because the resources required to defeat Theobald and the distraction it provided meant that Louis' return to England was even further delayed, resulting in Henry making further gains against the resisting vassals in England. But on the other hand, the war had devastated Champagne but not so much that it would never recover and it remained a powerful county that was now handed over to a loyal vassal in the form of the new Count Erard of Champagne on the condition that he swear another oath of loyalty to Louis and promise to provide soldiers for a return to England. Hugh and Isabella were pardoned after a short period of imprisonment from December 1225 to August 1226 and allowed to keep their titles on the condition that both swear loyalty to Louis, promise to provide soldiers for a return to England and pay a hefty fine to the crown. What this effectively meant was that Louis now had some very significant support in France starting to build up that could, soon, be turned to a war in England.

This support only grew starting in 1225 with the resumption of the Albigensian Crusade when, in November 1225, Raymond of Toulouse had been excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX and a call for a renewed crusade in Toulouse issued. The Albigensian Crusade had stalled since 1216 when both Simon de Montfort and Innocent III had died leaving the crusade without any leaders save for the cautious (and from 1223, dead) Philip II as Amaury de Montfort was busy in England and so too was Louis. Caught in the midst of a revolt and well aware that the lack of papal support had cost him dearly in England so far, Louis began moving to endear himself towards the pope, publicly taking up the cross in return for papal denouncement of the rebelling nobles in France. Initially, the forces sent by Louis were relatively small while he focused on putting down Theobald in the North but with the end of the revolt in June 1226, Louis found himself finally freed up to move South against Toulouse in force. Funded by a tax authorised by the pope at the same council at which Raymond VII of Toulouse had been excommunicated, Louis swept down into Toulouse in August with fortified cities and castles quickly and easily surrendering to him. Avignon, which was nominally ruled by Emperor Frederick II of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE), however did choose to resist Louis leading to a three-month siege between August and November 1226. As the conflict continued on into 1227, the resisting Cathars found themselves increasingly desperate as their manpower wore thin and their ability to prevent the crusaders from ravaging their lands began to run out. It is at this point that the most important details in regards to the conflict between the Capetians and the Plantagenets emerge, the Siege of Avignon (1226) and the Excommunication of Frederick II (September 1227).

The Siege of Avignon effectively set the relations between the King of France and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire on a very distinct downward trend as Louis pointedly ignored Frederick's protests that Avignon was under his rule and took the city himself in November. In comparison, the latter event effectively set the tone for French-Papal relations in coming decades. With Frederick excommunicated, the beginnings of yet another conflict between the papacy and the empire began to stir and Gregory was well aware that he needed allies if he were to come out on top against Frederick. It should be no wonder, then, that Louis was the obvious choice. As the king of an increasingly powerful kingdom with an interest in balancing out the power of the Holy Roman Emperor, Louis was a much safer bet not just for his strength but his proximity and relatively stability (despite the recent revolt) compared to the more distant Henry III. This was exactly what Louis needed. Louis' peace terms to Raymond VII in early 1228 were probably modelled on what he had done with Hugh only two years earlier, allowing Raymond to keep his titles and lands in return for support against his enemies, particularly the Cathars. Raymond's daughter, Joan, was to be married to Louis' eldest son, Louis (the future Louis IX) to further secure the support of the County of Toulouse. Raymond ended up imprisoned for a time in early 1228 before finally being released with a sizeable fine and indemnity to be paid to the crown. What we see here is a distinct departure from the very tactics Louis had used in England, tactics which had alienated nobles and led to him losing England in the first place back in 1224.

Theobald's defeat, Hugh's imprisonment and now the defeat of Raymond had served to very efficiently secure support wherever possible for Louis to finally do what he had been hoping to do ever since his coronation; return to England. But, most importantly, the excommunication of Frederick II in September 1227 gave Louis the leverage he needed to secure a shift in Papal support. In return for a promise to support the Papacy and her Italian allies against Frederick's encroachments as well as recognition of the illegitimacy of Frederick's claims to the throne of Sicily, Louis was able to finally bargain Papal recognition of his claim to the throne of England. At this stage, it is possible that Gregory didn't go so far as to give definitive support for Louis as the King of England but rather stopped contesting or denying his claims to the throne and maybe hinted that, should Louis retake the country, he could probably be crowned with Papal support and recognition. Whatever the case, the change in how the papacy officially regarded the entire Capetian-Plantagenet conflict would prove especially important in areas where support for Louis was waning, bolstering the resolve of his supporters in England and allowing Louis to make some real headway towards securing support from Peter of Dreux. This came to a head with the Treaty of Nantes in January 1228 in which Peter promised to provide a contingent of Bretons and renew his oath of fealty in return for Louis confirming him as the Earl of Richmond and John I of Brittany as the heir to the Earldom as well as Brittany. With this, Louis finally jumped into action, raising forces from his own demesne as well as from Champagne, Montfort, Perche, Lusignan, Angouleme, Maine (under the aforementioned John Tristan) and a contingent from Toulouse while once again enlisting Eustace the Monk as his primary naval commander against the Plantagenets. Finally, in April 1228 he issued a statement proclaiming himself as the rightful king of England and stating his intent to return to the country as soon as possible before finally setting sail later that month.

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Notes from the author:

1) On the Albigensian Crusade: In our timeline Louis VII actually did take part in the crusade at around the same time (albeit leaving in June rather than August). Many of the castles and towns did surrender OTL and I saw few reasons why this should change in this timeline, especially given Louis' recent success against Theobald. Once again, Avignon resists ITTL as it did in OTL but with the major change (because of Louis' later arrival) of Louis not getting sick and dying as he did IOTL. With greater pressure from the French crown and Louis in command, the crusade progresses faster ITTL than IOTL and Raymond surrenders in early 1228 rather than 1229.

2) On conflicts in Chapter 5: I've skimmed over Theobald's Revolt as well as Henry's operations against the rebelling vassals in England and the exact details of the Albigensian Crusade so as to keep the chapter from becoming too long, rather I've focused on saying the basics of what happened and why and the outcomes.

3) EDIT: 14/08/2017. Changes in bold.

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