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Chapter 4: The Return of the King (1223-1224)
King Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
Chapter 4: The Return of the King (1223-1224)
The death of King Philip II in July 1223, effectively ended any hope that Louis might return to England that year in order to secure his position. Rumours had been circulating for months that Henry and Verraccio were planning a return to England, prompted and helped along by communication between many nobles and the Plantagenet court as well as the increasing number of Plantagenet supporters heading to Ireland or meeting in the North. Louis, of course, was by no means unaware of the risk to his position in England that was created by his absence and had left the Earls of Cornwall and Kent in charge of military forces in the region as well as putting Montfort and Langton in powerful administrative positions and these men had been far from inactive in the months leading up to Henry's return. Langton, especially, had been heavily involved in rallying support amongst the nobility in England in an attempt to prevent as many defections as possible should Henry return with a distinct focus on less loyal families and on the lords in regions that posed a potential landing point for Henry. Cornwall was relatively secure, held as it was by Fitzwalter, while the North was effectively beyond the power of either Louis or his supporters. Instead, Wales was to be the main focus for Langton and, to a lesser extent, regions such as Devon, Chester and Salisbury as well the Midlands in an attempt to bolster support at not only potential landing points but potential routes that Henry and his forces might have taken and potential allies of the Plantagenet court in England (Chester and Salisbury, for example, had been recently held by pro-Plantagenet nobles). Definitive news of the Plantagenet preparations in Ireland reached England in late July 1223 which, in turn, led to a meeting held in London in late August by Langton and Montfort and attended by a number of nobles as well as an envoy from the continent. The main goal of this meeting was, quite simply, to discuss the imminent arrival of the Plantagenet forces as well as to make preparations for when they arrived. Feeling that a landing in either the North, Wales or Cornwall was the most likely (due to their proximity to Ireland), an agreement was made to try and counter any potential landings in each area. Fitzwalter and Quincy would return to their respective Earldoms and raise forces in preparation to defend Cornwall against a potential landing by Henry to reclaim the Southwest. Meanwhile, letters were drafted to a number of Welsh lords, including Reginald de Braose to rally their forces in preparation to counter any landing that Henry might choose to make there. Clare, in the meantime, was to return to Gloucester and Pembroke and make further preparations and raise his own levies. The North, the area most removed from Louis' influence, was the area that needed the most attention. Langton immediately began drafting letters to King Alexander II of Scotland (who had paid homage to Louis on behalf of his English estates in 1216), urging him to denounce Henry and refuse to shelter or help the young king and his forces once they arrived in England. Bohun was, in turn, to make preparations for a potential campaign in the North come Spring 1224 in order to reduce the opportunity for Henry to make a concerted landing, while Thomas of Kent (Count of Perche) would head North from Kent to Warwick and meet up with the forces of William Maudit (the infant Earl of Warwick) who would be under the command of Montfort due to the royal guardianship of the young Earl.
While these decisions may seem to speak of an extraordinary level of cooperation and teamwork between the various pro-Capetian nobles and clergy, the truth is that most of it may well have come as instructions from Louis through his envoy (carefully planned out in advance to cover all his bases) or, if not, were at least done with the overview of Louis and most likely agreed and corroborated in correspondence before the meeting itself took place. Nor should what happened in the build up to Henry's return be mistaken for a unanimous support or loyalty of King Louis, but may well be also attributable to a mixture of loyalty and fear as those who had gained significant estates (such as Bohun, Fitzwalter, Clare, Quincy, Kent and others) seemed to stand to lose those estates (and possibly a whole lot more) should Henry emerge victorious. While Henry's arrival and the letter of November 1223 did nothing to assuage these fears, the reaction was far from the unanimity Louis may have hoped for. The letter served two purposes, to advertise Henry's return and fish for support but also to showcase Henry's intention to fulfil his bargain to his own supporters to not only return their own estates but also to reward them for their continued loyalty. By promising to remove the 'usurpers', the Plantagenets not only attacked Louis (reducing him to nothing more than a pretender) but promised to remove his supporters from the estates they had been granted, the very grants that had disinherited Henry's own supporters. In turn, this not only helped reinforce his position with the noble houses that were already behind him but also served to strengthen his position with those who were still wavering. It seems unlikely that the letter was ever intended to try and sway men like Fitzwalter or Quincy but rather to sway those who fell more in the middle and were, in many cases, shocked at Louis' seeming disregard for the terms set down in the Magna Carta, terms he seemed to have violated by so willingly disinheriting a number of noble houses. Henry's situation was further reinforced by problems in France following Louis' coronation, in which the king began to face serious criticism from a number of his own noble lords (most notably Theobald IV, Count of Champagne) for the vast expenses accrued by the crown and nobility for the campaign in England. Criticism only increased in the wake of Henry's return with a number of nobles drawing attention to the fact that Louis had campaigned in England for almost 7 years and Henry still hadn't been defeated despite large amounts of money that had been filtered into England by Philip as well as soldiers. Louis had quite rightly supported the local, English nobility since they were the ones who had invited him and had provided the majority of his forces while in England as well as funds and local support. That said, however, many nobles felt that their own contributions (financial or, sometimes, in actual military aid) hadn't been properly compensated nor addressed in the wake of Louis' victory and began to make a number of calls for Louis to provide compensation before he could return to England. Some, such as Theobald, went so far as to argue that the entire claim should be dropped and Louis should rather strike a treaty with Henry, promising to drop the claim in return for suitable financial compensation and recognition of French control of the former Angevin lands on the continent. Theobald would come into further conflict with Louis beginning in late 1223 and early 1224 when Louis passed a number of laws restricting the rights of the Jewish population, including declaring the interest on loans to Jews as no longer holding any weight and declaring that loans owed to Jews should be placed under the control of the lords who, in turn, would collect them for them. While Louis had decreed that the Jews should be repaid within three years and many barons willingly accepted this law, Theobald found the agreement that he had set up with the Jewish population (promising their safety in return for taxation) was under threat and tensions continued to grow between him and the crown. These disputes and criticisms would effectively bog Louis down in French politics from 1223 and severely limit his ability to actually campaign extensively in England as he had done prior to Philip II's death.
As a result, Louis didn't return to England in 1223 as he may well have hoped he could and no reinforcements actually came from France, effectively leaving the pro-Capetian nobles to deal with Henry themselves. Some pro-Plantagenet historians have since termed this the 'Second Baronial War' or even 'Second Baronial Rebellion', arguing that this was not a war between kings but rather the rightful King of England returning to reclaim his throne from the rebellious Barons who held England against him. That said, the conflict has become better known, and is often referred to, as a separate war known as the 'Capetian-Plantagenet War' although some historians have gone on to subsume this within a larger-context conflict covering a number of kings and pretenders even after Louis' death. Louis' inability to return to England in 1223 was disastrous for events in England, leaving his supporters without a king present to actually support and the 'regency' of Montfort and Langton to go on into another year. Langton was controversial to say the least as his standing within the church (the basis upon which his position lay) was by no means strong as he fell on the opposite side of a succession dispute from the Papacy and had already been deposed by the previous Pope once before and Montfort was, in title, no higher than his peers and his continued regency began to irritate many who began to resent his power within the country. Between them, Montfort and Langton held a huge amount of sway and influence, especially in the absence of an actual king on the throne of England. The effect of Louis absence was even more profound on many of the nobles who remained neutral who now began to see that there was only one king in England whose rival wasn't actually able to return. That isn't to say that Henry's forces were completely unified and disagreements quite quickly began breaking out amongst Henry's advisers, most notably between Ranulf de Blondeville and Pandulf Verraccio over how the army should proceed. Verraccio argued that their forces should move straight for Lincoln, thus helping to secure both Fosse Way and Ermine Street and then move down the latter straight to London. Blondeville, meanwhile, advocated that the army should instead march straight South towards Chester, recapturing the Earldom and securing its resources to make a move straight South towards the sea, thus cutting the forces in the East off from those in the West and thus enabling them to secure a power base before making a march on London. Henry had only recently come into his majority and, as a result, his advisers still held a significant amount of influence. But Verraccio's arrogance during Henry's minority had alienated a number of nobles and both the House de Blondeville and House Marshal saw obvious benefits to marching straight South (reclaiming their own Earldoms) which, in turn, won out. Correspondence between the Plantagenets and King Alexander II of Scotland had been going on for years (since 1221 at least) but only increased its pace with Henry's return in 1223, in an attempt to prevent Alexander from coming in on Louis' side or, if possible, to secure his support for Henry's claim instead. For the time being, however, that was not to be the case. Alexander feared that Henry, as king, was much more of a threat to his dominions than Louis was if simply due to the logistics of imposing authority on the North or marching an army up to Scotland, which was much easier for Henry than it was for Louis. Furthermore, the weakness of Louis' rule in England was no small benefit to Scotland and large parts of Northumberland were paying homage to Alexander by 1224, a situation that Henry threatened should he return to the throne. That said, Alexander was not keen to fall entirely in on the side of Louis either and merely agreed not to provide any supplies to the advancing Plantagenet army while also agreeing not to supply the Capetian supporters but refused both requests to provide direct support to either claimant.
As Henry swept South, the Barons rushed to try and block the advancing Plantagenet forces from continuing onward through Chester. Disaster struck in early spring 1224 when Baldwin de Redvers declared his allegiance to Henry and, given his position as the Earl of Devon, effectively moved to block Fitzwalter from leaving Cornwall and actually going to reinforce his allies in the North. In turn, Quincy (who was still in Winchester at the time) was blocked from taking the most direct route towards Chester and from reinforcing Fitzwalter. This only grew worse when William FitzGeoffrey de Mandeville, Earl of Essex, similarly declared allegiance to Henry shortly afterwards, cutting Kent off from the North and providing Henry with a further ally but one very close to London itself. Fearing an attack on the city of London, Quincy and Kent both agreed to send a number of soldiers to garrison the city who would be commanded by Langton himself (as Montfort had returned in January to Leicester to prepare his own forces). What we can see here is the main disadvantage of Louis' supporters without Louis; their disunity. Fitzwalter was in Cornwall and cut off from Quincy and Kent who were cut off from Montfort and the forces from Warwick. Joint cooperation was achieved in the South around London with a garrison made up of local Londoners as well as forces from both Winchester and Kent. But the main front of the conflict remained in the North, between Henry and those nobles who were able to unite their disparate forces in the North. Under the joint command of Amaury de Montfort and Henry de Bohun, the 'army' arranged to oppose Henry was a force composed of men from Hereford, Chester, Leicester, Braose (in Wales), Gloucester and Pembroke as well as a small detachment sent by Llywellyn the Great of Gwynedd on the request of Braose (who had married in to the family of the Princes of Gwynedd). Clare's forces remained divided, as he continued to garrison his own castles for fear of Redvers attacking the Barons in the rear. In many ways, England had descended into a siege scenario in which Redvers held Fitzwalter and Quincy in check while Clare, Fitzwalter and Quincy held Redvers in check. FitzGeoffrey held Kent in check but was limited in what he himself could do due to fears of an attack in the rear by the Earldom of Norfolk as well as still hostile forces under the command of Langton in London. The entire war seemed to depend on the two main forces on the field; the Baronial forces under Montfort and Bohun and the Plantagenet forces under Henry.
Determined to block the advance of the Plantagenet forces, Montfort and Bohun moved to a place called Warrington, which formed the crossing point of the River Mersey in the North of Chester and there made their preparations to meet the Plantagenets in battle, hoping to prevent them from crossing the river and moving to unite with Redvers in the South. Montfort had moved quickly, returning to Leicester in January 1224 and mobilising what forces he could as quickly as possible before rushing North to reach Mersey before Henry. Montfort's preparations had paid off and the bulk of the Baronial forces had managed to mobilise at Warrington before Henry despite their disparate positions. Lancaster itself is only about 30 miles from Warrington so it is undoubted that both Montfort had already had Bohun reinforce the river during 1223 and likely that Braose and Clare were encouraged to send their forces earlier in the year than usual in an attempt (however risky due to lack of supplies) to reach the Mersey before Henry. Nevertheless, the Battle of Warrington on 17th March 1224 would come to be one of the most important battles of the war. Initially, the Baronial forces, although outnumbered, quite effectively managed to resist the attacking Plantagenets over the course of a number of hours, eventually managing to drive the attackers into a retreat. What happened next has been alternatively attributed to overconfidence on the part of the Barons who had successfully resisted the attacking Plantagenets or Baronial fears that if they didn't follow up their success with a counter-attack, Henry would simply re-encamp and continue trying day after day until his forces either broke the Baronial line or the Barons ran out of men to resist with. Whatever the case, the Baronial forces ended up actually abandoning the bridge in favour of a counter-attack against the, seemingly, broken and disoriented Plantagenet forces. One historian quite famously said of what followed;
'They made it across the river and that was it.'
Indeed, that would prove to be the extent of Baronial successes that day. Finding the Plantagenets not quite as broken as they had hoped or thought, the Baronial forces soon found themselves back on the defensive as the superior numbers of the Plantagenets were now actually able to surround their opponents and a ferocious assault led by Blondeville finally broke their resolve. Now trying to push back across the bridge, the Baronial forces were cut down by missile fire from the Plantagenets in their rear before a cavalry charge finally put an end to any attempts to retake the position they had held before the attack. Broken, their retreat descended into a panicked rout as the Plantagenets descended upon them. The survivors were scattered, many fleeing to Wales to either Llywellyn or, more commonly, Reginald de Braose or instead heading South-East towards Leicester. Montfort very definitely escaped the battle, fleeing back South to Leicester with the survivors of his retinue but Bohun's fate is less certain. We know for a fact he was captured at some point, either in the battle itself or shortly after near Gloucester. Either way, his fate ultimately remained the same. It was here that Henry showed his biggest strength in fighting against Louis, his willingness and ability to learn from his predecessor's mistakes and act in a conciliatory manner towards the barons. After capturing Bohun in March/April 1224, Henry officially had Bohun 'step down from the Earldom of Chester' and restored it to Blondeville. Bohun then made a very public proclamation of his loyalty to Henry and denunciation of Louis' claim as being false and Louis himself as being a usurper and then was allowed to return to his position as the Earl of Hereford. As he continued South, Henry did the same thing with Clare in turn in May 1224, having Clare 'step down' from being Earl of Pembroke and proclaiming Henry as rightful king while denouncing Louis as a usurper. As he went, Henry made a point of restoring his own supporters to their previous positions, making William Marshal the 2nd Earl of Pembroke (thus denying that Clare was ever the rightful Earl of Pembroke by saying that the late William Marshal was the 1st Earl of Pembroke and his son, William Marshal was the 2nd Earl of Pembroke rather than the 3rd, as he would be if Clare were a legitimate Earl). In doing so, Henry was very much making a point of showing himself as a conciliatory king, quite willing to uphold the Magna Carta that both John and Louis had failed to uphold. William de Ferrers was restored as the Earl of Derby, William Longespee as the Earl of Salisbury and Henry de Beaumont as the Earl of Warwick.
Henry united with Redvers in May 1224, effectively trapping Fitzwalter in Cornwall and allowing Henry complete freedom to march on London throughout summer of 1224, pushing through Quincy's attempts at resisting him and finally forcing Quincy to flee, first to Surrey and then, as a separate force moved along the Southern coast, to Kent where he met up with Thomas. Finally, in September 1224, Henry arrived in London, the king victorious. In a scene now famous for its hundreds of depictions and its celebration in the art of later centuries, Henry finally took the throne of England, 8 years after being crowned king. Solemnly marching down the hall, in a scene undoubtedly prepared for and choreographed, Henry was flanked by Blondeville on one side and Verraccio on the other (two of his main supporters and symbolising both the secular and clerical worlds). Henry's return to the throne seemed as clean as possible given the circumstances, the Barons had been swept aside as compared to the slower and harder conquest of Louis from 1216-19. But the situation was not in any way 'clean'. Braose was still active in Wales, Fitzwalter in Cornwall, Montfort in Leicester, Bigod in Norfolk and Quincy, Thomas of Kent and Langton were all still active in Kent. Henry had presented himself as this noble king upholding the Magna Carta but as far back as 1216, when his regents first reissued it, there had been clauses that had been changed so that the Magna Carta would be more favourable to the papacy than it had initially been. Henry had taken the throne easier than Louis had but his opposition hadn't been crushed and Louis hadn't been inactive during this period. Rather, if Henry wished to keep the throne, it was going to be a long fight.