A different Royal Navy

[David Flin]

Out of curiosity, what's happening to the amphibious capacity? Fearless came in during 1965, but there were also mutterings (as there often is) in some quarters IOTL around this time of doing away with the Royal Marines. If some people had got their way, the RN would have had the ability to carry Royal Marines that they no longer had.

Royal Marines? Yes or no in TTL?
Amphibious capability?

 

[Riain]

balance of payments involved, you need a very good justification not to buy the UK design.

This is rarely acknowledged on this board but was so important as to approach national obsession. It pervaded popular culture to the extent that even in the (60s original) movie 'The Italian Job' jailed crime boss Mr Bridger wouldn't sanction robbing the Bank of England because he was worried about the balance of payments. When the balance of payments gets a mention in a 'caper' movie you know its a thing.

Making things in Britain isn't some pork barrelling project, its a vital national requirement in keeping Britain afloat.

 

[flasheart]

Out of curiosity, what's happening to the amphibious capacity? Fearless came in during 1965, but there were also mutterings (as there often is) in some quarters IOTL around this time of doing away with the Royal Marines. If some people had got their way, the RN would have had the ability to carry Royal Marines that they no longer had.

Royal Marines? Yes or no in TTL?
Amphibious capability?

With the exception of the intention to sell off HMS HERMES rather than convert her into an LPH amphibious capability and by extension the Royal Marines are at this point as per OTL

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

These are notes I made from Francis K. Mason's book about the Phantom in the 1990s if not earlier:

• 1963: Cost of Hawker P.1154 for RAF and RN estimated at £750 million, including several hundred aircraft at £1.5 million each;
• Development of the Spey Phantom was estimated at £12.4 million for the engine and a total cost of £25.3 million in February 1964;
• Development of the Spey Phantom was estimated at £28.7 million for the engine and a total cost of £45.5 million in May 1965. The bill was eventually £100 million;
• According to the Bank of England inflation calculator £25.3 million in 1964 was worth £31.2 million in 1969 when the Phantom entered service with the RAF and RN;
• On 4th April 1966 the costs of the American aircraft were put at the following over a 10-year period: £590 million for F-4K/M; £280 million for F-111K and £210 million for C-130K. The source did not give the number of aircraft to be purchased;
• On 28th February 1966 Dennis Healey put the cost of the F-4K/M at £300 million (of which £160 million was to be paid by April 1970). The number of aircraft to be purchased was not stated.
• However, in mid-1966 the unit costs were put at: £1.15 million for F-4K; £1.2 million for F-4M and £9 million for the C-130K. The costs for the Phantom were on a run of 210 aircraft. It did not give the numbers of Hercules aircraft, but 66 were eventually purchases in 2 batches IIRC of 48 and 18;
• In June 1967 the cost of F-111K had gone up to £336 million, when 50 TSR2 would have cost £610 million (in 1965 the projected cost of 100 TSR2 was estimated at £610 million including £270 million for the R&D);
• In May 1968 the unit costs were stated at £1.4 million for the F-4K and £1.5 million for the F-4M. Once again the number of aircraft to be purchased was not stated;
• Including the R&D cost each Phantom cost about £2 million for 170 aircraft. The Spey-Phantom programme was not a financial success and was not in service any earlier than the P.1154 would have been, invalidating major reasons for its procurement.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is good, but the Eagle already had her rebuild in 1964 so only needs a small 5 million pound refit for Phantoms and could easily run to 1980-85.

It would probably have gone over time and cost like the conversions of Blake and Tiger. According to Brown & Moore Scheme "Z" was originally to have taken 15 months per ship and cost £2 million per ship. Blake's refit to that standard took 4 years (early 1965 to April 1969) and cost £5.5 million. Tigers refit also took 4 years (1968 to July 1972) and cost £13.25 million. According to the Bank of England's inflation calculator £2 million in 1965 was worth £2.35 million in 1969 and £2.93 million in 1972.

According to Brown & Moore the Phantomisation of Eagle was cancelled in February 1968. It doesn't say what the modifications were to be, or the estimated cost or the estimated time required. However, if Devonport or Portsmouth Dockyards were given the job and the excellent jobs they did on Tiger and Blake are used as a guide we can expect the conversions to take 3 times longer than estimated and the final cost to be several times the original estimate.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Where is the money coming from for this?

By employing competent cost accountants.

 

[Riain]

It would probably have gone over time and cost like the conversions of Blake and Tiger. According to Brown & Moore Scheme "Z" was originally to have taken 15 months per ship and cost £2 million per ship. Blake's refit to that standard took 4 years (early 1965 to April 1969) and cost £5.5 million. Tigers refit also took 4 years (1968 to July 1972) and cost £13.25 million. According to the Bank of England's inflation calculator £2 million in 1965 was worth £2.35 million in 1969 and £2.93 million in 1972.

According to Brown & Moore the Phantomisation of Eagle was cancelled in February 1968. It doesn't say what the modifications were to be, or the estimated cost or the estimated time required. However, if Devonport or Portsmouth Dockyards were given the job and the excellent jobs they did on Tiger and Blake are used as a guide we can expect the conversions to take 3 times longer than estimated and the final cost to be several times the original estimate.

The Eagle needed water cooled jet blast deflectors and 4 dax 2 wires.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Eagle needed water cooled jet blast deflectors and 4 dax 2 wires.

That seems excessive at 1968 prices. To put £5 million in 1968 into perspective the estimated costs of one Type 42 were £17 million and a Type 21 was £7-8 million at that time.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Do you know what the estimated time for the Phantomisation was?

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The Eagle needed water cooled jet blast deflectors and 4 dax 2 wires.

Why not just turn the fire hoses on them?

 

[flasheart]

1967

1967 is considered to be a very good year by members of the submarine service. Britain's second SSBN HMS RENOWN is launched on the 25th of February. A third HMS REPULSE follows on the 4th of November. More importantly the lead ship of the class HMS RESOLUTION is commissioned into the service on the 2nd of October and immediately begins an intensive series of trials. While the navy is delighted with this some within the RAF are upset at the impending dissolution of the V force and the loss of its biggest strategic role.

Britain's 3rd SSN HMS WARSPITE is commissioned in April. Production now switches to the more advanced CHURCHILL class with 2 boats laid down and a 3rd ordered. This class however will be limited to only 3 boats as the first of the even more advanced SWIFTSURE class is ordered. This class is intended to be the first "mass produced" SSN taking advantage of the anticipated availability in building capacity following the upcoming completion of the SSBN program.

HMS EAGLE's "phantomisation" refit continues with work underway to install more powerful catapults and arrestor gears, water cooled blast deflectors and to strengthen the flight deck. However it is becoming apparent that both costs and timing estimates might have been somewhat optimistic.
In Belfast on the 10th of October Lord Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma is present at the Harland and Wolff shipyard for the keel laying ceremony of the new aircraft carrier HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH. The largest vessel that the Royal Navy has ever owned.

Amphibious capability is given a boost with the commissioning of the new LPD HMS INTREPID. Brazil announces its intention to purchase HMS TIGER. A buyer is still being sought for HMS LION with some subtle approaches being made towards Argentina.

The first batch of 4 of the new Type 82 destroyers are ordered from Swan Hunter. It is announced that the lead ship of the class will be named HMS BRISTOL with other ships in the class named after British cities. The final 2 vessels of the County class destroyers HMS NORFOLK and HMS ANTRIM are launched.
Production of the LEANDER class frigate continues with 3 ships (JUNO, ARGONAUT, DANAE) commissioned this year. Already a requirement has been identified for a follow on class and already Vosper Thrnycroft are pushing for one of their designs to fulfill this requirement.

Testing and maturation of the TSR-2 continues. Already low rate initial production has begun seeing as it is likely that only very minor modifications may be required to production aircraft from this point on. Germany shows considerable interest in the export version under development. Luftwaffe officers are invited to observe test flights. The Luftwaffe is very keen on the possibility of soon having the capability to launch strike missions deep behind the iron curtain.

An initial order is placed with Hawker Siddeley for 60 Harriers for the RAF. The first prototype of the GR1 version that will be produced flies on the 28th of December. Representatives of the USMC are in attendance to observe.

The first flights of Spey engined Phantoms take place. Production of Spey and non Spey engined aircraft for the RN and RAF begins. Out of necessity major portions of the RN's Phantoms will be manufactured in the UK. The government exerts pressure on the MOD to try and do the same for the RAF's Phantoms in order to safeguard British jobs.
Aircrew from both services take part in exchange programs with both the USN and USAF in order to gain operational experience with the aircraft.

 

[KokkenKunten]

1967

Production of Spey and non Spey engined aircraft for the RN and RAF begins. Out of necessity major portions of the RN's Phantoms will be manufactured in the UK. The government exerts pressure on the MOD to try and do the same for the RAF's Phantoms in order to safeguard British jobs.
Aircrew from both services take part in exchange programs with both the USN and USAF in order to gain operational experience with the aircraft.

Genius, pure genius. So there's now an even smaller fleet of Spey engined 'Tooms to absorb the development costs. Plus, you've now got to separately integrate and qualify the unique, UK systems into whatever flavour F - 4 you have The RAF buying (D? E? J?). Then, you've got two distinct spares, training & logistical trails to provide for the whole duration of service AND you want to petition for a separate line to be established building bits of The RAF's landlubbers too?

No - one, not even MoD (PE) at the height of their craziness, is gonna buy in to that...

Edit: And in the same year the pound is devalued by 14% too!

 

[Riain]

Why not just turn the fire hoses on them?

They did for the trials, but still had to wait for the steel plate chained to the deck to cool down before the next aircraft could taxi over it.

 

[jsb]

Re Eagle and Ark air wings, what about going for a developed supersonic Bucc for the FAA and RAF, then fitting it with Phantoms radar and missiles?
Might not be great but should work for the designed goal v Soviet bombers or 3rd world air forces?

 

[Riain]

Re Eagle and Ark air wings, what about going for a developed supersonic Bucc for the FAA and RAF, then fitting it with Phantoms radar and missiles?
Might not be great but should work for the designed goal v Soviet bombers or 3rd world air forces?

How much would it cost to develop? I can't imagine it would be cheaper to make a Bucc go fast that it was to put Speys into Phantoms or make the P1154 work.

 

[pdf27]

By employing competent cost accountants.

Problem is that it doesn't make things cheaper, it just gives you better warning that things will be hugely expensive.

 

[jsb]

Problem is that it doesn't make things cheaper, it just gives you better warning that things will be hugely expensive.

But did GB/RN not have and spend a lot its just that so much more capability could have been gained from the cash (or a lot of it saved for the same) if they had planned better and only started what they could realistically afford to finish and run long term? (not that its as easy for them as for us with total hindsight)

 

[pdf27]

Sorta-kinda: the issue isn't particularly well defined though. For instance:

• Technology was changing all the time, and getting more expensive with it - that means coming up with an accurate cost estimation for a fairly low-end warship similar to those you've built before (e.g. a Rothesay or a Blackwood) is feasible, but where the technology is very new as it was with the Sea Slug ships then you end up with beautifully written estimates based on dud data.
• The UK economy was in deep trouble, which mean that the budget was being continually cut: at some point you have to cut capability to match the new budget. In OTL that was the decision to cut the East of Suez role instead of the North Atlantic Escort role: the UK could afford to do one but not both, and decided that East of Suez was ultimately less important to UK security than the North Atlantic role was. Problem for this is that you haven't magically found more money, but are just diverting a bigger fraction of national wealth to the RN. That can only continue for so long, after which IMHO you're still going to find the East of Suez role going away - and the expensive new carriers with it, probably.
• The RN was limited more by manpower than by funding throughout the Cold War - any realistic timeline dealing with more spending for the RN has to deal with this. If you are building the CVA-01 ships you HAVE to scrap something else or otherwise they'll just spend their time swinging at anchor in mothballs.

 

[jsb]

I agree but it could have been done better, and since we are on a internet forum in 2016 its far easier

• Technology was changing all the time, and getting more expensive with it - that means coming up with an accurate cost estimation for a fairly low-end warship similar to those you've built before (e.g. a Rothesay or a Blackwood) is feasible, but where the technology is very new as it was with the Sea Slug ships then you end up with beautifully written estimates based on dud data.
• The UK economy was in deep trouble, which mean that the budget was being continually cut: at some point you have to cut capability to match the new budget. In OTL that was the decision to cut the East of Suez role instead of the North Atlantic Escort role: the UK could afford to do one but not both, and decided that East of Suez was ultimately less important to UK security than the North Atlantic role was. Problem for this is that you haven't magically found more money, but are just diverting a bigger fraction of national wealth to the RN. That can only continue for so long, after which IMHO you're still going to find the East of Suez role going away - and the expensive new carriers with it, probably.
• The RN was limited more by manpower than by funding throughout the Cold War - any realistic timeline dealing with more spending for the RN has to deal with this. If you are building the CVA-01 ships you HAVE to scrap something else or otherwise they'll just spend their time swinging at anchor in mothballs.

I would Concentrate on keeping long term just sufficient programs,
- concentrate early on NA but have the ability to send a force out of area v second rate opposition.
- not develop as much technology and types of ship, ie one class of frigate, by buying in less vital parts hopefully in trade with others.
- develop technology so its easier to fit into ships and you can deal with changes, ie try not to have very long Sea Slug style mags that basically have the ship designed around them!
- try to sell as much equipment as possible, so try to build stuff that others will want at least to licences produce them selfless.

With hindsight the RN had a lot of advanced technology and systems that did work and did even sell well. It has also had relatively few really hard tests since 1945. It wasted a lot of money and effort by not planning better.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Problem is that it doesn't make things cheaper, it just gives you better warning that things will be hugely expensive.

Point taken.

Having said that I for one would have liked to have known that the Tiger class cruisers would have cost as much and taken as long to complete as new ships with the same armament. Same for their conversions to helicopter carriers. Ditto for the aircraft carrier rebuilds.