alternatehistory.com

Part XX:


☆ John Bercow, Thatcher, Thatcherism, and Thatcherites, (Faber, 1998):

"The Sunday before the general election, there were sporadic forecasts of inclement weather on Thursday 15 October or Friday 16. But by midweek those forecasts became somewhat more equivocal. Severe weather was forecast for the Chunnel, while only a light touch would come unto the extreme coastal parts of Southern England. The first gale warnings in the sea were largely dismissed and during the evening of 15 October, radio and TV forecasts mentioned only strong winds. BBC meteorologist Michael Fish at the BBC in particular earned infamy for his falsely prophetic reassurance:


The Great Storm made landfall in Cornwall on the evening of 15 October, then tracked north-east to Devon and then over the Midlands and then going out to Sea. Gusts of up to 100 knots (120 mph), were recorded along the south-eastern edge of the storm, hitting Hampshire, Sussex, Essex and Kent."


★ Alastair John Campbell, The Claret Revolution, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"The storm caused substantial damage over much of England, felling an estimated 15 million trees. Fallen trees blocked roads and railways and left widespread damage. Over a hundred thousand people were left without power, not fully restored until more than two weeks later. The National Grid sustained damage, as crashing cables short-circuited and in some cases overheated the main system. The headquarters faced the choice of keeping the Grid online to help London as the storm approached but then risk a gradual system breakdown, or to shut down most of South East England, including London to avert the risk. The headquarters made the decision, the first since before World War II, to shut down the South East power systems. In London, many of the trees lining streets were blown down overnight, particularly plane trees, blocking roads and crushing parked cars. Building construction scaffolding and billboards had collapsed in many places, and many buildings were damaged. Much of the public transport in the capital was not functioning, and people were advised against going to work."


★ Rebekah Mary Wade, Hezza, (Politico's, 2000):

"In total, the Great Storm caused £2 billion damage by itself, but much worse was to follow."


♤ Norman Lamont, Inside Westminster, (Andre Deutsch Ltd, 1996):

"Reeling as we were from the Great Storm itself, more than a few men in the City were unable to reach the trading floors. Stock market trading was suspended twice and the market closed early at 12:30 PM. The City therefore could not immediately react to news of a Wall Street market correction on the 16th, when Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell a single-day-record of 108.36 points. By the time the Market reopened on Monday 19 October, the free world had experienced a Black Monday. The last time such an appellation was trotted out for a Monday was on 28 October, 1929 - widely considered the start of the Great Depression."


♤ David Mellor, My Moment, (Fourth Estate, 2000):

"Over the weekend, all Party leaders visited the hard hit areas, but avoided contact with one another, lest they be accused of political opportunism in a time of crisis. I was vaguely aware of the financial situation on Saturday as Lord Young (Chancellor of the Exchequer) kept referencing troubles overseas and impact on the market, but I did not quite grasp the extent of the 'troubles.' There were some continued inconclusive negotiations over the formation of a government throughout the weekend, but once the extent of Black Monday was understood even by such non-experts as I, Mr. King called an emergency session of the Cabinet."


♠ Mark Robinson, A Better Britain, (Pimlico, 2000):

"In the 19 October, 1987 Cabinet meeting, Tom King let it be known he did not believe a minority government would have the power or the mandate to deal with the problems facing the country. He rejected the 'game theory' expert-suggested course of waiting on Labour to offer a deal to the Alliance. He was willing to offer concessions to the Alliance to form a stable government to deal with the crisis: a Referendum on the Alternate Voting System for Westminster elections, a free vote in the Commons on Proportional Representation in the European elections and devolution to Scotland and possibly Wales. There followed a lively debate. Ted (Heath) waited until everyone had vented their spleen and then gave his advice: do nothing. Ted believed the pressure on the current government was nothing compared to the pressure now put on the Alliance to help form a government to deal with the crisis. The electorate would not forgive the Alliance for dithering in their negotiating in the midst of a crisis. Nor could they (the Alliance) afford a minority Conservative government collapsing in the near future and a new general election to be called. In such an election, both the Liberals and the Social Democrats would be targeted by the Conservatives and Labour as standing idly by in the hopes of getting a better deal while the nation suffered. They would appear childish and selfish and would be punished by the voters for it. The longer the Alliance waited to cut a deal, the quicker the press and the voters would turn on them. By the time Ted finished speaking the Cabinet was in stunned silence. No one expected such a speech and no one had expected it from Ted of all people."


♣ Peter Walker, A United Kingdom, (Hamish Hamilton, 1987):

"In April of '69, during the then height of Irish Troubles, republican socialist Bernadette Devlin managed to defeat the widow of a dead Ulster Unionist MP in the Mid-Ulster by-election. Flouting conventions about maiden speeches, the twenty-one year old firebrand deliver a big, brilliant and bigoted speech. It was spellbinding. As she sat down exhausted, Jim Prior leaned over from the bench directly behind Ted Heath's and whispered to him, 'Brilliant speech.' 'Yes, but it's the only speech she's got in her, she can't make another one,' Ted replied without a thought of contemplation. He was right. Bernadette could only make a variation of her maiden speech in the House and did so repeatedly, but people soon grew tired of her one-note act and she was finished. During his first spell as Leader of the Opposition, Ted had an intrinsic grasp of politicians. Sadly, his sure touch deserted him when he was Prime Minister and would not manifest itself when he became Leader of the Opposition. Perhaps his deftness will return to him in the twilight of his years now that he is advising Mr. King, but one has doubts."


♧ Mike Thomas, Separate Ways, (Duckworth, 2000):

"While Liberals had their doubts as always, before Black Monday, I knew my preference to be for a Conservative minority government to twist slowly in the wind, occupying Downing Street despite not having a mandate from the electorate. Such a government could not last and we could reload for another general election, with a clearer message to the electorate: give us the mandate to form a real government. But after Black Monday, a Conservative minority government could expound at length how while they were too busy saving the country, the rest of us played at politics. A quick election called after such appeal would crush us and give the Tories a clear majority. There was no alternative. We had to make a deal, the only question was the terms and whether Liberals should come with us."


♣ Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"David Owen called an emergency meeting with the senior leadership of the Social Democrats. Roy (Jenkins), Shirley (Williams), David Owen, John Cartwright, Mike Thomas and yours truly qualified. David wanted to know what should be the minimum requirement for the SDP to support the Conservatives. Roy, Shirley and I exchanged a look. David Owen could not have been so careless as to not to use the word 'SDP' when he meant 'Alliance.' Just to be sure, Shirley sought clarification, 'Don't you mean the Alliance, David?' she said almost lightly. 'The Alliance negotiations are a different matter,' the Exalted Leader replied. 'We need to decide what is acceptable for us, as a Party.' Shirley was too alarmed to engage in a meaningful way, but Roy recovered his wits wonderfully and outlined the case for Ministry of Justice, House of Lords reform, economic changes to enable greater employment opportunities and Proportional Representation (PR). David Owen went down the list, striking down Ministry of Justice as a Liberal plank in the Alliance manifesto, considered House of Lords reform to be a hopeless cause, said employment changes would come about by a more robust private enterprise and concluded we could not ask for PR as it would not be a 'serious' demand. Shirley, Roy and I were astonished. John and Mike, clearly told of the talking points forehand, quickly agreed with the Dear Leader. In one meeting, David Owen rubbished the manifesto he authorized and used as the basis of our campaign. As a veteran of the Harold Wilson Cabinet I was not naïve and would describe myself as cynical, but this was taking it too far and I said as such. David Owen glared at me. Shirley, the natural peacemaker, asked David what he thought should be our demands. David quickly ticked off his wish list: Alternate Voting System for the European Parliament, 'lifeline' for the elderly and prison reform. 'The rest is Liberal nonsense' he derided. Shirley, Roy and I were once again left astonished. Roy was on the verge of saying something rather rash, as a man of no small ego he could not be expected to sit silent with another man taking charge of a table with such ferocity. For that matter, neither could I. But Shirley once again attempted to heal divisions by asking the Great Leader to reconsider the Ministry of Justice, outlining the social case for it and tying it into prison reform. Had I suggested it or Roy, it would have been turned down flat, but the price to pay for going through life playing alpha male, as David so enjoyed, is that you attempt to woo any woman at the negotiating table in the hopes of turning her to your view just to reassure yourself you're still an alpha. David allowed himself to be swayed on the Ministry of Justice to buy Shirley's approval on his overall plan. Shirley played his game and agreed, to stall for time. But by this point Roy's hands were on the verge of shaking. John Cartwright of all people spotted it and said it would be best if all of us would take time to consider our position, 'our' in this case meaning Social Democratic, to the exclusion of the Alliance. We left the room. In the lift, Shirley, Roy and I rode down in silence until Roy turned to me and said rather softly, 'He has to go.' I was not sure whether Roy was blowing off steam, but Shirley realized he was deadly earnest. 'Roy, not now, surely,' she implored. 'Not now. In three months, or six, or a year, but go he must. He is a danger to the Party. As we are ready and the time is right, we must move quickly. Bill, you could be the candidate. Be ready.' Roy said all this softly still, staring directly ahead and not making eye contact. The lift stopped and Roy walked on, leaving stunned Shirley and I behind. Not even at the lowest point in Roy's relationship with Harold Wilson did he ever advocate regicide. But David Owen had pushed him too far."


♧ David Owen, Into the Maelstrom, (Macmillan, 1991):

"Mike, John and I had a robust meeting with Roy, Shirley and Bill on Black Monday on the negotiating stance we should take with the Conservatives. We agreed on an overall plan, but some of the details caused disagreements among us, as well they should, for when one talks about forming a government with another Party there should be a debate."


♦ David Steel, Against Goliath: The David Steel Story, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"I had a meeting with my senior leadership on the state of negotiations with the Conservatives and Labour. It was a full and frank discussion and I came out of with a better understanding of the varied needs the Parliamentary Liberal Party felt had to be addressed before any further negotiation were to take place with either of the two Parties vying for a deal with us."


♦ Paddy Ashdown, Battlegrounds, (HarperCollins, 2001):

"The always entertaining David Pehaglion told David Steel, 'Big Jim (Callaghan) buggered us the last time we got in bed with the government and that was when we actually agreed with half of the government's policies. If we get in bed with Tommy (King), we'll all be buggered as Thatcherites, with the eyes of the nation upon us.' There followed a good debate. I do not wish to generalize, but very, very broadly speaking there were two sorts of Liberal MPs in '87: dreamers and realists. The dreamers prefer all or nothing, while realists would settle for half, or less, to be able to achieve change within government. The senior leadership at the time reflected such a split. Had the 50th Parliament included 314 Labour MPs or even 300, and we were discussing the formation of a Labour government it would have been a much different discussion. But Labour looked to be dead in the water."


♥ Denis Healey, Silly Billies, (Penguin Books, 1990):

"Through intersession of men who shall remain nameless I arranged a furtive face to face meeting with Enoch Powell on Monday at St. Ermin's Hotel, a site of many Labour battles. He was polite and forced me to sit through five minute exchange of pleasantries about our families before letting me proceed with the business at hand. I outlined my case for a electoral pact of Labour, Liberal, SPD and Unionist parties to form a government backed by 327 MPs in the House, then asked him what would his Party want in return for being part of it. His metallic tinged reply was precise and brutal though courteous, 'Given such an unwieldy government would be fated to fall apart in less than four months, what can your offer me that could be fulfilled in such short interval?' I was not quite prepared for a fatal diagnosis of a government as yet not born and cycling through my offers I realized nearly all of them would need more than four months to implement. When I had admitted as such to Enoch, he astonished me. He was of the opinion (rightly as it turned out) that the European Economic Community (EEC) was going to identify Northern Ireland as one of Europe's poorest region in January of '88 and thereby make it eligible for regional structural funds. Enoch believed a Conservative government would dispute such a finding and thereby reduce the funds available to Northern Ireland. He wanted a Labour led government to not dispute the findings. Enoch despised the EEC and famously broke with Heath over it, and furthermore he was the driest of all dries when it came to monetary aid from his own government, never mind that of a body whose existence he opposed. My face, which I had willed to be blank in more than a few high profile negotiations conducted in the course of my long life, did not stay blank for Enoch's precondition. He spotted it and said, 'It is not about my needs, but the needs of my province, my constituency and my Party.' It was not unreasonable demand and one I could easily communicate back to my leadership. I waited for more. Roy Hattersley once confided in me, back when he confided in me, that Ulster Unionist MPs were prepared to vote to support poor Jim Callaghan in the vote of no-confidence of '79 had he promised them a gas pipeline to Northern Ireland to keep heating costs down. When I broached the subject, Enoch said, 'It will all end in tears, for you will never be able to deliver it, but I suppose it would be good to announce it.' I sat there like a great stone waiting for more demands. None came. I cracked. 'What about devolution for Northern Ireland and an end to direct rule?' He spared a single glance. 'I oppose it, but half of my Party supports it. Full integration is the only path to solving the troubles in Northern Ireland, but you lot lack the will to see it through one way or another and it would be savaged by your left wing until it would be rendered toothless.' I should have been offended, but I was not, for it was true. Thus ended my 'negotiation' with Enoch Powell, securing the possibility of 12 MPs helping to form a hypothetical Labour government.


♣ Michael Gallagher, Wanderer, (Penguin Books, 1989):

"My attempt to capture Milton Keynes in the '87 general election ended in tears. It was a seat we could have won in a by-election, but in a general election we were easily beaten by the Conservatives. I had decided I had quite enough of skating uphill and went off to skulk in my tent. And by tent I mean a pub in London, to where I returned for reasons not entirely clear to me at the time, nor made better by the passage of time. The Great Storm marooned me there, and it was in such inauspicious circumstances, drinking terrible beer by the light of a great fat smelly candle and being utterly miserable, that John Smith managed to find me and initiate back channel talks between Labour and SDP, though both of us were at great pains to pretend it was just two politicos talking. Our talks were not unproductive."


♣ Bill Rodgers, Call Me What You Will, (Politico's, 2000):

"John Smith via Michael Gallagher brought news of a remarkable Labour volte-face on Polaris. Multilateralist Labour MPs were prepared to use the cover of an electoral pact with the Alliance to force the Labour Party to abandon the unilateralist commitments of their '87 manifesto. Far from being a deal breaker, the Social Democratic stance on Polaris could act as a bridge between likeminded Labour MPs and SDP and thereby help stitch together a new government. I was overjoyed and sought out David Owen. He was disdainful. In view of the Great Leader, we could not trust Labour. Given we would, in such a deal, hold the balance of a no-confidence vote and given abolition of nuclear deterrent could not be done covertly nor quickly, I failed to see any semblance of logic in his increasingly peevish arguments. At first hint of Labour attempt to scrap Polaris, Alliance could finish off the Labour government. But David Owen could not, or would not, follow my arguments. It was worse than unproductive."


♧ Mike Thomas, Separate Ways, (Duckworth, 2000):

"Much stock has been put to the alleged drunken ramblings of Michael Gallagher regarding Labour's unilateralism and how it could have been set aside for the sake of quilt patchwork Le Grand Alliance of racialist loon Enoch Powell and his merry band of Ulstermen, soft serve ice cream left Neil Kinnock, rising hope cum elder statesman David Steel and our Social Democrats to form a two-seat majority of 327 MPs and thereby create a government. How could anyone expect such an unwieldy unnatural union to last longer than four months barring an outbreak of World War 3 or Conservatives electing Alan Clark as their Leader? It was not just grasping at straws, it was willful denial of reality and sanity."


♥ Joe Ashton, My Labour, My Party, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993):

"There were far too many small minded idiots on both sides of the fence for a Social Democratic and Labour pact to ever work in October '87. Not that Liberals were any better though."


♦ Paddy Ashdown, Battlegrounds, (HarperCollins, 2001):

"It came to my attention that David Owen was prepared to negotiate with the Conservative Party separate from the Alliance and that his demands would be limited to a free vote on an Alternate Voting System for the European Parliament, 'lifeline' for the elderly and prison reform. There would be no reform of the House of Lords, no Ministry of Justice, no devolution for Scotland and Wales and no economic measures. I relayed the substance of David Owen's upcoming betrayal to David Steel. David at first did not want to believe it, but then got confirmation from sources I am not at liberty to disclose. What followed next must be laid entirely at the feet of David Owen."