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Curragh 'Incident'
The Curragh 'Incident'
'The Curragh Incident' by Andrew Charles McGregor, first published in "Politics and the British Military" Edinburgh, 1999, edited by A. C. McGregor and J.H. Telford.
By early 1913 the continued violence by the UVF, against Republicans and Trades Unionists alike, had began to impact on 'mainland' affairs. While the Lords would be unable to prevent the passage of the Home Rule Bill into law if it was reintroduced, Asquith was concerned that in the event of Home Rule going ahead, the UVF would turn that violence against the government and bring about a full blown Civil War in Ireland, with potential to spread to English cities like Liverpool.
Nor did the advent of the Liberal-Labour coalition make matters any easier for Asquith. He had retained Birrell as Secretary for Ireland, but the Labour Party was not especially sympathetic to the Unionist cause, especially since the UVF had shown itself to be rabidly anti-Trade Union. Keir Hardie, and the party's former leader Ramsay Macdonald were both especially outspoken on the idea of Home Rule for Ireland and for the broader idea of 'Home Rule all Round'. Even within his own party he could not be entirely sure of support – Churchill was an implacable opponent of everything Carson stood for, especially after his treatment by the Unionists in Belfast and only a couple of years before had made a major speech in support of a Federal Britain.
Just before the election, in August 1913, John French, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) was asked by the King for his views on the Irish situation (the King had also written to the Prime Minister.) In reply he wrote that the army would obey "the absolute commands of the King", but added that some might think "that they were best serving their King and country either by refusing to march against the Ulstermen or by openly joining their ranks" although he stressed that he wanted to act firmly against dissidents within the army. Later in the year, French went further and recommended that Captain Spender, who was openly assisting the UVF, be cashiered, although this was not acted upon.
By January 1914, Asquith was increasingly pessimistic about the outcome of the Constitutional Convention. Faced with intelligence that the Ulster Volunteers (now 100,000 strong) might be about to raid the armoury at Carrickfergus Castle, he asked French to prepare plans for the use of the Army to forestall such an event or if the threatened declaration of a Provisional Government went ahead. French did not oppose the deployment of troops in principle but told Wilson, the Director of Military Operations at the War Office, that the government were talking of "scattering troops all over Ulster as if it were a Pontypool coal strike". Wilson however was a highly political officer. He supported Ulster Unionist opponents of Irish Home Rule and approved of the Unionist plans to form a Provisional Government in Ulster in the event of the Bill going through. Indeed he expressed the view to his brother Jemmy that the proposals were “all very sensible.” He was already leaking information to the Unionists, although it is unclear whether he actually envisaged armed insurrection or simply hoped that the Government would back off. He had also been sounded out by Lord Roberts on his becoming chief of staff for the UVF. Although he declined he told Roberts that if necessary he would fight for Ulster rather than against her. He passed information about the new planning to George Richardson, a former Lieutenant General in the Indian Army, who had been appointed as UVF Chief of Staff after Wilson declined.
Arthur Paget, Commander in Chief, Ireland had also been warned, by the secretary of the Army Council, of possible attempts by unspecified persons to seize weapons and ammunition. In his reply he warned that large-scale mobilisation of the Army into Ulster would exacerbate the situation. Moving specifically against the UVF would be very different to the deployments that had taken place at the height of the confrontations between the UVF and Republicans. Paget was summoned to London in late January at which Seely informed him that the government was intending to introduce the Home Rule Bill and had no intention of allowing the UVF to start a civil war. The UVF must be crushed if they attempted to do so.
Asquith also set up a Cabinet Committee, chaired by Viscount Crewe, Lord Privy Seal (who soon fell ill), and consisting of John Simon (Attorney General), Augustine Birrell (Chief Secretary for Ireland), John Seely, (Secretary of State for War) and Winston Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty). Churchill and Seely both seemed eager to directly confront the UVF, even at the risk of bloodshed. At a meeting earlier in the year Churchill had said that there were "worse things than bloodshed, even on an extended scale" and "Let us go forward together and put these grave matters to the proof," The failure to include a Labour member on the committee was to prove critical in later months.
Paget's orders were to occupy government buildings, to repel any assaults by the UVF and to guard the armouries at Omagh, Enniskillen, Armagh, Dundalk and Carrickfergus to prevent thefts of weapons. He was also told to send troops to Newry (an old, empty barracks with no stores) and Dundalk, both in nationalist areas and so unlikely to be seized by the UVF, but of strategic importance in any move to bring Ulster under military control. Numerous contingencies were discussed, including armed resistance to the troops as they moved to protect the arms depots. In the event of a railway strike, or other obstacle, Churchill offered transport of forces by the Royal Navy. All movements were to be completed by dawn on Sunday 1 March. The 3rd Battle Squadron was ordered to the Firth of Clyde while other vessels were made ready to help deploy troops to Ulster (in case of a strike by loyalist railwaymen). It is possible that the move to deploy troops may have been a ploy by Churchill and Seely to goad the loyalists into a rebellion which would then be put down. Such a rebellion would have placed the government in a much stronger position at the Convention.
On the evening of 12th February, Carson stormed out of a Commons debate and travelled to Ulster. Asquith, Seely, Churchill, Birrell, Field Marshal French, and General Paget held an emergency meeting at 10 Downing Street where Seely claimed to have intelligence of an imminent unionist coup in Ulster when Carson would declare a Provisional Government.
Paget returned to Dublin the same night. He had no written orders, probably because there were things which the politicians were reluctant to put in writing. From his subsequent actions, it seems he was not clear on what was expected of him. On the morning of Friday 13th February, Paget addressed senior officers at his headquarters in Dublin. He began by saying that "active operations were to commence against Ulster," a provocative choice of words. He then claimed that with French’s assistance he had obtained “concessions” from Seely, namely that officers who lived in Ulster would be permitted to “disappear” for the duration, but that other officers who refused to serve against Ulster would be dismissed rather than being permitted to resign. He added that Gough – who had a family connection with Ulster but did not live there – could expect no mercy from his "old friend at the War Office" (French). This was not the case - French and Seely had actually agreed with Paget that officers with “direct family connections” to Ulster should be left behind in any mobilisations against the UVF. By presenting his officers with an ultimatum, Paget showed poor judgement. Had the order been given simply to move north, with the let out for those with Ulster connections, the majority would probably simply have obeyed.
Paget's presentation led to a split in his command. Maj-Gen Sir Charles Fergusson, GOC 5th Infantry Division, warned Gough, GOC 3rd Cavalry Brigade that the Army must hold together at all costs, and that he himself would obey orders. Gough's reply was that he would not and he would not fire on his fellow countrymen, before going off to speak to the officers of the 5th Lancers (one of the regiments under his command). Gough did not attend a second meeting with Paget in the afternoon, at which he (Paget) confirmed that the purpose of the move was to overawe Ulster rather than fight.
Gough offered the officers under his command at nearby Marlborough Barracks the choice of resignation rather than fighting against the Ulster Volunteers. The same choice was also passed on to the rest of Gough's 3rd Cavalry Brigade 25 miles away at the Curragh Camp.
On the evening of 13th February Paget sent a telegram to the War Office in London announcing that almost all the officers of 5th Lancers intended to resign and the same was probably true of 16th Lancers. Seely replied, telling Paget to suspend any senior officer who had offered to resign. A second telegram just before midnight confirmed 57 officers preferred to accept dismissal (it was actually 61 including Gough):
Officer Commanding 5th Lancers states that all officers, except two and one doubtful, are resigning their commissions today. I much fear same conditions in the 16th Lancers. Fear men will refuse to move. Regret to report Brigadier-General Gough and fifty-seven officers 3rd Cavalry Brigade prefer to accept dismissal if ordered North.
This was not technically a mutiny, as the officers concerned had resigned before refusing to carry out a direct order. As all were in Gough's brigade, and as they were informed of his reservations about Seely's orders, he was seen as central to the whole incident.Gough and 2 of his 3 colonels (the attitude of the third was unclear) were summoned to report to the War Office.
Colonel Philip Chetwode was offered command of Gough's Brigade. He later wrote that he knew he would be “looked upon by all his brother officers as a scab” but thought it “his duty as a soldier to do as he was ordered & not to meddle in politics”.
Fergusson toured the units under his command on the morning of Saturday 14th February to ensure their future compliance with government policy. One of his officers said later that "He [Fergusson] reminded us that although we must naturally hold private political views, officially we should not be on the side of any one political party. It was our duty to obey orders, to go wherever we were sent and to comply with instructions of any political party that happened to be in power. There was no sloppy sentiment; it was good stuff straight from the shoulder and just what we wanted." Paget made efforts to do the same but his speech was described by an officer who heard it as "absolutely unconvincing and inconclusive."
Gough, summoned to the War Office, confirmed (Sunday 15th February) that he would have obeyed a direct order to move against Ulster. Meanwhile French, in an audience with the King and advised by Haldane (Lord Chancellor) blamed Paget saying that he should not have asked officers about "hypothetical contingencies." He threatened to resign if Gough were not reinstated. Paget was then ordered to report to London and Macready was sent out to Belfast (but without official announcement) as General Officer Commanding Belfast District and as military governor-designate of Belfast in the event of civil war breaking out.
Asquith and his Liberal Ministers backed down, claiming an "honest misunderstanding." At French's suggestion Seely issued a document in the name of the Cabinet, stating that the Army Council were satisfied that the incident had been a misunderstanding, that it was "the duty of all soldiers to obey lawful commands." that the Government had the right to use "forces of the Crown" in Ireland or elsewhere, but had no intention of using force "to crush opposition to the Home Rule Bill." Gough insisted on adding a further paragraph clarifying that the Army would not be used to enforce Home Rule on Ulster, to which French concurred in writing. Gough promised to keep the “Cabinet” document confidential, but it soon leaked. Both Gough and French leaked it to the Morning Post, while Wilson leaked it to Bonar Law and others.
The matter was debated in the Commons, (24th and 25th February) where Asquith publicly repudiated the document which had been issued. French, the Adjutant-General Spencer Ewart and Seely all resigned. The Labour Party was especially outraged that the Army, apparently happy enough to suppress industrial unrest, had been allowed to prevent the use of force in Ulster. Under pressure from both Keir Hardie and the former leader Ramsay Macdonald, Henderson threatened to pull out of the Coalition. In the end though, realising that this was an area where Tories and many Liberals were in agreement, so making a Liberal-Conservative coalition possible, he did not press matters, arguing that Labour had a greater influence on affairs from within government. In return, he insisted on Labour membership of all Cabinet committees and reluctantly Asquith agreed.
No one emerged well from the incident, least of all Asquith, Gough and Wilson. The myth of an apolitical military had been exposed as had the willingness of at least some senior officers to use the power of the army in support of their political position. The event boosted unionist confidence and convinced nationalists that they could not expect support from either the Government or the army in the event of a UVF insurgence. Support for the separatist paramilitary forces the Irish Volunteer Army and the Irish Citizens' Army grew, putting even greater pressure on the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention.