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1972: NASA hell of a year (12)
talking about Saturn V future (this is straight out of OTL)

On the left a Saturn V lay on its side, its stages separated and mounted on wheeled trailers.Dave grinned when he caught Natalie York gawping at the Saturn.

"That's just a test article," he said. "The first one built. The story is that when it looked as if we might be canning Apollo altogether, there was talk of taking one of the flight articles and putting it on display here, or maybe at the Cape. A man-rated moon rocket as a lawn ornament." He chuckled and shook his head. "Can you believe it?"

(Stephen Baxter, Voyage)

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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, ALABAMA 35812
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DEP-T May 24, 1972
TO: NASA Headquarters
Attn: Mr. Philip E. Culbertson
FROM: DEP-T/W. R. Lucas

SUBJECT: Long Term Storage and Launch of a Saturn V Vehicle in the Mid-1980’s

This is in response to your request of May 9 for information concerning the cost of maintaining present reliability of the Saturn V vehicle as a function of long time storage and the cost of storing and maintaining a capability to launch a Saturn V in the mid-1980’s.

First, it is extremely difficult to estimate the cost of maintaining the current reliability of the Saturn V launch vehicle for approximately 13 additional years since this time is so far beyond our experience. For example, a June 1985 launch of one of our available Saturn V’s would mean that the age of some of the critical components from start of stage assembly would exceed 18 years. We are prepared to state, based upon tests and other experience, that there is no significant degradation of some of the more sensitive components, for example engine soft goods, up to ten years, provided the storage environment is closely controlled. However, we do not understand quantitatively the effects of aging on our systems beyond the ten year period.

To gain confidence in components between ten and twenty years old, we would have to establish the requirement to do single engine static firings three years prior to launch, utilizing spare J-2 engines. The J-2 engine would be selected because it contains most of the commonly used softgoods (most likely to deteriorate) on the vehicle. In addition, selected electrical, electronic and mechanical critical components that were stored with the vehicle would be subjected to functional tests and teardown inspection. There would be no remove-and-replace activity on the vehicles unless determined necessary by this test program.

[2] In addition to the vehicle hardware reliability concern, there is another vital element to consider. The present Apollo and Skylab Programs depend on the full-time, dedicated involvement of carefully selected, highly skilled individuals within both contractor and Civil Service ranks. Many of the key individuals can trace their experience back to the beginning of the Apollo Program. Every Saturn V launch to date, particularly the Apollo 16, has required their real time decisions to convert a potential launch scrub or mission loss situation into a mission success.

By the 1980’s, this present capability will be practically nonexistent. It must be rebuilt with individuals possessing possibly more advanced technical knowledge of new vehicles but who would lack specific knowledge of the Saturn V systems. Therefore, these individuals must be provided the means and the time to become technically proficient with the Saturn V system. All records pertaining to design, qualification, manufacturing and assembly processes, handling, checkout, and launch preparation and launch must be preserved.

In addition to the above, there are other potential problem areas which deserve a brief comment:
• Advanced computer processing systems may not be compatible with the developed Saturn software programs.
• It is not feasible to environmentally control all critical components of the system. For example, the [Launch Umbilical Tower] and the stage transporters will be exposed to atmospheric conditions requiring possible major refurbishment.
• Certain critical spare parts would be impossible to replace if an unforeseen problem required an unusual demand for replacement parts.

In summary, we have very little basis for extrapolating reliability of Saturn vehicles beyond the proposed six to fifteen year period of inactivity. Undoubtedly some degradation would occur. If it is intended to use a Saturn V in the mid-1980’s, the earlier the requirement is identified, the better will be our confidence in maintaining a reasonable reliability at a tolerable cost.

[3] In conjunction with [Kennedy Space Center], we examined the major factors influencing the cost of a program to maintain the capability to launch one of the two unassigned Saturn V launch vehicles (SA-514 and SA-515) with confidence in the mid-1980’s.

Comments and cost estimates from [Kennedy] are included. The examination was conducted in accordance with the guidelines and assumptions presented in enclosure 1.

The approach taken would require the present contractors to prepare the stages, spares and documentation for long term storage before their present contracts expire; store the stages and spares at [Kennedy]; maintain the documentation at [Marshall Space Flight Center]; and then identify the required post storage activities to be performed.

A summary of the cost and manpower phasing is presented in enclosures 2 and 3. You will note that the Post Storage and Launch Phase contains two options: the first option utilizes only Civil Service and support contractors; the other option utilizes a single prime contractor for this phase. This choice is left open because it is not possible to predict at this time the density of workload within the Civil Service ranks during the mid-1980’s. Depending on which option is chosen, the estimated total program cost for a Saturn V launch in mid-1985 will range from $206.0 M to $298.7 M.

William. R. Lucas
Deputy Director, Technical
Marshall Space Flight Center
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