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Battle for the space shuttle (15)
battle for the shuttle - phase II

November 8 1971

Since the 22 October Director's review, every people involved in the shuttle program hold their breath. Weinberger rejection of the shuttle had come as a shock, notably for James Fletcher.

In less than three weeks, NASA future manned spacecraft had shrunk from Saturn-Shuttle to dumb expendable Titan carrying capsules.

First to react had been Mathematica. Heiss document, dated of October 28 and entitled Factors for a Decision on a New Reusable Space Transportation System, sat in Fletcher desk.

Fletcher looked determined.

This is an excellent work by Mathematica, but alas it came six days too late for the shuttle” he declared.

“Have a look at this. Klaus Heiss states that their studies show the thrust assisted orbiter shuttle (TAOS) to be the economically preferred choice.

By using the orbiter engines at take-off the booster size and velocity are reduced furthermore, to the point we may even use solid rocket motors ! Of course with the main engines running for all the flight the external tank has to be fatter.

Among the reasons given for TAOS economic superiority are: lower development costs of less than $6 billion; lower development risks; equal capability with the originally proposed system; elimination of the need for an immediate decision on a reusable booster; and the assurance of an early programme definition and thus a purpose to the agency."

Fletcher made a brief pause and continued reading.

"I wish we considered that Mathematica's shuttle earlier" Fletcher sighed. "Truth be told, I neglected this proposal, convinced as I was the Saturn or press-fed Shuttle was the way to go. George, do you think we can still reverse Weinberger decision, and substitute that TAOS to Big Gemini - Titan ?"


Here we are. Decision point once again, George.

"I fear we aren't. In my opinion the OMB crossed a red line at the director’s review. For the first time, they talked about a capsule. Before that date, cutting costs meant downgrading the shuttle: at least we kept some form of spaceplane. Shuttle equalled manned spaceflight, you see ? Even Fubini’s glider was some form of shuttle, in the sense it has wings and a payload bay."

What Low kept for himself was his early support for the glider, long before Fubini. In fact the very idea originated from him. I killed the space shuttle, damn it.

"But we rejected it, out of hand and too early - in August - and thus the most basic spaceplane, the smallest and cheaper shuttles of all, died with it. Only capsules can be less expensive. Do you remember Weinberger memo to Nixon dated August 12 ? His mind was set on no shuttle equals no manned spaceflight.

Now he knows this is wrong… a cheaper capsule can do the job. Enough said.”


"But we haveto reverse this decision !" Fletcher retorqued. "I won't sit still for the other options, for damn Big Gemini or the glider or anything of that sort, because they really don't have the full capabilities that we need. I will go as far as the president himself if needed. To think that early October I had nearly convinced those OMB bureaucrats that the pressure-fed booster shuttle was the way to go. Then they changed their mind in a hurry…how did this happened, by the way ?"

"It's because the Flax committee tell them that the problem was not the booster, it was the orbiter size and payload. Plus the Titan was cheaper. After once we rejected the glider, Weinberger simply chose Big Gemini as the least expensive option."

"That Flax committee held meeting every six weeks… the next should be close no ?"

"It will happen on November 17 – 18."

"You will have to convince them of the Mathematica Shuttle merits, George. I will do the same within the Bureau of Budget. We will convince Nixon advisors, be them bean counters or scientists, of the value of the shuttle." Fletcher did not minced his words.

"I've heard that the men from Mathematica - Morgenstern and Heiss - have a very strong motivation. They won't give up easily." Low tried to reassure Fletcher.

He tried to assess the situation further. Evidently, something had gone wrong with the glider, someday in September… it was a shame, because, even if the Glider was unattractive, at least its wings and payload bay made it a shuttle.

By contrast, he felt Big Gemini was too far from any shuttle concept.
The gap we have now to fill is too wide. The glider would have made that gap narrower…we would be in a much less difficult situation in our quest for the Mathematica full size orbiter.

He was not sure Fletcher fully grasped how desesperate the shuttle situation was. Meanwhile that Whitehead mid-staffer from Flanigan office was pushing hard for some kind of alternative, something more balanced than Fletcher "shuttle or burst" vision.

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