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Battle for the space shuttle (14)
the shuttle is half dead.. yet it might be even worse for NASA

November 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PETER FLANIGAN

BY:

CLAY . T. WHITEHEAD

(NOTE: Peter Flanigan was named Nixon's deputy campaign manager in 1968. He served as a presidential assistant until 1972. Such was Flanigan's influence and support for big business that Ralph Nader labeled him as the "mini-president". He resigned from the Nixon administration in June 1974)

I am having lunch with Jim Fletcher this Friday. I intend to convey to him our concern (I.e. , yours and the Administration's) that the President deserves better planning in the space area than we have had to date.
I will say that there seems to be a nonconstructive battle between NASA and OMB, and that you want to see planning over a longer time horizon. I would like to emphasize your willingness to facilitate such an activity on the condition that Fletcher recognize the constraints and limitations under which the President must work as well as his broad objectives.
The key to all this is to get Fletcher off the battle line he seems to be drawing publicly -- that it's the Shuttle program or nothing - and to get him to work with us toward defining a space program the President can enthusiastically endorse.

The first step in this is to discuss with him the attached draft of the Administration's criteria for the future of the space program. It is consistent with, but more detailed than, the President's statement of last year. I will tell Fletcher that you have asked me to work with him to develop the outline of such planning preparatory to your meeting with him and then possibly with the President.


ATTACHEMENTS

How and when do we achieve NASA's agreement to resize its institutional base?
While none of these actions would directly impact the FY 1973 budget, at least a tentative understanding about future Center closures should probably be worked out with Dr. Fletcher at this time.

In particular, a decision to proceed with a shuttle program could be conditioned on the need to shut down the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). If a small unpowered shuttle is selected, it would have neither orbiter engines nor a reusable booster, which just about eliminates any need for MSFC.

The shutdown of Marshall could provide about 40% of the funds required for a reduced cost shuttle.


Possible options

A - Shutdown Marshall, Huntsville, Ala. (1/74 - after Skylab) Transfer 500 top Marshall technical experts to MSC, Houston, Texas.

B- Shutdown JPL, Pasadena, Calf. (1/75 - after Viking orbiters fab.) Transfer 400 top JPL planetary experts to Langley or Goddard =MI +400 - Reduce Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio (7/73)


Conclusions
1. Seriousness of a gap in manned flight cannot be substansiated on programmatic grounds. The scientific return would be meager. There is no intrinsic urgency for these missions.

2. However, if for reasons of national prestige a manned space program is considered mandatory during the mid-1970's, these options could provide the cheapest method of conducting manned space flight.

3. A Soviet rendezvous is justified only on the basis of international political cooperation and national prestige. Although spectacular, it would have little programmatic value and similar objectives could probably be achieved by other means at much less cost.

4. Unemployment effects of the scheduled Apollo/Skylab phasedown would be reduced to a more gradual decline, particularly in the near term.

5. All of the options can be achieved without the services of the Marshall Space Flight Center.


Clay T. Whitehead - :11/3/71
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