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Battle for the space shuttle (11)
time for the main POD
October 22, 1971. Office of Management and Budget Washington DC Caspar Weinberger and its staff were well prepared for the so-called Director’s review. They had some important documents on hands. They consisted of two OMB staff papers; a letter from Fletcher; and varied memos from the Flax committee. “NASA next manned vehicle concepts fall into two categories: large shuttle and alternatives. "Large shuttle is essentially the full size Air force orbiter – 15*60 ft payload bay, 60 000 pound payload. Only boosters differs. NASA wants a Saturn first stage, we at OMB prefer a ballistic pressure fed booster.
“Alternatives fell into two categories, and we at OMB tasked Flax with reviewing these options. As you can see the glider, far from ranking lower than the least acceptable form of piloted space vehicle, is actually the most ambitious option that the Flax Committee is willing to endorse.
Moreover, the committee's glider would carry only 10,000 pounds of payload. But Flax did not stopped there, and asked himself: what could be less ambitious than this glider? "There is the possibility of modifying Apollo spacecraft to make them refurbishable and continuing to fly them using the existing Saturn IB, on rare occasions.
Another option calls for developing the Titan III-M and Big Gemini, the latter really a chopped-up shuttle - imagine only a reusable cockpit with an expendable payload bay." Weinberger paused. "Flax's report then address the subject of shuttle economics.” he continued “He deals specifically with NASA's preferred concept, which call for concurrent development of booster and orbiter, with the orbiter using phased technology. People describe this orbiter as "Mark I/Mark II," referring to an initial version that would later be upgraded with better engines, reusable thermal protection, and advanced onboard electronics.
NASA's estimate cost per flight are $9.0 million for Mark I, falling to $5.5 million for the improved Mark II. "Significantly, and like the OMB, Flax does not challenge these estimates. He merely denies that they promise advantage.” economist John Sullivan added. “So we will base our decision on four documents you all have in hand.
You have first an OMB Staff Paper, dated October 4 and entitled The Future Space Transportation System- An Economic Analysis of the Options.
"Dated October 14 is The U.S. Civilian Space Program—A Look at the Options which discuss post-Apollo/Skylab plan and includes an analysis of the shuttle.
"Then come Sullivan, Rice and Flax comparison of gliders and 3 stage vehicles (reusable 1st stage, expendable 2nd, powered orbiter).
"Last document is NASA answer to that, a letter Fletcher send to Cap, October 19 – three days ago.
I’ll add that on October 12 George Low recognized that NASA would need at least six more Titan III before the shuttle; he expected the military to have similar needs.” ”So let's see what we can do with this stuff.”Weinberger said “Have a look at the 19 October letter I received from James Fletcher. He frantically calls for a shuttle. I call this blackmail."
The aerospace industry will be hurt by continuing indecision and further delay in the shuttle program. A firm go-ahead, on the other hand, will quickly create jobs in the industry. It will not be possible to sustain the momentum now built up in the shuttle program much longer. A loss in momentum will have serious and costly consequences, and may even be irreversible.
“Gentlemen, what are you conclusions ? should we allow a full size orbiter ? some form of shuttle ? or something else ?” Weinberger asked his staff. After half an hour of debate the OMB staff answer was blunt: cancel the Shuttle program.
Some then proposed that, if not feasible, the decision should be held off for another year, when the OMB would deal with the budget for FY 1974. Don Rice asked for silence. “So NASA wants the Mark I/Mark II orbiter with a very large recoverable booster – either the pressure-fed or the winged S-IC booster. Alexander Flax told us this is not realistic, and that we should consider less-costly alternatives, capsules or glider, all launched by Titan expendables. We will limit our choice to these two options. Caspar ?”
“Flax colleague Eugene Fubini told us that NASA staff violently rejected the glider a month ago*.
They consider it as the worst of both capsules and shuttle worlds. A backward move to 1963' when McNamara cancelled DynaSoar. “So this mean that the only alternative are capsules - Big Gemini or an uprated Apollo ?” “Exactly. We won’t approve any big shuttle; they don’t want the small shuttle atop a Titan III, so NASA will have to settle for capsules and expendable boosters."
Suddenly John Sullivan had a doubt. "Isn’t the alternate shuttle from Mathematica competitive ? Maybe we should consider it further."
"We won’t. The problem with this concept is that - well, Fletcher did not even requested it !
His budget request is all about the flyback Saturn, with the pressure-fed as Plan B. Not a trace of that Mathematica shuttle as far as I'm concerned. And this is not a surprise, however." Weinberger continued.
"Fubini told me that Myers and Fletcher don't really care about Mathematica's shuttle when compared to their pet projects. They certainly have sound reasons for that, on technical grounds perhaps.
Whatever their reasons, in the end it doesn't really matters since this TAOS is still a big orbiter shuttle, so Flax argument applies to it after all.
I say it before and I say it again: we won't fund anything bigger than an enlarged Dynasoar on top of a Titan III-L. If they don't accept that, they will end with more capsules, Apollo or Super Gemini." The argument was over, and the little group separated on a consensus summarized by Weinberger final speech. "Flax opposition to large orbiters is actually justified since the shuttle economics are doubtful even with the inclusion of every military and commercial payloads. Since the shuttle can not be justified on economic grounds and had nowhere to go it had no role and thus its high development costs can't be justified."
*together with September 19 and 24 entries - this alternate history point of divergence. In our universe - within the first three week of October 1971 (up to October 22) NASA fell from Saturn-shuttle to glider.
After a violent reaction from Mathematica six days later (October 28), the space agency managed to rebound from the glider to the familiar, full-size shuttle we all know. Both the glider and Big Gemini were launched by some Titan III; the difference was that Big G had no wings and no payload bay. Although a manned space station logistic vehicle (like the glider and shuttle), it had no wings and its cargo compartment was not recoverable. The glider actually had both, and as such it was the most basic form of shuttle; at least it was still a shuttle ! Big Gemini, by contrast, was not. It is the point of no return: without the glider, the full-size shuttle can't return. The thin red line not to be crossed was drawn somewhere between Big Gemini and the glider; cross that line and the shuttle is lost ! In this alternate universe the space agency killed the glider late September after a little clash between Dale Myers and George Low. As such, a month later when the full-size shuttle was threatened the agency had no glider on which to *rebound*, and fell all the way from Saturn-shuttle heights to Big Gemini bottom... without any glider to stop the fall !