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the capsules strike back !

October 19, 1971
Alexander Flax

Memo to:
Dr. Edward E. David
Executive Office of the President - Office of Science and Technology
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Ed:

The Space Shuttle Panel has now had several meetings over a period of two months and I believe it would be useful to give you an interim report on our current impressions and opinions regarding the NASA Space Shuttle Program.
Even during this brief period, as a result of ongoing technical and cost tradeoff studies and program changes to accommodate changing FY -73 budget and peak year funding guidelines and constraints, the shuttle configuration and program phasing have been undergoing continuous revision.

While, in my opinion, the searching examination and revision of the program which has been taking place has been, for the most part, healthy, it has limited the extent to which the Panel has been able to review in depth the merits of particular approaches and the plausibility of the economic and other justifications for the changing program plans.

Given the diversity of scientific and technical backgrounds, interests, and value systems represented among the Panel members, I am sure you will not be surprised to learn that up to this time, we are far from achieving any degree of unanimity regarding the attractiveness, utility, desirability, or necessity of the space shuttle system or, for that matter, on the virtues of alternatives to it. Nevertheless, there are some areas of fairly general agreement and some points of disagreement which I believe are worth reporting in order to help illuminate the critical issues.

Most of the members of the Panel doubt that a viable shuttle program can be undertaken without a degree of national commitment over a long term analogous to that which sustained the Apollo program. Such a degree of political and public support may be attainable, but it is certainly not now apparent.

Planning a program as large and risky (with respect to both technology and cost) as the shuttle, with the long-term prospect of fixed ceiling budgets for the program and for NASA as a whole, does not bode well for the future of the program.
Already some decisions regarding the shuttle system and program have been taken which introduce additional hazards to the success of the program technically, operationally, and economically in order to reduce projected peak-year funding requirements.

For this and other reasons, most Panel members feel that serious consideration must be given to less costly programs which, while they provide less advancement in space capability than the shuttle, still continue to maintain options for continuing manned spaceflight activity, enlarge space operational capabilities, and allow for further progress in space technology.

The attachment contains a more detailed discussion of questions considered by the Panel under the headings:

I. Space Shuttle Objectives, Benefits and Viability
II. Shuttle System and Program
III. Shuttle Cost, Economics and Risks
IV. Space Program Assessment
V. Alternative Programs

Although I have tried in this letter and the attachment to reflect the consensus of the Panel, there has been no opportunity for the members to review and comment on them and they should therefore be considered to be in the nature of a

Chairman's report on Panel activities.
Attachment
Sincerely,
Alexander H. Flax


(...)
V. Alternative Programs
The Panel considered a number of alternatives to development of the shuttle which would provide lesser capabilities and lesser potential long-range future cost savings than the shuttle program but which met to some degree the requirements for a continuing manned program and for further progress in space and spave vehicle technology.

Unfortunately, the costs and technical data for such programs have not been available in anywhere near the depth and detail as for the shuttle program; this is not at all surprising in view of the massive funding and emphasis which the shuttle program has received over the past two years.

Objections can be and were raised to every alternative program on the grounds that, although it was cheaper than the shuttle program, the potential benefits were so much smaller that the cost of such programs could not be justified.

Such objections effectively left only two alternatives for the next ten years: either (1) proceed with the shuttle program now or soon, or (2) drop manned spaceflight activity after Skylab A and the possible Salyut visit and do nothing new in space vehicle and space operations technology. Most of the Panel rejected these "all or nothing" views.

There were three principal alternatives to deciding now to proceed with the shuttle with a 1978-79 objective for the first manned orbital flight which gained some degree of support within the Panel.

This support was subject to various qualifications such as, on the one hand, that they should be considered as preferable to the shuttle and, on the other hand, that they should be considered only if the shuttle were rejected because of budget limitations or the failure to achieve a sufficient degree of national commitment.

In any case, it was agreed that all the alternatives required a good deal more technical, operational and cost analysis before they could proceed.

The alternatives are as follows:

A. Defer Decision on the Shuttle
This alternative contemplates the possibility that with further studies, analyses and technology advancement, uncertainties and risks in the shuttle technical and cost areas can be reduced to a point of greater acceptability and that the national climate for generating the requisite degree of commitment to the program may be improved over the next year or two.

This alternative can, of course, be combined with a period of more intensive study of other alternatives so that there would be a better basis for decision at some future time. A deferral of decision involves lengthening the period during which the U. S. will have no option for a manned spaceflight activity. Present planning by the NASA Office of Manned Spaceflight (01\4S1-7) calls for two Apollo flights in 1972, three Skylab flights in 1973, a Skylab revisit in 1974, and possibly Salyut docking in 1975 and 1976. If carried out on the current schedule, the shuttle program could achieve first manned orbital flight in 1978 or 1979, giving a two or three year lapse in U. S. manned spaceflight.

If a decision on the shuttle is deferred for a year or more, the hiatus in U. S. manned activity could extend to four or five years. There is some Saturn/ Apollo hardware which not used for backup in Skylab or Salyut docking could be used to support another Skylab (which, however, would have no backup). The continuation of the Saturn/Apollo industrial and support effort even during periods when there is little spaceflight activity is very expensive ($500 million to $1 billion annually) with present hardware and mode of operation designed to launch the very large and expensive payloads for manned lunar flights.

It does not seem economically sound to adopt a course of action which would l cad to having to continue the Saturn/Apollo industrial and support base for an extended period, the duration of which is necessarily unknown at the time it is decided upon. This is particularly so because Saturn/Apollo assets are limited in number (4 Command and Service Modules will remain after Skylab and Salyut docking) and reopening manufacturing lines would further significantly increase the already high cost of this approach.

Therefore, if a shuttle decision is to be delayed beyond July 1972, if a viable continuing manned spaceflight option is to be assured without undue economic burden, it would be essential to initiate detailed engineering design and planning for one of the two alternative launch vehicle and spacecraft programs.

B. Ballistic Recovery System
This alternative involves foregoing technological innovation in launch and recovery. However, it permits a continuing manned spaceflight capability, at least for low orbit, at a cost considerably lower than presently possible with Saturn/Apollo systems.
One proposal for a new ballistic recovery system is the "Big Gemini" which is billed as a growth version of the Gemini recovery capsule, but, which to all intents and purposes, is a new spacecraft design based on Gemini technology.
The vehicle is capable of reentry with 2000 pounds of payload and with a Titan III-M launch vehicle can be orbited with 7,000 pounds of payload, including cargo carried in a non-recoverable cargo -propulsion module. It has a passenger capacity of nine men.

There is also a proposal to modify the Apollo command module to make it refurbishable. This would be capable of launch and recovery with four men and would be launched with a modified expendable service module similar to the one used to launch Apollo. This system could most readily be launched by a Saturn IB with which the basic command and service module hardware is already compatible.

Apparently, NASA has considered such ballistic recovery systems only as a short-term interim manned spaceflight capability to cover delays of a year or two in shuttle availability. Therefore, there has been no study of the best approach, if a longer-term program were to be pursued.

The Saturn IB/Apollo program might be the best solution if only a short period were involved, but it is probably not the best choice for a system to provide for a period of 5 to 10 years.

The Big Gemini/Titan III approach is estimated to cost $0.8 to $1.2 billion in RDT&E. However, annual program support costs and direct operating and refurbishment costs would be substantially lower.

A careful and complete comparative study of the two system approaches and perhaps other alternatives is required before the choice could be made for this alternative.

The selection of the launch vehicle also requires more analysis. In addition to Titan III-M and Saturn IB, consideration should also be given to versions of the Titan III-L (large -core Titan vehicle with varying numbers and arrangements of strap -on solid rockets xith a payload of 100,000 pounds)

The parachute-recovered pressure-fed booster might also be attractive for this program if it proves to be feasible and cost effective. Launch vehicle selection should be based not only on requirements of the manned spacecraft, but also on the payload requirements of the space station modules and experimental hardware which the manned spacecraft would presumably be supporting.

The ballistic recovery vehicles and non-recoverable launch vehicles contemplated in this alternative would be justified only if a slow-paced manned spaceflight program were contemplated (2 to 4 manned flights per year).

If the annual frequency of manned flight activity rose much above 5, the cost of each flight ($50 to $150 million) would quickly become prohibitive.

On the other hand, for the low flight rates, this program would require much lower initial investment than the shuttle and should provide a continuing manned spaceflight capability at considerably lower cost than the present Saturn/Apollo systems.

Except for providing a launch vehicle system of higher payload capacity in common use, this alternative would have little effect on unmanned space programs. It would provide a respectable capability to support manned space experimentation and other space station activities. The crews would, however, be subjected to the same launch and recovery accelerations and environments presently experienced by the Apollo astronauts.