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Chapter VII: The Battle of Wake Island, December 8th-24th 1941.
Pretty much.
IOTL Hitler assumed Japan would keep the US occupied until he finished the job in Europe. Besides that I thought Hitler's sense of racial supremacy would come into play: 'the pesky Slavic untermenschen will be defeated before American power can be felt and with Soviet resources we're invincible'
.
Anyway, here's an update for you all.
Early on the morning of December 11th, the garrison, with support of the four remaining Wildcats, repelled the first landing attempt by the South Seas Force, which included three light cruisers, six destroyers, two patrol boats and two troop transports containing 450 troops. The US Marines fired at the invasion fleet with their six 5-inch (127 mm) coastal artillery guns. Major Devereux, the Marine commander under Cunningham, ordered the gunners to hold their fire until the enemy moved within range of the coastal defences. “Battery L”, on Peale Islet, succeeded in sinking destroyer Hayate at a distance of 4.000 yards with at least two direct hits to her magazines, causing her to explode and sink within two minutes, in full view of the defenders on shore. Destroyer Yubari’s superstructure was hit eleven times. The four Wildcats also succeeded in sinking the destroyer Kisaragi by dropping a bomb on her stern where the depth charges were stored. Both were lost with all hands, with Hayate becoming the second Japanese surface warship to be sunk during World War II after Kaga. The Japanese force withdrew before landing (it was the last time that a naval invasion was defeated purely by coastal artillery).
The siege of Wake and frequent air attacks on the island’s garrison continued, without resupply for the Americans, though Commander Winfield Cunningham had sent a long list of critical equipment he needed (including fire-control radar, gun sights and spare parts). The US Navy planned a relief attempt centred on Taskforce 11, which was composed of aircraft carrier USS Saratoga, fleet oiler USS Neches, seaplane tender USS Tangier, heavy cruisers Astoria, Minneapolis and San Francisco, and ten destroyers. Taskforce 14 – with the fleet carrier USS Lexington, three heavy cruisers, eight destroyers, and an oiler – was to undertake a raid on the Marshall Islands to divert Japanese attention.
HMS Warspite’s commanding officer Douglas Blake Fisher, recently promoted to Commodore for his actions at Pearl Harbor, proposed a different and more daring approach, which the Americans adopted. He proposed that TF 11 and TF 14 would both steam for Wake, providing the island with air cover and providing it with the necessary equipment (including 18 US Marine Corps SB2U Vindicator dive bombers originally intended for Midway). Additionally, HMS Warspite would be added to this fleet and be escorted by destroyers USS Hull, USS Macdonough, USS Worden, USS Farragut and USS Dale. The relief force was therefore composed of two aircraft carriers, one battleship, six heavy cruisers, 23 destroyers, two oilers and one seaplane tender, in other words quite a sizeable fleet. It also carried the 4th Marine Defence Battalion and the VMF-221 fighter squadron equipped with Brewster F2A Buffalo fighters, along with 9.000 5-inch (127 mm) shells, 12.000 3-inch (76 mm) shells and 3 million .50 cal. (12.7 mm) rounds. Dummy messages were dropped that only USS Saratoga, three light cruisers and a meagre destroyer escort were headed for Wake (communications to the contrary were limited to written orders as much as possible, for fear of Japan breaking and reading coded messages to the contrary). It would be a target that Fisher believed would be too juicy for the Japanese to pass up, and if they took the bait then there’d be another opportunity to weaken Japan’s carrier force. Fisher’s plan was ambitious to say the least in a time that defeat piled upon defeat for the Allies in the Pacific, but it could count on enthusiastic support from Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Roosevelt went along with it because he believed this gamble could be enough to hold Wake, which would be a major boost to morale as well as a boost to the spirit of Anglo-American cooperation. It was an improvised operation and gamble, but it might just work. The entire effort was coordinated by ABDAFCOM or “American-British-Dutch-Australian-French Command” which was under the over-all command of Sir Archibald Wavell, at least in theory.
The US relief force arrived at Wake on December 22nd and at 9:00 they received news indicating the presence of two enemy carriers and two fast battleships. The two fast battleships in fact turned out to be heavy cruisers and the carriers were Hiryu and Soryu, which had been diverted here because Wake was a key part of the to-be-established perimeter meant to ward off American counterattacks. Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, commander of the First Air Fleet, seized this apparent opportunity to sink an American aircraft carrier: it would, after all, level the playing field (since the Japanese had already lost one carrier to the Allies) and give the Imperial Japanese Navy some breathing space. Hiryu and Soryu were ordered to look out for the American carrier Saratoga.
The new commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Fleet Vice Admiral William S. Pye, a staff officer without significant combat experience, was tempted to abort the operation merely for fear of losses upon learning of Japanese reinforcements. A message from Commodore Fisher stated that he would assist Wake by himself if need be, which forced Pye’s hand because the heroes of Pearl Harbor couldn’t be allowed to be defeated ignominiously (Pye would soon be replaced by the less risk averse Admiral Chester W. Nimitz). The second Japanese invasion force came on December 23rd, composed mostly of the same ships from the first attempt with the major reinforcements of the carriers Hiryu and Soryu, plus 1.500 Japanese marines. Wake’s four remaining F4F Wildcat fighters were supplemented by 18 SB2U Vindicator dive bombers from USS Lexington and fourteen F2A Buffalo fighters (originally intended for Midway and Oahu respectively). Combined with Saratoga’s and Lexington’s own carrier wings, they were able to successfully counter Japanese attempts to gain air superiority, thwarting the planned amphibious assault.
At 8:10 AM on December 23rd, Japanese reconnaissance flights indeed discovered an aircraft carrier, namely the Saratoga. She was approaching Wake from the east and at eight o’clock in the morning she was about 80 kilometres away from the island; Hiryu and Soryu, in the meantime, were 30 km to the north of it, and about 85 km away from Saratoga. It was also reported that the enemy carrier was being escorted by a battleship that wasn’t supposed to be there, namely HMS Warspite. Nagumo dismissed the battleship as inconsequential against air power and figured its sinking would be another notch on his belt. He subsequently ordered an attack on the Saratoga, to be carried out by his Nakajima B5N “Kate” torpedo bombers. After her reconstruction, however, Warspite had eight 4-inch Mk XVI anti-aircraft guns (4x2), thirty-two 40 mm two-pounder anti-aircraft guns (4x8) and four quadruple 0.50 calibre Vickers machine guns. Additionally, there was her armour: she had a 14 inch armoured belt, thicker than that of the preceding Iron Duke-class, and also had improved underwater protection compared to the Iron Dukes (the scale of deck armour was less generous, but sufficient for the time when she had been first commissioned, namely 1915). In effect Warspite was to act as a floating punching bag as well as anti-aircraft battery, drawing away attention from Saratoga whose aircraft complement would assist Warspite in keeping Japan’s carrier planes occupied.
Lexington and the accompanying Taskforce 14 steamed westward as well, but they were located about 70 kilometres to the north of Taskforce 11 and 90 kilometres away from the Japanese. Lexington remained undetected and – upon receiving word from Warspite and Saratoga that their radar had detected incoming enemy planes – launched her own attack, composed of 21 Buffalo fighters, 32 Douglas SBD dive bombers and 15 Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers who only had to worry about a small number of Zeroes on CAP. The TBD Devastators were the spearhead and were covered by eight Buffalos, and they were engaged by Zeroes on CAP with devastating effects: all but three planes were shot down because they, unfortunately, served as sacrificial lambs. While the TBD torpedo bombers and their fighter escort were being decimated, the SDB dive bombers descended from high altitude before Japanese fighters could climb to meet them. In fact, climbing Zeroes, otherwise superior to Allied fighters, were attacked and massacred from above by the thirteen Buffalos escorting the SDBs. Their 12.7 mm machine guns easily penetrated the wooden fuselage of the Zeroes (the Zero had superior speed and manoeuvrability, but its armour protection was weak compared to other aircraft of a similar role, configuration and era; its armament was also weak when compared to that of the Hawker Hurricane, the Spitfire and later the P-51 Mustang).
In the meantime, Nagumo had made the ill-fated decision to re-equip some of Soryu’s Aichi D3A dive bombers with armour piercing bombs designed for anti-ship purposes (basically, they were modified 16 inch shells). The reason was that Nagumo correctly assumed, based on the approach vector of the torpedo bombers that had just been shot down, that there was another American aircraft carrier out there. His timing, unfortunately, was poor because the American dive bombers struck right at the moment that Soryu’s aft deck was littered with aircraft, aviation fuel and bombs. Her aft deck was consumed by a huge fireball and was engulfed by an enormous conflagration that would burn for hours, forcing Soryu to withdraw while Hiryu took in her returning aircraft. Zeroes recalled from CAP drove off the American attackers, but they still managed to sink light cruiser Tenryu and a patrol boat. On December 24th, Christmas Eve, Nagumo made the decision to abort the invasion of Wake.
All-in-all, the failed invasion of Wake had cost the Japanese a light cruiser, two destroyers and a patrol boat while one of their carriers would be in dry dock for repairs for the next six months, after she had limped back to Japan. This was a handicap the Imperial Japanese Navy could ill afford at this time. Though Wake itself wasn’t extremely important, putting an enemy carrier out of commission for six months was a strategic victory. Besides that, the victory in the Battle of Wake Island was a major boost to American morale and – as an Allied rather than a purely American victory – further cemented Anglo-American relations.
Pretty much.
IOTL Hitler assumed Japan would keep the US occupied until he finished the job in Europe. Besides that I thought Hitler's sense of racial supremacy would come into play: 'the pesky Slavic untermenschen will be defeated before American power can be felt and with Soviet resources we're invincible'
.Anyway, here's an update for you all.
Chapter VII: The Battle of Wake Island, December 8th-24th 1941.
In the meantime, simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Wake Island started when 36 Mitsubishi G3M medium bombers flown from bases on the Marshall Islands attacked. Four patrolling F4F Wildcat fighters didn’t detect them due to poor weather and another eight were destroyed on the ground, but two Japanese bombers were shot down the next day. Two more air raids followed in which the main camp was targeted on December 9th, resulting in destruction of the civilian hospital and the Pan Am facility, and on December 10th during which the bombers focused on Wilkes Island. Following the raid on December 9th, the guns had been relocated in case the Japanese had photographed the positions. Wooden replicas were erected in their place and the Japanese bombers attacked the decoy positions.
Early on the morning of December 11th, the garrison, with support of the four remaining Wildcats, repelled the first landing attempt by the South Seas Force, which included three light cruisers, six destroyers, two patrol boats and two troop transports containing 450 troops. The US Marines fired at the invasion fleet with their six 5-inch (127 mm) coastal artillery guns. Major Devereux, the Marine commander under Cunningham, ordered the gunners to hold their fire until the enemy moved within range of the coastal defences. “Battery L”, on Peale Islet, succeeded in sinking destroyer Hayate at a distance of 4.000 yards with at least two direct hits to her magazines, causing her to explode and sink within two minutes, in full view of the defenders on shore. Destroyer Yubari’s superstructure was hit eleven times. The four Wildcats also succeeded in sinking the destroyer Kisaragi by dropping a bomb on her stern where the depth charges were stored. Both were lost with all hands, with Hayate becoming the second Japanese surface warship to be sunk during World War II after Kaga. The Japanese force withdrew before landing (it was the last time that a naval invasion was defeated purely by coastal artillery).
The siege of Wake and frequent air attacks on the island’s garrison continued, without resupply for the Americans, though Commander Winfield Cunningham had sent a long list of critical equipment he needed (including fire-control radar, gun sights and spare parts). The US Navy planned a relief attempt centred on Taskforce 11, which was composed of aircraft carrier USS Saratoga, fleet oiler USS Neches, seaplane tender USS Tangier, heavy cruisers Astoria, Minneapolis and San Francisco, and ten destroyers. Taskforce 14 – with the fleet carrier USS Lexington, three heavy cruisers, eight destroyers, and an oiler – was to undertake a raid on the Marshall Islands to divert Japanese attention.
HMS Warspite’s commanding officer Douglas Blake Fisher, recently promoted to Commodore for his actions at Pearl Harbor, proposed a different and more daring approach, which the Americans adopted. He proposed that TF 11 and TF 14 would both steam for Wake, providing the island with air cover and providing it with the necessary equipment (including 18 US Marine Corps SB2U Vindicator dive bombers originally intended for Midway). Additionally, HMS Warspite would be added to this fleet and be escorted by destroyers USS Hull, USS Macdonough, USS Worden, USS Farragut and USS Dale. The relief force was therefore composed of two aircraft carriers, one battleship, six heavy cruisers, 23 destroyers, two oilers and one seaplane tender, in other words quite a sizeable fleet. It also carried the 4th Marine Defence Battalion and the VMF-221 fighter squadron equipped with Brewster F2A Buffalo fighters, along with 9.000 5-inch (127 mm) shells, 12.000 3-inch (76 mm) shells and 3 million .50 cal. (12.7 mm) rounds. Dummy messages were dropped that only USS Saratoga, three light cruisers and a meagre destroyer escort were headed for Wake (communications to the contrary were limited to written orders as much as possible, for fear of Japan breaking and reading coded messages to the contrary). It would be a target that Fisher believed would be too juicy for the Japanese to pass up, and if they took the bait then there’d be another opportunity to weaken Japan’s carrier force. Fisher’s plan was ambitious to say the least in a time that defeat piled upon defeat for the Allies in the Pacific, but it could count on enthusiastic support from Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Roosevelt went along with it because he believed this gamble could be enough to hold Wake, which would be a major boost to morale as well as a boost to the spirit of Anglo-American cooperation. It was an improvised operation and gamble, but it might just work. The entire effort was coordinated by ABDAFCOM or “American-British-Dutch-Australian-French Command” which was under the over-all command of Sir Archibald Wavell, at least in theory.
The US relief force arrived at Wake on December 22nd and at 9:00 they received news indicating the presence of two enemy carriers and two fast battleships. The two fast battleships in fact turned out to be heavy cruisers and the carriers were Hiryu and Soryu, which had been diverted here because Wake was a key part of the to-be-established perimeter meant to ward off American counterattacks. Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, commander of the First Air Fleet, seized this apparent opportunity to sink an American aircraft carrier: it would, after all, level the playing field (since the Japanese had already lost one carrier to the Allies) and give the Imperial Japanese Navy some breathing space. Hiryu and Soryu were ordered to look out for the American carrier Saratoga.
The new commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Fleet Vice Admiral William S. Pye, a staff officer without significant combat experience, was tempted to abort the operation merely for fear of losses upon learning of Japanese reinforcements. A message from Commodore Fisher stated that he would assist Wake by himself if need be, which forced Pye’s hand because the heroes of Pearl Harbor couldn’t be allowed to be defeated ignominiously (Pye would soon be replaced by the less risk averse Admiral Chester W. Nimitz). The second Japanese invasion force came on December 23rd, composed mostly of the same ships from the first attempt with the major reinforcements of the carriers Hiryu and Soryu, plus 1.500 Japanese marines. Wake’s four remaining F4F Wildcat fighters were supplemented by 18 SB2U Vindicator dive bombers from USS Lexington and fourteen F2A Buffalo fighters (originally intended for Midway and Oahu respectively). Combined with Saratoga’s and Lexington’s own carrier wings, they were able to successfully counter Japanese attempts to gain air superiority, thwarting the planned amphibious assault.
At 8:10 AM on December 23rd, Japanese reconnaissance flights indeed discovered an aircraft carrier, namely the Saratoga. She was approaching Wake from the east and at eight o’clock in the morning she was about 80 kilometres away from the island; Hiryu and Soryu, in the meantime, were 30 km to the north of it, and about 85 km away from Saratoga. It was also reported that the enemy carrier was being escorted by a battleship that wasn’t supposed to be there, namely HMS Warspite. Nagumo dismissed the battleship as inconsequential against air power and figured its sinking would be another notch on his belt. He subsequently ordered an attack on the Saratoga, to be carried out by his Nakajima B5N “Kate” torpedo bombers. After her reconstruction, however, Warspite had eight 4-inch Mk XVI anti-aircraft guns (4x2), thirty-two 40 mm two-pounder anti-aircraft guns (4x8) and four quadruple 0.50 calibre Vickers machine guns. Additionally, there was her armour: she had a 14 inch armoured belt, thicker than that of the preceding Iron Duke-class, and also had improved underwater protection compared to the Iron Dukes (the scale of deck armour was less generous, but sufficient for the time when she had been first commissioned, namely 1915). In effect Warspite was to act as a floating punching bag as well as anti-aircraft battery, drawing away attention from Saratoga whose aircraft complement would assist Warspite in keeping Japan’s carrier planes occupied.
Lexington and the accompanying Taskforce 14 steamed westward as well, but they were located about 70 kilometres to the north of Taskforce 11 and 90 kilometres away from the Japanese. Lexington remained undetected and – upon receiving word from Warspite and Saratoga that their radar had detected incoming enemy planes – launched her own attack, composed of 21 Buffalo fighters, 32 Douglas SBD dive bombers and 15 Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers who only had to worry about a small number of Zeroes on CAP. The TBD Devastators were the spearhead and were covered by eight Buffalos, and they were engaged by Zeroes on CAP with devastating effects: all but three planes were shot down because they, unfortunately, served as sacrificial lambs. While the TBD torpedo bombers and their fighter escort were being decimated, the SDB dive bombers descended from high altitude before Japanese fighters could climb to meet them. In fact, climbing Zeroes, otherwise superior to Allied fighters, were attacked and massacred from above by the thirteen Buffalos escorting the SDBs. Their 12.7 mm machine guns easily penetrated the wooden fuselage of the Zeroes (the Zero had superior speed and manoeuvrability, but its armour protection was weak compared to other aircraft of a similar role, configuration and era; its armament was also weak when compared to that of the Hawker Hurricane, the Spitfire and later the P-51 Mustang).
In the meantime, Nagumo had made the ill-fated decision to re-equip some of Soryu’s Aichi D3A dive bombers with armour piercing bombs designed for anti-ship purposes (basically, they were modified 16 inch shells). The reason was that Nagumo correctly assumed, based on the approach vector of the torpedo bombers that had just been shot down, that there was another American aircraft carrier out there. His timing, unfortunately, was poor because the American dive bombers struck right at the moment that Soryu’s aft deck was littered with aircraft, aviation fuel and bombs. Her aft deck was consumed by a huge fireball and was engulfed by an enormous conflagration that would burn for hours, forcing Soryu to withdraw while Hiryu took in her returning aircraft. Zeroes recalled from CAP drove off the American attackers, but they still managed to sink light cruiser Tenryu and a patrol boat. On December 24th, Christmas Eve, Nagumo made the decision to abort the invasion of Wake.
All-in-all, the failed invasion of Wake had cost the Japanese a light cruiser, two destroyers and a patrol boat while one of their carriers would be in dry dock for repairs for the next six months, after she had limped back to Japan. This was a handicap the Imperial Japanese Navy could ill afford at this time. Though Wake itself wasn’t extremely important, putting an enemy carrier out of commission for six months was a strategic victory. Besides that, the victory in the Battle of Wake Island was a major boost to American morale and – as an Allied rather than a purely American victory – further cemented Anglo-American relations.
- Onkel Willie
- Word Count: 1.9k