How much of a factor was that in 1848/49? While Magyarisation was pushed later in the 19th century, I'm not sure if it was an issue at the time and have heard that the Hungarian revolutionaries were quite modern and democratic in their treatment of other nationalities.
I'm not sure how much this has been discussed here and I'm not that familiar with this period of history, but hopefully this forum is knowlegeadble on the subject. Firstly, do you think the Hungarian revolutionaries could have defeated the Habsburgs and retained independence? What would be a...
Even OTL WW1 kind of counts as a Vietnam analogue because Germany gave up because of a combination of military defeat outside its borders and civilians being unable to take the costs of war. Germany was not physically subjugated by its enemies.
In terms of WW2, Germany didn't need to occupy...
As a New Zealander, I also wonder if a successful Gallipoli could have caused this. I need to do more research into it though before I could give an opinion on its plausability and how that TL might go. Previous TLs or threads on this would be cool to see.
I was thinking about this recently and perhaps the Brusilov Offensive being followed up could have been too much pressure for Germany to handle. This would have been a hugely consequential change in world history by placing Russia in the ranks of the victors and delaying (but not preventing imo)...
Some sectors of the Eastern Front like Rzhev did actually resemble WWI trench warfare, so this could be a useful comparison. Looks like this was a far bloodier 'meat grinder' than any battle in WWI, that probably means it was worse for the individual soldiers but I need to read up on it.
Germany wouldn't risk a major war in the east while leaving a known enemy on its west, the logic of Hitler's expansionism required France to be subdued first.
An interesting feature of the last two crises according to Christopher Clark is how enthusiastic the Allies of the 'belligerents' were, with Britain in 1911 and France in 1912 both strongly backing up their allies and claiming they were ready for war despite the crises being similarly to July...
A notable feature of the leadup to WWI was the increasingly regular diplomatic crises between great powers and alliance blocs, though this is more obvious in hindsight. How do you think these crises compare with that of July 1914? So which do you think was likeliest to start a similar war? By...
Would it be right to say the Central Powers were under the most pressure in 1916 of the three years in question, or does anyone have in mind a scenario with a breakthrough in 1915 or 1917?
Excluding the perhaps obvious choice of at the Marne or in the Race to the Sea, so I'm thinking of a change sometime between 1915 and the end of 1917.
The odds of any kind of breakthrough or even a significant advance may be low due to the nature of WWI. However, when do you think the Western...
The problem in 1919 was that the Allies were in nowhere near as strong a position as in 1945. Their immediate capacity to impose terms in Germany was not limitless.ore importantly, their commitment to enforcing the terms was shaky and ultimately ended up being pretty weak. In that context, a...
Imo 1996 had the kind of conditions that an incumbent would usually win a landslide in like Nixon and Reagan did. I wonder whether Clinton's weaker margin showed that polarisation was increasing and a Reaganesque win was no longer possible. Or maybe Clinton did run a worse campaign than those...
Democrats had a chance of winning every election after 1984. Obviously the ones with incumbents could not have a different candidate (and Gore basically was an incumbent in the 2000 primary), and some like 1988 and 2004 were harder to win. 2016 also had so few candidates, Bernie likely could...