All they had to hit was the power source. There were two masts, a sending mast made out of metal, and a receiving one made out of wood. It would surely have been easy to destroy the receiving mast. Alternatively they could just jam the radar either electronically (which they did do, apparently, later in the BoB) or with Window (which the Germans knew about but were afraid to use, lest it be used on them - a stupid argument if the Germans had won). Anything can be repaired, including the dams broken by the dam busters, are you saying that the dam buster raids were a waste of lives and resources because the dams were repaired during the war? All they had to do was knock out the radar masts or huts and control rooms in the SE of England, not the whole system, and if they were knocked out for most of the daylight hours then that was sufficient.
Operation Sea Lion: The Invasion Itself
- Thread starter YamSeng
- Start date
All they had to hit was the power source. There were two masts, a sending mast made out of metal, and a receiving one made out of wood. It would surely have been easy to destroy the receiving mast. Alternatively they could just jam the radar either electronically (which they did do, apparently, later in the BoB) or with Window (which the Germans knew about but were afraid to use, lest it be used on them - a stupid argument if the Germans had won). Anything can be repaired, including the dams broken by the dam busters, are you saying that the dam buster raids were a waste of lives and resources because the dams were repaired during the war? All they had to do was knock out the radar masts or huts and control rooms in the SE of England, not the whole system, and if they were knocked out for most of the daylight hours then that was sufficient.
I think the controller stations were located next to the bigger air fields, which makes the the task a bit easier.
However, it is difficult to identify one single component in this system which is easy to hit and difficult to repair.
The towers were easy to put back in operation (as proven).
Hitting runways is easy (if you can get past the defense), but also easy to repair (sort of). There are no real cratering bombs yet.
The power supply is a good one, but I am not up to speed on battery power/generators for the stations.
It will require a determined effort of Germany to try to think in systems, which was not prevalent in 1940.
It was hard enough for the Allies to identify the key oil targets in 1944.
Attacking airfields and home chain was the best option, but the key questions are: how? and at what cost?
Ivan
However, it is difficult to identify one single component in this system which is easy to hit and difficult to repair.
The towers were easy to put back in operation (as proven).
Hitting runways is easy (if you can get past the defense), but also easy to repair (sort of). There are no real cratering bombs yet.
The power supply is a good one, but I am not up to speed on battery power/generators for the stations.
It will require a determined effort of Germany to try to think in systems, which was not prevalent in 1940.
It was hard enough for the Allies to identify the key oil targets in 1944.
Attacking airfields and home chain was the best option, but the key questions are: how? and at what cost?
Ivan
Saphroneth
Banned
Guess who it was who had the techniques of Operational Analysis. (Indeed, one argument is that OpAn was the big difference between the Western Allies and the Axis. They knew how to think about problems, even if they didn't always get the right results from it.)
Guys, this has devolved into the classic rehashing of old, old, old arguments. The Germans should destroy Fighter Command bases... the Germans should destroy the radar stations... I know this is unsympathetic to newbies, but think about it for a minute; do you really think this was not addressed a couple thousand times before?
So go read the old threads. There is a a reason for the consensus on this topic. As for myself, I'll beg your pardon and bow out of this thread, I really see no point in reposting here the same very obvious considerations that were made again and again and again in the past, for someone who can't be bothered to look them up in the threads where they were made.
So go read the old threads. There is a a reason for the consensus on this topic. As for myself, I'll beg your pardon and bow out of this thread, I really see no point in reposting here the same very obvious considerations that were made again and again and again in the past, for someone who can't be bothered to look them up in the threads where they were made.
I don't know that much about Sandhurst beyond the Wikilink. Can you provide a link to the precise rules of play used? I see here a bare bones outline -
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion_(wargame)
Provided neither team knew the weather data, then only the bolded part is unsound. The rest is fine.
25% losses of barges to weather - what's the source for that assumption? The weather conditions on 22 September 1940 do not seem bad enough to warrant 25%.
What were the assumptions about the air battles that caused this outcome? How exactly did the fighting go that the Germans lost 333 aircraft in one day and the British 237? These are huge losses for one day of combat.
Both of those would be player, not umpire, decisions.
Which player(s) made the decision to commit the counterattack forces? What information did they have (situational awareness)? How were the invasion forces halted operationally? What units were committed and why were they victorious? What units remained uncommitted to the fighting? No details.
Where's the detailed description of the logistic model used by the umpires to underpin this narrative? What caused the German logistics to fail in the game so catastrophically in the first 48 hours with no RN involvement?
This again would be a player, not an umpire decision, and no wargame of Sealion would assume a bombing campaign against London going on simultaneously to a sea invasion.
Where are the full details of this air-sea engagement? 65% of how many barges? How many RN destroyers engaged out of how many dispatched? What were the exact game rules/planning assumptions that caused the umpires to rule 65% sunk? Why did the German command attempt a reinforcement landing in daytime?
The assumption of the invasion being defeated is logical from the elmination of the 2nd wave. But where are the details of the evacuation phase? 15,000 evacuated to 75,000 killed or captured seems spectacular game play by the British team - how did they manage it?
The game is wrong to say they only had barges when there were many types of transport ships as well as barges, and the initial invasion fleet for beach "E" didn't have any barges at all. There's also mention of a panzer division arriving on the second day, which the final plan didn't allow them to do until possibly S+10. There's mention of Folkestone being totally wrecked but the British orders were to wreck it only so much that it could be repaired in a week after the British recapture it.
by the way, here's a link to a swathe of interesting documents, including the Luftwaffe plans for the support of Sealion: http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numberedusafhistoricalstudies151-200.asp
You can re-read a religious text any number of times and hear people say on line that it is the literal truth over and over again but that doesn't mean that it can't be incorrect or disagreed with. Jehovah! Jehovah! He said Jehovah!!! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SYkbqzWVHZI
Reading a previous Sealion thread is often pointless as it often reads like the high priests of Sealaam repeating sacred texts (e.g. the Gospel According to Brooks and the Book of Fleming) and using it as an opportunity to bully and be rude to the blaspheming minority. There has also been valuable new research done and published that negates many of the arguments used on older threads which makes reading older threads futile.
by the way, here's a link to a swathe of interesting documents, including the Luftwaffe plans for the support of Sealion: http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numberedusafhistoricalstudies151-200.asp
You can re-read a religious text any number of times and hear people say on line that it is the literal truth over and over again but that doesn't mean that it can't be incorrect or disagreed with. Jehovah! Jehovah! He said Jehovah!!! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SYkbqzWVHZI
Reading a previous Sealion thread is often pointless as it often reads like the high priests of Sealaam repeating sacred texts (e.g. the Gospel According to Brooks and the Book of Fleming) and using it as an opportunity to bully and be rude to the blaspheming minority. There has also been valuable new research done and published that negates many of the arguments used on older threads which makes reading older threads futile.
Last edited:
Whilst also substituting for mobile artillery, given difficulty of bringing heavy weapons across for some time.
Saphroneth
Banned
Er... so one of the arguments against the wargame is that it gave the Germans a panzer division eight days early?
If you look at the plans for operation Purge... the RNs reaction plan to an invasion it isn't an unrealistic amount of time to be honest. Invasion was expected along the East Coast not the South Coast and as far as I can tell there was no coordinated RN plan for the defence of a south coast invasion. You can only assume that the delay in the RNs reaction was due in part to the expectation that the invasion was just a diversion and that the destroyer flotillas were, in the main, positioned to repel an attack from the East.
The only Operation Purge I can find anything about is the post-millenium one in Afghanistan. Also, I'm not sure why the RN expected an invasion from the east, they knew the Germans had limited landing capabilities, namely the barges, and thus, that would put limits on where the germans could actually land. Also, there appears to have been no German plans to spoof the British into believing the attack would come from elsewhere, and since it would take probably several days to get everything into position (mines, u-boats, etc.) I have trouble believing that the RN could really be caught by surprise that badly.
Did they? I dissertated on Sea Lion and IIRC there was enough to fill a chapter on German deceptions and big plans - like the concrete crocodiles - that British intelligence seemed to be believing were a threat IOTL.
Actually, no, the game didn't 'give' the Germans a panzer division, it appears it was ruled as crushed by the RN at sea.
I asked where Sandhurst got its numbers for 333 German and 237 British aircraft destroyed in one day. These numbers look absurd. What is the basis for them?
Sorry for the miscommunication.
You are the one saying that Sandhurst is the definitive exercise so that we need not bother with another one. Yet, when asked a simple question like what was the model for 65% of barges sunk in the naval action of Day 2?, or how did the RAF shoot down 400% more Luftwaffe planes in one day than it ever scored on any day in the Battle of Britain, no one seems to know.
Something I've been curious about is what forces could the British bring in from overseas in response to an invasion? The nearest reinforcements are in Canada and the Caribbean.
Another question is, what might the USA have done? I can imagine FDR ordering the Navy in to protect Americans. If they free up British garrisons and ships for the front, oh well, that happens. I also like the idea of US cruisers loaded with Canadian and other Empire troops making high speed runs across the Atlantic.
Another question is, what might the USA have done? I can imagine FDR ordering the Navy in to protect Americans. If they free up British garrisons and ships for the front, oh well, that happens. I also like the idea of US cruisers loaded with Canadian and other Empire troops making high speed runs across the Atlantic.
A better summary, but still no explanation for any of the gaming results. It's not clear if the judges imposed restrictions on the British players to clear the Channel for the first assault, but it looks like they forced them to go for the diversionary force. It seems apparent that the judges interfered with the German players in the guise of "Hitler" - preventing them from properly employing their available airpower, and then imposing a delay on the 2nd wave to time it to arrive at dawn straight into the arms of the waiting RN CL/DD forces when it appears the German players did not want to do it that way.
No explanation of combat modelling - how air losses are about 300% higher than they should be, how more ships got sunk in 24 hours than were sunk in the entire Tunisian campaign of 1942-1943, etc. The modelling looks to have been something like 1 bomber sortie = 1 barge sunk and 2 fighter sorties = 1 aircraft shot down - if so, this is too crude.
No explanation of combat modelling - how air losses are about 300% higher than they should be, how more ships got sunk in 24 hours than were sunk in the entire Tunisian campaign of 1942-1943, etc. The modelling looks to have been something like 1 bomber sortie = 1 barge sunk and 2 fighter sorties = 1 aircraft shot down - if so, this is too crude.