Another Sunday, another Post! Last week saw Chelomei succeed in getting the R-6 to launch the USSR's first satellite. This week we take a look at what other plans he has for cosmic exploration...
Part I Post #6: The Soviet Conquest of Space
Whilst the general international reaction to ISZ-1 had not been as admiring and awe-struck as some had hoped (“The Russians launched a satellite? Didn’t the Americans already do that last year?”), the Soviet satellite did impress in certain scientific and technical quarters. Firstly its shear size was noteworthy. At 1.3 tonnes ISZ-1 was 130 times heavier than the Vanguard series of satellites, indicating a powerful rocket that could not be matched in the West, at least until the Atlas missile began launching spacecraft. This large mass meant more room for scientific instruments. Whereas Vanguard 2 had carried just its radio beacon and cloud cover experiment, ISZ-1 had a suite of twelve instruments for investigations into the composition of the upper atmosphere, charged particles, cosmic rays, electromagnetic fields and micrometorite detectors. Despite having launched after the end of the International Geophysical Year, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR announced that they would follow the principles of the IGY and make their discoveries freely available to the scientists of the world.
Certainly the most famous result obtained from ISZ-1’s mission was the discovery of what would come to be known as the Vernov Radiation Belts. As soon as the first data started to come in to Podlipki, the results showed that ISZ-1’s detectors were picking up huge amounts of radiation, almost to the point of saturating the instruments. At first there were theories that the radiation could be the result of a recent American nuclear weapons test, but as more data came in from successive orbits, dutifully recorded and relayed by the spacecraft’s Tral-D tape recorder, Soviet physicists were able to build up a map of the radiation and rule out an artificial source for the particles. At a conference held in New York City in March 1959, Academician Sergei Vernov presented a paper on their initial findings, demonstrating that the Earth was surrounded by a concentrated belt of radiation trapped by the planet’s magnetic field. Later observations by other spacecraft, both Soviet and American, would confirm Vernov’s findings, marking an important step in the understanding of the near-Earth environment.
With the success of ISZ-1, Mikhail Tikhonravov’s spacecraft team at OKB-385 were keen to quickly follow up the mission with a second launch. As well as the back-up satellite for ISZ-1, they were working on a concept for a biological mission that would put mice and insects, or maybe even a dog into space to test their reactions. Unfortunately for Tikhonravov, it would be some time before he saw another of his satellites in orbit.
Following the American announcement that the Atlas ICBM was now operational, as well as news of a successful first test flight of the even larger Titan ICBM in February, the rocket team OKB-1 were instructed to complete the state trials for the R-6 as quickly as possible. It was at this point however that Chelomei’s early run of luck ran out, and the next two Shesterka launches in February 1959, using a new re-entry vehicle design, both ended in the failure of the carrier rocket. Knowing that a successful deployment of the R-6 would strengthen his hand in making proposals for his future plans, and also aware of the continuing progress being made by Yangel’s OKB-586 on a competing ICBM design, Chelomei drove his team hard. Between March and June he was able to demonstrate a record of seven successful launches from ten attempts. One of the failures had been the attempted launch of the ISZ-1 back-up at the end of March, so Chelomei discounted this and reported his success rate for attempted missile launches as seven out of nine, all using the new, more robust warhead design. This record was deemed acceptable by Nedelin and Ustinov, and so at the beginning of July the R-6 started its formal service with the Soviet armed forces. Whilst one operational R-6 pad was maintained at Tyuratum, the main base for the rocket forces was to be at Plesetsk in northern Russia, closer to its US targets, and it was here that the bulk of operational Shesterka’s were deployed starting in November 1959.
Having achieved success in nursing the R-6 through its problems, Chelomei’s stock was high with the military and political leadership, and he felt the time was ripe to present his plan for the future of Soviet space power. After first approaching Minister of Defence Rodion Malinovsky, Chelomei was invited to present his plans to a meeting of high-level government and military officials, including Khrushchev, in June 1959. Over the course of several hours Chelomei laid out his roadmap for the Soviet conquest of space.
Chelomei’s plan had two main thrusts, the “Universal Rocket” system of missiles and launcher, and the “Raketoplan” spacecraft platform. The Universal Rockets would consist of a scalable set of rocket vehicles based upon clustered common cores. This would allow them to meet all military requirements for nuclear warhead delivery and space launch, from the current 5 tonne payload of the R-6 all the way up to 100 or even 200 tonne monster rockets for the exploration of interplanetary space.
The payloads for these Universal Rockets would be Raketoplans. These would typically consist of a service module, providing propulsion, power, communications and other basic functions, and a mission-specific payload module. This could consist of optical telescopes and film re-entry vehicles for reconnaissance missions; communications systems to allow instant radio contact anywhere in the USSR; nuclear bombs that could be dropped on enemies at a moment’s notice; or even manned spaceplanes, that could overfly enemy positions anywhere in the world before returning to land at airfields on Soviet territory. By using standardised re-entry envelopes based upon the technology Chelomei had developed for encapsulating naval cruise missiles, a variety of different Raketoplan vehicles could be returned to Earth without needing dedicated heat shields. With the largest of the Universal Rockets, appropriately modified Raketoplans would enable a Soviet landing on the Moon, with even larger Raketoplans (called “Kosmoplans” by Chelomei) using nuclear reactors and electric thrusters to perform manned missions to Mars or Venus.
Khrushchev was impressed by Chelomei’s vision, but like many at the meeting he was not entirely convinced that such dreams were achievable. The Soviet leader believed that rocketry was the future (and cheaper) means of ensuring the defence of the Rodina, and Chelomei’s talk of larger missiles and performing reconnaissance and bombing missions from orbit certainly chimed with Khrushchev’s vision of a slimmer, high-tech military force. But people on the Moon and giant spaceships to Mars? That sounded very expensive, especially considering the relatively marginal prestige generated by the USSR’s space achievements to date. Khrushchev would need much more convincing of the value of space spectaculars before he could think about backing anything like that.
One of those definitely not impressed with Chelomei’s approach was Dmitriy Ustinov. The Minister of Defence Industry was irritated that Chelomei had gone through the Ministry of Defence rather than his own ministry, which still had official jurisdiction over rocketry. Of particular annoyance was the way Chelomei had made use of his contacts at the Aviation Ministry and with Khruschev personally to short-cut proper channels. Any proposals for long range plans should have come to Ustinov via Nedelin, not through afternoon drinks with ministers. Despite Ustinov’s obvious anger, Khrushchev instructed the Minister to look into Chelomei’s proposals and have him present a draft decree for consideration by the Council in August. His hand forced, Ustinov agreed to consult with Chelomei on his plan. In fact, he promised, he’d make sure the proposal got the best possible technical assessment by asking for comments from Chelomei’s comrade Chief Designers at the Rocket Propulsion Coordination Committee (KKRD).
Putting the proposal before the KKRD was a smart political move by Ustinov. Though many of the Chief Designers, notably Glushko and Yangel, had supported Chelomei over Sinilshchikov as the man to get the R-6 delivered, they had not been entirely happy with the way he appeared to be using his political contacts to hoover up projects and resources. Upon seeing the plan he’d put before Khrushchev, it was clear that aside from Glushko’s engines, Chelomei was planning to grab all large missile and space projects for himself. Yangel saw that his OKB-586 was intended to become nothing but a production sweat-shop for Chelomei’s UR designs, whilst Mishin was angered that, despite OKB-385’s success with ISZ-1 and the ongoing Sammit project, they were to be completely cut out of Chelomei’s Raketoplan developments. “Perhaps Vladimir Nikolayevich would like to have the Bolshoi Theatre assigned to OKB-1 as well?” Mishin is reported to have asked in sarcasm.
Following a stormy first meeting, Chelomei was forced to redraft his plans to include the other Chief Designers, and so the next month was spent haggling between the design bureaux. Mishin in particular made himself a thorn in Chelomei’s side, making sure to extract as many concessions as possible from the OKB-1 Chief Designer. He especially continued to push his preferred propellant combination of kerosene and liquid oxygen as the best solution for the large carrier rockets envisaged for Chelomei’s interplanetary and lunar ambitions. On this point Glushko fought back strongly, flatly stating that his OKB-456 would have nothing to do with the development of cryogenic engines. Without the support of Glushko’s experts, it was highly unlikely that suitable engines could be developed for such large rockets in a reasonable timeframe, effectively scuppering Mishin’s proposals. As before, it was left to Yangel to suggest a compromise between the two positions, proposing that Mishin be authorised to develop a smaller kerolox launcher within his OKB-385 in order to gain experience in the technology, whilst Glushko started work on his large storable propellant engines. Yangel himself would coordinate a study of the potential of nuclear rocketry, so that a fully-informed technical decision could be taken on the propulsion systems for the larger rockets at a later date.
With the major point of contention dealt with and the allocation of projects agreed, by September the KKRD finally completed a text for the draft decree to put before the Council of Ministers. The draft decree divided the areas of work as follows:
OKB-1 (Chelomei):
- Upgrade the R-6 rocket in collaboration with OKB-385 for use in deep space probes and manned launches, to be ready by 1962.
- Development of an initial 1-man capsule for launch on an R-6 to confirm the ability to support a human being in space for periods of up to 5 days, to be ready by 1962.
- Development of the UR-500 heavy ICBM/launcher with a payload of up to 30 tonnes to LEO by 1965.
- Presentation of a draft project for UR-600 technology development in 1961. The rocket to have a LEO payload of up to 100 tonnes to be developed by 1970.
- Presentation of a draft project for UR-800 technology development in 1962. This would focus on capabilities and potential mission architectures for a potential 150-200 tonne launcher to be developed after 1970.
- Development of unmanned and manned Raketoplans by 1965, with initial test launches starting in 1961. The unmanned versions would include a co-orbital anti-satellite weapon, electronic intelligence and navy reconnaissance capabilities. The manned version would carry a crew of at least two and be capable of rendezvous missions in Earth orbit for military inspections and reconnaissance, as well as having a large cross-range capability. Later manned versions to be capable of supporting lunar flyby and, eventually, lunar landing missions.
OKB-385 (Mishin):
- Deployment of Sammit photoreconnaissance satellites by 1961.
- Development of an upper stage for the R-6 in support of interplanetary probes by 1962.
- Development of a launch vehicle for small satellites (5 tonnes to LEO) using Mishin's preferred kerosene/oxygen propellants, to be ready by 1963.
- Development of a series of early lunar and planetary probes to be launched in the period 1960-1965. Unmanned Raketoplans would take over these missions from 1965 onwards.
- Development of scientific Earth orbit satellites, including weather satellites, over the period 1960-1965.
- Development of an experimental communications satellite for launch in 1963.
OKB-586 (Yangel):
- Development of a missile meeting the UR-200 requirement (10 tonnes to LEO, heavy ICBM) for deployment from 1963 onwards.
- Development of a Fractional Orbital Bombardment Satellite (FOBS) system for the delivery of nuclear warheads from orbit, to be ready by 1965.
- Early development work to investigate nuclear-thermal propulsion for potential use in the UR-600 and UR-800 and nuclear electric propulsion for Kosmoplans to be developed post-1970.
OKB-456 (Glushko)
- Development of high thrust, storable propellant engines in support of the UR-200 and UR-500 launchers.
- Early development work on high thrust, high energy chemical engines for the future UR-600 and UR-800, and for potential use in high energy upper stages from 1965 onwards.
This plan was presented to the Politburo before presentation to the Council of Ministers in September 1959. The final decree deferred all UR-800 related efforts except for nuclear engine studies, but authorised the rest of the KKRD programme, as well as a new point to be achieved in the short term, added at Khrushchev’s personal urging. With this decree in place, the USSR had a roadmap to the stars.
) to start launching on his say-so which is forthcoming as of now. That is, he has cleared two new orbital programs for launch, but one is top secret.
