Charles Evans Hughes in 1920?

Henry Cabot Lodge and other prominent Republicans urged Charles Evans Hughes to make himself available for the Republican presidential nomination in 1920 in case the front-runners Lowden and Wood deadlocked--as they did. But Hughes officially took himself out of the race in April 1920 when his twenty-eight-year-old daughter Helen died of tuberculosis. He even refused Will Hays' request to keynote the 1920 convention for fear that if he were to deliver a sufficiently inspiring speech, there might be a movement to draft him. http://books.google.com/books?id=Uia4A04q8dMC&pg=PT110

Suppose Hughes' daughter had not died, and without campaigning in the primaries, Hughes would not rule out a draft. People like Lodge did not want to see Harding nominated, but in OTL they had no strong alternative left after Wood and Lowden became deadlocked--Hiram Johnson was detested by Easterners and conservatives, Knox was from a safe Republican state (and, like Johnson, was perhaps too unequivocal in his opposition to any sort of league of nations), Hoover was tainted by his association with Wilson, etc. Hughes of course had the disadvantage of having lost in 1916, yet as Bryan, Dewey, Stevenson, and Nixon show (just to confine it to 1900 and later--there are of course earlier examples going back to Jefferson) losing a presidential election does not always prevent getting a later nomination. Besides, the Republicans would have good grounds to believe that many 1916 Wilson voters would show "buyer's remorse."

If nominated, Hughes would win overwhelmingly in November, given the huge unpopularity of Wilson. What would a Hughes administration be like? Presumably most of the scandals of the Harding administration won't take place. (It is not *totally* inconceivable that Hughes will name Albert Fall Secretary of the interior--Fall as a Westerner popular with conservatives and a Spanish-American War veteran did have some things going for him--but he was not a friend of Hughes' as he was of Harding's. And certainly Harry Daugherty isn't going to become Attorney General.) As for the substance of policy--it might be more "progressive" than that of Harding and Coolidge, but maybe not very much. Despite Hughes' background as a moderately progressive governor of New York, he was sufficiently conservative during the 1916 campaign that William Allen White complained, "He talked tariff like Mark Hanna. He talked of industrial affairs like McKinley, expressing a benevolent sympathy, but not a fundamental understanding. He gave the Progressives of the West the impression that he was one of those good men in politics—-a kind of a business man's candidate, who would devote himself to the work of cleaning up the public service, naming good men for offices, but always hovering around the status quo like a sick kitten around a hot brick!" http://books.google.com/books?id=KM4cAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA4-PA50

Three other questions:

(1) Who would his running mate be? A Hughes-Coolidge ticket would mean two Northeasterners. In traditional political terms, it would make more sense to provide geographical balance with someone from the Midwest or West. But in OTL the delegates insisted on Coolidge when the "senatorial clique" tried to foist Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin on them, and they might do so in this ATL also.

(2) Who will Hughes appoint as Secretary of State? My guess is Elihu Root. (Frank Kellogg, leader of the "mild reservationists" in the League fight, is another possibility.)

(3) Assuming Hughes is re-elected in 1924--and there seems no reason to think he won't be, especially given the divisions within the Democratic Party--who will his successor be in 1928? That may partly depend on whether he has a vice-president (e.g., Coolidge) popular enough among conservatives to be a serious rival to Hoover (who I assume will serve in his Cabinet and do as efficient a job as he did under Harding and Coolidge) about whom some of the Old Guard still harbor some misgivings.
 
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Nobody is interested in this?

One thing that occurred to me is that even if in terms of economic policy Hughes is not too different from Harding and Coolidge, and even if like them he is succeeded by Hoover, and the Great Depression and the 1932 FDR victory happen as in OTL, Hughes could still make a difference if he appoints more liberal Supreme Court justices than Harding did. In that case, the history of the New Deal could be substantially different (e.g., no attempt at court-packing).
 

bguy

Donor
(1) Who would his running mate be? A Hughes-Coolidge ticket would mean two Northeasterners. In traditional political terms, it would make more sense to provide geographical balance with someone from the Midwest or West. But in OTL the delegates insisted on Coolidge when the "senatorial clique" tried to foist Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin on them, and they might do so in this ATL also.

What about Harding for Veep? That would provide the regional balance, and Harding seems to be broadly acceptable to everyone.

One thing that occurred to me is that even if in terms of economic policy Hughes is not too different from Harding and Coolidge, and even if like them he is succeeded by Hoover, and the Great Depression and the 1932 FDR victory happen as in OTL, Hughes could still make a difference if he appoints more liberal Supreme Court justices than Harding did. In that case, the history of the New Deal could be substantially different (e.g., no attempt at court-packing).

What was Hughes' take on McNary-Haugen? Is he likely to veto it like Coolidge did?
 
What about Harding for Veep? That would provide the regional balance, and Harding seems to be broadly acceptable to everyone.



What was Hughes' take on McNary-Haugen? Is he likely to veto it like Coolidge did?

I am pretty sure he would veto it. He was, after all, a Northeasterner, and the bill was not popular in the Northeast.
 
I've wondered about a Hughes 1920's as well.

Like you I can't see him losing (or coming close to it) what with Wilson's unpopularity. He'd run on a 'return to Normalcy' platform (something like it anyway), though his campaign would be more about reversing the erosion of civel liberties during/after the war than Harding's, which was as vague as it could be. With this in mind, would Hughes push for an early end to "the noble experiment"? Perhaps not at first, but before he leaves office?


Harding for VP makes sense-a job he's more suited for imho, which in turn means no president Coolidge, ever. I imagine that without the stresses of the presidency (and Teapot) Harding lives longer, though not sure if he'd make it long enough to be renominated for VP in 1924 (I'd guess at 50/50 odds). If Harding dies before Hughes first term is up, who is nominated in his place? Would they attempt to clinch the 1928 nomination? I suspect Harding would opt out of running in 1928 if he lived that long here.

I could be wrong on this, but I think that Al Smith would end up being the Dem nominee in 1924. My reasoning? Without a major scandle, I'm imagining Hughes would look like a shoe-in, like Hoover in 1928 IOTL. So I think McAdoo (and the Dems in general) would let Smith take the fall. That probably disqualifies him from a run in 1928, meaning he doesn't stand down as NY governor (something he may have done for the 1924 election ITTL anyway, though don't quote me on that as my knowledge on NY politics is vague at best). Assuming this is the case, who do the Dems run in 1928? I still think Hoover prevailing in 1928 (both in terms of the GOP nomination and the election) is likely in this scenario given how popular he was in the 1920's, but I wouldn't say it's a certainty.
 
Hughes generally was the kind of candidate that no-one was enthusiastic about but merely found "acceptable", but I have to agree with points made elsewhere that in the end he may have been the best compromise candidate should the stars have been aligned in his favor. By '28 he had wanted to be nominated again but was too far gone politically, losing that base to Hoover who had become the heir-apparent.

As for the running-mate, Coolidge might remain the pick if only because he was as popular among the delegates as he was; Henry Cabot Lodge was actually the first pick of the dissenters but he declined (he did not realize their strength nor did he think they would remotely threaten Lenroot's chances), and agreed to let them nominate Coolidge as a bone. So Coolidge, or Lodge if you want a change of pace (though it is unlikely).
I could be wrong on this, but I think that Al Smith would end up being the Dem nominee in 1924. My reasoning? Without a major scandle, I'm imagining Hughes would look like a shoe-in, like Hoover in 1928 IOTL. So I think McAdoo (and the Dems in general) would let Smith take the fall. That probably disqualifies him from a run in 1928, meaning he doesn't stand down as NY governor (something he may have done for the 1924 election ITTL anyway, though don't quote me on that as my knowledge on NY politics is vague at best). Assuming this is the case, who do the Dems run in 1928? I still think Hoover prevailing in 1928 (both in terms of the GOP nomination and the election) is likely in this scenario given how popular he was in the 1920's, but I wouldn't say it's a certainty.
Given the Republicans would not be hit with the losses that they experienced in '22, the strength of the Catholic vote for the Democratic party would not yet have made itself manifest in the way it did in OTL, which on the whole means even fewer delegates that would have been willing to even vote for a Catholic than there were in OTL (which wasn't even half). The nomination would be McAdoo's to lose under these circumstances given he would have a clear majority of the delegations, though that would still require some major maneuvering to get past the two-thirds barrier. At some point he would break through by simple inertia, but there will still be a clear split between the KKK and Anti-KKK branches.
Hiram Johnson would, as he did Coolidge, challenge Hughes for the Republican nomination in an effort to drive the President further to his own views. Overall I think Johnson would do slightly better than he had against Coolidge given that Coolidge was able to effectively act as a political chameleon whilst using patronage and control of the party machinery to ensure the nomination was his; a big sticking point would have been that Southern Delegations wouldn't have been encouraged to go "Lily-White" as they were, which would have some repercussions in the near-term at least. Hughes wouldn't necessarily be threatened by Johnson though.

Follette likely still runs on his Progressive ticket, but almost certainly does worse given the Hughes and the Republican party would both be more popular and more progressive than the one that Coolidge would have been helming.

Can't really comment on '28 without further thought.



 
Here's my sense of the Hughes Administration in 1921:

President Charles Evans Hughes
Vice-president Warren Harding ¹
Secretary of State Elihu Root
Secretary of the Treasury Charles Dawes
Attorney General Philander Knox
Secretary of War Leonard Wood ²
Secretary of the Navy William S. Sims ²
Secretary of the Interior Calvin Coolidge
Secretary of Agriculture William Jardine
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover
Secretary of Labor William Sproul
Postmaster General Harry S. New

¹ Died in office, 11 September 1925
² Retired from active duty to take Cabinet post

With Harding's death in September 1925, the vice presidency remained vacant for three and a half years. It was unlikely that Harding would have been considered as Hughes' successor in any event: an incumbent vice president had not been selected as the standard-bearer since Martin van Buren--and while Harding was well-liked personally, few thought him presidential material.

On the other hand, the cabinet did contain a number of those who more or less met the general specifications of presidential material, including Coolidge, Hoover, and Sproul (Elihu Root commented at one point that he might have considered a bid when younger, but not at this point in life). But chief among these was the colorful Secretary of the Treasury Charles "Hell and Maria" Dawes.

One never wondered where Dawes stood on a given issue. He spoke forthrightly-indeed, forcefully-and rather eloquently. Further, he was credited with the creation of the Exchanges and Securities Bureau in 1923. That body acted to govern trading in securities and similar valuables, reining in the practice of buying on margin--a practice Dawes had warned would create a bubble that could burst with grim economic consequences.

Dawes also pointed out that not only was prohibition unenforceable in practical terms, but it removed a significant revenue stream. He maintained that excise taxes paid by those who chose to buy alcohol could reduce federal income taxes noticeably, and save money ill-spent in the futile enforcement of prohibition. Dawes' arguments led to adoption of a "wet" plank in the Republican platform in 1924. (When informed that Wayne Wheeler would support the Democrats as a result, Dawes replied, "Wheeler is a horse's ass with no practical common sense.")

At the 1928 GOP convention, Dawes won nomination on the first ballot and chose Kansas senator Charles Curtis as his running mate.
 
With Harding's death in September 1925, the vice presidency remained vacant for three and a half years. It was unlikely that Harding would have been considered as Hughes' successor in any event: an incumbent vice president had not been selected as the standard-bearer since Martin van Buren--and while Harding was well-liked personally, few thought him presidential material.

On the other hand, the cabinet did contain a number of those who more or less met the general specifications of presidential material, including Coolidge, Hoover, and Sproul (Elihu Root commented at one point that he might have considered a bid when younger, but not at this point in life). But chief among these was the colorful Secretary of the Treasury Charles "Hell and Maria" Dawes.

One never wondered where Dawes stood on a given issue. He spoke forthrightly-indeed, forcefully-and rather eloquently. Further, he was credited with the creation of the Exchanges and Securities Bureau in 1923. That body acted to govern trading in securities and similar valuables, reining in the practice of buying on margin--a practice Dawes had warned would create a bubble that could burst with grim economic consequences.

Dawes also pointed out that not only was prohibition unenforceable in practical terms, but it removed a significant revenue stream. He maintained that excise taxes paid by those who chose to buy alcohol could reduce federal income taxes noticeably, and save money ill-spent in the futile enforcement of prohibition. Dawes' arguments led to adoption of a "wet" plank in the Republican platform in 1924. (When informed that Wayne Wheeler would support the Democrats as a result, Dawes replied, "Wheeler is a horse's ass with no practical common sense.")

At the 1928 GOP convention, Dawes won nomination on the first ballot and chose Kansas senator Charles Curtis as his running mate.
Harding would not get the VP nomination. I can imagine his managers running around trying to secure it for him, but he wouldn't be able to evoke the kind of following that men like Coolidge or even Lowden would be able create. Contrary to my earlier statements I would even say that Frank Lowden would be the favorite for the VP nomination, but that only be in the case that Hughes agreed to stay on for a single term (allowing Lowden to run in '24), something I don't see him doing. Coolidge at this convention would remain by and far the favorite.

At this point Dawes was effectively a political nobody, and it was only because of his actions during his tenure in the Harding Administration that he was considered for the VP nomination in '24. When put next to somebody like Andrew Mellon who had been in the banking industry for decades, successfully at that, Dawes would have at most been appointed to the lowly office he attained.

By '28 though Dawes, provided he makes similar moves, could very well be Vice-Presidential material for whomever wins the nomination that year, except of course Lowden (provided they would be both from the state of Illinois). I mention Lowden because he would be in a strong position to run by that point provided he make the right decisions, and Hoover the wrong ones.

Also, to be frank, a "wet" plank would never be adopted in this era by the Republican Party. It might certainly have seemed hypocritical given the personal actions of many of those involved against Prohibition but there was a political cost associated with trying to dismantle it, and it was deemed too high by most.
 
Harding would not get the VP nomination. I can imagine his managers running around trying to secure it for him, but he wouldn't be able to evoke the kind of following that men like Coolidge or even Lowden would be able create. Contrary to my earlier statements I would even say that Frank Lowden would be the favorite for the VP nomination, but that only be in the case that Hughes agreed to stay on for a single term (allowing Lowden to run in '24), something I don't see him doing. Coolidge at this convention would remain by and far the favorite.

At this point Dawes was effectively a political nobody, and it was only because of his actions during his tenure in the Harding Administration that he was considered for the VP nomination in '24. When put next to somebody like Andrew Mellon who had been in the banking industry for decades, successfully at that, Dawes would have at most been appointed to the lowly office he attained.

By '28 though Dawes, provided he makes similar moves, could very well be Vice-Presidential material for whomever wins the nomination that year, except of course Lowden (provided they would be both from the state of Illinois). I mention Lowden because he would be in a strong position to run by that point provided he make the right decisions, and Hoover the wrong ones.

Also, to be frank, a "wet" plank would never be adopted in this era by the Republican Party. It might certainly have seemed hypocritical given the personal actions of many of those involved against Prohibition but there was a political cost associated with trying to dismantle it, and it was deemed too high by most.

Coolidge would be the favorite of the rank and file to be sure, but the idea of geographic balance was still very strong in 1920; IRC, it's not until 1948 that we got a ticket from the same region. That would definitely give Lowden and even Lenroot a boost - although the latter is probably too much of a clear progressive, while the others had sufficiently cloudy stances.
 
Coolidge would be the favorite of the rank and file to be sure, but the idea of geographic balance was still very strong in 1920; IRC, it's not until 1948 that we got a ticket from the same region. That would definitely give Lowden and even Lenroot a boost - although the latter is probably too much of a clear progressive, while the others had sufficiently cloudy stances.
I never meant to imply that geographic balance would not be an important factor, but it is hard to see any other candidate deriving the kind of following that Coolidge did, at least among those who would actively compete (Lowden, for example, would be one of the least willing to accept the VP slot given his actions in OTL). Lenroot would face similar issues as he did in OTL. Kansas Governor Henry Allen would be an interesting choice but more in the dystopic sense.


 

Stolengood

Banned
TR was considering Harding as his VP for 1920. Harding had been the convention chairman in 1916; therefore, I don't doubt that he had enough prominence to become VP candidate in 1920. It's very likely he would be.
 
TR was considering Harding as his VP for 1920. Harding had been the convention chairman in 1916; therefore, I don't doubt that he had enough prominence to become VP candidate in 1920. It's very likely he would be.
Again though his nomination would come from party bosses, which, if things proceed in a fashion similar as to how they actually did, would almost certainly destroy his bid for that position. That and his electoral viability had been challenged by his major defeat in the Indiana primary that year (where he came fourth).


 

Stolengood

Banned
Again though his nomination would come from party bosses, which, if things proceed in a fashion similar as to how they actually did, would almost certainly destroy his bid for that position. That and his electoral viability had been challenged by his major defeat in the Indiana primary that year (where he came fourth).


In 1920? I'm confused; where are you getting this primary information? :confused:
 
Wasn't Hughes considered to be "Wilson with whiskers"? I think the mood in 1920 was trending more conservative.

As I noted, Hughes, despite his progressive background, was pretty conservative in the 1916 campaign, calling for a higher tariff and opposing the Adamson Act. "By 1920, Hughes was decrying the enhanced power of the national state and asking 'whether constitutional government ... could survive another great war....' " http://archive.today/WNDx#selection-2217.1-2217.158) Given his rightward drift, I don't think that Hughes would have been considered too progressive for the GOP in 1920--after all, Lodge, who urged him not to rule out a candidacy, was hardly a radical.

(The phrase "whiskered Wilson" was TR's incidentally, and was meant to attack Hughes not for being too "progressive" but for not being eager enough to get America into the War.)

There was in fact always something conservative about much of the progressivism of the urban Northeast, which looked with some suspicion on the "wild men" of the agrarian West. Even before 1916, note for example Hughes' opposition to the Sixteenth Amendment: http://books.google.com/books?id=CxZSx5klWUAC&pg=PA65
 
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As I noted, Hughes, despite his progressive background, was pretty conservative in the 1916 campaign, calling for a higher tariff and opposing the Adamson Act. "By 1920, Hughes was decrying the enhanced power of the national state and asking 'whether constitutional government ... could survive another great war....' " http://archive.today/WNDx#selection-2217.1-2217.158) Given his rightward drift, I don't think that Hughes would have been considered too progressive for the GOP in 1920--after all, Lodge, who urged him not to rule out a candidacy, was hardly a radical.

(The phrase "whiskered Wilson" was TR's incidentally, and was meant to attack Hughes not for being too "progressive" but for not being eager enough to get America into the War.)

There was in fact always something conservative about much of the progressivism of the urban Northeast, which looked with some suspicion on the "wild men" of the agrarian West. Even before 1916, note for example Hughes' opposition the Sixteenth Amendment: http://books.google.com/books?id=CxZSx5klWUAC&pg=PA65

Ah, thanks for the clarification!

I was aware of the "conservative" and "progressive" thing, combined with the fact that labels can drift significantly. IIRC Calvin Coolidge described his views in the Massachusetts state legislature as "liberal to radical". Which, of course, they were, just not in ways that a 21st Century American would recognize the word.
 
In 1920? I'm confused; where are you getting this primary information? :confused:
Various sources, though the hard numbers are available in U.S. Presidential Candidates and Elections by James Havel. The numbers were:

  • Leonard Wood: 85,708
  • Hiram Johnson: 79,840
  • Frank Lowden: 39,627
  • Warren Harding: 20,782
Our Campaigns should also have them, provided you are able to navigate the site.


 
At this point Dawes was effectively a political nobody, and it was only because of his actions during his tenure in the Harding Administration that he was considered for the VP nomination in '24.

Not so. Dawes had already served as the Comptroller of the Treasury, and was a successful banker in his own right (admittedly, not to the degree of Mellon). Further, he facilitated consummation of the first loan ($500 x 10⁶) to the Entente, shepherding the loan as only a non-House of Morgan banker could. He also was the chief of supply procurement with the AEF during the war.

Sum that up and you have a successful banker with prior federal experience--not a bad candidate for SecTreas at all.
 
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