Lord Palmerston intervens in Schleswig

[Lt.Gen 767]

When Prussia was at war with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein the British PM, Lord Palmerston came very close to joining the war on Denmark's side a number of times:
When the war started in February Denmark requested the the British come to their aid and Russell urged him to send a fleet to Copenhagen but nothing came of it as it was believed that France wouldn't cross the Rhine. In April the Austrian navy was sailing to Denmark and an ultimatum was issued that if they entered the English channel Britain would declare war, the Austrians turned back. In June another ultimatum was issued that if Copenhagen was threatened Britain would go to war with Prussia and Austria and many conservative MPs wanted to go to war.
So what if Britain and maybe France had gone to war with Prussia and Austria over Schleswig-Holstein? Who would win and how would this affect the balance of power in Europe?

 

[wolf_brother]

You'll certainly get France, and likely the rest of Europe in fact, involved as well. The lack of an intervention by the Western powers in the Second Schleswig War was almost entirely due to a crisis of confidence in their allies. The British didn't intervene because they believed the French wouldn't support them; the French didn't intervene because they believed the British wouldn't support them; the Russians didn't intervene because they believed the British wouldn't support them; the Swedes didn't intervene because they thought the Russians and British wouldn't support them... etc. etc.

 

[Sian]

just for clarifying ... first or second schleswig war?

 

[Mikestone8]

You'll certainly get France, and likely the rest of Europe in fact, involved as well. The lack of an intervention by the Western powers in the Second Schleswig War was almost entirely due to a crisis of confidence in their allies. The British didn't intervene because they believed the French wouldn't support them; the French didn't intervene because they believed the British wouldn't support them; the Russians didn't intervene because they believed the British wouldn't support them; the Swedes didn't intervene because they thought the Russians and British wouldn't support them... etc. etc.

Why would France be interested in intervening?

Her only stake in the matter was as a guarantor of the 1852 Treaty of London, but the Danes themselves had abandoned that by trying to malgamate Schleswig into the Danish Kingdom. And Nappy III, as a Bonaparte, was hardly likely to go to war to maintain a frontier of 1815.

 

[Lt.Gen 767]

just for clarifying ... first or second schleswig war?

I am ,as wolf_brother said, referring to the second schleswig war.

Why would France be interested in intervening?

Her only stake in the matter was as a guarantor of the 1852 Treaty of London, but the Danes themselves had abandoned that by trying to malgamate Schleswig into the Danish Kingdom. And Nappy III, as a Bonaparte, was hardly likely to go to war to maintain a frontier of 1815.

The most obvious gain for the French is to stop Prussia from being able to unite Germany. With the benefit of hindsight we know that a united Germany will be a very powerful threat to France and I think that France would be able to figure that out at the time. If they are beaten in this war it will be a real setback in their plans. Prussia will probably try again but having stopped them once I think that the other European powers will stop them again.

 

[Monty Burns]

The most obvious gain for the French is to stop Prussia from being able to unite Germany. With the benefit of hindsight we know that a united Germany will be a very powerful threat to France and I think that France would be able to figure that out at the time. If they are beaten in this war it will be a real setback in their plans. Prussia will probably try again but having stopped them once I think that the other European powers will stop them again.

But the immediate outomce did absolutely not support the idea that Prussia would unite Germany soon: the Condominium was a mess and could be expected to work out that way. therefore, the war cemented German dualism - which is good from all neighbouring countries' point of view, right?

 

[Mikestone8]

I am ,as wolf_brother said, referring to the second schleswig war.

The most obvious gain for the French is to stop Prussia from being able to unite Germany. With the benefit of hindsight we know that a united Germany will be a very powerful threat to France and I think that France would be able to figure that out at the time. If they are beaten in this war it will be a real setback in their plans. Prussia will probably try again but having stopped them once I think that the other European powers will stop them again.

What "European powers"?

Prussia and Russia are on good terms, so nothing will happen on that front. Britain is negligible as a land power, so effectively France would have to fight alone against both Prussia and Austria - and five years earlier she had made heavy weather of it just against Austria.

Add in the fact that both GB and France had very strained relations with the Union side in the ACW, so there's a permanent risk of war with the US, and the chances of them doing anything about the Danish business are somewhere between negligible and zero. If France does anything at all, it would most likely be to pressure Austria into giving up Venice to Italy. No one in Paris was worrying about Prussia in 1864. Only after Koniggratz did they begin to take her seriously.

 

[wolf_brother]

Why would France be interested in intervening?

Her only stake in the matter was as a guarantor of the 1852 Treaty of London

She had in the First War, even in the height of a revolution, and she had guaranteed Denmark's unity afterward. You can't exactly deny that Napoléon III was highly interested in maintaining and expanding the empire's (and by extension, his own) prestige and influence. The war could have potentially cemented the Franco-British entente that he had forged in the Crimea.

but the Danes themselves had abandoned that by trying to malgamate Schleswig into the Danish Kingdom.

You really think someone like Louis-Napoléon cares about such things?

And Nappy III, as a Bonaparte, was hardly likely to go to war to maintain a frontier of 1815

I'm not sure what your point is with this. No one ITT had suggested France expand her frontier...

What "European powers"?

Prussia and Russia are on good terms, so nothing will happen on that front.

Such good powers that Russia had intervened in Prussian affairs in 1848 and in 1856 during the First Schelswig War and the Neuchâtel Crisis. Yes, certainly negligible.

Add in the fact that both GB and France had very strained relations with the Union side in the ACW, so there's a permanent risk of war with the US, and the chances of them doing anything about the Danish business are somewhere between negligible and zero.

Once again, it was a crisis of confidence, of leadership, taking the eye off the ball, whatever vague platitude you prefer. Change the political situation in Britain to where Pamerston feels more confident and he'll be the first to lead the charge to war. Hell, change what Napoléon III ate and he's likely to have a change of heart, the fickle bastard.

No one in Paris was worrying about Prussia in 1864. Only after Koniggratz did they begin to take her seriously.

No one except the Empress, the Council of Ministers, the generalship...

-----

Prussia & Austria went into the war somewhat resigned to failure in the face of another Western intervention carried on a wave of nationalist fervor following the sudden death of Frederick VII and Christian IX's decision to adopt the still incomplete November Constitution in an attempt to force the unity of Schleswig-Holstein with Denmark. The fact that nobody did, in fact, intervene, was quite a shock to both the Germans and the Danes. Remember, the war started when Frederick VIII von Augustenburg claimed the throne of Schleswig-Holstein as an independent duchy, relying on pan-German nationalist sentiment in the region to buoy his claims. The German princes knew that if they didn't support German irredentism in Schleswig-Holstein that they'd be facing 1848 all over again. Once the war started and no British or French ships arrived however...

 

[Mikestone8]

Once again, it was a crisis of confidence, of leadership, taking the eye off the ball,

What "ball"?

Even if Prussia had been seen as a threat to France, what was the sense of attacking her while she had Austria as an ally? The logical thing to do would be to sit back and wait for Austria and Prussia to fall out - which, if Prussia is to unify Germany, must inevitably happen - so that France, not Prussia, is the one with an ally. In the event, even in 1866 Nappy wasn't sufficiently concerned about Prussia to take any action. If not willing to do it then, why should he take the plunge under far less favourable conditions two years earlier - especially when he has this far more exciting project going over in Mexico?

No one except the Empress, the Council of Ministers, the generalship...

Have you a cite for this?

Harold Kurtz, in his biography of Empress Eugenie, quotes her as saying that Prussian acquisitions along the Danish border were preferable to "yet another independent pocket principality". Nappy himself advocated plebiscites in the affected areas - a demand which Bismarck would have had no trouble accepting. Indeed, he could even invite France to supervise the plebiscite - and then leave the Danes to slap Nappy in the face by rejecting it, thus forfeiting any hope of French support..

Prussia & Austria went into the war somewhat resigned to failure in the face of another Western intervention

What is your source for that, please?

 

[wolf_brother]

Even if Prussia had been seen as a threat to France, what was the sense of attacking her while she had Austria as an ally? The logical thing to do would be to sit back and wait for Austria and Prussia to fall out - which, if Prussia is to unify Germany, must inevitably happen - so that France, not Prussia, is the one with an ally. In the event, even in 1866 Nappy wasn't sufficiently concerned about Prussia to take any action. If not willing to do it then, why should he take the plunge under far less favourable conditions two years earlier - especially when he has this far more exciting project going over in Mexico?

You'd have a point, except that Napoléon III changed his mind and countermanded his earlier orders to go ahead with an intervention in the Seven Weeks War literally the night before the French operation was to begin. His reasoning? He had a trouble's nights rest with ill dreams - and to Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, mystic that he was who had always trusted more in his gut and his heart than his own brains, that was more than reason enough to call off the whole thing.

Have you a cite for this?

Harold Kurtz, in his biography of Empress Eugenie, quotes her as saying that Prussian acquisitions along the Danish border were preferable to "yet another independent pocket principality". Nappy himself advocated plebiscites in the affected areas - a demand which Bismarck would have had no trouble accepting. Indeed, he could even invite France to supervise the plebiscite - and then leave the Danes to slap Nappy in the face by rejecting it, thus forfeiting any hope of French support..

David Duff in his Eugenie and Napoleon III states that Eugénie had been privately calling for a French intervention within the the council and court since the beginning of the conflict between the Danes and Germans, and that a majority of the council and Napoléon's familiars in the court (e.g. Plon-Plon) supported such a move.

What is your source for that, please?

Ohio University's Encyclopedia of 1848 Revolutions

 

[Westphalian]

You'd have a point, except that Napoléon III changed his mind and countermanded his earlier orders to go ahead with an intervention in the Seven Weeks War literally the night before the French operation was to begin. His reasoning? He had a trouble's nights rest with ill dreams - and to Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, mystic that he was who had always trusted more in his gut and his heart than his own brains, that was more than reason enough to call off the whole thing.

I don't want to derail the 1864 question, but did the original orders of 1866 survive? If not, is there at least generally known what the French army was meant to do?

 

[wolf_brother]

I don't want to derail the 1864 question, but did the original orders of 1866 survive? If not, is there at least generally known what the French army was meant to do?

Randon told Napoléon III that he could have 80,000 French troops to the border immediately and over 200,000 there within two weeks. The French would have smashed into the Prussians ill-protected flank while the majority of her forces were across the Ores deep into Bohemia. This would have been just a day after Sadowa iirc, so the Prussians could try to wheel about back across the mountains and give up all momentum against Bohemia or they could try to press onto Vienna and hope their Landwehr could slow down the French advance.

 

[Westphalian]

When Prussia was at war with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein the British PM, Lord Palmerston came very close to joining the war on Denmark's side a number of times:
When the war started in February Denmark requested the the British come to their aid and Russell urged him to send a fleet to Copenhagen but nothing came of it as it was believed that France wouldn't cross the Rhine. In April the Austrian navy was sailing to Denmark and an ultimatum was issued that if they entered the English channel Britain would declare war, the Austrians turned back. In June another ultimatum was issued that if Copenhagen was threatened Britain would go to war with Prussia and Austria and many conservative MPs wanted to go to war.
So what if Britain and maybe France had gone to war with Prussia and Austria over Schleswig-Holstein? Who would win and how would this affect the balance of power in Europe?

What would the UKs demands be? That the situation of the London Protocol of 1851 should be restored? Or something more advantageous for Denmark, like the Eider border, ie splitting off Schleswig from Holstein, like the 1863 constitution did?

As others have said, Bismarck was trying to ride the tiger of German nationalism here and he is certainly not ready to engage in a war against the UK and France. His opinion of the British army was low, so he *might* risk a conflict with the UK alone. Question: How is Bismarcks relationship with the anglophile crown prince in 1864? Would hurting his prestige and influence in Prussia already matter?
For what it is worth, I dimly remember that the crown princess Victoria was much in favor of the Augustenburg claim, ie the proclamation of S-H as a sovereign duchy, probably allied with Prussia.

 

[Mikestone8]

What would the UKs demands be? That the situation of the London Protocol of 1851 should be restored? Or something more advantageous for Denmark, like the Eider border, ie splitting off Schleswig from Holstein, like the 1863 constitution did?

Presumably the Treaty of London. After all, we were one of the guarantor powers, so if the Danes repudiated it we'd be unable to support them. Palmerston would have to insist on that to have any hope of carrying the Cabinet with him
.

As others have said, Bismarck was trying to ride the tiger of German nationalism here and he is certainly not ready to engage in a war against the UK and France. His opinion of the British army was low, so he *might* risk a conflict with the UK alone.'

What British army?

The bulk of it was in Canada, and couldn't be removed till all possibility of a clash with the Union had passed. We might have scraped together a fiddling liuttle auxiliary corps from somewhere

Incidentally, in the unlikely event of France going to war, why would she necessarily attack Prussia? Austria is still stubbornly holding on to Venetia, which Nap III cares deeply about (don't ask me why) whereas he never expressed the slightest interest in Denmark. Also, while Bismarck won't sacrifice a single pickelhaube for Venice, Franz Josef is susceptible to attacks of honour, and might get it into his head that it was his "duty" to help his Prussian allies. He is also still smarting from 1859, and detests Louis Napoleon. In such circs, isn't LN more likely to stand on the defensive against Prussia, while making his main effort against the Austrians, in conjunction with Italy? After all, with Austria's best regiments up north, there'd never be a better moment.

Question: How is Bismarcks relationship with the anglophile crown prince in 1864? Would hurting his prestige and influence in Prussia already matter?

Their relations had never been worse. Only last year Fritz had got himself into hot water by pubicly condemning Bismarck's press censorship. Anything that weakened his influence would be entirely welcome to Bizzy.

For what it is worth, I dimly remember that the crown princess Victoria was much in favor of the Augustenburg claim, ie the proclamation of S-H as a sovereign duchy, probably allied with Prussia.

I expect so, but all that would do is turn King Wilhelm against the idea

 

[Mikestone8]

You'd have a point, except that Napoléon III changed his mind and countermanded his earlier orders to go ahead with an intervention in the Seven Weeks War literally the night before the French operation was to begin. His reasoning? He had a trouble's nights rest with ill dreams - and to Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, mystic that he was who had always trusted more in his gut and his heart than his own brains, that was more than reason enough to call off the whole thing.

That sounds lie a classic bit of court tittle-tattle.

If Nap claimed to have had a bad dream (convenient excuse as there's no way of checking it) it was because he didn't want to fight and was ready to grab any pretext to avoid doing so. If he got such a dream in 1866, we may take it as probable to the point of certainty that he would have had a similar one in 1864.

 

[Westphalian]

Presumably the Treaty of London. After all, we were one of the guarantor powers, so if the Danes repudiated it we'd be unable to support them. Palmerston would have to insist on that to have any hope of carrying the Cabinet with him.

If you are correct (and I think you are) then the Anglo-German war of 1864 is stopped before starting: Bismarck originally insisted only on the suspension of the Danish November constitution, since that document openly violated the London Protocol by binding Schleswig closer to Denmark than Holstein. It were the nationalists who insisted on greater aims, but that had no power - in factm they were mostly identical with the liberals in the Berlin parliament with whom Bismarck was already in open conflict.

But even if we postulate a breakdown of diplomacy leading to a British DoW, what will that mean? The UK can hurt Prussia and Austria at sea, but since 1863 Prussia and Russia are closely allied against the Polish Uprising, so a British Fleet in the Baltic will make St. Petersburg unhappy. How likely is an attack by the Royal navy on Austrian ports on the Adriatic?

And while I understand the sympathy for plucky little Denmark and the whole Davis-and-Goliath narrative, it is hard to champion the Danish leadership: The whole constitutional affairs is weird and in violation of esteblished treaties, the military strategy was screwy and the diplomacy also had its weank points: Even in May, after the German victory at Düppel/Dybböl, Denmark refused Bismarcks offer of a partition of Schleswig along the language line; so they lost all of it it when the fighting was renewed.

Strong British support will make the Danish government even more unflexible, probably without strengthening the Danish position that much.

 

[wolf_brother]

That sounds lie a classic bit of court tittle-tattle.

If Nap claimed to have had abad dream (convenient excusae as there's no way of checking it) it was because he didn't want to fight and was ready to grab any pretext to avoid doing so. If he got such a dream in 1866, we may take it as probable to the point of certainty that he would have had a similar one in 1864.

I think you're severely misunderstanding and underestimating Louis-Napoléon and how much of a romantic, in all the senses of that term, that he was. You can see it throughout his life - if you care to look.

Give the man a good night's rest in 1866 and you've stopped Prussian domination of the German states cold. There's simply no reason to assume, as you do, that because he had a poor night two years later that he would if Britain had pressed the issue in '64.

 

[wolf_brother]

The UK can hurt Prussia and Austria at sea, but since 1863 Prussia and Russia are closely allied against the Polish Uprising, so a British Fleet in the Baltic will make St. Petersburg unhappy.

On the other hand bear in mind that Russia was another of the original signatories of the 1850 treaty, and viewed German nationalism with some degree of hostility.

 

[Westphalian]

On the other hand bear in mind that Russia was another of the original signatories of the 1850 treaty, and viewed German nationalism with some degree of hostility.

Yes, but it was Denmark who had violated that treaty - and in 1863/4 the alliance with Prussia against Polish nationalism was much more important.

Too bad for AH that it is too difficult to have the Russian branch of the Oldenburgs inherit the Danish throne in 1863 ...

 

[Mikestone8]

I think you're severely misunderstanding and underestimating Louis-Napoléon and how much of a romantic, in all the senses of that term, that he was. You can see it throughout his life - if you care to look.

Give the man a good night's rest in 1866 and you've stopped Prussian domination of the German states cold. There's simply no reason to assume, as you do, that because he had a poor night two years later that he would if Britain had pressed the issue in '64.

I'm quite aware he was a romantic - which makes it all the less likely that he will be distracted from his Great Adventure in Mexico by some mundane affair about the ownership of a few square miles of cow pasture on the Baltic.

Even if he does look like moving, Bismarck can easily buy him off by inviting him to supervise a plebiscite in Schleswig (which those nationalistic halfwits in Copenhagen will immediately slap France in the face by rejecting), and maybe adding a half-promise of a free hand in Luxembourg and maybe even the Francophone parts of Belgium.