Neither Founding Fathers nor Bolsheviks
From The Jihad War by Thomas Friedman
Many in the west were astonished by the speed of the Saudi collapse when it came and the slow response of the western powers in the four months between the Hajj riots in November 1978 (the event which precipitated the fall of the Al Saud) and the Iraqi Invasion of February 1979. In part the very speed of the Al Saud collapse – an unexpected event in most western capitals despite the previous warnings - precipitated a cautious reaction. However to fully understand the events it is important to place them in context.
The Religious-Political situation in Saudi Arabia
Political and social power in Saudi Arabia rested in three groups: the royal (Al Saud) family, the Ulema and the tribal leaders.
The royal family dominated the political system. The family’s vast numbers allowed it to control most of the kingdom’s important posts and to have an involvement and presence at all levels of government. The number of princes is estimated to be anything from 7,000 upwards, with the most power and influence being wielded by the 200 or so male descendants of King Abdul Aziz. The key ministries were generally reserved for the royal family,as Arnold] were the thirteen regional governorships. Long term political and government appointments, (some senior ministers – all of whom are sons of the founding King – have held certain portfolios most of the lives, such as such as King Abdullah, who had been Commander of the National Guard from 1963 until he ascended to the throne in 1977, Crown Prince Sultan, Minister of Defence and Aviation since 1962 and Prince Salman, who has been Governor of the Riyadh Region since 1962. This practice has resulted in the creation of "power fiefdoms" for senior princes and created silos of power around individual figures rather than a more open, collaborative government. Inter-departmental activities often had to go through the ministers directly, even on the most trivial of matters. As a consequence, when push came to shove, there were ministries loyal to individual princes (or completely demoralized when their patron fled the country) but no national government to speak of distinguishable from the Al Saud princes themselves.
In the absence of national elections and political parties, politics in Saudi Arabia took place in two distinct arenas: within the royal family, the Al Saud, and between the royal family and the rest of Saudi society. The royal family is politically divided by factions based on clan loyalties, personal ambitions and ideological differences. The most powerful clan faction is known as the 'Sudairi Seven', comprising the late Crown Prince Fahd and his full brothers and their descendants. Ideological divisions include issues over the speed and direction of reform, and whether the role of the ulema should be increased or reduced. There are also divisions within the family over who should succeed King Abdullah in the post of Crown Prince.
This in fact created the “Crown Prince crisis” of 1977-78 which only further served to undermine the political authority of the Al Saud. The Sudari faction were not aligned with the revolutionaries - in fact Prince Bandar ibn Aziz and Juhyaman al-Qtabi were equally as vocal in denouncing them as part of the whole oligarchy - but members of thr group - and especially Prince Nayef, who was the leading Sudari candidate for the post of Crown Prince - believed they could use the unrest being created by the firebrand preachers to their advantage. Prince Nayef, who became Interior Minister after King Faisal's assassination in 1975, was personally committed to maintaining Saudi Arabia's conservative Wahhabi values. Of the senior princes, he was probably the least comfortable with the reformist tendencies which Abdullah had pursued as Crown Prince under the ailing King Khalid and after he became King himself. The evidence is that Prince Nayef did the most to turn the Mutaween (Religious Police) and the Saudi Army against the regime, believing that he could then take command of these forces as a more conservative leader than King Abdullah and his circle, perhaps to the point of supplanting King Addullah as monarch in what would have amounted to the first coup in Saudi history. That being the case, Prince Nayef and his supporters clearly underestimated - or chose to ignore - the radicalism and anti-monarchy position of the revolutionaries, who were not prepared to substitute one Saudi King with another, no matter how conservative he presented himself as being. Instead they took Prince Nayef's undermining of the religious police in particular, but also the Army (which, unlike the elite National Guard, drew its members from the lower orders of society - the same base that was embracing ? and ? message) and turned it to their favor, in effect leveraging palace intrigue into a serious threat to the regime which neither the King's supporters nor Prince Nayef's fully realized until it was too late.
The significance of the ulema (the body of Islamic religious leaders and jurists) is derived from the central role of religion in Saudi society. It has been said that Islam is more than a religion, it is a way of life in Saudi Arabia, and, as a result, the influence of the ulema is pervasive. In 1978-79 Saudi Arabia was unique in giving the ulema a direct role in government. Not only is royal succession subject to the approval of the ulema, so are all new laws (royal decrees). The ulema have also influenced major executive decisions, for example the imposition of the oil embargo in 1973 and the continued opposition to foreign occupation in Syria between 1974 and 1979. The ulema plays a major role in the judicial and education systems and has a monopoly of authority in the sphere of religious and social morals.
The ulema have historically been led by the Al ash-Sheikh, the country's leading religious family. The Al ash-Sheikh are the descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the 18th century founder of the Wahhabi form of Sunni Islam which is today dominant in Saudi Arabia. The family is second in prestige only to the Al Saud (the royal family) with whom they formed a "mutual support pact" and power-sharing arrangement nearly 300 years ago. The pact, which persists to this day, is based on the Al Saud maintaining the Al ash-Sheikh's authority in religious matters and upholding and propagating Wahhabi doctrine. In return, the Al ash-Sheikh support the Al Saud's political authority thereby using its religious-moral authority to legitimize the royal family's rule. There has been a high degree of intermarriage between the two families, which has served to strengthen the bonds between the two clans, and reinforced the authority of each within their own areas of responsibility.
By the 1970s, as a result of oil wealth and the modernization of the country initiated by King Faisal, important changes to Saudi society were under way and the power of the ulema was in decline, which many of the senior clerics had come to resent. This in part explained their support for the radical preachers al-Otabi and Abdullah Hamid al Qahtani. Furthermore, when the aesthetic Prince Bandar began to signal his support for the radical message (he later argued that the message was not radical at all, rather that the “radicals” were in fact restoring an older, purer form of the Islamic faith which had been corrupted by oil wealth and western influences) he provided the ulema with an alternate center of authority within their traditional alliance with the House of Saud. It is important to remember that Prince Bandar was a son of King Ibn Saud and had been passed over for the throne because of his devotion to religious scholarship and what, in the west, would be called the life of a monk. Where these had been vices to the royal family, they were in fact virtues to the rising tide of fundamentalist religion and secular rejectionism. Al-Otabial-Qahtani provided the firebrand message, but Bandar’s support allowed the ulema to shift their support within the House of Saud and so line-up with a revolution while at the same time not breaking with hundreds of years of tradition, or violating the tight family bonds between the two. and
Outside of the House of Al Saud, participation in the political process is limited to a relatively small segment of the population and takes the form of the royal family consulting with the ulema, tribal sheikhs and members of important commercial families on major decisions. This process is not reported by the Saudi media. In theory, all males of the age of majority have a right to petition the king directly through the traditional tribal meeting known as the majlis. In many ways, the approach to government differs little from the traditional system of tribal rule. Tribal identity remains strong and, outside of the royal family, political influence is frequently determined by tribal affiliation, with tribal sheikhs maintaining a considerable degree of influence over local and national events. Although they supported the royal house throughout, tribal leaders walked a fine line between that loyalty and an increasing support for the radicals among the mass of Saudis, especially those of the lower classes. They also took sides in the palace intrigue going on between Prince Nayef and the King. As a result the sheiks dithered and temporized, the result being that they undercut the last of the political support that the royal family had. This again was not readily apparent until the crunch came in November 1978. Only a few prescient scholars of Saudi politics foresaw what was happening and warned about it, and they were largely dismissed as alarmists in the West and as subversives by the Saudis themselves. Prince Nayef even called their warnings "black lies emanating from the Zionists to destroy the people of Islam."
Since the reign of King Faisal the Saudis had tried to maintain stability through leadership that has struck a careful balance between encouraging modernisation whilst respecting the conservatism of Saudi society. For example, whilst Faisal introduced radio and television to Saudi Arabia he ‘ordered large portions of programming time be devoted to religious instruction and readings from the Quran. Kings Khalid and Abdullah reinforce this, but a subtle change took place - they had the state broadcaster emphasise Quarn passages which could be interpreted as being pro-refrom, or at least leading in that direction. For conservatives - in a much broader circle than just the Sudaris or the revolutionists, but among some members of the ulema too - this was a red flag which suggested that Abdullah was moving toward a more liberal Islam (he wasn't necessarily, but like so much of the revolutionary fervor perception was manipulated to support the radical cause).
What undercut this were persistent rumors being spread by radicals (abetted by the Sudari faction) that the royal family was converting to Christiantiy or - worse from an Arab perspective - Judaism. That there was no substance to such a charge was quickly lost amidst rumor and rhetoric, especially in the mosques and at the street level. Evidence was produced in the form of a doctored photo of King Faisal supposedly shaking hands with an Israeli official, and the repeated "discovery" of secret stashes of Bibles and Torahs in places supposedly controlled by the royal family. Over the course of the three years from King Faisal's death to the Revolution such rumors - backed by the manufactured 'evidence" became like an acid undercutting what popular support the al-Saud faimly (both the King and, ironically the Sudari group as well) had left. It became popular to blame the Kingdom's many social problems - especially corruption and the unequal distribution of oil wealth - on this supposed "Crusader-Zionist" conspiracy to turn the home of the Holy Places away from Islam. By 1978 al-Otabi in particular was spreading a firebrand message that the King and his brothers were conspiring to bring about a new and final crusade against all Islam - to wipe it out - and that the Syrian occupation had been but the first step in this plan.
All of this culminated in the Hajj riots in the third week of November 1978. When the riots began (they began as a dispute between some Arab and Pakistani pilgrims over access to water), the royal regime tried to move to exert control, while the Sudari faction - which believed it had solid control over the Mutaween - held them back, allowing the riots to go on for a time, beleving this would weaken the King's postion. What they didn't count on was Prince Bandar and al-Otabi then turning this seeming lack of action back on the entire regime. In a sermon probably influenced by Bandar's writings, at-Otabi referred to the on-going violence against the faithful, and the regime's lack of action to stop it, as a sure sign that the King had given-up on Islam and was punishing the faithful in furtherance of a Zionist plot. In the charged atmosphere of the Hajj, and the violence going on, these otherwise over-the-top charges took hold in the popular mind, especially among the Mutaween and the Army ranks, because the previous years' proselytizing by al-Otabi and al-Qahtani on the subject had prepared them to believe it.
As the regime lost control of the Mutaween and the Army, and the National Guard failed to put down the rising (which was joined by many foreign muslims who shifted from riot to aiding the revolution under the guidance of al-Otabi, who had lead them to believe that the rioting was inspired by some evil plot by the al-Saud to allow Mecca to fall to the Zionists) the royal government paniced. Haunted by what had happened by the Iraqi King Faisal in 1958, and by the situation in Syria, the King and several ministers decided to flee, though they claimed that they planned to return once they could consolidate their forces. More than likely they expected the Revolution to burn out, or to receive foreign military assistance in reclaiming the throne once the revolutionaries had fallen out amongst themselves and proved that they couldn't govern. King Abdullah elected not to stay though because his security could no longer be guaranteed, and he did not wish to give himself up as a martyr to the revolutionaries.
No sooner had the Revolutionaries taken control and established their Islamic Caliphate of Arabia (or Islamic Emirate of Arabia as some preferred - they eschewed the word "Republic" as an infidel term and therefore un-Islamic) than they faced uprisings of their own. First the Sunni fanatics began to crack down on the substantial Shia minority in the country, which caused the Shia to take-up arms in their own defence. Both al-Otabi and al-Qahtani were firebrands in their belief that the Shias were "heretics" and had to be rooted out and destroyed in the name of a purer Sunni Islam. Then the Revolutionary Majlis decided to destroy the oil infrastructure- again as an act of Islamic purification- from which the Shia derived their livelihood, and a full scale civil war began.
That situation was soon changed when the Iraqis invaded and were, despite being lead by Sunnis themselves, greeted as liberators and protectors by the Shia.
Reactions Among the Western Powers
The rapid fall of the Al-Saud regime in November 1978 lead to differing reactions among the western powers, which in turn lead to a prolonged period of negotiation that was only preempted by the Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia at the end of February 1979. No less than the Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein, who lead the initial Iraqi military surge into Saudi Arabia personally, accused the west of “inaction” and “dithering.” Both King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Begin of Israel were equally as vocal in their denunciation of western sluggishness in response to the crisis.
Key to the western lethargy is to understand the causes behind the divisions between various western powers, and how this lead to endless rounds of seemingly unproductive diplomacy.
The United States, with perhaps the most to lose given its close ties to the Al-Saud family and reliance upon them for regional security, was paralyzed at the very top. The Saudi Revolution coincided with a constitutional crisis in which an ill President Wallace was temporarily replaced by his Vice President Nicholas Katzenbach. Katzenbach, who controlled U.S. foreign policy through much of November and into early December, was reluctant to act without a western consensus, one which rapidly eluded him. This happened in part because of the position of other powers, and in part because his legitimacy as a leader and policy-maker was subject to question as the Vice President was challenged by President Wallace, who successfully reclaimed his office in December.
President Wallace was ill, and in some accounts it has been suggested that his mental capabilities were sporadic during much of this period. Once Katzenbach ceased to be the acting President, control of U.S. foreign policy fell to U.S. Secretary of State Henry Jackson. In part his own personal style, and in part the wariness of other nations, lead to a situation where a consensus eluded the Secretary of State before the Iraqi invasion.
The U.S. did have a robust military response, in terms of the deployment of U.S. Navy and air support capacity to Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and North Yemen during this four month period. The U.S. expanded its military profile in the Gulf area over these four months, thanks largely to the efforts of Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor. Acting with seeming independence from (or disregard of) Wallace, Katzenbach or Jackson, Secretary Claytor ordered the increase American military presence in the region. The forcefulness of his preemptive response re-assured many Gulf states, but quickly raised red-flags in European capitals over U.S. intentions to intervene against the Arabian Revolution with military force, a policy option some U.S. allies regarded with dread.
Secretary Claytor’s unilateral orders may have stilled twitchy nerves in the UAE and Oman, but they won him no friends within the Wallace Administration or among both liberals and hawks on Capitol Hill. Liberals viewed the increased military presence as provocative, while hawks became obsessed over the idea that Claytor hadn’t gone far enough, and in the even lacked Presidential authority (from either Katzenbach or Wallace). Unhelpful to Claytor’s case was a row that broke out about the same time with some ultra conservatives, who were concerned that the Secretary of Defense was going soft on the question of prosecuting homosexual members of the U.S. armed forces. This ended in an ugly row between the Secretary and certain members of the Senate Armed Services committee on the eve of the Iraqi invasion.
The effect of this was (and Saddam Hussein made decisive reference to it on a number of occasions) was to make the American fist look empty and therefore useless. Neither Wallace nor Jackson gave any support to Claytor in the weeks of January and early February, when their support of the Defense Secretary could have underwritten clout behind the U.S. military moves. Instead, the political game in Washington gave to Claytor’s reinforcements the look of an empty threat unlikely to be acted upon.
Britain, the other historic power in the Gulf, took a very hands-off attitude as the Arabian Revolution evolved. Part of this was the result of limited British military resources already having been stretched too thin by occupation duties in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal (Madeira), Syria and Hong Kong. As a result there was to be no large scale British military support for the Gulf Kingdoms because the proverbial cupboard was already bare. However, had there been the resources, the Labour government then in power showed a decided disinclination to use them. Save for Northern Ireland and Cyprus, all of these foreign missions had been inherited by Labour from their Conservative predecessors in 1977. Since that election, the Healey government had been looking at ways to draw down on these overseas commitments. Some in the left-wing of the Labour caucus were quite vocal in their belief that the United Kingdom should remove itself from all of them, sighting them as relics of an Imperial age now long past. The recent – and then still on-going (six years) – occupation of Syria (which had started in an effort to stop another such fundamentalist revolution in Syria in late 1973), with its attendant violence and “quagmire” perception, had left an especially jaundiced view of military ventures in the Middle East, not just among left-wing activists but with many average Britons, who had rejected the previous Heath government at the polls in part because of the unpopularity of its foreign policy.
Prime Minister Denis Healey had to balance a conflicting set of priorities between the left and center wings of his parliamentary party, and as such was reluctant to take any divisive or controversial stands which might further divide his government. The Conservative opposition may have been quite vocal in their support for more forceful intervention, but lacking any clear leadership at this point (they were still divided amongst themselves over the future direction their party should take on many policy questions) they were hardly ready to take back the government should Healey’s fall over the question (which the Prime Minister took steps to insure wouldn’t happen). The more interim Conservative leader Geoffrey Howe spoke in favour of a muscular response, the lower his poll numbers went. When Liberal front bench figure Kenneth Clarke spoke of “a diplomatic and economic solution” to a “local” and “politically evolutionary” problem, the more his numbers went up, a point not lost on Number Ten.
On the international stage this translated into a combination of dissemblance and obfuscations on the part of the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, who in talks with his U.S. and NATO counterparts, stressed the need for a consensus approach that favoured “influence” and “limited sanctions” over any direct intervention. The U.S. Secretary of State Henry Jackson called this “cotton mouth diplomacy” and “mush-minded”, both of which observations did not endear him or his government to their British counterparts. Relations between Jackson and Callaghan, which had been good up until this point, started to decline in face of the differing views of how to react to the Arabian Revolution.
Geoffrey Howe MP (Cons.- East Surrey): Why will this government not recognize the special nature of this crisis, which not only threatens stability in Arabia but throughout the Middle East, and act? British consumers and British workers are already being affected by the rise in oil prices caused by this uprising by a bunch of fanatics, and that alone creates an imperative for His Majesty's government to act before this gets out of hand. Yet, instead of acting, this government sits on its hands. Why?
James Callaghan MP (Foreign Secretary): The action the honourable member is asking for is military action, which would be highly inappropriate and an overreaction to a local problem. If we were to charge in with the troops - as well the honourable members past government might have done - we will only aggravate an already volatile situation, and then the British people and British industry would indeed suffer from the rapid escalation of oil prices. Our course, Mr. Speaker, is one of caution and diplomacy which may lack the bang-and-bluff the opposition would prefer, but which will see us through to a peaceful and sustainable resolution to this crisis.
Keith Joseph MP (Cons. - Leeds North East): Fanatics do not respond to diplomacy, no matter how well intentioned. This lot have as their design nothing less than a complete Islamic revolution or complete martyrdom in its cause. That is what they claim day and night in their pronouncements. Well, that martyrdom may well drag down all of our allies and partners in the region and can lead to no good for the wider world. I call upon this government to show some backbone and to act now, before it is too late.
Barbara Castle MP (Deputy Prime Minister): Oh, we hear the cries of Empire. In light of a people throwing off the shackles of an oppressive, medieval monarchy, our friends across the aisle wish only to unleash the sword of British Empire and vanquish those who will not follow London's dictates. Well, let's be clear for all on this, the days of Empire are gone forever and the people of the world shall be allowed to settle their affairs in a way that suits them.
Howe: That view is naive at best, and foolhardy in all ways....
King George VII did not help the British political debate when, at the opening of an Islamic Housing Society, he suggested that Britain had "evolved to the place that we can allow others to decide their own affairs. Our nation's prestige need no longer rest on the laurels of how much of this planet's surface we control with our military, but by the productive interaction of our people with others - treating everyone on an equal footing and understanding that each society must solve its difficulties in unique ways that stem from its own experience. Britons may not always like the results of this, but then it is not our place to choose only the outcomes we prefer."
This latter speech lead Prime Minister Healey to remark (in private) "This King is going to make us into a Republic, whether he intends it or not."
France meanwhile actively courted the Iraqi regime as the sole regional power capable of countering the disastrous fall of the Al-Saud regime. This immediately raised hackles in Washington, where Iraq was regarded as a Soviet puppet regime (not without some basis). An American counter-proposal to present Iran as an alternative to Iraq as a regional intercessor faltered on the fact that in light of its own recent political upheaval and continuing internal instability, the Iranian regime was in no position to impose itself on a foreign revolution. There were some well-founded fears among Iran’s post-Shah leadership (who were by no means united amongst themselves on any issue) that any heavy handed action by Iran in Arabia (save on the Sh’ite question), and especially any effort as an enforcer of what was likely to be viewed by many Iranians as a western lead anti-Islamic counter revolution, would destabilize an already tenuous situation at home. Mehdi Bazargan went so far as to state what was largely unsaid: “If we sent our Army to Arabia today, the mullahs will be in command here tomorrow.” Many pooh-poohed Bazargan as an alarmist, until he was assassinated six days later by a religious extremist follower of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Bazargan’s vital point was that any attempt by Iran to actually stop Arabia’s Revolution could well spark one in Iran.
President Mitterrand would later claim that the Iraqis were the only local force of any consequence willing to do the job. At first he approached the Egyptians, but was told in no uncertain terms that they did not want any part of it. He received a somewhat more muted but essentially similar response from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. For these Arab regimes – all variously afraid of the spread of an Arabian Revolution (just as the Syrian version had ruffled them six years earlier) – it nonetheless seemed impolitic to be seen as helping a western, non-Islamic effort, to stop an Islamic revolution, especially in the geographic heart of Islam. Morocco and Jordan had co-operated with the western effort in Syria in various forms (as had Egypt under Sadat), and in return these regimes had been the subject of excoriation and condemnation by their own home grown religious conservatives and extremists. As the former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put it around that time “the (moderate) Arabs have all decided to be Swiss in this matter.”
Getting Israel to intervene was unthinkable, and Turkey was no more politically capable of such a venture than Iran.
Mitterrand therefore turned to the Iraqis as a way of exerting military force to counter the Arab Revolution while trying to keep it from being seen as a western lead counter-revolution. The French President knew instinctively that outside force could unite the Arabs as a matter of ethnic and religious resolve, so the better to let a fellow Arab state do the dirty work. His problem was that neither President Wallace or Secretary Jackson agreed with his reasoning, and they intensely disliked his choice of surrogate. President Gavin had committed to a multinational intervention in the Syrian crisis in part to control Soviet reach into the Middle East (his debatable tactic had been to make the Soviets a partner in that intervention), but Mitterrand seemed to be reversing that, giving a Soviet client potential control of the richest oil fields on the planet.
Mitterrand did meet with the Soviet Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin, on the question, but otherwise kept his distance from the Soviets, in part to assuage cold war fears in Washington. Zorin seems to have communicated no objection from Moscow to an Iraqi move south, but this would hardly have been regarded as good news in Washington.
Apart from wresting control of the oil fields from religious fanatics, the French President seemed to have had an idea of using the situation to re-set the balance of power in the Middle East by inserting France as a new patron of the Iraqi state, with perhaps the long-term idea that France could replace the Soviets as the Iraqis principal patron, and as such the French could increase their prominence as a power broker in the region. Certainly if Iraq controlled Arabia (and especially its oil fields) and the Baghdad regime felt it owed Paris something, this could increase the global authority of Mitterrand’s government on a host of issues.
Italy, West Germany, Japan and Canada were all concerned about the Arabian Revolution, as all depended on imported oil for their economic well-being, but none was equipped to act in support of a western military action. The Syrian intervention had left bad feelings in Italy, whose Communist government was in any event more concerned with its own political survival. The West Germans were unwilling to commit military force: they were still under the shadow of the Second World War, and any foreign military action was a deeply divisive and emotional issue among the German people, one the Kohl government was unwilling to open up. Japan had no military force, and Canada’s was relatively small, and what their was of it had already been committed to operations in Cyprus and Hong Kong. The new government of Prime Minister Lougheed did offer the Americans a hospital unit, a communications unit and a naval support vessel, which were based in the United Arab Emirates, but this was the extent of what Canada had to offer at the time.
This presented the western impasse on the day Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein lead his armies into the Arabian peninsula.
Iran’s Covert Action
Acting in concert with a number of religious figures in Iran – most notably the Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, a persistent critic of both the Shah and the new government – Iran supplied arms and assistance to the Sh’ite rebels who rose-up against the revolutionary government in Riyadh. While there seems to have been genuine sympathy and concern for their Sh’ite coreligionists caught-up in a radical, Sunni-lead theocracy, the Iranian government cynically exploited the situation to divert religious critics at home and build-up its pro-religious credentials. At the same time Iran exploited the collapse of the Arabian oil industry to ramp-up its own production and cast aside OPEC quotas. For these reasons the Iranians were intent on prolonging the crisis for as long as possible.
The Global Oil Market and OPEC
The Arabian Revolution, and the subsequent disruption of supply from both the Kuwaiti and Arabian oil fields, initially sent a shock through international oil markets and spiked prices upward. The invasion of Kuwait and then Arabia by the Iraqi military only aggravated the situation, as there was a great deal of uncertainty as to what the Iraqis would do with control over so vast an oil reserve. In the initial occupation of Kuwait and the anti-oil Jihad of the Revolutionary government in Arabia, followed by a Sh’ite counter-rising in many of the oil centers of Arabia, seriously disrupted supply from these sources. The Iraqi military invasion only added to the disruption.
Other OPEC nations, notably Venezuela, Nigeria and Iran began producing more oil – well in excess of their previous OPEC quotas – and this, over the longer term, stabilized and started to bring down oil prices, although periodic “oil shocks” continued to rattle the international economy well into 1981. Non OPEC producers such as the United States, the Soviet Union, Norway and Mexico also sought to profit from the situation by opening-up their reserves to further production and sale.
Iraq quickly joined this group, producing more oil from its own domestic sources, in order to pay for its military actions in the South.
The original OPEC embargo had come into force in 1973 in response to the Agnew Administration’s support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War and in its occupation of Damascus at the end of that conflict. When the Gavin Administration organized an international force to put down a radical religious rebellion in Syria (and prevent Syria from becoming a failed state) the embargo had been continued as an expression of Arab and Islamic solidarity against western intervention in an Arab nation. The Persian Shah of Iran had chaffed at this restriction and sought to circumvent it, as did non-Muslim (or Muslim majority) members such as Nigeria and Venezuela.
After the Iraqi invasion of first Kuwait and then Arabia, this solidarity collapsed, with Libya and Algeria alone adhering to the old embargo, although Algeria soon gave up on it too. The changes of early 1979 were so quick and dramatic that the embargo had now lost all meaning, and the international oil market became more of a free-for-all. It was the considered by many to be the beginning of the end for OPEC as an effective cartel.
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From Anonymous Behind the Fortress Walls
The executive committee met on the Arabian question shortly after the Iraqi invasion. Comrade Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov was absent due to illness. The official story was that he had contracted food poisioning during recent visit to Cuba. This was not wholly the truth, as Mikhail Andreyevich's infirmities caused by advancing age were begining to show themselves. Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko sat in his place, but he was a toady whom no one respected. With Mikhail Andreyevich's absence, and despite Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov's presence, the discussion was more frank than recent meetings had been.
"With the Iraqis liberating the Kuwaitis and Arabians from feudal monarchies, we can expect to spread, via our Iraqi allies, the message of socialist revolution over a wider area of the Middle East," Konstantin Ustinovich read from Mikhail Andreyevich's message.
Even Yuri Vladimirovich scoffed at this, but it was the foreign minister, Valerian Alexandrovich Zorin, who said what most at the meeting thought.
"We must be clear that the Ba'ath revolutionaries who rule Iraq are only marginally part of the socialist community - if at all. They have killed many of our ideological comrades, and the current ascendant, the Vice President Saddam Hussein, who is leading this military adventure of theirs, has been courting the French, who are seeking to make their own inroads of Empire from this."
"Will the French influence this Saddam?" Yuri Vladomirovich asked.
"They may," Valerian Alexandrovich conceded.
"Why? Have we not contributed much to his military machine? Does he not owe us his loyalty for this?"
Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the Deputy Premier, responded nervously. "He has also acquired arms stocks from the French, and these have proven to be more reliable in his campaign, at least according to our sources with ties to the Iraqi military." Yuri Vladomirovich's iron gaze fell on the Defence Minister General Viktor Georgiyevich Kulikov.
"The Iraqis do not take of the weapons properly. It is their own fault," Viktor Georgiyevich retorted.
"If we can exert control over the Iraqis we can expect them to prusue a militant policy with respect to oil prices - especially with a large percentage of the world's supply under their control," Nikolai Ivanovich offered. "But if the French gain influence, then we can expect them to lobby for lower oil prices. This will not only affect world markets but also our cash flows."
"As I have said, the Iraqis are an unpredictable people," Valerian Alexandrovich reiterated. "We may see them as clients, but they do not view themselves in this light. Indeed this Saddam Hussein views himself as non-aligned."
"I am never surprised by the ungrateful attitude of these backward black asses," Yuri Vladomirovich remarked. "We must see if there are alternatives to this Saddam whom we can support. Make it a top priority," he said to Vitaly Vasilyevich Fedorchuk, the head of the KGB. "And you," he added, shifting his steely gaze once more on Viktor Georgiyevich, "must do a better job of not only selling our weapons to them, but making sure they are completely dependent upon them."
You could see the strain in Viktor Georgiyevich's face at this near impossible command, but with a great deal of discipline he held in check his temper and said nothing.
"We will secure our place in the oil market," Yuri Vladomirovich said. "Perhaps it is time that we had a greater voice through OPEC or some other such agency."
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