All very valid points. But the Confederates even with their strained transportation system got those guns shipped to places such as forts Henry, and Donaldson in Tennessee. Port Royal, SC got some of those 32 pounders by October 1861, and others went into the defenses of Charleston, SC. Without Virginia joining the Confederacy it wouldn't have lasted much more than 2 years, but that's a different story.
How Would An 1840s Anglo-American War Go?
- Thread starter AltoRegnant
- Start date
All analogies are imperfect. The two situations were very different. The Southerners in 1861 were talking about winning a land war with a much stronger power on their border. The Americans in 1843 would be talking about a war with a primarily naval power based across the Atlantic Ocean. As it was even with just the heavy guns, and port defenses they could gather the Confederates were able to do a good job in defending their major ports. In every instance it took a Union army working with the navy to take a major port. In the Civil War no fleet, not even ones made up of ironclads ever sailed into a major port without getting it brains beaten out. Imagining that British wooden ships could do what ironclads couldn't is just dreaming.
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So, in my own readings, I find that the United States (Union), in 1861, initially tried to use a small force of troops with a 90 day contract, and when that failed, congress setup a 500,000 man volunteer force with 12 month contracts, and later, another 500,000 man volunteer force with 36 month contracts. For comparison, the US army was an inflexible 60 month contract during this same time frame. Too suppose that the 1843 USA, fighting not a civil war, but yet another war with Britain, is going to be incapable of putting some 600,000+ men into uniform is the only Delusion thinking in this thread.
If the British come into this war with the thought that they are so big and bad and all powerful, they are in for a long, brutal war ending in their defeat, big navy or no big navy. Looking at the ARW, that was fought over 8 years, and how many European nations decided to grab a chunk off of the British Empire, while they were in a big and costly war with a much smaller wanna be USA, with something like 1/4 the population as Britain back in 1775-1783, how did that war go for, how do you keep putting it, oh yeah, "The world's largest empire"?
They lost!
And the USA of 60 years later, that now is almost equal in total population to Britain, and far and away more powerful in this notional war that will probably be 1843-1851 if it is anything at all like the ARW was, and you keep coming in here and telling us that the British are going to win this?!?! And that no other rival empires are going to see their chance to get a piece of what the British have...
Riiigghhttt.
If you so badly want to have the USA stopped from having California >>> Washington, why not make a thread for that, and call it something like "The Anglo-Mexican war of 1823" or something?
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Well and truly said.
I've said again and again, a population in North America is much more telling and decisive than one on the other side of the Atlantic, for a large scale ground war over here, and if the UK isn't willing to go all in, with at least a 100,000+ man commitment in the first couple years, then when the Americans eventually come calling, once they have some 600,000+ men under arms, what happens to Canada, that has a long and indefensible land border with a much stronger neighbor?
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Supposing that the US government would or could pour the same amount of resources into a fight over a minor border dispute somewhere out west as it did over an existential fight for the nation's very surival seems by far and away more delusional.
Britain didn't become the global hegemon until after the Napoleonic Wars, so that's a dubious analogy at best.
If the U.S. and Britian got into a war it wouldn't matter what it started over that determined how many troops, were raised. Military needs would determine that. U.S. troop levels would be determined by the need to defend its coastal regions, and to invade Canada. The size of the navy would be determined by what would be needed to defend coastal waters and threaten British maritime interests.
Britian was never the global hegemon. They had the most powerful navy in the world and dominated global ocean borne trade. They were an imperialist power colonizing largely empty places like Australia and advancing into power vacuums like in India. The 19th Century was a multi polar world that no single power dominated. The term hegemon wasn't coined until the 20th Century, but if it had been understood none of the other European powers, or the U.S. would've said Britain was the global hegemon.
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If this were the case, every war would turn into a total war to the death, which obviously doesn't happen. Unless you're claiming there's something exceptional to the American character that makes them fight on when lesser races would roll over and surrender, which is both inherently dumb and not borne out by history.
Interesting theory, let's see how it holds up:
Oh.
Also, whilst the term "hegemon" wasn't coined until 1897, the term "hegemonic" dates back to the 1650s (and the similar "hegemonical" to the 1610s), and "hegemony" to the 1560s. Not to mention, "hegemon" is just a transliteration of the ancient Greek ἡγεμών, and the 19th century was the height of classical education in the western world. So I think people of the 1840s would have understood the word just fine.
Fascinating as this is, though, it's a bit of a distraction from the main point, which is simply that Britain in the 1840s is stronger relative to the rest of Europe than Britain in the 1770s. Hence the French or whoever are less likely to try and go to war with Britain, or to be able to seriously threaten the British Empire, if they do.
The march to New Orleans was a plan fraught with difficulties and dangers, not to mention logistics nightmares. But you are correct that it was steam powered warships which allowed the Union to run the forts to put New Orleans under their guns. But that army the us brought was not much larger than the one the British moved in 1814 either.
However, even threatening the city like that would tie down a simply massive number of troops from across the South which can't go anywhere else. So it does end up as a net win for Britain because even an attempt at a repeat affair would be enough to keep significant resources in place.
Even in 1843, the population won't much exceed 10,000 in an area which covers at least four modern states. The population of both Oregon Territory and Washington Territory in 1860 didn't exceed 25,000. In 1838-42, 43 if it exceeded 9,000 I would be surprised. Unfortunately, I can't find great population records before the provisional governments are officially organized in 1843-46 which makes this a best guess.
But to add to the point however, Britain landing a regiment in the region is overkill. You can't march an army to Oregon territory (in the Mexican War the force that took California was all of 1,000 strong including naval shore parties) overland, and if the British control the coast the only easy means of egress and outside access is now cut off from easy resupply. It's effectively the other side of the world for the US.
We've discussed this ad nauseum and much better historians than you or I have arrived at the exact opposite of your conclusion. Every first hand account I've read mentions economic privation, the rising prices, and the impossibility of getting anything because ships are stuck in port and the expense of moving things overland is ruinous to all but the most wealthy or those taking government contracts. As @cerebropetrologist has shown again and again in this thread, Americans of the 1840s thought they'd be facing economic ruin in a commercial war. The evidence stacks up pretty quickly that the American economy would be wrecked by such a conflict.
I don't see any argument to the contrary.
In 1861 they could have recruited upwards of 61,000 if they put their minds to it**, and in 1838-42,43 probably 50,000 is the maximum that could be easily recruited. However, since we have good evidence for who responded and in what numbers to a national crisis in this period, we can say with certainty that in an emergency roughly 25,000 men would respond to a call to arms in Upper Canada (roughly 20,000 were recruited in total between 1837-39 and enthusiasm was high in the period), while 12,000 men could be called upon immediately in Lower Canada - but mostly English speaking Volunteers and maybe French units in Quebec City depending. In the Maritimes, where 3,000 British troops were on station in 1839 (I do not have numbers for the 1840s) the militia numbers would be smaller, but no smaller than 15,000 between the two provinces based on only population numbers.
In 1843 there are roughly 10,000 regular troops still available in Canada as their numbers do not drop to 7,474 until 1845 with the gradual drawdown recommended by London in 1843 after the signing of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. So if we're going by what they had historically available, then yes they could risk another 25,000 to North America to bring their numbers up to 30,000+ to augment the 30-40,000 militia which could be raised in an immediate war crisis. Best case scenario for the British is 60-70,000 men ready to defend Canada when war breaks out.
I want to once again ram home the point that this peacetime British establishment in 1843 in Canada is still in roughly equal numbers to the whole American Army at the same period, with a militia who are both much more enthusiastic about fighting invaders and who have more recent experience with being under arms than most of their American counterparts.
**This is again based on my own research, both of the reported numbers of British officers designed to research the exact issues, the doubling of the population from 1838 when we got the aforementioned 33,000, and from a perusal of period papers and diaries which showed a similar enthusiasm for fighting. The only reluctance I found from the Canadians was expense it seemed.
Any early successful invasion would depend on an overall immediate superiority that the US is just vanishingly unlikely to have for the reasons I spelled out. On land they will be, in Lower Canada (assuming the British concentrate 2/3rds of their regular forces there), facing roughly 7,500 regulars and 12,000 Volunteers immediately, plus whatever troops end up showing up. So off the bat you need an invasion forces that exceeds 40,000 for the two to one advantage in Lower Canada. Assuming the British have only sent 2,500 regulars to Upper Canada to augment the 20,000-25,000 Volunteers we can postulate, same problem. You need 50-60,000 men to have an initial advantage.
So to tally up, to get an immediate advantage over the Anglo-Canadian defenders the US needs to raise in excess of 80,000-100,000 troops to invade only the United Province of Canada, never mind the Maritimes! Already we're exceeding the Mexican War numbers needed for mobilization.
That doesn't even include ships for the Great Lakes where, again, Britain has the advantage of having put a pair of armed steamers into commission with the Royal Navy in the 1840s on Lake Ontario, with another on Lake Erie*. This with any ships which can be sent up the Rideau Canal to reinforce the Ontario squadron, and then what the Royal Navy can sail up the Saint Lawrence.
The US will have Michigan on Lake Erie launched near the end of 1843, but for most important Ontario, they must start from scratch.
*The British did not, however, believe they could meaningfully contest Lake Erie, so I doubt they would make an enormous effort to try.
The geography you're imagining is different. Arnold marched up the Kennebec River through central Maine and overland from there, which was what got him in trouble. The British owned and marched through the St. John River Valley in this period (pretty much where the modern border line exists) and did it in 1837 and 1861. Old Brains was quite right that Arnold's route was impossible to move and supply an army through in the period in question. There's no way to do it before the advent of modern highways or the railroads, and even then, you wouldn't really want to. which is why its so sparsely populated even today.
The other issue Old Brains well and truly grasps is that the geography of attacking Canada means you can only really go one way if you want a quick end to the war. That's both a good thing, and a problem because the enemy can predict your movements with remarkable clarity. Granted, the British would have the same problem going the other direction (a problem I found when researching my own TL to poor results for the British).
The issue that does bear repeating is that, from all documentary evidence, we are not making any points that American sources themselves are not making at the time. They knew their coastal defences were weak or inadequate, they knew the militia system was of dubious utility at best, and they were well aware that their economy and maritime trade would be completely ruined by such a war. It seems unfair to categorize this as anything but going with the prevalent thought of the time!
Could some big surprises come around? Of course. Do I personally think the US will wilt under British pressure? Absolutely not. Do I think the existing military imbalance on the ground would make the war a terrible quagmire which the US is not immediately prepared for? With the numbers and imbalance I lay out above, well, obviously.
You have generals like Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor on the US side, they were in the prime of their lives and Scott at least was probably one of the best military minds ever generated in the US. They could at the very least make a really good go of it.
On the seas though, the result is almost pre-ordained. The USN is miniscule compared to the Royal Navy, even in it's peace time establishment. They don't have the vessels or know how to challenge the RN on a ship for ship basis or in a fleet action, which means they would avoid it and so be blockaded in port and fall back on the strategy of commerce raiding. That is not a war winning strategy however, and would be almost what the UK would want to happen, but it's militarily unavoidable.
None of this is to say the US is bad, but it's just the reality that they had not spend seriously on their military since 1815, and had no political impetus to do so. The smaller starting point then just makes it that much more uneviable a position to be in to be going to war with one of the Great Powers of its day.
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All that would only lead to both sides wanting to end the war as soon as possible. It wouldn't lead to the Americans wanting to give up territory to the British. For years the Americans had been proposing the 49th parallel line be extended from the western end of Lake Superior all the way to the Pacific, but the British refused. 54/40 or Fight was an extreme negotiating position to force a settlement. It incorrectly has gone down in history as what the Americans wanted all along. The dispute over Hawaii was something that was more important to the Americans than the British. As long as British interests in Hawaii were protected, they didn't care that the Americans had more influence. The Americans considered Hawaii in the hands of another great power to be a treat to the West Coast. They also needed Hawaii as a base to advance their interests in the Pacific.
Your arguments are usually logical my friend, but in this case, you're missing something important. In a national emergency the president would call up State militias, and the Secretary of War would order States to send a certain number of regiments to serve under national command. So, Louisiana might be ordered to send 2 regiments to say Michigan, to join with other State, and Federal troops in the Detroit area to invade Canada. At the same time Louisiana, and Mississippi between them might call up 10 regiments of militia, and volunteers to defend both of their coastal areas. Given 6-12 months the size of the Federal army would expand to 70-100,000 strong, and Federal troops would man most of the forts around the country.
At no time would it ever be the plan to send most of the troops from the Southern States to the front in Canada. A British attack on the Gulf Coast wouldn't divert any troops from Canada because their contribution to that front would be minimal in any event. Most of the troops earmarked for operations in Canada would be raised in Northern States. Far inland Southern States like Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Missouri would send regiments both to Canada, and the South to reinforce their home defense forces.
I was surprised to read that the Union only sent an army of 5,000 men to occupy New Orleans. Sorry I was wrong about thinking it was 10,000. The British army started the 1814 invasion with almost 8,000 men. That was about 50% bigger than Jackson's army at the start of the campaign. I don't know how many troops you're thinking the British would bring in 1844, but the strength of the defending army would be far greater than in 1814. Coastal defense forces are a built-in factor. It doesn't' matter what the British do their going to be there. It's the choice of the British to engage them or not.
It's like the Germans in 1944 defending possible landing beaches all around Europe because they didn't know where the Allies might land. Even after D Day they still had to keep large numbers of troops defending other possible invasion sites because the Allies might mount another amphibious operation. Wasteful yes, but what other strategic choice did they have? So, in 1844 the Americans have to defend Charlestown, SC if the British attack it or not. The bottom line is if the British do attack the Gulf Coast the U.S. won't be sending troops from Canada to save the day.
It doesn't really matter what the population of Oregon was in 1843-44. What we know is the American population was almost 10 times bigger than the British. How can a British regiment gain control of 100,000 sq miles of mostly unsettled land? A regiment might land in Portland, but they're not going to march along the 150-mile length of the Willamette River to gain control of the American settlements. By 1841 the Oregon Trail was open to wagon traffic all the way to the Willamette Valley, so why couldn't the Americans send a regiment to Western Oregon? By the way where do the British find a regiment to send to Oregon? In 1843 the nearest British troops are in China, or Australia, and it's not like they have a lot of extra troops, or ships to spare.
Respectfully your argument is based on a book you talked about in an early thread that postulated the American economy was about to collapse in 1815. You used this to argue that if the War of 1812 went on any longer the American war effort would collapse. I presented statistics from the Economic History of the United States that in the period of the War of 1812 although maritime interests were badly hurt the overall economy continued to grow, and industrialization accelerated. Despite inflation many new banks were chartered, and basically life went on, and so did the war effort. It showed that both GDP, and per capita income after inflation rose in each year of the war.
Clearly a war in 1843 would be a disaster for maritime interests, but it wouldn't wreck the overall economy, or bring the country to its knees. In fact, the maritime industries in New England, and the mid Atlantic States would be building large numbers of warships, privateers, and blockade runners to resist the British blockade. Foundries would be forging heavy cannon for ships, and forts. In 1843-44 the Americans would have a more aggressive strategy against the RN operating in its coastal waters.
Your assessment of what Canada could put in the field in 1843 is based on the number of men who turned out in the 1838 crisis. It seems that only a few hundred loyalist militia ever saw action in that conflict. All the battles of the war involved no more than a few hundred men, and casualties of no more than a few dozen. Do you know how many of those 33,000 men were organized into actual armed, and trained units? In 1861 during the Trent Affair this is what the Canadian militia was able to field. From Wiki
Williams' task in raising, arming and disciplining this army was not dissimilar to the one that the Union and Confederates had faced at the beginning of the Civil War, a year earlier. In the Province of Canada there were 25,000 arms, 10,000 of them smoothbores, and in the Maritimes there were 13,000 rifles and 7,500 smoothbores: though weapons were readily available in England, the difficulty was in transporting them to Canada.[101] 30,000 Enfield rifles were sent on December 6 with the Melbourne, and by February 10, 1862, the Times reported that modern arms and equipment for 105,550 had arrived in Canada along with 20 million cartridges.[102]
On December 2, at Williams' urging, the Canadian government agreed to raise its active volunteer force to 7,500. The risk of war pushed the number of volunteers to 13,390 by May 1862, although the number of "efficient" volunteers was only 11,940.[103] On December 20, Williams also began training one company of 75 men from each battalion of the Sedentary Militia, about 38,000 men in total, with the intention of raising this to 100,000.[104] Warren describes the Sedentary militia on their initial muster, before arms and equipment were served out to them:
So, unless you think Canada had many more guns, and trained troops in the early 1840's most of those 33,000 men raised in 1837-38 were not really in effective combat units, but just men who turned out for service.
So, I would think that the idea that Canada would have an armed, and trained militia army of 20-25,000 men in Upper Canada in the spring of 1844 is very optimistic. Also, at this time according to the Economic History of Canada, Canada was dependent on food imports from the United States.
I concede this point to you.
The direct route to Montreal is the obvious main line of advance. The other 2 lines of attack I proposed would bring about the American occupation of almost all of the settled land in Canada around the Great Lakes. So, even if Montreal isn't captured most of Canada would be.
Actual combat experience during the Civil War showed that wooden ships were more vulnerable to fire from shore batteries than they thought they would be. Every fleet that attacked a defended major port had it brains beaten out. Even Ironclads got the hell knocked out of them and had to withdraw. Trying to fight your way into New York Harbor would've been suicidal. Just because the American officers in charge of coastal defenses didn't know that in advance doesn't mean it isn't true.
Given several months of training militia & volunteer units can and did fight very well. The same would be true for Canadian units. In this conflict both sides would have time to prepare their armies for action.
U.S. naval strategy was not based on having its warships sitting in port being blockaded. What they planned was a risk kind of strategy, like German pre-WWI thinking. The USN was large enough that it would take a very large fleet to over awe it in home waters. The USN had a possible fleet of 9-10 ships of the line, and the idea that they didn't know how to fight a fleet action would be dangerous assumption.
At the time the flagship of the North American & West Indies Station HMS Illustrious, and any other 74 would find itself out gunned, and probable out sailed by the USN ships of line. During the first year of the conflict new screw frigates, and sloops would be built, and wouldn't just sit in port, but slip out at the first opportunity. The British can't sail with no less than 10 ships of the line at all times. If they do, they can only be blockading one port at a time.
The RN of the time was far from the massive force it was in 1815. Here is an analysis of the Royal Navy in 1837 I found on Naval History Net. https://www.naval-history.net/xGW-RNOrganisation1837.htm
They didn't have an endless number of large ships to send over the Atlantic to overwhelm the Americans.
The accession of Queen Victoria to the throne in 1837 was the last occasion on which a new British monarch inherited a fleet made up almost entirely of ships built of wood and propelled by sails.
The most striking feature of the fleet was not so much its size but how few ships were actually in commission and actively employed. Only 17 of the 78 ships of the line were in full commission, and only 15 of the 86 frigates were active. Amongst the smaller vessels - corvettes, sloops and brigs there was a majority of ships employed actively - 77 out of 91. The 24 steam-powered vessels were a small proportion of the total and were best described as minor war vessels at this stage. The disproportion would have been greater if these figures included the many ships and frigates relegated to harbour service - these ships are NOT included in the following lists. They were employed as hulks on such duties as depots, barracks, hospitals etc., and had no further wartime role.
Equally striking is the absence of a battle fleet in home waters. Normally the most obvious and significant indicator of naval power, there was no 'Channel Fleet or Channel Squadron'. Nor was there any grouping of partially-manned ships at the home ports which could provide the means for a speedy mobilisation of the fleet. Instead, ships were laid up 'In Ordinary' for many years with no masts and rigging, no guns, and no maintenance crews. A considerable number of these ships had been launched and placed straight into Ordinary with ever being commissioned. The naval bases in the Medway, at Portsmouth, and at Plymouth were full of such vessels. Only a few large ships were kept in harbour service commissions in each port to provide dignified flagships for the port admirals.
Those ships which were in active service were employed in a variety of overseas stations where their main purpose was to protect British foreign policy and commercial interests. The principal station was the Mediterranean where the threat of political instability in the area combined with suspicions of French and Russian intentions to provide the need for a substantial fleet at Malta.
A temporary concern was the political turbulence in Spain generated by the Carlist wars which resulted in the stationing of a force at Lisbon, and the distribution of smaller warships around the coast of Spain.
The other stations were the North America and West Indies - described in the 1837 Navy List as 'West Indies, Halifax and Newfoundland'; East Indies [which included China]; South America which included the Pacific; and The Cape of Good Hope and Coast of Africa'. A small force was based in Australian waters.
The Admiralty operated a large number of brigs on government mail services - the Packets - these vessels are not included in the following lists as they were not ships of war.
The confidence that the Admiralty and nation placed in the Royal Navy by this distribution can be assessed by reference to the only two navies which could challenge Britain - France and Russia.
Summary of International Naval Strength 1837
| Country | Ships of the Line | Frigates | Steam Vessels |
| Great Britain France Russia Baltic Black Sea | 78 22 25 12 | 86 36 16 19 | 22 24 ? ? |
Summary of Royal Navy Strength 1837
| Type of ship | Active | Harbour service | In Ordinary | Totals |
| First Rate Second Rate Third Rate Fourth Rate Fifth Rate Sixth Rate Ship-Sloops Brig-Sloops Steam Vessels | 1 4 12 6 9 18 19 40 15 | 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 3 | 12 10 34 19 51 6 1 8 6 | 18 14 46 25 61 24 20 50 22 |
Two tables follow:
List of ships of each type in alphabetical order
Distribution of active ships by station/command
Of course they wouldn't want to give up territory. The question is, would their desire to not give up territory outweigh their desire not to have their economy wrecked and their cities invaded and occupied?
Except of course, the British will not be taking and occupying any cities.
Now we seem to have come full circle back to all the big bad, and have decided to give the US war hawks all the atrocities they need to make this war an existential threat, and so make sure the Americans fully mobilize, and fight an all out war to it's conclusion.
In 1861, just the Union part of the USA Mobilized 500,000 volunteers, and that is just 18 years later than this posited war, and that 500,000 was then augmented by a second 500,000 man force being authorized for three year contracts. A foreign invasion of the US is going to see more, not less, of a mobilization on the part of the USA, so it is possible that my notional 600,000 troops might actually be coming in on the light side of things.
Canada maxes out at around 50,000 troops, and if the British bring just 100,000 troops, they end up outnumbered 4:1 in North America. There is no path that leads to a British/Canadian victory. Canada west and north of Lake Superior will fall without too much trouble, and when the American forces cut the heavily populated part of Canada in half, and put some 200,000 men on the north side of the St Lawrence river, between Kingston and Montreal, they will take Kingston and Ottawa, cutting off all access to lake Ontario from lower Canada, and with Ottawa is US hands, the easy alternative route to the great lakes via the Ottawa river is also denied, so all of Ontario falls, and with the loss of some 433,000 (about 1/3 of the national population of Canada at the time) are the Canadians going to ask for terms? Of course they will, the only question is, how much more land is the USA going to take and keep because of this war? California >>> Columbia is a given, but does the USA also annex everything north and west of lake superior? I could potentially see the remnants of Canada losing all of the sparsely inhabited lands even in northern modern day Ontario, and perhaps those of Quebec as well, meaning Hudson Bay in a US bay.
So tell me, how many troops are the British sending to North America again, and where they are going to be deployed, to protect the Canadian population from the evil Americans? If you are sending less than 100,000 troops, how do you keep the Canadians from just making peace on US terms to save what they can? How many years from the wars start date, until the USA has mobilized to her potential, built the infrastructure needed to support the invasion of upper canada, and win the war?
So, as Naval Aviation Fan would say we come full circle back to the British Navy destroying American cities. So, I ask you why the USN couldn't do that to any defended major port in the Civil War? Somehow in this discussion we get that coastal defenses will be less effective than they were in the Civil War, and that under a united nation ground forces supporting the forts wouldn't be stronger or make a difference. All we need to know is what was said in reports to Congress about the deficiencies of coastal defenses to know the cites couldn't be defended. Well, the actual combat experience in the Civil War showed those assessments were overly pessimistic. Earthen defenses actually stood up to naval fire better than stone, and mason forts. All of the actual combat experience is hand waved away because the British Navy can do anything.
Sorry but that sounds to me like an appeal to British Exceptionalism.
So the US is going to fight to the death if any of its cities are occupied, but Canada is just going to roll over and submit to Uncle Sam if any of its cities are? Seems like American exceptionalism to me.
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For one thing, the Royal Navy was simply better -- bigger, more experienced -- than the US Navy.
For another, who says they'd have to attack from the seaward side at all? If the batteries would really cause a problem to ships, just disembark the troops a few miles down the coast, then march round and take the city from the landward side instead. It's not like the US had been investing in land defences during the period.
Trusting the reports of contemporary US officers is "British exceptionalism" now?
Ah but the salient point is this will tie down federal troops to different positions. The US is (assuming they raise the 9th Regiment like the did for Mexico, and probably 10th) going to have to make tough decisions about where to allocate the regulars for service. Everyone will want them, but there's not 10,000 of them to go around. Even with militia being regional, many governors will probably balk at sending them elsewhere or demand federal resources. A maritime war will mean that the long US coast needs to be defended.
I feel like you've answered your whole question here. Firstly, a single regiment controlling important coastal settlements and overawing the locals, and being able to maneuver around the coast as you please means you control the whole sparsely settled territory. Exactly how much is just what's haggled out at the peace table. The troops would come from the Pacific slope, escorted by ships from the Pacific squadron.
In one scenario laid out after all, this does begin over a fracas in Hawaii. So that's where some British ships and troops are ending up anyways. Only one other logical target for them.
There are lies, damned lies, and statistics pulled from wikipedia. GDP fell in 1814, not coincidentally when the British blockade came at its tightest, and inflation jumped to over 30% and didn't fall again until 1815 after the end of the war, while prices also spiked by ruinous amounts, driving up the cost of goods and depressing wages. This was happening in 1813-14, and would have continued to ruinous effect in 1815 if the blockade continued. Building new factories does not translate into everyone having money in their pockets, affordable goods, and the good life for all. Overland transport was even more important back then and coastal shipping was still the best way to move goods.
I have posted the personal recollections of people who say that things were bad economically, and the government was having to take out increasingly bad loans to pay for the war. That was not a winning economic strategy to continue the war. The government was also beginning to run perilously short of specie, something that continued after the war as well.
Which is still economic disaster. To use a more potent example, the British blockade of Russia in the Crimean War was, while ruinous for Russian coastal trade, not impacting its overland routes into Europe. What it did impact was their ability to get good loans, credit, and specialty goods that could only be gotten through Britain, a major reason they began to go to the negotiating table. The exact same thing would (and did happen in 1812) to the United States. It doesn't have to cause the country to starve, merely make economic life very painful and ruin trade networks to the point that those in business cry uncle.
And they might produce ships, but then again if the British start coming for navy yards - the targets of any aggressive maritime blockade - then that's more problems.
All of them in fact. We know this because Parliament, God bless their penny pinching hearts, was paying for it! As we see here, the enumerated forces collected by 1839 were 21,300 incorporated Volunteers in Upper Canada, 3700 in Lower Canada, and 8038 'local and stationary militia' for a total armed body of 33,067 men. Contrast this with the reports on troop numbers from up to April 1843 which lists troops payed directly (and shows us that to that point there were 10,874 regular troops still in Canada). Of those that we can be more suspect as to how they're organized, it would be those 8,038 local and stationary militia.
And in fact more than a few thousand saw action. Montgomery's Tavern saw over 1,000 men organize a show up, though it wasn't much of a battle. The Battle of the Windmill in 1838 saw 1,100 local militia turn up to fight the ill fated Patriot invasion, and there were 2,000 men at the "Siege" of Navy Island. The volunteers in Lower Canada were infamous in their scrapes across a dozen little actions in the Patriot invasions of 1838. So, roughly speaking, a good chunk got not inconsiderable experience in combat. Though in fairness, they had a large number of ex-soldiers among them and most of the old Loyalists had seen action in 1812. You have a good crop of men who are not strangers to battle.
As pointed out above, yes indeed there were more trained troops and guns in the early 1840s. Much better organized, with some better experience, and a stiff spine of regular soldiers to straighten them out.
25,000 seems about fair in light of the above. As for "dependent on food imports from the United States" I am extremely skeptical since they could afford to export wheat to Britain in the time period. I know they'd be reliant for certain crops and industrial products, but overall food imports? Never even heard of that.
As was pointed out before, the US did try that in 1812-13, and it didn't work very well at all. If largely because (as US historians themselves said) it dispersed US forces and left them incapable of mutual support while allowing the defenders to meet them and turn back invasions. Even granting the sheer incompetence of many early US commanders, the odds that three divided columns invading Upper Canada against prepared local opposition would succeed overwhelmingly is pretty slim, especially with the far too small numbers you gave.
Pointedly, they have to win Lake Ontario to do much of what you proposed. That's step one.
That was also nearly 20 years later with modern shell guns by and large.
That's what would happen though. The US squadrons are either scattered around the world and need to be recalled, which puts them in port, or they're refitting after foreign cruises. They can't gather together in one place where they can get any real training in to act in squadron, which was why the French couldn't mount a serious naval challenge to Britain. They were restricted to port which makes it pretty impossible to do the kind of training and maneuvers to actually make a good fighting force.
The British North America and West Indies Squadron, on average, seems to have had over 20 ships in the 1830s and 1840s. Some further ships were sent in the rebellions as escorts and troop carriers, but I'd have to look harder for 1843 numbers.
By my count, the USN had 38-40 ships in service come 1838-42,43. 8 of those are a mish mash of varying types of ships of the line, and of the 8 actually constructed, only the Independence (razeed in 1836 from a 90 gun ship to a 54 gun frigate), the Columbus (which near as I can tell never mounted its slated 90 gun compliment), Delaware (62 guns) and North Carolina (74 guns) were actually in service. The others were all being used as hulks in harbor for storing supplies.
There were also 11 frigates, 16 sloops, and 1 steam sloop and 2 steam frigates. These were parceled out in small squadrons at the time, and rarely operated together. It is not far fetched to question if they could fight a fleet action as, well, they never did or seemed to have trained to do so as a cohesive whole.
Well, as outlined above, it probably has equal the guns to the largest ships the US has. When larger warships start coming over from Britain, the problems intensify as there's nothing the US has that can match a squadron of ships of the line acting in concert, and it will be back to port the USN goes. So, no, Britain doesn't need to sail with 10 ships of the line at all times, and in fact could pretty handily overawe a US squadron through firepower.
Nor will they be building screw frigates or sloops. They did not begin churning those out until the 1850s.
The USN will be largely stuck in port save for single ships which dart out to commerce raid.
This seems to be another case of answering your own question. That's 282 ships altogether, while the USN can rely on only some 30 actually in service. The number of brig sloops alone outnumbers the US Navy! There's 124 active ships! And they're not going to be inert either. If we go by the 1843 scenario (I don't have the active ships number to hand, nor dispositions or doctrinal changes between 1837-43) but what would happen is that ships would be shifted around from stations not in trouble while other ships are worked up and taken out of ordinary to be sent off to the battlefront. This will be a slow process, but it bears repeating that the Royal Navy is just huge compared to the USN and has a lot more to fall back on.
You can grow a GDP and still have a bankrupt government. In both 1813 and 1814 America refused to raise taxes and the government was literally defaulting on loans by the end of the conflict. In another three months it would be insolvent and be unable to pay its soldiers, buy food for them, or build warships. It turns out that the party with their hands on the levers of power were more than willing to beggar the nation rather than be inconvenienced with taxes and that the opposition was willing to let the state go bankrupt to prove they were right about it launching an unjust war.
If you want to read an in depth analysis about how government finances were collapsing you can find one Here (one can start on page 126) or read "How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815" by Brian Arthur who also did his PhD thesis on the topic.
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The historical precedent of the time would be the Bombardment of Acre (1840).
Where the Royal Navy did indeed deploy multiple Ships of the Line successfully against the shore batteries of a defended port.
(Acre is, incidentally, almost exactly the same distance from Britain, by sea, as is New York)
What all of you are missing is the geography, and the level of competence of the defenders. Acre is a fort jutting out into the Mediterranean. That gave the allied fleet the ability to draw close, and lay broadside to the town, and fortress. The Egyptians made the situation worse by guessing wrong that the fleet wouldn't come so close- and built-up added defenses that prevented them from depressing the fire of their guns. The defenders then suffered a devastating blow by having their main magazine explode. I'm also sure the Egyptians didn't have any shell guns. From your own post.
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The Egyptian loss was heavy, even leaving out that caused by the explosion. About three hundred people were killed in the batteries, and nearly all the guns on the sea face were disabled. The fleet suffered very little except aloft, and had but 14 British, and 4 Turks killed, and 42 wounded. The result would have been very different, and probably very disastrous, if the Egyptians had not blocked up their embrasures, and made false assumptions as to the probable positions of the ships, and if the explosion of the main magazine had not deprived them of most of their powder. On the day after the action, a smaller accidental explosion killed a number of Turks and a Marine, and wounded Captain Edward Collier, of the Castor, and the Chaplain of the Princess Charlotte.
Attacking New York City would be a very different situation. NYC is a sheltered port; you have to sail through the narrows along a narrow channel, and face numerous forts, and gun batteries. Large ships would run aground if they left the channel to close with the forts on Long Island, and the waters around Staten Island is also too shallow.
In 1808, Lieutenant Thomas Gedney of the United States Coast Survey discovered a new, deeper channel through the Narrows into New York Harbor. Previously, the passage was complex and shallow enough that loaded ships would wait outside the harbor until high tide, to avoid running into the huge sandbar, which was interrupted in a number of places by channels of fairly shallow depth: 21 feet (6.4 m) at low tide and 33 feet (10 m) at high tide. Because of the difficulty of the navigation required, since 1694, New York had required all ships to be guided into the harbor by an experienced pilot. The new channel Gedney discovered was 2 feet (0.61 m) deeper, enough of an added margin that fully laden ships could come into the harbor even at slack tide. Gedney's Channel, as it came to be called, was also shorter than the previous channel, another benefit appreciated by the ship owners and the merchants they sold to. Gedney received the praise of the city, as well as an expensive silver service.[16]
At low tide even a 74 would have to stay in the channel or ground. So, when you enter the lower harbor, your fleet has to stay in the channel, stay in a column and run the narrows as fast as they can sail, (Hope for a favorable wind) taking fire from dozens of guns from both sides including shell guns, while avoiding any mines, or obstructions. If any ships run into a mine, or obstruction the ships behind them have to maneuver around them disorganizing the line of advance and keeping them under fire longer. If nothing slows the advance, and you have a good wind the column may be sailing at 10 knots, which means running the gantlet should take about 20 minutes.
Odds are that the lead ship, which is probably the biggest will have been shot to hell by the time it reaches the narrows, assuming there's no chain, or boom blocking the Narrows which they'd have to ram fast enough to jump it. If she came near one of Colt's electric triggered mines, she's sinking, and disorganizing the column behind her, if not blocking the channel. If she struck an obstruction she may have been stopped, or at least been slowed by taking on water. Ships behind her may be damaged or sunk by mines, or slowed, and damaged by hitting an obstruction.
Simply put a lot of things can go wrong. If the head of the column is getting hammered the following ships being dependent on the wind would have a hard time trying to disengage, and sail back into the lower, or outer harbor. So, once committed everyone may have no choice but to go through with it. Any ships that get passed the Narrows will see the wind would die down a bit, and then they'd have to face more shore batteries in Brooklyn, Manhattan, the north shore of Staten Island, and several islands in the inner harbor with batteries mounted on them. Then any ship the U.S. Navy has at the Brooklyn Navy Yard would out with guns blazing. They may have a new floating battery to replace the one Fulton designed in the War of 1812, or an iron steam ram which in the narrow confines of the inner harbor would be deadly.
Before anyone rages about an iron steam ram such a ship had already been thought about and would be easy to build in an American shipyard of the time. Someone like John Erickson would have no trouble designing and building one in just a few months. The USS Monitor was laid down on October 25, 1861, and commissioned 4 months later on February 25, 1862. The USS Princeston took less than 11 months, but an iron ram would be much simpler to build, and in a time of a war scare would get a higher priority. Erickson wanted to build an iron hulled screw driven frigate, but the U.S. Navy made him settle for only a sloop.
Using Acre as a template for an attack on New York is a bad idea. The situation is much less favorable, and more complex, with much greater risks.
Americans are largely delusional in their thinking about Canadians willingness to fight them, seemingly unaware that if British North Americans had their way the empire and united states probably would of gone to war 2-3 more times than they did otl.